Forgotten Origins: Nuclear Weapons And Environmental Security

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Forgotten Origins: Nuclear Weapons and Environmental Security Chad Michael Briggs

Dept. Political Science Carleton University Ottawa, Canada [email protected]

Presentation for the ‘Resources, the Environment, and National Security’ Panel International Studies Association Annual Conference Washington, D.C. February 19, 1999

Abstract Numerous analyses of environmental security focus upon the nuclear fallout and waste issues of the military during the Cold War, but several larger questions often remain unanswered. Many assume that the environment and conceptions of nature played little role in the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the postwar years, but their presence was vital. This paper argues that people understood nature as seen through the physical sciences, but this vision differed between the scientists and those of the general public. These differing views on the nature of atomic energy, coupled with historical events of the Second World War, contributed to current understandings of environmental security in the United States. Rather

than simply providing a way of understanding nature and the environment, the physical sciences were implicated in their destruction, as national and environmental security quickly became intertwined. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature. -Nils Bohr

In the world of human thought generally, and in physical science particularly, the most important and fruitful concepts are those to which it is impossible to attach a well-defined meaning. -H.A. Kramers

Much of the current environmental security literature, if not all such writings since 1989, has proceeded on the assumption that issues of the environment or nature were simply not on the security agenda of states during the Cold War. In some ways, this may be an admonishment of previous inattention, that for all the other issues associated with the Cold War, we should have been more aware of these issues and how they affected security. Rather, critics tell us, the realists and neo-realists could not conceptualize such issues, nor would they consider them too important if they could. The integrity of the state, the sovereign entity of the international system, was judged according to its military capabilities and those military threats arrayed against it. The environment, even as it became an important policy and politics area during the 1960s and 1970s, was an invisible player in this highly military domain. Largely, we describe the natural environment as a victim of the Cold War. It was not only degraded by national security structures and resultant actions, but its very existence was held hostage by them, as well. There are various considerations to this issue, from natural resource access of the 'Third World' by the militaries, to the direct damage of the environment caused by state militaries while undertaking weapons production and testing. Of these various approaches, however, one of the most poignant and frightening issues has been that of the military-industrial nuclear programs in the U.S. and former U.S.S.R., for these fell into the heart of the Cold War and seemed to symbolize all that went wrong with conceptions of national security during that time. Issues of nuclear waste and weapons testing were written largely in the imaginations of those studying the Cold War and its legacy, while the environment silently suffered at the hands of ‘security.’ Nevertheless, was the Cold War environment’s influence truly as illusory as we claim? It may be easy to dismiss the idea of nature and the environment as a contemporary issue during the Cold War, for some might argue that they were simply not on the agenda of most states in any form until the Cold War was well into its most dangerous form of the early 1960s. This would be to imply that states were simply guilty of carelessness and a lack of interest in the subject, or that

-2we simply did not address the subject of the environment in the nuclear dimension until the 1980s. Such an argument would be correct in some respects, for it was true that states did not account for natural resource degradation concerning how the drive for security might affect the environment. In another sense, however, such a statement may be a misunderstanding of all the questions involved, for nature has always been intricately intertwined with nuclear or atomic issues. The more appropriate question to ask might be: what role did the environment play in this process of nuclear security in the U.S.? Why does it seem that they missed the environment? In other words, we are not asking how nuclear security issues affected the environment, but rather, how the conceptions of the environment affected nuclear security. These are not simple questions, for they include consideration of several dimensions of thought in the nuclear issue, in addition to government structures, political pressures, and the way in which science understood nature in the United States. These questions are, however, important. It is difficult to integrate the environment into national security for the very reason that such security has been so detrimental to the environment in the past. Yet if one is to get beyond this cognitive barrier, a deeper understanding of just why it has been so difficult to consolidate security and environment might prove instructive. That these institutional biases exist and harm the environment, it is necessary to consider why this is so. This paper argues that the dominant conception of nature and the environment in the United States helped to create the very security dilemma which would itself so greatly harm the physical environment. As current conceptions of the environment did not necessarily exist then, it is well to remember that people’s understanding of nature was closely related to how the sciences described the world. To varying degrees, this is still the case today, but the physical sciences and their understanding of nature made an enormous impact upon both national and environmental security as a result of the Second World War and the development of atomic energy. We can explain the relationship between nuclear issues and the environment on several different levels, the first two of which bear mentioning before going into more detail regarding the third. On one level, it is the preparation for nuclear war and the resulting civilian/military programs which pose the threat. The production of warheads and ill-designed nuclear power

-3plants generate waste, threaten populations with radiation, and undermine more emotional considerations of well-being among those peoples confronted with the problem. This is the dimension which appears most often in the security and policy literature, and finds its most expressive outlet in Mike Davis's article "Dead West: Ecocide in Marlboro Country.”1 Davis astutely points out that the structures of national security and nuclear testing have created intense problems for those living in areas regarded to be 'marginal' and of less concern than the more overriding national security of the States, and that the secrecy involved has prevented much discussion on the topic. It is in these marginal geographical areas in which one of the most ironic of security paradoxes occurs, for their insecurity relative to others is largely caused by the very state which is claiming to provide for their security. Such arguments have circulated and held sway for quite some time, tracing much legitimacy back to the work of such dissident physicists as Andrei Sakharov’s work on the effects of radioactive fallout in the 1960s.2 What these writers do not address in their works is the other dimension in the nuclearenvironmental relationship, one which is so obvious that noticing it is difficult. That is to consider that nuclear war, itself, posed one of the most fundamental threats to the natural environment imaginable. Apocalyptic visions of the end of nature come naturally with envisaging the end of the world, and hardly a soul has dared argue that nuclear weapons were anything but the quintessential danger of modernity when it came to the environment.3 The discussions surrounding environmental damage due to nuclear war emphasized the direct effects resulting from the detonation of such warheads, and on a much larger scale than the weapons testing mentioned above. In this vein, one often thinks of the somewhat dubious contentions of nuclear winter popularized by Carl Sagan in the early 1980s, which again does not engage the larger questions regarding the very existence of such weapons.4 One can then approach the third notion, that nuclear weapons and the destruction they cause are supremely feared not simply because of the immense and unfathomable death and injuries which would be involved in any nuclear exchange. People also closely relate them to ideas about fundamental forces of nature and the role which science should and does play in modern society.

-4Science, Nature, and Promise: Since the 17th century, people’s understanding of nature and the environment have been greatly influenced by the sciences, providing ways of seeing the world which were quite different from previous religious or animistic world-views. Such changes in understanding have not come easily, nor has the impact of modernity been felt without much struggle. The question has always remained of whether science has had a positive impact on society, and whether the intentions of scientists in gaining an understanding of nature have been forthright or mischievous. This is very much the case with the Cold War and development of atomic energy. It is entirely plausible to assert that the Cold War conception of national security arose from liberal intentions to make the world a better place, especially on the part of the scientists concerned.5 As Spencer Weart eloquently recounts, modern science has always concerned itself with notions of transforming the world, and many of these scientists saw nuclear energy to be a force of incredible value in forming the gleaming 'white cities' of tomorrow.6 This is closely associated with the idea that one can translate unlimited energy to the eradication of poverty, that the unsuitable vagaries of nature can be tamed to suit the needs of men and women. H.G. Wells popularized many of these notions in his science fiction stories, for just as in the Island of Dr. Moureau and The World Set Free, nature was a force to be overcome. This is not to suggest that the intentions of scientists were as deliberately dark and brutal as some interpretations of Bacon and Newton might suggest, or even that they possibly conceived certain intentions at the time. Note that there were significant differences in thought between those who were aware of scientific inquiry, and those who were involved in such research. This was particularly the case with respect to technology in the early part of this century, and its relationship with physics. It was a rare physicist who would make claims for the beneficial application of physics research, for most of that generation held true to the joking claim of the Cambridge University scientists, “Thank God none of this is useful.”7 The physicists of the first half of the 20th century were guided much more by the allure of new knowledge, for nuclear and quantum physics were then completely new fields of study. From the main research centers in Göttingen, Copenhagen, and Cambridge, the physicists created a sort of international community, dedicated to accurately modeling the structure and workings of

-5the atom. To say that they were actively engaged in transforming the world would be quite misleading, for only a few physicists spoke of the possible applications of such work. The weapons implications of nuclear physics, although mentioned in futuristic terms in The World Set Free with its atomic bomb, were viewed as physically impossible until the late 1930s. The neutron was newly discovered, and until the theoretical models indicated that a sustaining chain reaction was possible in the element uranium, scientists did not take such fantastical ideas seriously. This did not occur until early in 1939.8 The popular conception of such research and knowledge during this time was quite different, and related to people’s conceptions of the role and power of nature. Physicists could not explain the nature of radioactivity until later physical models could be constructed, but to many others, its discovery and existence suggested that it contained nearly magical powers. Many saw radioactivity as beneficial, and its associated applications could only be health inducing, as well.9 The dangerous nature of radioactivity was not well understood until perhaps the 1950s, and not made public until the 1960s, so in the first half of the century, many non-scientists could only view the possible uses of radiation with positive connotations. The atom was, after all, a breakthrough in scientific understanding of our world, and for those who were taken with the notion of modernization (which included many people in North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union), they understood that to “harness “ the atom was to control forces otherwise beyond their control. To control nature, especially at a time in which most deaths in the industrial world still came from influenza, could only mean that things would turn out for the better. The dark side of such ideals was that science may not be able to transform society so much as warp and distort it, for the Pandora's Box of nature's secrets could go beyond the control of the scientists and society hoping to tame them. Romantics saw simply learning these secrets as a violation of nature, a close analogy to how others could abuse and use such knowledge against natural systems and humankind. These fears likewise found their voice in stories and newspaper editorials of the early 1900s, with people warning that the power of the atom might go unchecked, and could even cause a chain reaction to destroy the earth.10 The public did not base these fears as much upon science as they did upon fantasy, with guarded illusions regarding the mythical nature of the atom and radioactivity. The fear was that knowing too much about nature

-6was dangerous. Even if science could uncover natural forces, was not modernity flirting with the danger of producing a Dr. Frankenstein, and he, in turn, creating his monster? As this particular research led to the creation of the atomic bomb, it is important to ask whether its creation during World War II was a certainty. Was this research manipulating nature by stealing her secrets, and was the atomic research of the 1920s and 1930s a natural progression to the Manhattan Project? The short answer to this is no, but some explanation is necessary, especially as such an answer runs counter to the arguments made by many critics of science. These critics frame the creation of the American atomic bomb as the prime example of science’s drive toward domination, as well as showing its violent tendencies. Although the nature of many current research projects is analogous to the Manhattan Project (largely owing to their federal defense-related funding), to claim that these are basic characteristics of scientific inquiry does not necessarily follow. Rather, the development of the A-bomb was a result of political fears and motivations of the time, not of a fatalistic drive within scientific research. The motivations were to come from outside sources, and those sources believed in the control so often mentioned by science’s critics. As stated, few of the scientists involved realized the potential of atomic research in creating weapons of mass destruction, though they were instrumental in the development of models essential to their construction. The discovery of the neutron, made in 1932, gave no indication that a weapon would be possible– it was up to individuals (especially Leo Szilard and Iréne Joliot-Curie) to make the connection that a sustained chain reaction might be feasible.a The discovery of the neutron was key, however, for without the neutron, no model of nuclear fission was possible. What was even more remarkable in historical terms was the timing of its discovery.

The Coming War: a

Fission occurs when the nucleus of the atom is split, and the resultant loss of mass releases energy, and subatomic particles (which are manifested as light and radioactivity). The traditional belief was that the atom (or its nucleus) was inviolate, and could not be intentionally split, especially as the remaining matter would have transmuted into different elements. It was further understood that neither protons nor electrons could do the job– positively charged protons would repel other protons, while electrons were much too small. The neutron, which carried no electrical charge but had the same mass as a proton, was the ideal possibility. The basis for a sustained chain reaction was to find an element which, when its nucleus was split, would emit at least two neutrons as radiation, so that the reaction would progress geometrically over time. Only Uranium 235 and Plutonium 239 had the necessary properties.

-7Within twelve months of Frank Chadwick discovering the neutron in February 1932, Franklin Roosevelt was elected in the U.S. (November 1932) and Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany (January 1933).11 Had these events not occurred at roughly the same time, the political history of physics may have been quite different. The rise of National Socialism in Germany, in particular, was a key factor (if not the key factor) in the development of the atomic bomb. Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies, coupled with a distaste for the newer theories of relativity and probability, forced many of the brightest minds in physics to flee Germany, Austria, Italy, and Hungary, just as his invasions of countries such as France and Denmark also prompted a mass exodus of physicists. While some of them went to work at Cambridge, the one country most open to providing positions for these scientific refugees was the United States, where such notables as Einstein and von Neumann could be found. In this way the United States, which did not have a notable community of physicists until that time, was suddenly in possession of the brightest minds on the subject. However, Hitler and his government provided much more than a ready supply of physicists to the U.S. and Britain. Many emigrating scientists were Jewish, and had very strong feelings against the Nazis and their policies, and a genuine fear of their actions. Once war broke out in 1939, many of the physicists’ worse fears had been confirmed. A lingering fear remained among several of their number, and one could describe this as their worst fear: that Germany would be able to develop and use an atomic bomb. Germany still had large numbers of competent physicists (including Werner Heisenberg), it had a large industrial capacity, and perhaps most important, it was thought that Hitler had the will to actually use such a ‘device’. With this in mind, Leo Szilard proposed two things to his colleagues, which were the first steps in aligning science with national security. First, all further research regarding nuclear fission was to be withheld from international publication, a proposal which met with much derision from a community of scholars used to sharing their findings with others, regardless of their nation of origin. Secondly, he approached Albert Einstein in September 1939, explaining the possibility of the development of an atomic bomb. Einstein himself had not yet made the connection that such a weapon might be possible, but immediately understood that it would be catastrophic if Germany developed the bomb first. With such motivation, Einstein took the

-8remarkable step of writing a letter to President Roosevelt, urging him to develop the bomb before Germany could. This is remarkable because of his openly pacifist attitude of the past, and the letter itself would later cause him much guilt and grief.12 Later that year, Roosevelt approved what was later to become the Manhattan Project, but not without stiff resistance from many in the military.13 It took several presidential advisors to bring FDR around to the idea that such a massive investment as would be required for the Manhattan Project was necessary, but at last, FDR confidant Alexander Sachs was able to convince Roosevelt that this project was necessary to prevent domination by the Germans. Even so, the project started quite slowly, hampered by the lackluster performance of the U.S. Bureau of Standards, which was originally put in charge of the research and production, and by the lack of available funds to start the project. In fact, it was not until December 6, 1941 (the very day before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) that Congress granted substantial funding and backing to begin research in earnest.14 The research was propelled by the firm belief that the Germans had already begun such research, themselves, and so it may be little surprise that it was the foreign-born scientists who worked the hardest and more earnestly on the project early on. This motivation created an almost institutional character, driving the scientists to pursue or tolerate actions which under any other circumstances, would have compelled them to quit or retire from the effort. The notion that the Germans already had a dangerous start in the atomic-armaments race had become so deep rooted that it was treated as a certainty. “We were told day in and day out that it was our duty to catch up with the Germans,” recalls Leona Marshall, one of the few women in the project. There was never any doubt of this hypothesis. It silenced scruples that occasionally cropped up.15 It was then that the humanitarian ideals of scientific liberation came into contact with state security. It was to prove a most unhealthy combination. In 1942, the U.S. government gave control of the project to the military, officially becoming the Manhattan Project and coming under the guidance of Brigadier General Leslie Groves. Groves, an engineer who had been responsible for construction of the newly-completed Pentagon Building, viewed his job as more akin to the strict application of science– that is, how to translate physics, chemistry, and

-9metallurgy into a working atomic bomb. With the aid of the newly-appointment director, Robert Oppenheimer, the geographically disparate scientists involved in the project were collected in Los Alamos, New Mexico, to work under strict security and supervision. The military censored all ingoing and outgoing mail, they allowed little contact with those outside the “compound,” and even the scientists’ wives were not to be told the nature of their husbands’ research.16 The extreme nature of security surrounding the Manhattan Project was most unusual for a scientific project, and was so pervasive that different teams at Los Alamos were kept unaware of what their colleagues were doing next door. Living conditions were miserable, their academic lives had been completely disrupted, but the goal, the idea that they were racing to prevent Germany from developing the bomb first, was the impetus to ignore all other considerations as secondary. But by surrendering control of their science to the military, people’s perceptions of science (and of physics, in particular) were changed permanently. The Second World War changed the face of science, so that as Daniel Kevles later wrote, physics became identified with national security.17 If science was our way of understanding nature, then the environment, too, became intertwined with security.

After the Bomb: Following the Trinity test in July 1945, the Genie was out of the bottle, so to speak. Prior to this time, the knowledge that the bomb existed was the most important secret. Someone said, when the first atomic bomb went off, that the only important secret is now let out— the thing works. After that, any determined country could make the bomb, given a few years.18 It then remained to consider Nils Bohr's warning to Truman shortly afterwards, that this scientific revolution would require a similarly radical change in society, if they were both to survive. What seemed more the case was that the practice of science was changed to cater to the needs of the state. Although science had, of its own accord, discovered the mystery of the atom, it was the state which had pushed this science headlong into the further developments, and then used those technologies for purposes of national security. Particularly because of the awful and overwhelming effects of the war, nuclear issues quickly became intertwined with the state and what it considered most important for its survival.

-10The earlier worries about the effects of nuclear energy upon the environment did not disappear. Most often, they simply changed form, for with the start of the Cold War around 1947 the first two dimensions of environmental threats to nature (mentioned earlier) raised their respective heads. The notions of a security and secrecy state referred to by Davis and Deudney19 were largely imposed during this time (though it was an easy carry-over from the war), and the nuclear projects of the government were kept under tight lock and key. This prevented effective outside regulation and oversight, and meant that the only real form of safety regulation was that imposed by the scientists, themselves.20 The veil of secrecy alone was the most daunting challenge for many of those most interested in the environmental factors of nuclear radiation and possible accidents, for these were kept cloaked in secrecy in the name of national security.21 That this scientific secrecy was the historical outcome was not predetermined. It is related to what was mentioned above, of the idea that nuclear physics was somehow a natural 'secret' stolen and appropriated from the earth for America's use, rather than a wasting asset which was not so much a secret as simply an advantage in industrial processes. Although there were attempts to return scientific knowledge to the same base from which it had come, once the Second World War was over much of the scientific research was either directly or indirectly controlled by the government. Change from state control to the more international flavor of the past would be extremely difficult, and the push for international control of atomic power is one such example of how turning back the clock was difficult. The U.S. government hoped that their nuclear monopoly could be used as a strong diplomatic lever to help shape the postwar world, and the conventional wisdom of the time was that the States should not give their nuclear 'secret' to anyone else to use.22 Scientists and several key people in Washington thought differently. They realized that the use of nuclear weapons was a terrible threat to all humanity, and that perhaps the only rational choice of action to take was to create international control of nuclear weapons and supplies. Several key people in Washington, including the heads of the State Department and War Department (later the Dept. of Defense), realized that the atomic bomb changed strategic thinking, and that attempting to maintain sole control of these technologies would result in an arms race. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson and physicist David Lillienthal thus proposed

-11their plan for effective international control and cooperation of nuclear weapons, which was meant to bring the Soviets into the fold and not alienate them into forcing a new nuclear arms race.23 Secretary of Defense Henry Stimson was quite vocal in his concerns that such a race might well spell destruction for both societies, and President Truman largely agreed. Considering Truman’s strong feelings against communism, this was a bit of a surprise, but the fact that his key advisors were supportive of such a plan made the decision easier. So, too, were a fair majority of the very scientists who had created the bomb, and their interest in the subject had turned them quite vocal after the war.24 The Acheson-Lillienthal Plan was not to be, however, for the White House handed it over to others (such as Bernard Baruch) for implementation, who had opposing ideas regarding nuclear control and the notion of secrets in relation to security. Feeling that science had discovered new ways of understanding nature, Baruch changed the plan so that this new knowledge would be held solely by the United States. Any international plan for atomic energy could only be used, they argued, to keep powers such as the U.S.S.R. in check. Although the U.S. tabled the plan at the newly-minted United Nations, the Soviets (predictably) refused the offer on the grounds that it would have been too intrusive into their state and would have left them at a serious disadvantage against the U.S.25 Although such plans may have never come to fruition, in any case, it is important to reiterate that the notion of a nuclear 'secret' was based upon beliefs that the knowledge to build nuclear weapons was some force of nature to which American scientists alone were privy. Apart from the actual production process (which is mostly a matter of time, money, and technology for any industrialized country), there were no scientific secrets to be had. It was a political fantasy based upon conceptions of nature and the image of science 'stealing' these secrets from the environment. It also played to the fears of radiation and atomic power of previous years, for this was terrible knowledge which could only be used in the hands of the virtuous, not to those federations whose slogans portended the downfall and destruction of Western society.26 We are not as concerned with the outcome of one particular plan, for various factors others than Baruch may have impeded or outright blocked passage of such a measure. Rather, what is of interest are the differing ways in which people viewed atomic power then, as well as

-12the role of scientists themselves. What was important to them was their view of science and technology, and the realization that the two are not the same, easy as it may be to confuse the terms. Studying physics and inquiring into nature are not the same as constructing an atomic bomb, but the role these scientists had taken made that connection seem real. Possession of knowledge is different from the decision to employ it, and after the Allies realized that the Germans’ atomic weapons project was minimal, those scientists working on the project began to strongly object to the idea of actually using the bomb against human targets.27 Nevertheless, the military leaders, especially Gen. Groves himself, saw no reason to let such a potent weapon lay idle. This was particularly true as long as discussion centered around the coming plan for an invasion of the Japanese mainland in 1946, an invasion which would have resulted in countless casualties on both sides. As well, the progression of the war had led to what many now refer to as ‘total war’, exemplified by Army Gen. Curtis LeMay’s firebomb attacks on Tokyo (which killed more people than the attacks on either Hiroshima or Nagasaki).28 This was a true example of knowledge serving as power, and the U.S. government was hardly willing to release these ‘secrets’ from its possession.

The Environment Meets National Security: Here is where the real paradox begins. For in trying to assert that the U.S. and its allies alone should hold the secrets of nature, meant that any true security of the States would be compromised, be it national or environmental. This secrecy led to the lack of oversight and understanding of the impacts these issues had upon Americans at home, and appropriated the nuclear energy field primarily for military purposes. Other factors such as basic mistrust were at work, of course, but it is interesting that the environment did play a role in the thinking of these issues so early in the Atomic Age. Again, the earlier dangers and worries about atomic energy played their part, though this time writ large into the entire national security state of the U.S. The traditional conception of national security disappeared with the advent of atomic weaponry, for no longer could territory be protected from the dangers such weapons posed. The U.S. feared the 'loss' of Western Europe and the democratic values which it shared with that part of the world, for it sensed that the postwar world was still entirely chaotic and that

-13a dangerous sense of disorder prevailed. To use David Campbell's approach, then, to say that 'we' in the West were threatened by this disorder by 'they' in the Communist states, was to inscribe a simple black and white relationship onto the world.29 It meant that those fearing a loss of selfidentity in the European countries would try all the harder to assert the sense of 'we', to project outward for causes of a threat and to contain the expansionist Soviet Empire. Although nuclear weapons were soon to erase all advantages of borders and boundaries of safe vs. dangerous, there was a frantic attempt to reinstate just such a sense of security and well-being. In the most dangerous of ironies, the search for this traditional concept of security only undermined it further, for American attempts to assert nuclear 'superiority' translated into an immense arms race which further threatened the state and the environment.30 Truly, the security of natural systems and of the state were largely the same when it came to these weapons, and were both compromised in attempts to provide for greater security. Destruction at the hands of nuclear weapons would harm the biosphere and populations as well as military targets. It was a totality that people considered threatened, not simply the 'state'. In fact, the state had become a somewhat unavailing concept in the territorial sense, since any nuclear war would not be fought to gain control of U.S. or Soviet ground, nor were the geographical advantages previously enjoyed by those countries very important.31 Such security was a mere construct, while the natural environment and people's health were important considerations in that formulation. Even when the Eisenhower administration proposed the Atoms for Peace program, it was again a call between those who believed in the role that modernity had to play in shaping society, and those who were worried about health effects of radiation and fallout from bomb tests. Though some criticized the administration for its approach, it worked all the harder to deny what it did know about the negative effects of nuclear energy or the radiation in fallout.32 This may be called denial in its most basic form, and it was present in many aspects of the nuclear debate, however ironic it may have been.33 There were doubtless other levels of national security invoked during this time, ones which justified large levels of conventional forces and interventions in other states. During the Cold War, however, all basic questions of national security ultimately led back to the question of nuclear weapons, and most basic fears of the Soviets also led back to such considerations.34 The

-14immense agenda-setting properties of the nuclear issue precluded any real consideration of the environment as a separate factor. Furthermore, the urgency of the perceived problem created a need for quick action which prevented the lengthy research which would normally have been undertaken with such a new and possibly dangerous scientific area. It is quite reasonable to say, for example, that civilian nuclear power would still be in its prototype stage today were it not for the military needs of nuclear energy.35 The dynamic of environmental worries worked both ways. Not only were questions of nature and modernity's role important in considering the fear of nuclear war, but people often projected fears of nuclear war onto environmental issues, as well. We may see this psychological projection as a way of coping with the helplessness felt by many people when the issue of nuclear war was raised, and they often transferred it onto environmental issues.36 Nuclear power plants, for example, though a qualitatively different beast than nuclear weapons, became the targets for many groups in the anti-nuclear field, for as many of them indicated, attempts to stop such power plants were steps in the right direction. If people could not affect the larger superpower conflicts, at least something could be done. It is the basic distrust of modernity and liberal promise of emancipatory science which held true for both environmentalist and anti-nuclear demonstrators, and it should be no surprise that these people were often the same. To those struck by the importance of developing and using the A-bomb, it was not simply the loss of life which was the issue, but what the atomic bomb represented in terms of nature and modernity. To many, the bomb represented all that was wrong with science and technology, a dark side to a society which had prided itself upon such achievements until WWII. The notion of modernization was certainly not dead, but now people had a true culprit for its failings, as science was and has been implicated time and again since Hiroshima. Certain people were simply against the idea of ‘stealing secrets’ from nature, and pointed out how dangerous that practice had become. Since the work of the Manhattan Project had at once conflated science and the military, or science with technology, the target was an unavoidably large one. Once the environmental movement began growing in the 1960s and 1970s, the onus of science as insecurity was drawn in even starker terms. This may be how the topic of Davis's environmental approach surfaced, by projecting

-15basic and fundamental fears of nuclear war and the dangers of nature’s secrets onto the domestic level. That it was missed for so long may come as no surprise when one considers the larger issues at stake, though the irony here is that the two levels were dependent upon one another. One could not exist without the other. Environmental damage of 'Marlboro Country' would persist if there existed a greater perceived threat of harm from the Soviets, one in which natural issues were so important that they were not often mentioned. People may have taken them for granted. Perhaps after the invention of the thermonuclear warhead in the 1950s, what was the use of worrying about the environment when it came to national security? For if such weapons were ever used, who would be around to worry about such questions? The powerful imagery of barren wastelands depicted in futuristic Mad Max stories is frightening more for its lack of modernity, or even for the barren wastes of what were once natural ecosystems, than they are for what we actually see. It is because of the realization that it was modernity that could cause those wastelands. Both were threatened at the same time.37 Now that the Cold War is over, it is easy to sit back and point out with such indignation the environmental damage caused by the preparation for a nuclear war, and rightfully so. There has been extensive radioactive contamination of many parts of the U.S., which is estimated to cost the Dept. of Energy some US$100 billion to ameliorate over the next ten years.38 The extent of such contamination in the former Soviet Union is reported to be at least 100 times worse, with no cleanup in sight.39 Still, these are issues seen with the benefit of hindsight, and with consideration of those problems with which we must deal today. During the Cold War, the problems were presented quite differently, and the perceived dangers much more overarching and difficult to grasp.

Conclusion: The environment was always a factor in the nuclear debate, and it was written into the Cold War national security of the U.S. in ways which made it seem as if it were being ignored. It was not. One must simply understand that not only was the environment being threatened by the national security of the time, but the entire notion of the state and all of its trappings, were as well. The illogic of security over the fifty years after WWII made possible the simultaneous

-16threat to a nation as a whole, while the (often good) intentions of policymakers and scientists led them to pronouncements that they were acting to ensure everyone's security. Denial of the basic threat, of 'we' threatening ourselves, was not an easy thing to admit, even more so for the immense stakes involved. Rather, some critics shifted blame for the loss of security, be it national or environmental, onto the people and practice deemed responsible for creation of the atomic bomb. This included not just nuclear physicists, nor simply physicists overall, but the entire ‘project’ of science (assuming such a thing ever existed) was culpable. Surely some individuals could be considered so guilty, but the special attention paid to science and the ‘death of nature’ had at least as much to do with the powerful mythology built up around scientific discoveries. This attribution of special powers and responsibility was made by both sides of the nuclear debate, for those in support of the Cold War felt that science had all the answers, and that it alone had a special faculty to strengthen Cold War security. After the shock Americans felt at the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, what else was to be done but to advocate massive increases in federal funding for science education? When Reagan was looking for a way to increase U.S. security in the 1980s, where else need he look but to believe that the American scientific community could find the answers to his Star Wars (SDI) program? As the quotation by Nils Bohr states at the beginning of this paper, physics concerns what we can say about nature. But these interpretations depend upon where one begins in the security debate, for different people claim that science says quite conflicting things about nature. As well, people’s perceptions of how science affects nature differs greatly between C.P. Snow’s “Two Cultures,”40 for while some claim that knowledge of nature holds promise for the future, others assert that such knowledge is dangerous and perhaps not even authentic. No matter the position one holds in the debate on modernism or national security, two interesting points exist to keep in mind concerning science and environmental security. The first is that perceptions of nature and the environment did play a role in the early security debates and formulations, even if it was not obvious or explicitly remarked upon. Scientists viewed the discovery of atomic fission differently than did those in the U.S. government, for while one considered fission a rapidly wasting secret, the other thought fission to

-17be more akin to a national security secret about nature–- stamp “Top Secret” on the documents and no one would know or find out. Many in the U.S. government considered it unlikely that the Soviets could build an atomic bomb within forty years, if at all. (It was first detonated in 1949) The second point to keep in mind is that this outcome, the building of the bomb during WWII and the close connection between scientific research and the military, was not a certainty. The scientists were persuaded to act as they did because of certain historical circumstances, not because the project of science so dictated. The process of physics becoming synonymous with national and environmental security was dependent upon certain events at the time, as well as the differing perceptions of science and nature detailed above. As these dominant conceptions of nature and the environment helped to shape security as we now know it, it should be of little surprise that academics should address its historical legacy in terms of how the environment was always missing from security. Although it was a consideration, nature was not addressed by those writing traditional security because they thought that nature and the environment could be controlled. Indeed, that belief among policy makers heavily contributed to the nuclear security dilemma of the Cold War, both in terms of national and environmental security. If we are to understand our current difficulties in these areas, perhaps it is best to focus upon how they first came to be.

-18. 1

Davis, Mike., 1993. "Dead West: Ecocide in Marlboro Country," New Left Review. 200, July/August 1993, pp. 49-73

. 2

Roberg, Jeffrey. 1998. Soviet Science Under Control. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

3. The sole exception to this may have been Al Gore, who claimed (much to the derision of others) that automobiles were more dangerous than nuclear weapons. In fact, Gore goes so far as to claim (rather incongruously) that the advent and deployment of nuclear weapons was probably of long-term benefit. Gore, Albert., 1993. Earth in the Balance. New York: Plume, pp. 205. 4. In this sense, I refer to two articles published in Science in 1983. Turco, R.P., O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and Carl Sagan.,1983. "Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War," Science 222, no. 4630 (23 December 1983); and Erlich, Paul, M.A. Harwell, Peter H. Raven, Carl Sagan, and G.M. Woodwell, "The Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," (same issue). 5. For the more political angle on this issue, see Sherwin, Martin J., 1987. How Well They Meant : in The Arms Race and Nuclear War, Evan, Hildgartner (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. pp. 51- 57. A contemporary analysis of those engaged in weapons production and research is found in: Rosenthal, Debra., 1990. At the Heart of the Bomb: The Dangerous Allure of Weapons Work. New York: Addison Wesley. . 6

Weart, Spencer R., 1988. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Please also refer to the effects of Wells’s visions upon nuclear physicists in Rhodes, Richard., 1986. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Touchstone. 7.

Jungk, Robert., 1956. Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. New York: Harvest Books.

8. Ibid. 9. Weart, 1988, op. cit. 10. Ibid. 11. Junck, 1956, op. cit., pp. 51

-1912. Ibid. See also Kevles, Daniel., 1997. The Physicists. Amherst: Harvard University Press. 13. For a comprehensive account of the motivations of both scientists and policy-makers at the time, please see Rhodes, 1986, op. cit. 14. Junck., 1956, op. cit. 15. Ibid, pp. 114. 16. Rhodes, 1986, op. cit. 17. Kevles, 1997, op. cit., pp. ix 18. Snow, C.P., 1963. The Two Cultures: and A Second Look. New York: Mentor, p. 46 9. 1

Deudney, Daniel., 1992. "The Mirage of Ecowar: The Weak Relationship Among Global Environmental Change, National Security and Interstate Violence" in I.H. Rowlands & M. Greene (eds) Global Environmental Change and International Relations. London: Macmillan. Deudney, Daniel., 1991. “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 1991, pp. 22-28 0. 2

Thurber, James and Evanson, Timothy., 1993. Subsystem Politics and the Nuclear Weapons Complex: Congressional Oversight of DOE's Environmental Restoration Program. : in Herzik & Mushkatel (eds.) Problems and Prospects of Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy. Westport: Greenwood Press. Also useful in approaches to nuclear safety issues and history are; Sagan, Scott., 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kemp, Ray., 1992. The Politics of Radioactive Waste Disposal. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 21. This issue of secrecy with environmental matters and the military is not limited to nuclear issues, and has, at times, raised some misunderstandings of internal politics. For the more conventional angle to the issue, see Renner, Michael., 1991. "Assessing the Military's War on the Environment," in L. Brown, et. al. State of the World 1991. New York: Norton, pp. 132-152. Finger, M., 1991. "The Military, the Nation State and the Environment" The Ecologist 21(5) pp. 220-225.

-202.

Beckman, Peter R, Larry Campbell, Paul W. Crumlish, Michael N. Dobkowski, and Steven P. Lee., 1992. The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War and Beyond. New York: Prentice Hall. Crockatt, Richard., 1995. The Fifty Years' War. London: Routledge. The Soviet perspective on what the U.S. was up to at this point is quite interesting, as contained within Holloway, David., 1994. Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press. 23. A fair account of the Acheson-Lillienthal Plan may be found within Rhodes, Richard., 1995. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster. also see Crockatt, 1995, op. cit. 4. 2

Hewlett, Richard G., 1962. The New World, 1939-1946. A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. V. 1. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

5. 2

Stimson, Henry L., [1945] 1989. Henry L. Stimson's Appeal for Atomic Talks with Russia. in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 277-279 This issue is also dealt with in Clarfield, Gerard H. and Wiecek, William M., 1984. Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980. New York: Harper & Row. 26. Weart (1988, op. cit.) had an interesting account of the role of the 'Aviators' in early science literature, men who would be virtuous enough to be able to handle such weapons for the benefit of the globe. He contends that the Strategic Air Command eventually saw themselves in much the same light. 27. Jungk., 1956, op. cit. 28. LeMay would later go on to head the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command, as well as becoming Air Force Chief of Staff. 29. Campbell, David., 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 30. One should refer to the basic document of national security strategy of the time, NSC-68, which contains Acheson's plans for military expansion and is based upon ideas first set forward in George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' (though he was to maintain that he was misinterpreted). Were it not for the Korean War, it is unlikely

-21that things would have turned out as they did. National Security Council., [1950] 1989. National Security Council Paper No. 68 (NSC-68) in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 301-305 Miscamble, Wilson D., 1992. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kennan, George F., [1946] 1989. George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram," in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 284288 Also refer to the account of American foreign policy in Paterson, Thomas G., 1989. American Expansionism and Exaggerations of the Soviet Threat. in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 340-352 31. In considering possible alternative nuclear regimes, please see Tarr, David W., 1991. Nuclear Deterrence and International Security. White Plains: Longman Publishing. Also of great interest are the moral and philosophical judgements made in Bailey, Alison., 1989. Posterity and Strategic Policy: A Moral Assessment of Nuclear Policy Options. New York: University Press of America. 32. Boyer., 1994. op. cit. The official history of the Atoms for Peace program can be found in: Hewlett, Richard G., 1989. Atoms for peace and war, 1953-1961; Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission. A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. V. 3. Berkeley: University of California Press. 33. Again, on this subject please refer to Weart, 1988, op. cit. Also fair sources are Lifton, Robert J., 1987. Nuclear Illusions : in Evan & Hilgartner (eds.) The Arms Race and Nuclear War. Edgewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp. 224-227 and Moyer, Robert S., 1987. The Enemy Within. (same as above), pp. 228231. Lifton, Robert Jay and Eric Markusen., 1990. The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat. New York: Basic Books. Lifton, Robert Jay and Greg Mitchell., 1995. Hiroshima and America: A Half Century of Denial. New York: Avon.

-2234. Boll, Michael., 1988. National Security Planning. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Walker, Martin., 1993. The Cold War: A History. New York: Henry Holt. 35. This is an idea put forward by Weart (1988, op. cit.), who is himself a nuclear physicist, but it is echoed at times by other writers. 36. Please see Weart, 1988, op. cit; Moyer, 1987, op. cit.; and Lifton, 1987, op. cit. 37. For an interesting study of films and the nuclear age, see: Henriksen, Margot A., 1997. Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. 38. U.S. Senate. Comm. of Environment and Public Works, SubComm. on Nuclear Radiation. Status of Nuclear Waste & Safety Issues. May 6, 1992. For further current sources on the DOE's polcies, also see Oregon Office of Energy., 1996. Cleaning up Hanford's Nuclear Weapons Wastes. Gerber, Michelle., 1996. PUREX Plant: The Hanford Site's Historic Workhorse. Gerber, Michelle., 1996. PUREX Plant Waste Management Was a Complex Challenge 39. For sources on such problems in the former USSR, see Peterson, D.J., 1993. Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Boulder: Westview Press. Leskov, Sergei. "Lies and Incompetence." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 1993. 0. 4

Snow, C.P., 1963, op. cit.

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