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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union Research proposal

Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach December, 2008

Word count: 3.410

The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Acknowledgments Many thanks to Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Proffessor Lord Norton whose support was essential to gain the chance of being placed in the European Parliament. Thanks also to Gary Titley MEP for first encouraging me to focus the research in the very exciting topic of the EU-Arctic relations. To Stewart Arnolds for arranging the interview with Diana Wallis MEP and the presentation with Jaime Reynolds - who contributed to this study by providing the expertise viewpoint. To Hossain Kamrul for

organising a fantastic conference and taking into consideration the ideas presented in this paper. Finally, big thanks to Madlen Haupt for her indispensable help with reading, checking and correcting the following text.

December 2008, Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Index 1.

Introduction

p.5

1.1.

The Arctic Region

p.5

1.2.

The Arctic Region and the EU

p.5

1.3.

The Arctic Governance

p.6

1.3.1

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

p.6

1.3.2

The Arctic Council

p.7

1.3.3

The Nordic Dimension

p.7

1.4

The Clash of EU interests with other stakeholders

p.8

1.4.1

Canada

p.9

1.4.2

United States of America

p.9

1.4.3.

Russia

p.9

1.4.4

Norway

p.10

1.4.5

Denmark

p.10

2.

Research hypothesis

p.11

2.1.

The importance of the legitimacy question

p.11

2.2.

Three different sources of legitimacy

p.11

3.

Objectives and research methodology

p.12

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

List of Abbreviations MEP

Member of the European Parliament

US

United States of America

IPPC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ACIA

Arctic Climate Impact Assesment

EU

European Union

EC

European Commission

DG Mare

EC’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

UNCLOS

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

UK

United Kingdom

AEPS

Environmental Protection Strategy

DG ENVI

European Commission's Environment Directorate-General

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

1. Introduction 1.1 The Arctic Region According to the US Geological Survey report1 the Arctic conceals over 20 % of the world’s undiscovered gas and oil resources. Over the past 50 years, its air temperature has increased by twice the global average2, with 2007 as the warmest year on record for the Arctic3 and the lowest level of sea ice in modern history4. On 15 September 2007, the Arctic ice cap was 22% below the last record set in 2005. This 2007 record exceeded the computer model predictions used to prepare the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007. Perhaps even more important than ice-coverage as such, is the increasing percentage of first-year sea-ice. Indeed In 2004 the (ACIA) Arctic Climate

Impact Assessment study5 did forecast a 7 Celsius degrees temperature rise by the end of the present century and other studies do work with the hypothesis that by 2040 the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free during the summer months. 1.2 The Arctic Region and the EU Due to the ice melting, the Northern Sea route has been navigable for the first time since last year6. Thus, according to the EU Fisheries and maritime Affairs Commissioner Joe Borg, speaking last September to a Conference of the Nordic Council in Ilulissat, Greenland could offer a “first time opportunity”7 to use new trade routes and massive energetic resources. Exploitation of these resources was of great interest for Europe and ensuring its equal access would be a top priority for the Commission. Nonetheless, this situation will raise undoubtedly other increasing concerns. In March 2008 the EU’s chief of foreign policy, Javier Solana, distributed a statement on the security implications of Climate Change to the members of the EU Council8. Among other things, this paper titled ‘Climate Change and International Security’ highlighted the upcoming issues caused by the Arctic melting such as sealevel rises, new migratory flows, territorial disputes and political radicalisation. Overall, opportunities and risks in which’s management the EU certainly wants to have a say.

1 U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049, Kenneth J. Bird, Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. Gautier (CARA Project Chief), David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, Janet K. Pitman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. Schenk, Marilyn E. Tennyson, and Craig J. Wandrey; Edited by Peter H. Stauffer. Washington, 2008. 2 Arctic Report Card 2008, J. Richter-Menge, J. Overland, M. Svoboda, J. Box, M.J.J.E. Loonen, A. Proshutinsky, V. Romanovsky, D. Russell, C.D. Sawatzky, M. Simpkins, R. Armstrong, I. Ashik, L.-S. Bai, D. Bromwich, J. Cappelen, E. Carmack, J. Comiso, B. Ebbinge, I. Frolov, J.C. Gascard, M. Itoh, G.J. Jia, R. Krishfield, F. McLaughlin, W. Meier, N. Mikkelsen, J. Morison, T. Mote, S. Nghiem, D. Perovich, I. Polyakov, J.D. Reist, B. Rudels, U. Schauer, A. Shiklomanov, K . Shimada, V. Sokolov, M. Steele, M.-L. Timmermans, J. Toole, B. Veenhuis, D. Walker, J. Walsh, M. Wang, A. Weidick, C. Zöckler. 2008 3 Cfr. Footnote 2 4 Fetterer, F., and K. Knowles. 2002, updated 2008. Sea ice index. Boulder, CO: National Snow and Ice. Data Center. Digital media. 5 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment - Scientific Report. Jim Berner, Terry V. Callaghan, Shari Fox and others. 2005, Cambridge University Press 6 Northeast and Northwest Passages Both Free of Ice, 08/28/2008, Die Spiegel. 7 The Arctic: a matter of concern to us all. Speech by Commissioner Joe Borg at the Conference: "Common Concern for the Arctic", Ilulissat, Greenland, 9 September 2008 8 Report 7249/08 of the Council of the European Union, on Climate change and international security by the Commission and the SecretaryGeneral/High Representative. March 2008.

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Additionally, the EU is developing its Arctic policy as part of its newly adopted integrated maritime policy wherein the Commission (DG Mare) promises to produce 9 a report “on strategic issues relating to the Arctic Ocean” within the year 2008. Earlier last year Diana Wallis, vice President of the European Parliament, addressed the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians with the topic of the Arctic Region. She argued10 that it was time to go one step further than the so called Arctic Window of the Northern Dimension in the EU involvement in the Arctic. Her speech took a view which was adopted later on by others within the EU: There is no need for new environmental legislation but for a better coordination within new frameworks. A recently published European Commission’s communication11 aims to define the role that the EU wants to play in the future of the region. The communication calls for measures such as the creation of new research infrastructure, screening and monitoring of chemicals, increased cooperation on prevention, preparedness and disaster response, engagement of Arctic indigenous peoples in a regular dialogue, extension of existing regulatory framework on fisheries to the Arctic, improvement of maritime surveillance, the setting of a regulatory framework on fishing for the part of the Arctic high seas not yet covered by an international regime of conservation and management, promoting full implementation of the existing rules and enhancing environmental and safety standards of the International Maritime Organisation or enhancing Arctic multilateral governance. However it does not take up the Parliament’s call12 to open international negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty.

1.3 The Arctic Governance 1.3.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The case of the Arctic governance is complex and unique. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)13, ratified by more than 150 countries14, is currently the most accepted arrangement that rules the handling of the Arctic Region. The Convention contains three relevant points: it allows signatories to develop special legislation to protect ice-covered water, appoints a competent authority (International Seabed Authority) with capacity to sanction unlawful exploration and mining and delimits an Exclusive Economic Zone for the boundary states. 9 The adopted integrated maritime policy states in section 4.4. that “[a]ttention will also be given to the geopolitical implications of climate change. In this context, the Commission will present in 2008 a report on strategic issues relating to the Arctic Ocean”. See at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF. 10 Speech by Diana Wallis MEP, Vice-President of the European Parliament, at the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region,Rovaniemi Finland 28th February 2008 11 Communication, COM(2008) 763, The European Union and the Arctic Region, from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. December 2008, Brussels. 12 European Parliament resolution, P6_TA(2008)0474, of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance. 13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 14 Consolidated Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements, as at 7 November 2008. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2008.pdf . Acceded November 2008.

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Under the UNCLOS the coastal states (Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark and USA) have ten years from its ratification on to make claims to extend its 200 miles exclusive economic zone. The UN LOS Convention also recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal state over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea, the airspace above and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty entails exclusive access and control of living and non-living resources and all-encompassing jurisdiction over all human activities, unless states have in one way or another consented to restrictions thereon.15 But even if no country owes by itself the North Pole or the surrounding Arctic Ocean there are institutional frameworks that attempt to govern it. 1.3.2 The Arctic Council The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental body that brings together representatives of indigenous communities and fourteen nations, of which eight (Canada – in representation of the Northwest territories, Nunavut and Yukon, Denmark – in representation of the autonomies of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, United States – in representation of the State of Alaska, Sweden, Russia, Norway, Iceland and Finland) are full members and six observers (the UK in representation of the country of Scotland, Spain, Poland, Netherlands, Germany and France) who 16 are increasingly demanding a better position in the Council . However the Council not only lacks binding powers but also a permanent secretariat with full-time dedicated stuff. Previously, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS, 1991) was established by the so called A5 (the group of five countries that encircle the North Pole) plus Iceland, Finland and Sweden as a cooperation forum to identify the environmental threats that these states face. More importantly the AEPS holds a number of expertise working groups such as the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme or the Conservation of the Arctic Flora and Fauna. Two years later, in 1993, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the European Commission together with Russia established the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The BEAC, given that Canada and the US are only observating members, mainly attempts to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Russia by incorporating Russia in a multilateral body for the first time after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Nordic Council of Ministers are as well two additional relevant regional Councils. However to investigate the history of the EU-Russia involvement in the area we have to turn to the Northern Dimension. 1.3.3 The Nordic Dimension The Finish and Swedish accession to the EU in 1991 substantially increased the Northern presence of the Union. The meeting of the European Council in December 1997 (Luxembourg) sketched for the first time17 the Northern Dimension framework. Only one year later, in Vienna, the European Council adopted a 15

Cfr. Footnote 14 See at http://www.barentsobserver.com/non-arctic-countries-want-membership-in-arctic-council.4516094-16174.html. Presidency Concussions of the Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm. Acceded November 2008 16 17

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Commission Communication calling to settle a “Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union”. It was under the German and Finish presidencies of the Union a year later when the concept was specified and a Ministerial Conference on the topic was held. In 2000, at the Feira meeting of the Council, an Action Plan18 based on a document drafted by the European Commission with the guidelines for the implementation of the Nordic Dimension was adopted. At the 2002 ministerial meeting in Luxembourg the guidelines for a Second Northern Dimension Action Plan were adopted, which were impulse by the Danish government at the ministerial meeting held in Illulisaat, Greenland. One year later the second Nordic Dimension Action Plan was adopted. Built on these first Action Plans, the 2007 declaration established a permanent tool shared by its members - Norway, Iceland, the Russian Federation and the European Commission - that aims to “reaffirm their responsibility for the prosperity of Northern Europe, its sustainable development and the well-being of its population”19. It intends to make the best of the rich potential of the region and to avoid new dividing lines in Europe by addressing its challenges as the living standards disparities. However the Nordic Dimension policy, with special regard to North West Russia, is mainly an economic cooperation and integration body seeking to maximise the human and financial resources in the region on the basis of the subsidiary principle between national and regional authorities.

Nevertheless, the Nordic Dimension also focuses on the areas of a) Freedom, Security and Justice, b) External Security and c) Research, education and culture. In addition, two partnerships – the Northern Environmental Partnership and the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well Being – work as institutional cooperation frameworks within the Nordic Dimension. The climate change and the melting of the Arctic are becoming recently new core topics of this complex relationship. In this context we find the above mentioned Arctic Window, a political space within the Nordic Dimension designed for the cooperation between the EU and the Arctic States. 1.4 The clash of EU interests with other stakeholders Certainly further involvement/commitment of the EU in the Arctic is generally welcomed by its member states and other regional stakeholders. However, even if the EU has a long track involving other countries in regional as proved in the previous section, some voices suggest that there is an increasing risk of a potential clash of interests in the area. According to some scholars20 the increasing importance of the region in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics could lead to the emergence of a new “great game”. Indeed when last year a Russian expedition placed a titanium Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole, many observers feared the beginning of an increasing militarisation of the Arctic region.

18

Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria de Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm Acceded November 2008 Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy, Joint Press Release on the IV Northern Dimension Ministerial Meeting, 2007. 20 I.e. As the Arctic ice retreats, the old Great Game begins to boil over, Ben Macintyre, The Times, February 11 2006, London 19

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

1.4.1 Canada Canada responded to the above mentioned events with the mobilization of a vast military contingent in order to be ready for any possible challenge to Canada’s sovereignty in the area. Nevertheless Ottawa is not only concerned about the protection of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A major issue is the Northwest maritime passage, given the fact that it is becoming ice-free and both the EU and the US do not recognise Canada’s sovereignty over the route21.

However, Canada interest in the area, as most of the other regional actors, is nothing new. Back in 1909 Canada accused Inuits of murdering members of a Polar expedition; as a consequence of this Ottawa self extended its jurisdiction and consequently claimed territorial rights in the North Pole. Since then Canada has been one of the most active players in the region. 1.4.2 United States of America The case of the United States is a quite particular one. Although its first claim over the Arctic dates back to a legal request in 1924 over the coastline of Alaska, Washington is the only Arctic Coastal state that did not ratify the UNCLOS. Recently former President George W. Bush called for the ratification of the treaty22 as many advisers argued, the US should claim the extension of its EEZ and take part in future negotiations – especially regarding Russia’s recent moves in the area. Presumably the incoming American President Barack Obama will follow this line towards a multilateral cooperation. However some observers remain sceptical as the Senate could again decline the ratification of the UNCLOS expressing concerns about the limitations that the UNCLOS could impose on the US freedom of actions. In the same way that Canada did, the United States reacted on the Russian expedition that placed a flag in the North Pole. In August a bill was passed conceding $8 billion in order to increase the number of Coast Guard officers and soldiers in the Arctic surroundings. 1.4.3 Russia We have already mentioned some of the consequences of the expedition to the Lomonosov Ridge, which Moscow considers as an extension of the continental platform of Siberia. But the real implication of the expedition in 2007 led by the Vice Speaker of the Russian Duma, Artur Chilingarov, is the informal claim of the sovereignty over 45% of the Arctic which Russia is determined to obtain by any means.

21 U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski, during the U.S. Strategy in the Arctic: Energy, Security, and the Geopolitics of the High 3orth conference organised by Center for Strategic & International Studies on July 23, 2008. 22 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21131181/ Acceded December 2008

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

However other disputes need to be resolved earlier. In 2001 Russia requested the United Nations under the UNCLOS to extend the limits of the Continental Shelf23 that would lead to an extension of its EEZ as well.

1.4.4 Norway It is precisely with Norway that Russia maintains one if its most litigious relations. Despite of the 1920’s Treaty of Paris24 which gave sovereignty to Oslo over the Spitsbergen Island in the Svaldbard archipelago, Russia still claims the right to develop economic and trade activities in the area. Although it is expected that the UN Commission will reach a compromise between both nations, it is also expected that it will still require a hard battle in the near future, especially due to the fact that this 176,000 square kilometre area could be the key to an enormous future hydrocarbon production.

1.4.5 Denmark Also Denmark is currently involved in disputes with Russia regarding the territorial sovereignty of certain areas of the Arctic. In 2007 an expedition was sent to stock up evidences that the Lomonosov Ridge is indeed a natural extension of Greenland. Denmark is as well one of the few neighbours seeking stronger regional cooperation. However the Copenhagen government organised an Arctic Conference in which only the A5 countries were present. Despite of the recent referendum in which Greenland gained more autonomy25, Denmark is often discordant with EU policies given the particular necessities of the local communities of Greenland.

Due to all these divergent interests metioned above, any European moves usually raise the suspicion of other stakeholders, which often regard them as an attempt to unilaterally introduce new regulation in the area. Under these circumstances the question is raised: Does the European Union has any legitimacy to adopt its own policies regarding the Arctic? And if so, where does this legitimacy end?

23 On December 20, 2001, Russia Submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in accordance with Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 24 Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, and Protocol, Paris, 9 February 1920 25 A non-binding referendum on Greenland's autonomy was held on 25 November 2008

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

Research hypothesis

2.1 The importance of the legitimacy question 26

between two kinds of The classical analysis by Max Webber distinguished legitimacy in politics, substantive and procedural. This implies that the acts of a government can be legitimated either for what they achieve (substantive) or for how they are achieved (procedural). Although an abstract concept, political legitimacy is of high importance to the policy-making process. As professor Christopher Lord from the Leeds University argues27 “[…]legitimacy concerns to the acceptability of policy to the public. It, therefore, goes to the heart of whether institutions of government can get their way. Without widely agreed views of who has a right to make public-binding decisions, when and how, governing bodies find it difficult to achieve the un-forced cooperation of citizens. Furthermore when talking about the EU policy-making process each level of government –supranational, national and sub-national- is increasingly implicated in the legitimacy of each other.” Given that, despite of the recently announced intentions of Iceland28 to join the EU, none of the current EU Member States are costal states respect to the Arctic Ocean (since Greenland chose in the mid 1980’s to withdraw from the EEC); there are several reasons to expect legitimacy to be a tough problem for the EU in developing its Arctic-related policies. However through the following pages we will consider and analyse three different groups of factors that provide either substantial or procedural legitimacy. And therefore eventually it will be argued that the EU is indeed a fully legitimated actor in the process of the Arctic-related-policies.

2.2 Three different sources of legitimacy Firstly we will examine the existing legislation on trade, defence and environmental preservation as well as the current policy framework for the EU-Arctic relations. Given that the competence on environmental protection is currently shared between the EU (EC) and its member states we will search for national, subnational and supranational elements. By reviewing the history of the EU – Arctic relationship we will present the current involvement of the EU in the Arctic region as a logic consequence of its own evolution. Later we will contemplate the EU as an interested part in future scenarios. This will be a threefold approach as we will study the risks (EU as an involuntary affected regional actor), opportunities (EU as an international player in a global scenario) and responsibilities (EU as a global polluter) faced in the changing Arctic region. Finally we will focus on the democratic mandate by the citizens of the European Union expressed through the European Parliament. 26 Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: when abstract questions become practical policy problems, page 1, Dr. Christopher Lord, Universty of Leeds, 1998 27 Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: when abstract questions become practical policy problems, page 3, Dr. Christopher Lord, Universty of Leeds, 1998 28 On 30 October 2008, Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, minister of education said that "Iceland has to define its long-term national interests and part of that is a revision of the currency regime, including a possible EU application". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iceland_and_the_European_Union. Acceded, December 2008

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

3. Objectives and Research Methodology The overall aim of this paper is to analyse the legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union and to estimate the future scenarios for the EU – Arctic relations. Therefore, the purpose of the study is to critically analyse the status quo of the European Union involvement in the Arctic region, to identify the current challenges of this relationship and to draw conclusions with respect to the future. In order to achieve these goals the research was based on both primary and secondary data. Given the polyhedric nature of the topic, it was necessary to study a wide range of written documents on the different aspects are relevant for the research. Not only books but academic journals and publications authorised by national governments, policy platforms, nongovernmental organisations and European institutions were taken into account. For example, while quantitative data from governmental and intergovernmental agencies was used to measure the impact of climate change on the Arctic region, publications authorised by environmentalist nongovernmental organisations such as the WWF helped to acquire a better understanding of its consequences. In this regard we need to state that the EU’s transparency with offers, despite of its bad reputation, the possibility to publicly access all its working documents was a cornerstone of the research. However due to the lack of literature answering to the very concrete dilemma presented in this research, it was very useful to read literature on other cases where similar questions on the EU’s competence were raised. Furthermore, given the high profile of this topic within the current political agenda, several seminars and events around the topic were held over the past months in Brussels and Strasbourg. The attendance to some of these events was extremely useful for the research as it granted access to primary information on the ongoing negotiations. Additionally it also offered a unique opportunity for the understanding of the policy decision making process. A good example of this was the ‘petite comité’ briefing (Brussels, 4th November 2008) prior to the publication of the Commission’s communication on the Arctic by Jaime Reynolds of DGENVI (EC’s Directorate General responsible for environment) that Stewart Arnold arranged for the Hull University students placed in Brussels. In a different seminar (Brussels, 18th November 2008) organised by the European Policy Centre, János Herman, also from DGENVI, explained Commission’s core proposals and its viewpoint on why the EU is “natural and legitimate player”. This

seminar also provided an excellent opportunity to get an idea about the main concerns of other stakeholders. For example, whilst the Norway’s Ambassador to the European Union, Oda Helen Sletnes, welcomed more EU involvement; Lars Vesterbirk, Counsellor of the Representation of Greenland to the European Union, was very critic with the EU’s involvement. According to him it only resulted from the new opportunities to access new transportation routes and hydro-carbon fields.

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The legitimacy of the Arctic related policies of the European Union, by Alejandro Olmos i Marcitllach

A very different perspective, the economical one, was presented (Brussels, 18th November 2008) by the Centre for European Policy Studies study on “defining the financial architecture of the new international climate change regime”. Only two days later the first meeting of the PSE (Socialist Group in the European Parliament) on the Arctic took place in Strasbourg. Probably the highest pitch of the research was the experts workshop hosted by the Stichting University on the 4th and 5th of December. This two-day seminar aimed to understand and strengthen the EU-Canada Relation in the Law of the Sea and Ocean Governance. Twenty-nine experts highlighted areas of convergence and divergence of interests and practices. Those uses include: aquaculture, fisheries, shipping, bio-diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, renewable energy production (for example, offshore wind farms and tidal power), seabed activities (minerals and hydrocarbons) and ocean disposal. Finally in December an in-depth interview with Diana Wallis was conducted. This was the starting point of a series of interviews that will take place between December 2008 and January 2009 with a number of Liberal, Socialist, Conservative and Green Members of the European Parliament. These interviews aim to identify the different political approaches towards the EU-Arctic relations.

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