Fifth Circuit Appeal April

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE: JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This is an Appeal of a Final Judgment, dated April 05, 2018; Management Order, dated September 13, 2018, ROA.339; Order of Dismissal and Preclusion, dated March 05, 2014, and a Temporary Restraining Order, dated August 06, 2018; and all subsequent judgments, orders and motions with respect to all parties. Final Judgment and Dismissal with prejudice was entered on April 05, 2019. A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 08, 2019. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1441 §1331 and §1337; pursuant to; 28 U.S.C. 1291(2) § 1292. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW A. Whether the district court have subject matter jurisdiction in state residential real estate property evictions; under the Texas Property Code ANN. § Title 4, Chapter 24; 24.004, and Tex. Civ. P. Rule 510. B. Whether the court’s “Opinion” on Detainer and Obedience in this matter is appropriate; and did the court abuse it authority. ROA. C. Whether the district court can order Appellant(s) to vacate property without proper notice being given first and in accordance with Texas Property Code Title 4, Chapter 24; Sec. 24.005, Notices. D. Whether the demand for possession must be made in writing by a person entitled to possession of the property; in compliance with the eviction requirements for notice(s) to vacate under Section 24.005. E. Whether a wrongful foreclosure law suit is considered frivolous. Appellant has a Texas Constitutional Right under Article XVI and the Texas Homeowner’s Rights

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Under Foreclosure Handbook; ROA.334; to ask that a wrongful foreclosure to be set aside and affords rights to sue for damages either or but not both. ROA F. Whether Appellant defied the unwarranted and not fully substantiated dismissal and preclusion order, since the court had not yet denied permission to sue until March 23, 2014. The Civil Procedures restricts the use of preclusion orders; especially when only one prior suit had been filed in 2010; and had nothing to do with a wrongful foreclosure, and was not adjudicated but settled. G. Whether Appellee’s has standing because they are in contempt in state court and do not have title/deed of trust. H. Whether Appellant has standing because she has not violated any preclusion order; had a Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 06, 2018; and has title. Otherwise, Appellees would not be asking her for the deed in lieu of foreclosure if they had title as explained further below. Furthermore, Defendants quit claim the title as explained further below. I. Whether Appellee(s) violated their Fair Trade Commission, FTC settlement order; CV10-4193; not to engage in any foreclosure actions for eight years. Appellant loan was not transferred to Shellpoint sub-servicer until January 15, 2015; in which her complete file was not fully transferred. J. Whether Appellees defied her Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 06, 2018; and foreclosed anyway on August 07, 2018

1. Whether Appellees unlawfully removed her petition to federal court; as outlined in the Joyce A. Leggette, v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, et al, case number 3-03-cv-02909-D, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. -2-

K. Whether Appellant filed four (4) lawsuits without Judge Hughes permission in defiance of the wrongful preclusion order. When three petitions not lawsuits were well in her constitutional and state rights regarding foreclosures. L. Whether the filing of a Petition for Injunctive Relief is the same as filing a lawsuit or is there a difference under current laws when the petition it is twofold; and/or mixed. M. Whether a “Management Order” is usually issued after a conference hearing. Because the denial of a motion should be ordered by a Judge and not management. N. Can a Lender foreclosure while a facially and complete loss mitigation modification package has been submitted to underwriting and still in underwriting on August 7, 2018 at 4:30pm cst.; after sales have closed at 4:00pm; in violation of 12 CFR §1024.35; and Texas Property Code Chapter 51 O. Whether the court’s Final Judgment should be voided since Appellees have since sold the property to a third party purchaser on January 22, 2019, as informed this court in their previous reply brief in case 18-20657, foot note; pg. 15; “On or about January 22, 2019, BoNYM sold the property to a third party and no longer has an ownership interest. In which the CWAB-2006-SD1 certificate trust cannot have the deed of trust foreclosed on because it is not part of the Pooling Service Agreement, PSA, as explained below. P. Whether the Judge’s inherent power (under his jurisdiction) to punish is justified in this case; if so should Appellees be punished for their defiance of a court order(s) to prevent the appearance of bias because they have no standing either. In addition, Appellant (hereafter Dawson) believes the district court failed to review her petition and claims properly; and should have dismissed her case if no standing was found in -3-

accordance with civil procedures. The district court also incorrectly decided the facts regarding the foreclosure proceedings; where on initial hearing of a TRO the court decides if Appellant has merit and standing to precede with a lawsuit for a wrongful foreclosure, if so, Appellees may not foreclosed until the lawsuit proceedings are concluded. However, Dawson’s case herein is not about a forcible detainer but is twisted into one to give the Appellate court no jurisdiction and/or to have the court rule solely on a final judgment for a forcible detainer to vacate when Dawson’s initial complaint is about a wrongful foreclosure and the right to proceed with a lawsuit or have rescission and set aside with a permanent injunction which is normal after trial but may be imposed sooner based merits; plus the district court has no jurisdiction over forcible detainers. The court chose the former so he did not have to dismiss and say for lack standing; and is why removals to federal court in foreclosure matters are not appropriate in accordance with the Leggette v. Washington Mutual Bank case. Nor did the trial court address any other motions, judgments, orders or specifics of Dawson’s case which all need to be reviewed; only to say she defied an (unjustifiable) preclusion order and refused to hear Dawson’s side. Appellant also believes there are many other reasons why the district court’s final judgment(s) and orders are erroneous; mainly because the court has no jurisdiction and the preclusion orders are clearly unwarranted; unsubstantiated and unjustifiable and should be waived and/or overturned in this matter where Dawson has a right to ask a court to set aside a wrongful foreclosure or is allowed to sue for damages. Dawson could have been allowed to hire an attorney if she was found to be unintelligent enough to amend her complaint. Appellant has not defied the March 5, 2014; preclusion order that prevents Dawson from reopening her 6/2010 case which claims did not involve a wrongful foreclosure but unrelated issues for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; RESPA regarding -4-

her escrow account and was not adjudicated, therefore, there is no justification for any such preclusion order. Nor did the order preclude Dawson from filing for injunctive relief, three of the four supposedly lawsuits Dawson defied. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 § 1337; Civil Diversity; and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Circuit Rule 5.1, Appellant respectfully petitions this Court for review and/or appeal from the Final Judgment entered on April 05, 2019; and all subsequent orders entered on September 21, 2018; and (attached hereto in the Excerpts); by the Honorable Lynn Hughes of the United States District Court of the Southern District of Texas; and State court; as to whether Dawson has standing, her motion for leave to amend her complaint, dated September 10, 2018, the management order, dated September 13, 2018; whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in a forcible detainer matters; review of the denial of Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Amend with a management order; and all subsequent motions, orders and judgments on the ROA.223; rather than leaving Dawson’s case in between the unfair loop holes and in the interest of justice, fairness based on the merits. “Texas Rule of Civil Procedure § 320 states that a judge may set aside a judgment and order a new trial "for good cause." The only specific grounds mentioned are the damages being "manifestly" too small or too large. The Texas Supreme Court has held that as long as the trial judge finds that a new trial is "in the interest of justice and fairness" there is no recourse other than to set aside the judgment and proceed with a new trial.” The Homeowner’s Rights Under Foreclosure Handbook, ROA.334; Rev. 2009; that explains the rights of borrowers to defend against a wrongful foreclosure which stipulates a foreclosure may be set aside and rescinded if there are numerous improprieties in which there are

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and the borrower may seek a rescission/set aside or sue for damages but cannot do both. ROA In which the district court is trying to prevent Appellant from doing through unwarranted and unsubstantiated preclusion orders and enjoinments in which strict guidelines must be adhered to before issuance. Clearly Dawson’s complaint is not “an impermissible collateral attack”; it is her State’s right; page 12, para. 1. ROA. In addition, this court also has inherent powers to strike or amend at will. Therefore, Dawson is seeking to have the wrongful foreclosure rescinded in which Shellpoint’s Power of Attorney; PA gives them the authority to do. If not, Dawson should be allowed to sue for damages in which the existing preclusion order must be vacated or waived as improper; and her actions viewed not as a collateral attacked but as a right. Appellant has never been in a court that was so determined not to let her exercise her right to sue (foreclosure) or appeal rights and has done everything in its power to see that irreparable harm is forced upon her. The same day the 5th Circuit dismissed Dawson’s case on April 05, 2019, the district court issued its final judgment and closed her case; “warning” case closed, in an attempt to prevent Dawson from appealing in which she has at least 10 days to appeal; therefore the closing of her case is premature and not proper. Who gives a warning when closing a case; unless something is terribly wrong and unethical? Moreover, Appellant has never known a Judge or court to issue a partial judgment for the sole purpose of causing irreparable harm while covertly trying to deny a litigant’s appeals rights for no justifiable reason; just because she filed “one” previous lawsuit that was not adjudicated and had nothing to do with her attempt at a second lawsuit based on different merits and for that she is precluded forever from filing a law suit against Appellees.

Accordingly, Federal Courts can only adjudicate specific types of cases or controversies. A. Applicable Legal Standard: Federal Question Jurisdiction: Article III, § 2 permits federal

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courts to hear all cases arising under the laws of the US Constitution. This is adapted in 28 USC § 1331; 1442. In 28 USC § 1337, §1292; federal courts will have original jurisdiction to hear all cases concerning a Congressional Act which regulates to commerce. To bring a case in federal court, the personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction need to be satisfied. Foreclosure TRO and defect hearings are general not federal laws and does not regulates commerce; and is why Dawson case if reviewed appropriately should be remanded back to state court, de nova if not set aside or made right here in accordance with the Joyce A. Leggette, v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, et a case. Because if Dawson’s wrongful foreclosure is not set aside she should be allowed to sue for damages and she cannot go back before Judge Hughes because the court has already threaten when she received his final judgment and enjoinment from suing; that any attempt made by Dawson to sue would come back before him; and we all know what that is like; and her interpretation of this statement is; so I can put you in jail and fine you for disobeying my judgement(s); because I do not care what any other law bodies or person thinks of says; which is essentially what he told Dawson at the conference hearing on September 29, 2018. However, wrongful foreclosures may be heard in federal court but is not recommended and should remain in state court if a substantial federal question is not raised. Nonetheless, if Dawson’s case is stayed in federal court, she asks with a different impartial Judge. Because Appellees constantly violate laws and nothing is ever done about. 1) Creation Test: a suit arises under the law that creates the test. i) 28 USC § 1331: Actions with a federal question. ii) 28 USC § 1337: Actions arising under a federal law that concerns commerce. iii) 28 USC § 1442: Actions involving federal officers.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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Appellant, (herein Dawson); filed for a Temporary Restraining Order, TRO, on August 6, 2018; after Appellees brought a foreclosure action against her. ROA.14-23. Appellees answered Appellant’s Temporary Restraining Order/Petition in Fort Bend County District Court on August 17, 2018; ROA.169-172.; and immediately removed the case to Federal Court the same day. On September 04, 2018; Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss, in Federal Court; ROA. 209-216. Dawson responded on September 04, 2018. ROA.240-244. An Order Setting Conference was set for September 18, 2018; ROA.208. Appellant then filed her motion for leave to file amended complaint on September10, 2018; ROA.255; because Appellee’s alleged in their motion to dismiss because Dawson did not state any viable cause of action; and to ensure she complied with federal law; the preclusion order dated March 5, 2014. A conference was scheduled entailing that all motions would be heard at the conference on September 18, 2018. Dawson wanted to ensure all her motions had a chance for review and was pending for reference. ROA.258-269.

Appellant initially responded to Appellee’s wrongful foreclosure action in Fort Bend County District Court in response to Defendant’s illegal foreclosure notice to sale her property beginning on April 03, 2018 through August 07, 2018; at auction for a staring bid of $190,000.00; when appraised and modified values are considerably higher because Dawson does have an equitable interest in the proceedings and is allowed to respond especially, when deficiencies occur. ROA.157. Furthermore, she believed her note had been somehow transformed into a home equity home loan lien being “asset back” without her permission; and she had a constitutional right under Texas Article XVI to defend self and property. Nonetheless, Appellees refused to follow proper loss mitigation procedures; other options and could have

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easily refinanced or modified the terms of her existing modification to make more affordable to ensure any repayments. Subsequently; to an unauthorized and unfair foreclosure proceedings while listing Dawson’s and others property vastly under market value; and not receive a single bid from the public on a $350,000.000 + house is a violation of the Fair Trade Act; when Dawson had tons of real estate investors interested in the property sending her nonstop texts; calls and investment letters. If you check any Texas and other states’ county recorder websites you will find that all Countrywide, CWAB, Inc.; certificate series are all reverted back and/or purchased by the Bank of New York, Mellon; BNY without a single bid or purchase from the public; these cohorts have no oversight; and do not deliver deeds as required to BofA, BNY or the beneficiaries; while using public facilities and not allowing the public to bid on otherwise advertised public property is a violation of the Federal Trade Act., FTC and other state and federal laws.

A bona fide purchaser is "[a] person who acquires property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest." Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (West 2014). Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001). However, the protection usually afforded to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice does not apply when such purchaser's claim is dependent upon a forged instrument. Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

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The Bank of New York, Mellon, is not the mortgagee and their claim is dependent upon a forged instrument by a supposedly Countrywide Vice President whose name is not on the quit claim deed and is BofA, robo signer for the Assignment dated April 03, 2014, see Texas Fraud Digest ROA. “A purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, obtaining by means of his purchase deed some legal estate, some legal right, some legal advantage has an absolute, unqualified, unanswerable defense,” despite it being sworn to, notarized and recorded by scam artists, law benders/twisters and/or perpetrators or whatever the appropriate adjective.

Nevertheless, Appellee(s) are banking on these strategies and unspoken protocols and biases within the system to succeed. Nonetheless, during the disclosure phase of the conference Dawson was given proof that she did not receive a proper “notice of default” in which the Judge failed to review; presumably because he believed Dawson had no standing because of his prior unjustifiable preclusion order dated March 95, 2014; and alleges this order has been violated four times in his opinion on detainer; ROA.366; and again on September 13, 2018; when her motion for leave to amend was denied and a management order issued by the case manager. ROA.339. However, this is not true; Dawson believes the preclusion order was done in error because her February 27, 2014 claims were different from her June 2010; with Judge Hoyt; claims that were never adjudicated but Dawson reached an unfortunate settlement under distress that did not involve a wrongful foreclosure claim; but Appellee’s wrongful actions of paying Dawson’s taxes when she had waived an escrow account at closing and her taxes were deferred by the state. Therefore; a Res Judicata defense is not plausible by Appellees nor have they ever alleged any.

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In addition, in 2010; Judge Hoyt indicated if there was a future problem regarding this case parties were to come back to his court. Appellees have there “Statement of Relevant Facts and Procedural History” wrong and is somewhat misleading. It is not known how Judge Hughes ended up with Dawson’s February 27, 2014 complaint in which he issued the non-justified preclusion order. The Judge had never met her and was unfamiliar with all the facts of her case to issue such a preclusion order. However, Dawson surmises the courts are familiar with her assertions that they are valid and will do whatever is necessary by any means necessary to attack and preclude these assertions from going forth and being properly heard and if you are not an attorney will beat you down because you are not expert in the law.

Dawson had filed only two complaints in 2014; one in federal court dated February 27, 2014; and the other in state district court on March 20, 2014; the two being the same; in case Judge Hughes did not grant permission to sue. Dawson not being an attorney did not know she could not file her complaint in state court if her petition to sue was denied in federal court; this was a pure honest mistake and not an attempt to defy a court order like Appellees do routinely all the time by defying temporary restraining orders and removing cases to federal court as a strategy while committing multiple other violations.

Nonetheless, the 2014 state case was removed to federal court Judge Hoyt who did not preclude Dawson from ever filing suit against Appellees but dismissed with prejudice. Precluding someone from defending themselves where irreparable harm exists and has never been heard is Un-American; abuse of authority; and an unlawful act; especially, on a wrongful

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foreclosure case that has never been adjudicated on the merits by any court nor was there ever a proper notice of default issued to Dawson among other violations.

Moreover, Appellee’s asked for a motion to dismiss; instead the court took it upon itself to issue an “opinion” on detainer and obedience which is improper; when Appellant has yet to receive a proper notice to vacate or eviction notice as required by Texas Property Code Sec.§ 24.001-5; forcible entry and detainer. However, Appellee’s motion to dismiss is not warranted and Dawson’s case needs to go forward. The court is trying to make Dawson’s appealable case about a forcible detainer to vacate when in fact it is about a wrongful foreclosure, this is blatantly wrong because it is not like the court does not know of Dawson’s prior appeal for lack of jurisdiction, they have issued another vacate final judgment order on April 05, 2019, telling Dawson to vacate, like who is going to stop me; just like all the attorneys and banks because they know the majority of Appellate court(s) have their backs, but who is looking out for the consumer? Therefore, Dawson prays this court will be fair with its inherent powers because not only is the final judgment a farce Appellees have sold her property to a third party purchaser so what good or is the meaning behind this type of ruling from the district court; when the law stipulates if the court finds no standing it must dismiss the case not issue a partial judgment for forcible detainer based on false premises and no jurisdiction; when Dawson’s filed petition is about trying to stop a wrongful foreclosure when she was granted a TRO; and the judgment properly should have been a dismissal when the court declared presumably declared she had no standing because at this point it is not clear what the court’s reasoning is other than she supposedly defied a unsubstantiated preclusion order than needs to be reviewed and corrected where appropriate. Because Dawson needs her entire ROA reviewed, where this court could

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properly rule on her standing issue, motion(s) reply motion on improper removal from state court, motion for leave to amend, motion of contempt by of court by Appellees and all her ROA orders, judgments and motions; rather than ruling the court has no jurisdiction now that the district court judgment is final. Dawson fully understands now about not being able to file a partial appeal but now that it is final her entire ROA should be reviewed and not just the previous court’s unlawful forcible detainer to vacate and opinion which the court clearing had no jurisdiction and if that being the case her case should be remanded back to state court with permission to move forward with her any suit if necessary and/or have the foreclosure set aside. Because Appellant was deprived of her initial TRO hearing on August 20, 2018; to determine if her case had standing and merit to move forward with a law suit and being removed to federal court was all done in error to deprived Dawson of her right to ask for a rescission or sue for damages and no court should deprived her of that right for no unjustifiable reason other to protect the banks who are well known for their fraud, deception and misconduct.

In regards to the Appellee’s removal; Dawson maintains that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the parties are not completely diverse or registered; and her state-law claim does not arise under federal law. The removal statute 28, U.S.C. § 1441, should be strictly construed in favor of remand. The question whether exercising federal question jurisdiction would disturb a congressionally approved balance of the federal and state judicial responsibilities; In re Bass, 171 F. 3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1999); “concluding that it would, the court holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case back to state court.” The court should consider first whether Dawson’s state-court petition necessarily raises a stated federal issue that is actually disputed and substantial; and the state may not require all the

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particulars as would in federal court. In this wrongful foreclosure it was not Dawson’s intention to sue but to have Appellees correct their many errors; if possible or ascertain permanent injunctive relief because Appellees have not standing.

Finally, and perhaps obviously, while collateral estoppel may apply despite substantive differences between two legal schemes, Liberty Bank of Seattle, Inc. v. Henderson, 75 Wash. App. 546, 548, 559-60, 878 P.2d 1259 (1994), review denied, 126 Wash. 2d 1002, 891 P.2d 37 (1995), when the statutes are sufficiently different that they preclude the full litigation of an issue, the doctrine will not be applied. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 418, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989); City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Reg'l Council, 98 Wash. App. 23, 988 P.2d 27, 35 (1999). In this case the federal court has no jurisdiction over evictions; while state court has full jurisdiction in wrongful foreclosure litigation; they do not need all the particulars required in federal court when a federal question is not raised.

While deciding whether the management order of the District Court denying leave to amend is appealable, ROA.387; the court may apply the collateral order doctrine. Applicability of the collateral order doctrine depends upon three tests: “(1) the order must be a final determination of a claim of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action; (2) it must be too important to be denied review, in the sense that it presents a serious and unsettled question; and (3) its review cannot, in the nature of the question that it presents, await final judgment because when that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the . . . order and rights conferred . . . will have been lost, probably irreparably. “DE Nubilo v. United

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States, 343 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1965); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321 (U.S. 1971) Id. at 330-331; In re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. Mo. 1976). After receiving the Fifth Circuit ruling on this matter case #18-20657; pg. 3; Dawson agrees with the court and is now asking for review. She has just never been in a situation with so many improprieties or partial judgments when her life would have been made much simpler if the court would have just dismissed case albeit erroneously as asked to do by the Appellee rather than abuse its authority sending shock waves across the system. Thereby allowing Dawson to appeal appropriately and properly rather than attempting to deny her of any appeal rights until after irreparable harm had occurred.

There are still legitimate motions to be heard Dawson’s reply to motion for removal; ROA. 187-202; contempt of court; ROA.101-113; state district court contest reply motion; ROA.166-167; and motion for leave to amend; ROA.255 256; all of which have not been adjudicated properly; in addition to, the wrongful foreclosure, defects, sale price and all other deficiencies. This cannot be accomplished without due process under the law. B.

Factual Background and Prior Proceeding: During prior proceeding; on August 4, 2008; Appellant filed a suit against Countrywide

Home Loan for refusing to except further payments and breach of contract of deed of trust, RESPA where Dawson waived an escrow account; the case was removed to the Southern District of Texas civil action number 4:08-cv-02778. On February 26, 2014; Dawson sued Bank of America, NA; for failing to report her payment history to the credit bureaus as required by her contract; under civil number 14-mc-00530; the case was not adjudicated but dismissed by Judge Hughes with prejudice. On March 20, 2018 Dawson filed a TRO in county court case number - 15 -

18-CCV-061718; which was the wrong court; she non-suited and filed correctly in district court on case number 18-DCV-250145 but counsel asked to get off the case so Dawson non-suited. On August 06, 2018; Dawson filed her final TRO which was granted the same day; a hearing was scheduled for August 20, 2018. However; Appellees removed the case on August 17, 2018 to federal court; case number 4:18-cv-02846; and a partial judgment was issued on September 21, 2018.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Appellant’s claims have merit and this is not a res judicata defense by Appellees. Appellant claims are so valid that counsel and the district court are doing everything in their power to keep from coming to light. Appellant did not defy the preclusion order issued on March 05, 2014; her intentions were to ask permission if so warranted. An application for a Temporary Restraining Order, TRO or injunctive relief is not a lawsuit; and is issued to prevent irreparable harm; at the hearing a Judge may order a party to correct any defects. If they are unwilling then the Judge decides if there is sufficient merit surrounding the claims to sue.

However, Appellant never received this opportunity because her case was removed August 17, 2018; before the scheduled hearing date on August 20, 2018, in state court. However, Appellees are in contempt of court. ROA.101-113. Appellant was going to ask the Judge for permission to sue if necessary but was not allowed the opportunity because the court’s mine was already made up based on the status quo and erroneously believing Appellant had previously filed four lawsuits prior without his permission which is not true and a stumbling block to the issuance of TRO’s ploy to keep valid claims from ever being properly adjudicated on its merit. In this case a wrongful foreclosure sale in which Appellant has never brought suit

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or claim prior; if there is a case that was sought without the court’s permission it is the state filed case 4-DCV-1817 “removed” to Judge Hoyt in 2014; again, Dawson did not know she could not file in state court; which was done prior to permission not being denied and she did remove it to federal court but would have dismissed it.

pril 03, 2014; ROA.60-63; (there are two distinct versions of this assignment: one showing the beneficiary and the one docketed not); which are not valid; not only because it was not timely; N.Y Estates, Trusts and Powers Law §§ 7-1.18.7-2.4; Glaski v. Bank of America, NA 218 Cal. Rptr. 4th 1079 (2013); Saldivar v. JPMorgan Chase, 2013 WL2452699 (BKY. SD Tex. 6/15/130; and is void or voidable; but because ownership and lien had been previously transferred to West Florida Wholesale Properties; WFWP; on September 11, 2013; forever; who are not part of the settlement agreement. ROA.53-55. In spite of New York law governing securitization in general; these particular CWAB certificates have long been paid in one form or another. Nevertheless, if BNY trust wants to become a designated “mortgagee” in Texas they must be registered with the Secretary of Texas to conduct residential mortgage loans and not just mortgage loans secured by commercial properties in Texas. At any rate Appellees notices of sale and entire conduct is fraudulent, flawed and erroneous.

Nonetheless, Appellant is berated and made out to be the villain when in fact she has done nothing wrong. Instead she is yelled at “you borrower the money and you are going to pay.” However, Appellant put $50,000.00 down on her property of her life savings whereas Appellees have not paid one dime toward her lien. Notwithstanding, Appellant purchased lender title insurance in the amount of $200,000.00; to cover the lien in the event the loan was modified or refinance which it was; Appellees pocketed the money just like all their others law suits

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alleges substantial amounts of fees being pocketed and kept overcharging borrowers to no end; if Appellees purchased the title insurance it would be different but they did not.

Subsequently the district court issues an Order on Annoyance when all Appellant did after the conference was email his case manager twice in which Appellant informed the case manager of her intent not to pester just to be on the safe side; ROA.365; and so only because the Judge continued to cut her off and would not even look at any of Dawson’s motions or pleadings; his mind was already made up and true intent to block Appellant from ever filing a suit against Appellees because Dawson believes the Judge is fully aware of Appellee’s fraudulent behavior; he’s probably seen it all. Moreover, this is not a matter of Res Judicata alleged against Dawson by Appellees because it is a totally different claim of wrongful foreclosure; a very serious matter that needs to be heard on its merits and adjudicated properly with due process of the law. The case manager never complained to Appellant directly of any annoyance or rudeness but instead filed the two emails into the record; ROA.341-343. Dawson believes the initial remarks of rudeness made by the court at the hearing; ROA.441; were in retrospect made to prelude and deny all Dawson’s motions and issue an order of annoyance to further make her look bad. ROA.365. In addition, the Judge makes it seem in his Opinion on Detainer and Obedience that “Dawson’s lawsuits have not stopped.” This is not true Dawson is only responding to Appellees erroneous actions by way of “injunctive relief.”

Moreover, prior to the dismissal and preclusion order issued in 2014; Dawson had only filed one lawsuit in 2010 against Appellee; and four years later this is the only action taken against Appellees and in response to their wrongful foreclosure sale, no matter how bad Appellees want to make Dawson out to be with her other unrelated justifiable lawsuits for

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exercising her rights to sue set forth in agencies policies. As Appellees have stated Dawson has filed “three lawsuits this year” which are one in the same actions. While not stating one word about Appellee’s contempt of court and three improper notices of acceleration and default. Or the damage Appellees have done to Dawson’s county record with all its errors and tax evasion tactics; based on a void or voidable assignment dated April 3, 2014; which must be ratified if deemed voidable. Appellees cannot claim they did not know because Dawson emailed and informed the Akerman Firm; Ms. Summers April 2018. Nonetheless, all this is an attempt to make Dawson look bad when in fact there are no legitimate reasons for any admonitions or preclusion. It is not Appellant’s fault Appellees have waited four years to foreclose complicating the matter; why because they know they do not have any standing. Dawson cannot make them do their job properly; while at the same time making it harder for Dawson to pay unnecessary fees and cost; while Appellees collect servicer compensation pay. Under the old law they would be barred from foreclosing after four years. These entities have no idea of what they are doing to folk’s lives or who’s who or what they are doing; this is why BNY will not accept any liability for their actions. However Dawson should not to penalized for Appellees mistakes and have her life’s savings investment stolen; she will never again have $50,000.00 to put down on a home; she is elderly on disability and unable to work gainfully; her livelihood and American dream will be lost forever through no real fault of her own; when she has tried diligently to have the terms of her modification modified; refinanced and a modification; reduction; anything to no avail. Even after learning the lender was either paid or forfeited the title insurance Dawson purchased for them; and Freddie Mac guaranteed the certificates with TARP funds, the investors paid market value in cash for the notes that has since been released in which Bank of America - 19 -

repurchased the trusts and operating under a Pooling Service Agreement in which borrowers are not a part of. Also, the “note” is a 15 year balloon note and expired on August 25, 2014; and Appellees do not have possession of the deed of trust/title which was sold to WFWP. In addition, Dawson tried to complain and seek answers about a non-legitimate modification through the justice system in 2014; but she was precluded from doing so while she was unable to get answers from the lender, now she is the villain, what are borrowers supposed to do.

If Appellees are allow to succeed while committing numerous violations; fraud and deception; and refusal to verify title insurance payment(s) made as required when doing a modification is an act of forfeiture; ROA.325; item J. The Fair Debt Collection Practice Act; FDCPA stipulates failure to verify debtors claims are deemed valid. Moreover, Texas State law is clear that a lender may not foreclose on the note alone both the deed of trust and note are required and is what Appellees have done without the deed or note which now is held by West Florida Wholesale Properties; WFWP.

The courts have indicated whoever holds the note can foreclose; ROA.459; Line 21; however, BNY does not hold the note; West Florida Wholesale Properties, WFWP holds the deed and note forever and all notes have been paid in full. Nevertheless, there remains the question of the modification taking first lien priority because the $200,000.00; note has been modified and needs to be addressed because Real Estate Investment Conduits that are equity based cannot be modified or have money added to them they are strictly based on equity.

The produce the note defense is rooted in the requirement of standing, which is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. If the foreclosing party lacks standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the foreclosure action must be dismissed. UCC Section 3-301 provides - 20 -

the “holder” of the note has the right to enforce the note. However, BNY is not the holder of the note or notes in which Appellees did not produce. ROA.451; Line 20; trustees are supposed to be holders of the deed of trust, DOT to ensure notes are paid; but traded them in for a PSA; note holders are usually owners or lenders. Dawson has standing because she did not violate any preclusion orders and is only responding to an action brought against her. West Florida Wholesale Properties; WFWP is the owner and holder of the note/title as seen in the quit claim deed (supposedly) that has been paid by the lender’s title insurance Dawson purchased for them. Again, only the lender has the right to invoke foreclosure pursuant to the DOT. In addition, Appellees have violated 12 CFR § 1024.35; 1024.41(3)(i)(D)(2); Servicer’s errors; they have no respect for the rule of law. Appellant was still in loss mitigation workout on August 7, 2018; until 5:45pm est., at which time the foreclosure sale ended at 4:00pm central time. ROA.328. Appellant was not allowed to appeal as required by the above statute or given a notice of default after any such letter from Appellees indicating “there are no other mitigation options available” for you to pursue in accordance with statute in which Dawson never received and the recent letter from Appellee’s debt collector that mentions a default dated July 27, 2016; is not a valid “notice of default” notification letter. ROA.222-223. Appellees are supposed to devise their policies consistent with state and federal laws instead they operate rogue with absolutely no oversight and should be told these shady tactics are no longer going to be tolerated which only congest the courts and rob hard working folks of their property.

Dawson has standing because she is the proper party to bring the matter forth because she has suffered harm by having her property illegally foreclosed on caused by Appellee’s disobedience and contempt of a Temporary Restraining Order, retraining them from foreclosing.

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If Dawson violates our laws or supposedly be in contempt of court; she is jailed. Dawson did not receive a proper and accurate notice of default; Appellees also points to a letter dated June 16, 2017; that Dawson responded to on July 1, 2017; which advises her of a default but is not a formal notice of default issued by the lender but an improper acceleration according to Judge Hughes. Nonetheless; Dawson disputed the inaccuracies; and since has been in loss mitigation. In addition, to be in compliance with the deed of trust only the lender may invoke foreclosure; and the Bank of New York, Mellon is not the “mortgagee” and stipulates so in its power of attorney. ROA.287-289. Nor can a debt collector appoint a substitute trustee in violation of the Texas Property Code, Chapter 51. Moreover, the FTC settlement agreement dated May 13, 2010. COA; FTC v. BofA case filed with motion but not made part of ROA.; case # CV-10-4193; answered Dawson question about her modification being a GSE modification or a BofA in house modifications.

Moreover, Appellee requires borrowers to purchase lender title insurance for them so they can pocket the proceeds; along with all the write-offs, bail-outs, trust insurance, FDIC insurance and scams; ROA.128-143; these Appellees are hustlers and would never in the wildest of imagination forfeit a title insurance policy when they have work so hard ensuring that borrowers purchases it for them; and if they continue to ignore this issue then the matter should be deem forfeited. This is why Appellees do not notarize or record modifications with the county or credit bureaus like they are required to do when participating in HAMP; in order to deceive the courts and other perspective parties; and is why counsel stated in the transcript; ROA.458, Line 14-15; “hard to get people to bid on a property like this”; because they are reaped in fraud; never mind all the harm it causes the borrowers. It is not that loans like these are hard to get people to bid on; it is the fact that these securitization loans have special - 22 -

governmental laws; that stipulate for Real Estate Owned, REO properties are to be “refinance;” 12 CFR 34.83; ROA.160. Also, they carry with them a different “foreclosure” meaning, under 26 U.S.C. § 856; in that a simple default is considered grounds for a foreclosure. When Dawson contacted BNY she was told in an email her property was listed as REO; she then follow-up with a phone call and told the same. However, all of the above statutes are ignored.

Since no Government Sponsored Enterprise; GSE (Fannie Mac, Freddie Mac); have any record of Dawson’s modification it is safe to say Dawson never had a GSE, HAMP Tier I modification, thanks to the FTC suit CV-4193 answering a question Dawson has been asking for years; and could have qualified for a legitimate GSE HAMP 1 or II; since her current modification had been breached by Appellee; but for Appellee’s predatory and deceptive lending practices; not disclosing Dawson’s loan was already securitized and guaranteed by Freddie Mac; in which case borrowers do not quality for GSE modifications but are led to believe this is what they currently have and given the extreme run around.

The reason Dawson did not qualify for a GSE HAMP modification is because Freddie Mac was already guaranteeing the CWAB-2006 SD1 loan certificates. This is why Appellees do not report to the credit bureaus or record modifications; because CWAB, Inc., loan certificates cannot have any more cost added to them and is why Appellees only foreclose on the note(s) after severely harming Appellants. Dawson and her family have been constantly lied to; tricked and are victims of predatory lending and a host of other violations perpetrated upon them. Nonetheless, this is background information only because today’s claims are strictly about the wrongful foreclosure.

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Appellees know the end strategic game while helpless hard working folks are kicked to the curb with foreclosures at an all-time high to keep Appellees unjustly enriched and flipping momentum going. Appellees are so brazen they will not even respond to the Attorney General’s office regarding Dawson’s complaint.

ARGUMENT Appellant’s case is strictly about a wrongful foreclosure; “to establish a claim of wrongful foreclosure, the Appellants must show “(i) ‘a defect in the foreclosure sale proceedings’; (ii) ‘a grossly inadequate selling price’; and (iii) ‘a causal connection between the defect and the grossly inadequate selling price;” which Dawson has shown; ROA.157, 249,299-300. “Where a debt is ‘secured by a note, which is, in turn, secured by a lien, the lien and the note constitute separate obligations.’” (quoting Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied))). 7 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002(a) states: A person may not make, present, or use a document or other record with: (1) knowledge that the document or other record is a fraudulent court record or a fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property; (2) intent that the document or other record be given the same legal effect as a court record or document of a court created by or established under the constitution or laws of this state or the United States or another entity listed in Section 37.01, Penal Code, evidencing a valid lien or claim against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property; and (3) intent to cause another person to suffer: (A) physical injury; (B) financial injury; or (C) mental anguish or emotional distress.”

Also, BNY is not a “book entry system” of residential mortgages but was assigned as Custodian of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP; in 2008; and does not qualify as a residential “mortgagee” now that the relief program has ended in December 2016; wherein BofA and BNY settlement included a way after this date for servicers to conduct “standard and in house modifications. In addition, if BNY is allowed to take on this role they are still not “registered” with the State of Texas to originate residential loan or modifications. Also, there is no proof with the broken chain of assignments where BofA/CW ever made a deposit at BNY.

All previous deposits were into CHL and CWAB Inc.; and with JP organ - 24 -

Chase/Bear Stearns; as they remain, the assignment filed April 03, 2014; is void for not being timely or accurate; and/or BNY only being trustee of the liens v. the note. ROA.145151. BNY is the “custodian” of the 2008 crisis; just because an institution may be a book entry system does not mean the CWAB loans were deposited therein; the 2011 BNY/BofA settlement is clear naming BNY as trustee or indenture trustee and not “mortgagee;” BofA is the owners.

Nor does Dawson have a Government Enterprise Sponsored, GSE loan of $200,000.00 in which the original terms have been illegally modified with the loss of first lien/note priority; now in the hands of West Florida Wholesale Properties who are not part of BofA and BNY settlement agreement of June 28, 2011. Therefore, BNY is not the “mortgagee” of Dawson’s “note.” but trustee of collateral bad debt that has been paid.

This is why these

CWAB certificates were never meant to participate in the GSE HAMP I & II programs or to have the original loan terms modified; they are considered asset backed based on “market values” used for home equity loans; and investment cash for the lender; in which Freddie Mac guaranteed after becoming pooled; but no longer as May 05, 2015 once paid through BNY and BofA 2011 settlement agreement. Also, Resurgent Capital Servicing should have been servicing Dawson’s loan in compliance with the FTC Settlement, Case # CV-4193 as of 2010; and Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co735 F.3d at 225, 228. From this case and others you can determine that the CWAB, Inc.; are home equity based loans; as seen on ROA.53-55. Dawson believes her equity was stolen because Black folks are not supposed to have equity in their homes let alone a home, and not surprising but typical of banks to create fake accounts like Wells

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Fargo to unjustly enrich themselves; some get caught while others do not. Moreover, BNY was trustee of the “liens”; for the home equity or second mortgage loans within the CWAB certificates and not the “deed of trust” which becomes obsolete or null in a Pooling Service Agreement, PSA. Therefore, BNY cannot foreclosure on the “note.” Because they do not have title and Dawson is not part of the PSA, plus they have been paid in full as previously discussed. If so, then BNY is not the “mortgagee;” and their entire foreclosure proceedings are defected. In addition; “Notices to the defaulting borrower must be given in accordance with Property Code sections 51.002 et seq. and the deed of trust. The content of foreclosure notices is technical and must be correct to insure a valid foreclosure that cannot later be attacked by a wrongful foreclosure suit. Clients often protest when their lawyer advises renoticing the debtor—"But I've already sent them an email telling them they are in default."

"To lawfully exercise an option to accelerate upon default provided by a note or deed of trust, the lender must give the borrower both notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration, and in the proper sequence." Further, "both notices must be clear and unequivocal." Karam v. Brown, 407 S.W.3d 464 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013, no. pet.). Accordingly, two certified mail notices to the borrower are required, the first being a "Notice of Default and Intent to Accelerate" which gives formal notice of the default and affords an opportunity for the borrower to cure it (at least 20 days for a homestead, although if the deed of trust is on the FNMA form, 30 days must be given). Note that S.B. 766 and S.B. 472, which did not make it out of committee in the 81st Legislature, would have extended the 20-day period. This legislation may be revived in the future. Many lawyers consider it best to routinely give a 30-day notice. After the cure period has passed, a "Notice of Acceleration and Posting for Foreclosure" must be sent at least 21 days prior to the foreclosure date. This second letter must also specify the location of the sale and a three-hour period during which the sale will take place. A notice of foreclosure sale should be enclosed. This notice is also filed with the county clerk and physically posted at the courthouse. If there is going to be a change in trustees it is also necessary to file a written appointment of substitute trustee.”

The court recognized and acknowledges the improper acceleration in ROA.454; Line 7. Consequently, the deed of trust and note cannot be separated as well established law. However; when Dawson loan was securitized; sold and pooled into CWAB. Inc., trust; asset backed, - 26 -

insured and guaranteed by Freddie Mac; Dawson’s deed of trust, DOT became null and void in place of a trust instrument a new Pooling Servicing Agreement, PSA security instrument; and you cannot pull out a DOT or note that has been securitized; because it is connected to and intertwined with many other loans; in order to foreclose a note that has been guaranteed through Freddie Mac securitization and insurance just because a borrower may have defaulted; which is why securitized collateralization notes are guaranteed and/or insured in the event of a default. However; these are the risks these institution take and in doing so destroy systemic systems in its path. The law requires the trusts be dissolved before foreclosing; and the debt holder (BofA) must refinance according to the special securitization laws; 12 U.S.C. § 34.83; which governs OREO collateralization debt securities; and nowhere in this statute does it stipulate the owner of this debt may “foreclose” only sell. Notwithstanding; in wrongful foreclosure cases the 5th Cir.; stated (well) the borrower should bear some of the risk; Dawson possibly could live with that even though her DOT did not stipulate the pooling and collateralization of her loan to further the lender’s own enrichment by using it to invest in plats in Florida and remove her loan off their books for market value cash and tax purposes. However, not to the point of being kicked to the curb; put out of her home of twenty years and made homeless all because Shellpoint refused loss mitigation help from the (TARP Freddie Mac funds) and Defendant now understands why BofA and Shellpoint refused to do a modification) resulting in part of the TARP money having to be refunded in part because these institutions are unwilling to help the public but want to make interest off of bailout funds to use for their own advantage and enrichment because average folks are not allowed to own property; plus these REMICs beginning with CW and CR cannot be modified because they are equity based. In addition, to why they will not refinance in accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 34.83; - 27 -

because it would give some symbolist of control back over to the borrower. These out dated debt trusts should be dissolved now that the notes and investors have been paid. Furthermore, 12 C.F.R. 34.83; stipulates the deed of OREO properties may be sold to investors or contracted but not by way of foreclosure. Because truly Dawson’s note has been paid through TARP funds, write offs; more bail outs but more importantly by Dawson’s lender title insurance paid to lender in the event of her loan was (unlawfully) modified thereby losing first lien priority but is not recorded or disclosed; so how can one successfully defend against these types of tactics? Nonetheless, now that these trust certificates have been repurchased and is now considered collateral debt in which BNY is the indenture trustee.

Securitized loan trusts cannot be

converted back into the same DOT instrument before or after any trust dissolvement. The PSA that gave the authority to a lender to foreclose without the borrower’s consent or signature; and cannot co-exist at the same time as a Pooling Service Agreement, PSA, in which borrowers may not challenge but stipulates the governing clauses and servicing of the trust in lieu of the DOT.

Therefore; securitized collateral notes cannot be legally foreclosed on due to default as long as the trust and PSA are in governing effect according to Dawson’s lawyer consultation. Initially, borrowers were told you must obtain a copy of your PSA to fight a foreclosure until the courts struck that down and said we are not a party to the PSA and if we are not a party to; then surely our DOT has become obsolete and/or to a PSA and/or remains valid with borrower otherwise the lender or servicer would not be asking borrowers to sign over their “deed of trust”, DOT/title in lieu of foreclosure so they can list the property in a “short sale”. Nonetheless, Dawson would not sign over title because the DOT entails three parties, the lender, trustee and borrower and the previous owner BofA forfeited their part of the DOT through securitization and quit claim deed. As seen in ROA and Shellpoint’s letter; letter dated May 24, 2018; 3rd para., - 28 -

“full title is not in possession of the beneficiary or BONY, therefore, the property is not considered what is commonly referred to as “real estate owned””. They are using the PSA and do not have “full title;” they do not have possession of the title while the PSA and securitized trust are in effect which supersedes the DOT; again the two may not co-exist; and Dawson is not part of the PSA and should not be foreclosed on. Also, the note was previously paid by investors and has no mortgage/balance which has been paid in full and upon the release of the trust notes the DOT has reverted back to the borrowers and BofA only repurchased the notes. According to Shellpoint; if a beneficiary releases its lien on the property full title would then be in possession of the homeowner/borrower (party with vested interest in the property).” The beneficiaries in the trusts/PSA have release the lien(s); and are barred from further claims. Therefore, the DOT reverted back to the borrower according to Shellpoint and securities laws regarding collateral securitization. These are the risks these banks take and it is their duty to try and “refinance” not modify or suffer the loss for repurchasing debt because Dawson did not consent to pooling securitization nor does she have any vested interest in a PSA. However, Dawson does have vested interest in the DOT which gives lenders the authority to foreclose in which the lender did not sign the DOT according to law and does not have any vested or legal interest in the DOT after collateral securitization; and the DOT must be signed by both parties according to law; by the borrower and lender; only the note may have a one party buyer signature. There are just too many improprieties surrounding this wrongful foreclosure and third party purchaser in which the law states is grounds for the foreclosure to be set aside. Nevertheless, Appellees (Shellpoint & BofA) wants to continue this sham unchecked. However, Dawson has complained to the Texas Attorney General and Saving, Mortgage Lending agencies.

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In this petition, Dawson seeks review of a Wrongful Foreclosure; Management Order, Partial judgment order—to wit, Opinion on Detainer and Obedience Order, and Order on Annoyance; dated September 21, 2018. Also, Dawson’s motion for leave to amend on the ground that she supposedly had no standing because she defied a preclusion order issued on March 05, 2014. In addition to the management order denying Dawson leave on September 18, 2018; in which the court has no jurisdiction over States “vacates” notices and evictions. These partial judgments appear to be issued out of bias to deny Dawson due process under the law because they cannot be appealed until after the irreparable harm has been done as a strategy and should be unlawful, with complete disregard for motion to dismiss when no standing is found. Dawson had a lawful Temporary Restraining Order; TRO in place at the time Appellees foreclosed in defiance of the TRO; Dawson was not restrained from filing for injunctive relief; or that she needed permission to do so. Dawson’s intentions were not to sue because Appellees had no standing and if appeal therein Appellees would probably have been ordered to start the process over and/or issued a preliminary or permanent injunction by the court. Consequently, Appellee’s removal to the U.S. District Court; ROA.6-11; was unlawful and in accordance with Dawson’s “reply to defendant’s removal.” ROA.187-202. Her TRO’s were filed for injunctive relief and not meant to become lawsuits. Because of the erroneous removal Dawson was not afforded a chance to argue; prove or establish standing and lack thereof by Appellee’s; because every time she opened her mouth the Judge became very agitated. Nevertheless, if no standing for was found the court should have dismissed her case in accordance with Appellee’s motion to dismiss; wherein Dawson may appeal properly. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

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Appellant believes the district court order to vacate was issued in error and is also a matter for review under the civil diversity rules and jurisdiction. A court inherent authority does have limits; if the court’s initial actions were inappropriate or made in error may be waived or overturned. In addition, to Dawson being precluded from further suit against Appellees without the courts permission also should be overturned and/or waived because it is not warranted or properly substantiated. Appellant do not believes all appropriate steps in the Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 41 was complied with before issuing a preclusion order. Plus it is inconclusive and do not define what type of preclusion it is. Three elements must be satisfied in order to apply the

doctrine.



There must be a prior litigation in which the identical issue was brought before the court.



The issue must be actually litigated in the first judicial proceeding, and the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first judicial proceeding.



The issue must necessarily be decided and rendered as a necessary part of the court’s final judgment. Dawson believes this is a grave miscarriage of justice given the gravity of this situation;

and evident by the transcript that the court “do not care” about previous case law or regulations and believes she is being attacked for no justifiable reason. Dawson do not believes she has violated the preclusion order because she did ask permission to sue but was denied in federal court; ROA.246; but the same law suit was also filed in state court and removed to federal court to Judge Hoyt. Moreover, to date over two (2) months later Appellees still have not complied with the partial judgment or the sound advice from this court to evict Dawson; apparently there is no hurry or harm caused to Appellees. - 31 -

However, Appellees like to exaggerate to make Dawson look bad but offer no explanations for their contempt of court; misconduct or show in anyway how they have been injured or have standing; and is why they are hesitant to proceed in state court. Nor elaborate on the number of times their clients have been rightfully sued. Appellee’s wants Dawson sanctioned but who is going to sanction them for their contemptuous acts and violations. Appellees were correct in stating the law; that even if you believed an order was incorrect or made in error is no justification or reason to disobey it; this applies to Appellee’s as well; in which they disobeyed Dawson’s TRO dated August 06, 2018 and COA Preliminary injunction dated November 13, 2018; by endeavoring to continue to re-set a hearing. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975). Dawson has not violated Rule 11; no documents have been submitted to harass or cause unnecessary delay or expense; and she would not be in this predicament if these known predatory lenders would do their jobs properly; follow the law and stop scheming, scamming, twisting and bending the law; and disclose to their customers what is actually transpiring with their loan. Dawson has only filed two suits against Appellee as described above and recently have only responded to their improper actions through injunctive relief which is not a harassment or otherwise. Moreover, there is no evidence on the record for the court to determine that Dawson signed and filed suits in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, when she merely responded to three of Appellee’s wrongful actions brought against her through injunctive relief which were not lawsuits in that the state court judge had to determine the merits for a lawsuit before proceeding. In addition, for Dawson to act in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment she must initiate an action first and without merit. Therefore, Appellees are in contempt for disobeying a Temporary Restraining Order, TRO and the wrongful removal of Dawson’s case to federal court. - 32 -

The court may have inherent powers under Rule 13 and 11; however, they must be within the courts subject matter jurisdictional limits and appropriate. ROA.187-201. Appellee’s alleges “The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;” which may or may not be true depending on the circumstances and should apply where appropriate. It is not clear when or how many times this supposedly contempt by Dawson transpired, however the transcript ROA.441; Line 4; indicates when Dawson filed for injunctive relief. Appellees would have the court believe when she filed for injunctive relief; and that she is not entitled to petition for injunctive relief in this matter which is not a lawsuit. However, the process of this entire ordeal appears to have been a set up to deprived hard working folks of their property hassle free and without due process. In addition, Appellees fabricated their notice of default supposedly given on January 10, 2015; using the U.S Postal Service to generate false certified mail certificates that were never completed or delivered to deceive the courts; ROA.414-428. Dawson was led to believe that due to her bankruptcy discharge Appellee’s were not attempting to collect a debt. The court stated that Dawson’s deed of trust authorized the selling of her loan numerous of times; however, it was never disclosed to her that her loan would be pooled and her property used as collateral to purchase plats/land in subdivisions for the enrichment of investors and lender. As of May 05, 2015; the new investor of Dawson’s loan is Bank of America due to their repurchase of CWAB, Inc.; certificates listed in the settlement agreement dated June 28, 2011; and referenced in BNY’s power of attorney; ROA.287-289. BNY is Trustee, and BofA lender/beneficiary; the previous investors had shared investment responsibility with Freddie Mac the guarantor of CWAB, Inc., loan certificates. In addition, Dawson’s title insurance paid the - 33 -

note in the event of a modification and loss of first priority through modification of her note. Therefore, Dawson has a constitutional right to defend self and property under the constitution. Appellant seeks the aid of this Court of Appeals to not only correct the structural due process errors, but may possibly conduct a trial de novo if necessary of the TRO and preceding Motion(s), orders and judgment and apply the express language of the lease to the factual findings. If this is done, it should be dispositive of the entire case. If not Dawson should be granted permission to sue for damages or asked that her wrongful foreclosure be set aside if all else fails. As a preliminary matter herein lays the issues; Appellant’s claims are not frivolous; she did not defy the court’s preclusion order and she is not seeking to congest the court(s). Appellant did not file four (4) lawsuits; the three TRO petitions alleged all involved this one foreclosure incident. Appellant first filed in county court which was the wrong court and the TRO was dismissed, she then non-suited and hired an attorney who after taking Appellant’s money she had to borrow wanted off the case because of the preclusion order given to him by Appellee’s counsel to scare him off. However, an order is an order right or wrong that applies to both parties and Appellee’s should not have defied the TRO or COA order dated November 15, 2018 by filing a two part motion to re-set. Maness v. Meyers, 419, 458 (1975).

Consequently; Appellant not being an attorney had to file this third TRO; which is now in federal court counting as four possible cases when in fact they are all one in the same. In addition; Dawson being in the right court to ask for permission to sue if Appellees was unwilling to correct their defects. However, the Judge had no intention of ever giving Appellant permission to sue regardless of the merits; he has made it crystal clear he does not even want her in his court room let alone listen to argument or consider valid evidence. The Bank of New - 34 -

York, Mellon is not the “mortgagee;” but the trustee and has been sued well over ten times by its employees; the public and investors more times than can be named in this brief. If you want to be a mortgagee in the State of Texas you must be registered with the Secretary of State in which BNY is not; only as trustee and the originator of “commercial” loans not residential. Dawson has not received a bill on the $200,000.00 note since February 2008; when her bankruptcy was discharged.

.

Wherefore, Appellant seeks relief pursuant to FTC Section 13(b) of the FTC 13 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), FTC case # CV10-4193; filed June 15, 2000 and the Court's own equitable powers, requests that the Court: Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future egregious violations of the Fair Trade Commission FTC Act; FDCPA and Texas Property Code Chap. 51. Appellant also seeks relief for any of the following; (1) rescission; (2) permanent injunction’ (3) the district Judge “final judgement” subsequent orders to be vacated and (4) dismissed as required if no standing is found; and/or; remanded back to state court for further proceedings after considering Dawson’s response to the removal; and/or whatever this Court deems appropriate.

Dawson has already demonstrated the impracticability of proceeding in federal court and will serve the public’s interest by not allowing attorneys to become judges in deciding what if any preclusion orders were violated in order to routinely defy court orders. Moreover, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing is not properly licensed with the state or has acquired the proper Texas “Mortgage Company License; ROA.332; which has substantially harmed Appellant by their lack of education, training, which Dawson’s property was foreclosed on after violating 12

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C.F.R. § 1024.35. Dawson has never wanted to fight with or sue anyone; only have a right to sue if necessary where most cases are eventually settled. The “United States antitrust law is a collection of federal and state government laws, which regulates the conduct and organization of business corporations, generally to promote fair competition for the benefit of consumers. The main statutes are the Sherman Act 1890, the Clayton Act 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914.” Moreover, members of Congress on the floor have told borrowers not to leave their homes because of fraud, securitization and TARP funds; (however, Dawson’s title insurance paid her note); even DOJ has sued BAC in part for flipping houses for 17 billion; and continuing to sell their foreclosed properties to third party purchasers when there are claims against the property under sworn Special Warranty Deeds which is a violation of security laws and continued deceptive practices toward investors; not to mention all the harm it as caused Appellant; and most lower the courts still by any means necessary protecting Appellees /Shellpoint who also need to be sued by DOJ as was BofA; otherwise they will continue to delved in fraud, abuse and deception. Appellant make all these remarks as a concerned and affected citizen. At least the third party purchaser can get his (money) back in accordance with the Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 21A.002(b); because the deed is voidable.

CONCLUSION Wherefore, Dawson appeal is strictly about a wrongful foreclosure and her right to sue for damages if necessary. She regrets and is grieved by having to continue to file appeals; and is only trying to well plead her case and not leave anything out to the best of her ability. Therefore; Dawson’s prayer is for the merits of a permanent injunction, rescission or have her case remanded back to state court for proper proceedings with permission to sue if necessary, have

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her wrongful foreclosure set aside in which Appellee’s are authorized to do or whatever this court deems appropriate. Because there are too many improprieties, defects and violations surrounding this foreclosure proceeding including a contempt of court by Appellees; and the low selling price of a trust loan that resulted from “collateralization;” which is based on market values in which she has vested interest. Also, BNY is not the “mortgagee” of Dawson’s DOT or “note.” Appellant was also going to show in State court a violation of Sec 23.08, Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code, a break in chain of assignments which would have resulted in Appellees having no standing and is not a registered “mortgagee”, with the state nor did BNY issue the deposits; and as long as the PSA is enforce the deed of trust is moot or null. Plus title was sold to WFWP in Florida; and now they have sold a bad loan to a third party purchaser and is why investors are constantly suing Appellees. However, every time the public put forth claims to these laws they are changed; it appears the legislator’s and/or agencies uses public complaints to right laws in favor of businesses. Nonetheless, there is no list naming each creditor of the assigning debtor, nor does BNY hold the title.

Therefore, a rescission and permanent injunction is warranted stimming

from the initial TRO proceeding as an option. KEY WEST, FLORIDA: CIRCUIT JUDGE RULES THAT BREAK IN … foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=77

KEY WEST, FLORIDA: CIRCUIT JUDGE RULES THAT BREAK IN CHAIN OF TITLE TO MORTGAGE RAISES ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. As such and without proof of a continuous and proper chain of title to an assigned mortgage, it will no longer be “business as usual” for foreclosure attorneys or their clients.

In addition, to BNY telling Dawson that they are not the mortgagee in the email described above. This court has already ruled on what constitute a wrongful foreclosure in case number14-20678; David D. Ericson v. Resurgent Capital Services, dated July 30, 2015; and who - 37 -

or what constitutes a depositor. Therefore, the law requires when there are substantial improprieties surrounding a foreclosure it must be set aside rather than continue to burden the courts resources unnecessarily and waste taxpayer money.

Subsequently, in consideration of Dawson’s plight the court may simply de nova, and find after careful consideration of the ROA issue a rescission and permanent injunctive without having to rule on all motions and judgements individually. Respectfully submitted

Carolyn R. Dawson, Pro se 1802 Pecan Forest Drive Missouri City, TX 77459 Tel: (281) 809-5824 [email protected]

EXCERPTS (Under Separate cover)

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