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Introduction Nowadays the problem of effective and legal response to extremist manifestations is urgent for all countries, because there is a menacing tendency of the emergence of numerous organisations pursuing goals considered as threats for governmental safety, political, social and economic balance and peace. Every day, according to media, there are many vivid confirmations of increasing number of people and organisations exposed in extremist activities. This cases include a wide range of types and degrees of direct or indirect involvement in extremism. Certain features depend on how different actions are perceived in society, by government or defined by legislation. Among the variety of political extremism acts (which are the most widespread and could be effectively prosecuted by law unlike other types of extremism acts) should be emphasized the following: provoking public disorder, spreading leaflets , broadsheets and banners with information causing hatred and feud among groups of people, committing terrorist acts with specific purpose, prompting the overthrow of current political system or conducting other aggressive acts against government, or religious, ethnic and other parts of community. Some explorers of this problem consider that the main reasons, which facilitate growing of extremist activity in the country, are: social and economic crises, abrupt drop of level of life, constant suppression and excessive governmental control of opposite parties, organisations and etc. Nevertheless, the government gives its own definition of extremism and what actions should be indicated as extremist and be punished by law. In other words, this situation also depends on legislator’s decision concerning governmental and community safety. Every country uses unique methods and programs in order to counter extremism. Consequently, it is vital to analyze and review some of them for scientific purposes. Complex implementation of these options may be auspicious for every political system. This research outlines the measures taken in the USA, Russia and Great Britain.

Extremism in Russia In Russia, the legal definition of what acts are considered extremist is contained in the 1st article of Federal Law No. 114 "About countering extremist activity". According to the amendments of November 23, 2015, extremist activities (extremism) include:  violent change of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation;  public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activities;  inciting social, racial, national or religious strife;  promotion of the exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person depending of his social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;  violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and a citizen depending on his / her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;  obstruction of citizens ' exercise of their electoral rights and the right to participate in a referendum or violation of the secrecy of voting, coupled with violence or the threat of its use;  obstruction of the lawful activities of state bodies, local self-government bodies, election commissions, public and religious associations or other organizations, coupled with violence or the threat of its use;  commission of crimes on the motives specified in point "e" of part one of article of the Criminal code of the Russian Federation (extremist motive);  propaganda and public display of Nazi attributes or symbols, or attributes or symbols similar to Nazi attributes or symbols to the point of confusion, or public display of attributes or symbols of extremist organizations;  public calls for the implementation of these acts or the mass distribution of knowingly extremist materials, as well as their production or storage for mass distribution;

 public obviously false accusation of the person holding the state position of the Russian Federation or the state position of the subject of the Russian Federation in Commission by it during execution of the official duties of the acts specified in this article and being crime;  organization and preparation of these acts, as well as incitement to their implementation;  financing of the specified acts or other assistance in their organization, preparation and implementation, including by providing educational, printing and material and technical base, telephone and other types of communication or rendering information services. Having this instructions in law helps to outline criminal concepts and to protect the state, society, groups of people and individuals by prosecuting criminals. In addition, this list helps to emphasize the main directions of the countering extremism in Russia. However, some of the paragraphs are not specific enough and in some cases, the definition of extremist activity may include noncriminal acts. This definition of extremism has been criticized by European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). In its reports on Russia in the 2000s, the Commission constantly notes the vagueness of the concept of "extremism" in Russian legislation. The Commission has repeatedly recommended to revise the definition of extremism in the Federal law on countering extremist activity to ensure that it applies only to serious cases involving hatred and violence and to state clearly the criteria to be met in order to declare any extremist material. In the report of the Commission for 2015, the Commission also recommended as a priority to find ways to identify those Russian citizens, noncitizens and stateless persons who face obstacles in the residence registration procedure and facilitate their registration so that they are not denied access to their rights. Considering this comments, the Russian government defined the most important directions and made special list of extremist materials, which are

prohibited for distribution. Edition of this list is considered to be an effective measure of countering extremism on the Internet. Propaganda of information containing illegal context can be really dangerous, because the speed of its spreading can be enourmous, and at the same time it is quite difficult to identify the author or the distributor of this information. The tendency of the last years illustrates that extremist activities committed with using Internet sources and young people involvement become more frequent. That is why Russian government puts more effort to control information stream in social media – for example, enhanced control over information posted on social networks has led to increasing number of people have been prosecuted under article 282 (Arousal of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation. The data on the number of convictions under extremist articles by all Russian courts for the years are as follows (the total number of convictions under articles 282, 282.1 and 282.3 of the criminal code):  2013 — 227 convicts on basic qualification, another 48 convicts this qualification was imputed in addition to another crime;  2014 — 307 convicts on basic qualification, another 40 convicts this qualification is imputed in addition to another crime;  2015 — 414 convicts on the basic qualification, another 110 convicts this qualification is imputed in addition to another crime. In assessing these data, it should be taken into account that in 2015 there was a full-scale Amnesty in Russia, which terminated criminal cases against a number of those accused of extremism. According to the judicial Department, in 2015 there were articles 282-282.3 criminal cases against 107 persons (on basic qualification) and 16 persons on additional qualification were terminated on non-rehabilitating basis (including Amnesty). Such method has been criticized as well: the Chairman of the monitoring Committee of the parliamentary Assembly requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation "About countering

extremist activities". Based on this request the European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission) issued an opinion: 1. The law on extremism, due to its wide and inaccurate use of words, especially in the "basic concepts" defined in the Law, such as the definition of "extremism", "extremist activity", "extremist organizations" or "extremist materials", provides too wide a discretion in its interpretation and application, which leads to lawlessness. 2. The specific instruments provided for by the Law to counter extremism raise issues and contradictions related to freedom of Association and freedom of expression, which are guaranteed by the ECHR, and require amendments. 3. The law can contribute to the imposition of disproportionate restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, which are guaranteed by the European Convention on human rights, especially the right of freedom of speech. Later in 2018, the article was partially decriminalized. According to the amendments to the criminal code, it is assumed that actions aimed at inciting hatred or enmity, as well as at humiliating the dignity of a person or group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion, as well as belonging to any social group, committed publicly, including using the media or via the Internet, will be criminalized in the case of, if they are committed by a person after bringing him to administrative responsibility "for a similar act within one year" (in this case, a criminal penalty is provided up to imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years – the sanction itself does not change). As it was emphasized in the explanatory note, this is done "in order to exclude cases of criminal prosecution for acts committed once and do not pose a serious threat to the foundations of the constitutional system and the security of the state." As emphasized in the explanatory note, this is done "in order to exclude cases of criminal prosecution for acts committed once and do not pose a serious threat to the foundations of the constitutional system and the security of the state".

For the first violation, citizens will face an administrative fine of 10 thousand to 20 thousand rubles or mandatory work for up to 100 hours, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days. The partial decriminalization of article 282 of the Criminal code is a decision that, on the one hand, will eliminate cases of excessively severe punishment for a single careless publication or repost on the Internet, on the other – will retain responsibility for manifestations of extremism on the network. Prevention of extremist activities in Russia In the Russian Federation, the issues of countering extremist activity fall within the competence of the FSB of Russia, Regardie, the Main Directorate for countering extremism of the Russian interior Ministry. In order to counter extremist activity, Federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local self-government bodies, within the limits of their competence, carry out preventive, including educational and propaganda measures aimed at preventing extremist activity as a matter of priority. No less important is determination of responsibility of officials, state and municipal employees for their extremist activities, because their actions have huge influence on groups of people. So, their statements about need, admissibility, possibility or desirability of implementation of extremist activity made publicly, or at execution of official duties, or with indication of the post, and equally failure by the official according to its competence of measures for suppression of extremist activity involves heavier responsibility established by the legislation of the Russian Federation. The relevant state bodies and higher officials shall immediately take the necessary measures to bring to justice the persons who have committed the actions referred to in part one of this article. Citizens of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens and stateless persons shall bear criminal, administrative and civil liability for carrying out extremist activities. In order to ensure state and public security on the grounds and in accordance with the procedure provided for by Federal law, a person who

participated in the implementation of extremist activities may, by a court decision, would have restricted access to state and municipal service, military service under contract and service in law enforcement agencies, as well as to work in educational institutions and engage in private detective and security activities. If the head or a member of the governing body of a public or religious association or other organization makes a public statement calling for extremist activity, without indicating that this is his personal opinion, this association or organization would be obliged within five days from the date on which the said statement was made, publicly express their disagreement with the statements or actions of such a person. If they do not make such a public statement, it can be considered as a fact indicating the presence of signs of extremism in their activities.

Legal definitions in the United States Unlike legal definitions given in the Russian Federation, in the United States, the expression of extremist views is protected by the First amendment to the Constitution, and term "extremism" is not widely used in legal practice. Similar crimes in some States of the USA are often qualified as "hate crimes" or “hate speech”. This is a special legal qualification of a special kind of crimes against the person committed under the influence of hatred to persons of another race or nationality, religion, ethnic origin, political beliefs, gender and sexual orientation, persons with disabilities. Such additional qualification aggravating guilt and toughening punishment exists in some States of the USA, in some countries of Western and Central Europe, but may be absent in other States. Hate speech in the United States is not regulated, in contrast to that of most other liberal democracies. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that hate speech is legally protected free speech under the First Amendment. The most recent Supreme Court case on the issue was in 2017, when the justices unanimously reaffirmed that there is effectively no "hate speech" exception to the free speech rights protected by the First Amendment.

A hate crime (also known as a bias-motivated crime or bias crime) is a prejudice-motivated crime which occurs when a perpetrator targets a victim because of his or her membership (or perceived membership) in a certain social group or race. Examples of such groups can include and are almost exclusively limited to: sex, ethnicity, disability, language, nationality, physical appearance, religion, gender identity or sexual orientation. Non-criminal actions that are motivated by these reasons are often called "bias incidents". "Hate crime" generally refers to criminal acts which are seen to have been motivated by bias against one or more of the social groups listed above, or by bias against their derivatives. Incidents may involve physical assault, damage to property, bullying, harassment, verbal abuse or insults, mate crime or offensive graffiti or letters (hate mail). Hate crime laws are distinct from laws against hate speech: hate crime laws enhance the penalties associated with conduct which is already criminal under other laws, while hate speech laws criminalize a category of speech. Hate speech laws exist in many countries. In the United States, hate crime laws have been upheld by both the Supreme Court and lower courts, especially in the case of 'fighting' words and other violent speech, but they are thought by some people to be in conflict with the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, but hate crimes are only regulated through threats of injury or death. According to the FBI Hate Crime Statistics report for 2006, hate crimes increased nearly 8% nationwide, with a total of 7,722 incidents and 9,080 offenses reported by participating law enforcement agencies. Of the 5,449 crimes against persons, 46% were classified as intimidation and 32% as simple assaults. 81% of the 3,593 crimes against property were acts of vandalism or destruction. In 2015, the Hate Crimes Statistics report identified 5,818 single-bias incidents involving 6,837 offenses, 7,121 victims, and 5,475 known offenders. Another cathegory of threats is called “violent extremism”. It includes aggressive acts against the government and has strong relation with terrorism. Violent extremism Violent extremism refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to achieve radical ideological, religious or political views. Violent extremist views can be exhibited along a range of issues, including politics, religion and gender relations. Though “radicalization” is a contested term to some, it has come to be used to define the process through which an individual or a group considers violence as a legitimate and a desirable means of action. It is often used as a code name for Islamic terrorism. In the American military domain, the term "violent extremist organizations" or VEO is now used. The government defines VEO as groups of "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political

goals".These groups include both ideologically-motivated international terrorist organizations (ITO) and homegrown violent extremists (HVE). Measures taken to counter violent extremism In the United States, acts perpetrated by violent extremists can have far-reaching consequences. Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (TPP) aims to address the root causes of violent extremism by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote the use of counter-narratives to confront violent extremist messaging online. Building relationships based on trust with communities is essential to this effort. The Department of Homeland Security issued a notice of funding opportunity on July 6, 2016 announcing the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program, the first federal grant funding available to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutions of higher education to carry out countering violent extremism programs. These grants will provide state, local and tribal partners and community groups— religious groups, mental health and social service providers, educators and other NGOs—with the ability to build prevention programs that address the root causes of violent extremism and deter individuals who may already be radicalizing to violence. The Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP) emerged in order to manage this work. The mission of OTPP is to enhance education and community awareness regarding the threat, provide resources as appropriate to terrorism prevention stakeholders, coordinate relevant Department of Homeland Security terrorism prevention activities, actively counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment, and promote early warning so that our frontline defenders can intervene to stop attacks and help prevent individuals from going down the path to violence. OTPP implements a full-range of partnerships to support and enhance efforts by law enforcement, faith leaders, local government officials, and communities to prevent radicalization and recruitment by terrorist organizations. Its objectives are: 

Community Engagement. OTPP works with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to facilitate community engagements to build awareness and promote dialogue with community partners, which includes engagements with DHS senior leadership;









Field Support Expansion and Training. OTPP supports DHS field staff across the country to develop and strengthen local partnerships and to provide training opportunities; Grant Support. OTPP worked with FEMA to provide $10 million in grants to community-based programs under the FY2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program. Those projects have a period of performance that runs through July 2019. Philanthropic Engagement. OTPP works with the philanthropic community to maximize support for local communities, and encourage long-term partnerships; Tech Sector Engagement. OTPP engages the tech sector to identify and amplify credible voices online and promote counter-narratives against violent extremist messaging.

Education as an effective measure to prevent the recruitment for committing crimes The role of education in preventing violent extremism and de-radicalizing young people has only recently gained global acceptance. The main direction is to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth and discourage their participation in acts of violence, terrorism, xenophobia, and all forms of discrimination. Education has been identified as preventing radicalisation through:   



Developing the communication and interpersonal skills they need to dialogue, face disagreement and learn peaceful approaches to change. Developing critical thinking to investigate claims, verify rumours and question the legitimacy and appeal of extremist beliefs. Developing resilience to resist extremist narratives and acquire the socialemotional skills they need to overcome their doubts and engage constructively in society without having to resort to violence. Fostering critically informed citizens able to constructively engage in peaceful collective action.

This program aims to instill respect for human rights, social justice, gender equality and environmental sustainability, which are fundamental values that help raise the defences of peace against violent extremism. Extremism in the UK There have been many different definitions of "extremism". Peter T. Coleman and Andrea Bartoli in their book “Addressing Extremism” give observation of definitions: “Extremism is a complex phenomenon, although its complexity is often hard to see. Most simply, it can be defined as activities (beliefs,

attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary. In conflict settings it manifests as a severe form of conflict engagement. However, the labeling of activities, people, and groups as "extremist", and the defining of what is "ordinary" in any setting is always a subjective and political matter. Thus, we suggest that any discussion of extremism be mindful of the following: Typically, the same extremist act will be viewed by some as just and moral (such as pro-social "freedom fighting"), and by others as unjust and immoral (antisocial "terrorism") depending on the observer's values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of their relationship with the actor. In addition, one's sense of the moral or immoral nature of a given act of extremism (such as Nelson Mandela's use of guerilla war tactics against the South African Government) may change as conditions (leadership, world opinion, crises, historical accounts, etc.) change. Thus, the current and historical context of extremist acts shapes our view of them. Power differences also matter when defining extremism. When in conflict, the activities of members of low power groups tend to be viewed as more extreme than similar activities committed by members of groups advocating the status quo”.

In recent years, terrorist groups such as ISIL, Al-Qaida and Boko Haram have shaped our image of violent extremism and the debate about how to address this threat. Their message of intolerance – religious, cultural, social – has had drastic consequences for many regions of the world. Holding territory and using social media for real-time communication of their atrocious crimes, they seek to challenge our shared values of peace, justice and human dignity. On 15 January 2016 the Secretary-General presented a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to the General Assembly. On 12 February 2016, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that "welcomes the initiative by the Secretary-General, and takes note of his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism". The General Assembly decided to "give further consideration to the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism beginning in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June 2016 as well as in other relevant forums". The Assembly concluded its general debate on the plan of action to prevent violent extremism on 16 February.

https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/plan-action-prevent-violentextremism

Prevent is a cross-cutting policy led across Government by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office and delivered by a number of departments and agencies which all have specific policy interests in the Prevent strategy. Its aim is to stop radicalisation, reduce support for terrorism and violent extremism and discourage people from becoming terrorists.1 CLG contributes to the delivery of all elements of the strategy and leads the community-based response to violent extremism.2 2. Since 2000, the UK has enacted five main pieces of legislation to deal with terrorism.3 However, the Government also recognised that in the years following the events of 11 September 2001, legislation and security measures were not sufficient to deal with all of the consequential issues raised by terrorism. These issues included: x Finding practical ways to foil an attack rather than securing a conviction after the event when fatalities have occurred4 x Understanding why people become involved in terrorism5 x Working out how the UK can best protect its infrastructure6 x Understanding how the Government can assist the general public and the business community in being more resilient to the threat of terrorism7 . The current objectives of Prevent are: x To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices x To disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support people living in the communities where they may operate x To support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists x To increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism x To address grievances which ideologues are exploiting x To develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information x To improve strategic communications.12 6. In the UK, there has been an increasing emphasis on involving people and grassroots organisations in political decisions and in managing local environments. This is reflected within Government policy and governance. Formal responsibilities for

policy implementation and service delivery are being shared across statutory agencies and community groups in the form of partnership work. . Closely linked to the question of identity is that of the impact of the UK’s foreign policy. Recent examples of British foreign policy (for example the Government’s perceived hesitation in responding to the most recent Israeli bombardment of Gaza) are cited by many witnesses as a reason for some Muslims rejecting a ‘British’ identity, and a potential catalyst for radicalisation. Quilliam believes that this argument is flawed: The argument that radicalisation is driven by grievances, in particular about foreign policy and the idea of a “War on Islam”, is a popular one but one that is undermined by a comparison between Britain and America. If British foreign policy feeds into a narrative of a “War on Islam” then America’s foreign policy must also equally or more so. Yet, despite American Muslims sharing British Muslims’ concerns about a “War on Islam”, America has seen nothing like the home-grown 7/7 attacks.1 the Government take steps to clarify its understanding of the terms ‘violent extremism’, ‘extremism’, and ‘radicalisation’. Holding extreme views is not illegal and Prevent should clearly focus on violent extremism. Extending Prevent interventions to those holding extreme views should only take place where there is a risk that an individual’s adherence to an extremist ideology may predispose them to violence. The Government should ensure that this understanding is shared widely across the range of its partners in delivering Prevent-related projects. Between April 2017 and March 2018, the U.K. government noted an increase of 36 percent of the number of people referred to the government’s counter-extremism program for far-right activities. The United Kingdom has taken steps to counter far-right extremism. In December 2016, Home Secretary Amber Rudd banned the neo-Nazi group National Action, officially outlawing membership and support of the group. National Action, which has held demonstrations in British cities bearing banners saying “Hitler was right,” is now classified as a terrorist organization. The classification marks the first time that membership of a far-right group has been prohibited in the United Kingdom. Rudd declared, “National Action is a racist, antisemitic and homophobic organization which stirs up hatred, glorifies violence and promotes a vile ideology…It has absolutely no place in a Britain that works for everyone.” (Sources: Gov.UK, CNN, Guardian, Independent)

Despite the group’s proscription, National Action members have reportedly continued to meet under different group names to avoid conflicting with the ban. In July 2017, whistleblower Robbie Mullen informed authorities of plans to kill Labour Party parliamentarian Rosie Cooper. During the June 2018 trial of National Action leader Christopher Lythgoe and five other members, Mullen described preparation for a so-called “white jihad.” National Action member Jack Renshaw pled guilty to buying a knife to kill Cooper, but denied membership in National Action. The following month, Lythgoe received an eight-year prison sentence for membership in a banned group. (Sources: Sky News, BBC News, BBC News) In December 2016, Home Secretary Amber Rudd banned the neo-Nazi group National Action, officially outlawing membership and support of the group. Britain First is a far-right, nationalist party formed by members of the British National Party in 2011. The group views itself as a “patriotic political movement” but has no representation in the British government. A video on Britain First’s website shows members at a so-called training camp in North Wales learning combat techniques. In a self-described “invasion” in May 2014, Britain First sent members to Whitechapel’s East London Mosque with army-issued Bibles and Christian pamphlets. The group has also formed so-called “Christian patrols” to hand out anti-Islam pamphlets to Muslims in London, Luton, and other cities. Britain First has promised to be the first “professional, patriotic, nationalist campaigning organization” and promised to “get our country back.” Fourteen churches and Christian groups representing every Christian denomination in the country issued a joint condemnation of Britain First as “extremist” and accused the group of “hi-jacking the name of Jesus Christ to justify hatred and spread fear.” In April 2016, members of Britain First carrying signs declaring “No more mosques” protested outside a mosque in Whitechapel, London. The demonstration ended in violent confrontation with counter-protesters, which Britain First described as “aggressive Muslims assembled who promptly attacked our activists, stealing expensive camera equipment, and inflicting violence on our activists.” (Sources: International Business Times, Daily Mail, Huffington Post UK) On June 16, 2016, Member of Parliament Jo Cox was murdered by an assailant who reportedly shouted “Britain First” before the attack. Other witnesses have disputed the claim and Britain First has denied any connection to the attack. In November 2016, Member of Parliament Louise Haigh called for the British government to proscribe Britain First as a terrorist organization. (Sources: National Post, MSN) The English Defence League (EDL) emerged in Luton in 2009 to take a stand against radical Islam in Britain, according to its leaders. The EDL believes that British society is under attack by Muslim extremists. British media has routinely referred to the EDL as a far-right group, which has “aggressive rallies” at Luton’s Central Mosque and violently clashed with anti-fascist protesters. In 2011, EDL

members joined vigilante patrols in southeast London and clashed with police. Matthew Collins of the British NGO Hope Not Hate told British media in 2013 that the EDL had become increasingly fascist in its protests and went from being concerned about extremism, to them radicalising themselves.” A 2013 British media poll after the Lee Rigby murder found that 61 percent believed that the EDL made terror attacks more likely. In October 2013, the EDL’s founder, Tommy Robinson, quit the group citing concerns of far-right extremism. Domestic Counter-Extremism Following the September 15, 2017, London underground bombing, the United Kingdom raised its terror threat level to its highest level of “critical,” indicating suspicion of an imminent attack. The threat level returned to the next lowest level of “severe” two days later. The government previously raised the threat level to critical after the May 22, 2017, Manchester suicide bombing. Prior to the Manchester attack, the terror threat level had been at the second-highest level of “severe” since 2014. Less than a week after the Manchester attack, the government lowered the alert level back to severe, indicating an attack is highly likely but not imminent. In December 2016, MI6 head Alex Younger declared that the United Kingdom and other European democracies faced a “fundamental threat” from cyberattacks, propaganda, and “subversion of the democratic process” by hostile states. ISIS and its sympathizers pose an “unprecedented” threat, Younger also said. (Sources: Fox News, BBC News, BBC News, Telegraph, Guardian, Guardian) Since Khalid Masood’s March 2017 car-ramming attack, British authorities have stopped several threats. On April 27, 2017, London police arrested a 27-year-old man carrying knives outside of Parliament. In unrelated action the following day, police raided house in west London and Kent, foiling what they said was an active terror plot. Six people were arrested in the raids and a female suspect was shot and wounded. (Sources: New York Times, BBC News) British authorities reported a total of 273 terrorism-related arrests in 2018, a 41 percent decrease from the 465 arrests in 2017. The Home Office partly attributed the decrease to the high number of arrests in 2017 following terror attacks in London and Manchester. The government also reported that there were 221 persons incarcerated on terrorism charges as of December 31, 2018, a 1 percent decrease from the 224 incarcerations as of December 31, 2017. It is the first yearover-year decrease since 2013. Of those in custody on terrorism charges as of December 2018, 79 percent held Islamist views, 13 percent held far-right views, and 8 percent subscribed to other ideologies. (Source: U.K. Home Office) British law enforcement has contended with limited resources and budget cuts, which have curtailed terrorism investigation and prevention initiatives. Between 2010 and 2015, the national police budget decreased by £2.3 billion. There were

122,859 police officers in England and Wales in 2016, down from a high of 144,353 in 2009. In June 2017, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Cressida Dick warned that police had fewer resources for “forward-looking” intelligence to prevent future attacks because they were spending more time on “backwardlooking” investigations into recent terror attacks. This has put a tremendous strain on British police resources and stalled several ongoing investigations, she said. In a letter to Home Secretary Amber Rudd, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley wrote of the “significant impact” of terror investigations on other crime prevention in England and Wales. (Sources: BBC News, Guardian, Guardian) In the wake of the June 2017 London Bridge attack, the British government instituted a three-month emergency plan called Operation Roset in order to strengthen British counterterrorism efforts. The plan includes reassigning police officers from other investigations to focus on counterterrorism. U.K police heads have requested assurances that the increased counterterrorism operations will not come at the expense of non-terrorism-related police investigations. In late June 2017, Rudd acknowledged in Parliament that British police resources had been stretched “very tightly” in confronting a “new phase” of the terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom. The British Home Office pledged to increase counterterrorism funding to police by 30 percent by 2022. (Sources: BBC News, Guardian, Guardian) Few British police officers carry live firearms. British police chiefs reportedly fear that their armed officers could face public accusations of misusing their firearms on suspects. However, the Police Federation of England and Wales reported in May 2016 that a national shortage of armed officers leaves Britain vulnerable to terror attacks. As of March 2016, only 2,139 of London’s 32,000 police officers (6.7 percent) were armed. According to a January 2017 poll by the Police Federation of London’s officers, 43 percent believed there should be more specialist firearm officers, while 26 percent believed that all officers should be regularly armed. (Sources: Telegraph, Guardian, BBC News, BBC News) Throughout 2016 and 2017, the United Kingdom has taken steps to increase the number of armed police officers in the country. In April 2016, British police announced plans to arm 1,500 more police officers nationwide. In August 2016, Scotland Yard armed an additional 300 London police officers, raising the number of the city’s armed officers to just under 3,000. The additional armed officers included members of the Metropolitan Police’s counterterrorism unit, which would carry SIG 516 semi-automatic carbines and Glock 9 mm pistols. Despite the planned increases, the Police Federation has warned that recruiting and training an additional 1,500 armed officers could take up to two years. In May 2017, the British government allocated an additional £114 million to fund 1,000 additional armed officers over five years. (Sources: Independent, Telegraph, Telegraph, Guardian, BBC News)

Activity to prevent terrorism in the United Kingdom is presently at its highest level in years. MI5 increased its operations throughout the country after the 7/7 bombings. The intelligence agencies also increased their cooperation and expanded their recruitment. MI5 head Andrew Parker said in October 2016 that the agency had stopped 12 jihadist plots in the United Kingdom in the last three years. According to Scotland Yard, there were more than 299 terror-related detentions for the year between March 2014 and March 2015 as a result of police conducting “exceptionally high numbers of counter-terrorism investigations.” Of these, 16 people who returned from Syria were charged. In addition to devoting more resources to counterterrorism investigations—leading to greater numbers of arrests—U.K. security forces are also seeking to sever the sources of radicalization. As of October 2014, there were 100 Syria-related “preventative activities” each week, and police are removing thousands of pieces of illegal online material showing beheadings, murders, torture, and suicides. Over 80 percent of the content is related to Iraq and Syria. (Sources: Guardian, Guardian, Guardian, Guardian) In the aftermath of the May 22, 2017, Manchester terror attack, British authorities for the first time barred British citizens suspected of going overseas for terrorism from returning. The so-called temporary exclusion order requires suspects to contact British authorities before they are allowed to return to the United Kingdom. (Source: Guardian) On March 21, 2017, the British government enacted a ban on laptops and tablets on U.K.-bound flights from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. The move followed a similar U.S. ban on electronics bigger than a cellphone on flights originating from eight countries in the Middle East and Africa. (Sources: BBC News, Al Jazeera) According to MI5, more than 60 percent of lone-wolf attackers provide clues that they are about to carry out an attack through changes in their behavior. Since 2004, MI5’s Behavioural Science Unit (BSU) has studied and attempted to identify behavioral signs in individuals that indicate they may be planning a terrorist attack. For example, Roshonara Choudhry, who stabbed parliamentarian Stephen Timms in 2010, reportedly quit her college course, emptied her bank accounts, and settled her student loan before she attempted to murder Timms. The BSU comprises criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and other specialists in the social scientists. The BSU uses intelligence information collected through networks of informants. Findings are then passed along to The BSU reportedly foiled at least seven terrorist plots in 2016 alone. The BSU is reportedly monitoring hundreds of British jihadists, including some 400 returned foreign fighters. The unit is charged with determining whether suspects are merely threatening action or actually intend to carry through. A member of the unit who spoke with the Times in August 2016 that “Many of those whom the service investigates have secrets from their family and friends. They many even lie to themselves about who they are.” The unit has

reportedly doubled in size since the 2013 murder of Lee Rigby. MI5 has labeled the BSU a valuable resource that “is regularly used by investigative and agent running teams to support assessments and decision making.” (Sources: BBC News, Times, Sun, Economic Times, Gov.UK) Social Media and Extremism Online A September 2017 study by the British think tank Policy Exchange found that online extremist content attracts more clicks in the United Kingdom than anywhere else in Europe. Worldwide, the United Kingdom is the fifth most frequent location for accessing jihadist content. The study further claimed that the majority of the British public would support legislation criminalizing reading online content that glorifies terrorism. (Source: Policy Exchange) British officials have criticized social-media companies for continuing to allow the proliferation of hate speech, including extremist content, on their platforms. In April 2017, a report by the U.K. Parliament’s Home Affairs Select Committee cited the “repeated” failure of social media companies to remove such content, which committee chairwoman Yvette Cooper called a “disgrace.” The committee accused Google, Facebook, Twitter, and other multi-billion dollar companies of forcing taxpayer-funded government organizations like the Metropolitan Police to monitor content on their platforms. (Sources: Reuters, Guardian, Newsweek) The committee called for social media companies to pay the extra costs of policing their platforms and fines for those that do not act against extremist content. The committee also recommended social media companies publicly report their efforts to moderate their platforms. Additionally, the committee requested the government enact new laws to further regulate extremist content online. The committee also called for fines for companies that fail to act against extremist content. (Sources: Reuters, Guardian, Newsweek) In May 2017, ahead of June’s national elections, British Prime Minister Theresa May promised to create government mechanisms to punish social media companies that failed to remove illegal content. May’s Conservative Party issued a political manifesto that promised a new tax on social media companies to fund “awareness and preventative activity to counter internet harms.” The manifesto also called for sanctions against companies that failed to remove extremist content. The following month, Home Secretary Amber Rudd reiterated May’s pledge to fight online extremism. (Sources: Telegraph, Reuters, Guardian) On June 13, 2017, May and French President Emmanuel Macron launched a joint campaign against online extremism. According to May, the joint campaign would seek to create a “legal liability” for Internet companies that do not remove extremist content from their platforms. May pledged that the Internet “must not be a safe place” for extremists. Writing in British media, Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley reaffirmed May’s position that extremist

content is too readily accessible online. (Sources: BBC News, NBC News, Guardian) During her September 2017 address to the U.N. General Assembly, May demanded that tech companies go “further and faster” to develop artificial intelligence tools to remove extremist content. May said that the United Kingdom, France, and Italy were partnering to pressure tech companies to remove extremist content within two hours of its discovery on their platforms. May imposed a onemonth deadline of the October 20 G7 meeting for tech companies to demonstrate that they are progressing appropriately. (Source: BBC News) 2015 Counterterrorism Measures The British general election on May 7, 2015, resulted in the formation of a Conservative Party majority government for the first time in almost two decades. In the wake of his re-election, then-Prime Minister David Cameron reiterated the United Kingdom’s commitment to targeting radicalization and the “poisonous Islamist extremist ideology” and announced a series of new legislative measures. Furthermore, Cameron posited that the country’s “passively tolerant society” had engendered neutrality “between different values” and encouraged “a narrative of extremism and grievance.” His comments were buttressed by specific legislative proposals submitted by then-Home Secretary Theresa May, including: 

  

 

“Banning Orders,” targeting organizations that operate within the law but nonetheless seek to incite extremist hatred in the public or seriously threaten democracy. Banning orders may also criminalize fund-raising for and membership of such groups; Extreme Disruption Orders targeting those who want to radicalize young people; Measures to shut down premises where extremists seek to influence others; Granting new powers and an £8 million investment to the United Kingdom’s charity watchdog, the Charity Commission, to identify charities financing extremists and terrorists. The commission has been criticized for previously failing to identify abuses of the charity sector system. The draft Protection of Charities Bill will also allow the Commission “to disqualify any trustee candidate they deem unfit;” Stronger immigration rules on extremists; and Enhanced powers for the United Kingdom’s communications regulator, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), to “take action against channels that broadcast extremist content.

(Sources: BBC News, Prime Minister’s Office, Independent) CONTEST

In 2003, the United Kingdom began implementing a long-term, comprehensive Counter-Terrorist Strategy known as CONTEST. It consists of four elements: stopping terrorist attacks; preventing people becoming or supporting terrorists; enhancing protection against terrorist attacks; and mitigating the impact of a terrorist attack. CONTEST was strengthened in 2009 under then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown. The United Kingdom’s current specific focus is on developing programs to monitor Internet based communications, as well as supporting the U.K. security industry to export services and products to other countries hosting major global events. Within CONTEST is the Prevent strategy. The strategy has three objectives: respond to extremist ideology, built relations with civil society groups, and provide support to prevent radicalization. Through Prevent, the government has funded sports activities, leadership development forums, discussions on current affairs, and other programs to boost communal engagement in combating extremism. The government has reportedly been reluctant to reveal specifics of the programs instituted under Prevent in order to avoid hindering their effectiveness through association with the government. Prevent has also received criticism from NGOs, teachers, and within the U.K. government. In 2011, the government restructured the program in light of criticism that authorities were using Prevent-funded programming to spy on Muslim communities. In February 2016, the U.K. independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, called for an independent review of Prevent because some elements of the program have been “ineffective or being applied in an insensitive or discriminatory manner.” U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Assembly Maina Kiai said that Prevent has “created unease and uncertainty around what can be legitimately discussed in public.” In a March 2016 interview with the Guardian, Kiai said that because of the program “some families are afraid of discussing the negative effects of terrorism in their own homes, fearing their children would talk about it at school and have their intentions misconstrued.” For example, in March 2016, teachers at a Luton nursery school overheard a 4-year-old pronounce “cucumber” as “cuke bum” and thought he was referring to a pressure-cooker bomb.

Polling released by the British think tank Policy Exchange in September 2017 suggested that British citizens are concerned about the availability of extremist content online. According to the poll:      

74 percent believe Internet companies should be more proactive in removing extremist content from their platforms 65 percent believe that the major Internet companies are not doing enough to combat online radicalization 72 percent said that Internet companies had a responsibility to combat and remove extremist content from their platforms 75 percent would support the creation of an independent monitor to regulate web companies’ compliance with counter-extremism laws 74 percent would support new legislation criminalizing the consumption of online extremist materials 73 percent would support new legislation criminalizing the possession and viewing of online extremist content

https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom

There have been many different definitions of "extremism". Peter T. Coleman and Andrea Bartoli give observation of definitions:[4] Extremism is a complex phenomenon, although its complexity is often hard to see. Most simply, it can be defined as activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary. In conflict settings it manifests as a severe form of conflict engagement. However, the labeling of activities, people, and groups as "extremist", and the defining of what is "ordinary" in any setting is always a subjective and political matter. Thus, we suggest that any discussion of extremism be mindful of the following: Typically, the same extremist act will be viewed by some as just and moral (such as pro-social "freedom fighting"), and by others as unjust and immoral (antisocial "terrorism") depending on the observer's values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of their relationship with the actor. In addition, one's sense of the moral or immoral nature of a given act of extremism (such as Nelson Mandela's use of guerilla war tactics against the South African Government) may change as conditions (leadership, world opinion, crises, historical accounts, etc.) change. Thus, the current and historical context of extremist acts shapes our view of them. Power differences also matter when defining extremism. When in conflict, the activities of members of low power groups tend to be viewed as more extreme than similar activities committed by members of groups advocating the status quo. In addition, extreme acts are more likely to be employed by marginalized people and groups who view more normative forms of conflict engagement as blocked for them or biased. However, dominant groups also commonly employ extreme activities (such as governmental sanctioning of violent paramilitary groups or the attack in Waco by the FBI in the U.S.). Extremist acts often employ violent means, although extremist groups will differ in their preference for violent vs. non-violent tactics, in the level of violence they employ, and in the preferred targets of their violence (from infrastructure to military personnel to civilians to children). Again, low power groups are more likely to employ direct, episodic forms of violence (such as suicide bombings), whereas dominant groups tend to be associated with more structural or institutionalized forms (like the covert use of torture or the informal sanctioning of police brutality).[4] Although extremist individuals and groups are often viewed as cohesive and consistently evil, it is important to recognize that they may be conflicted or ambivalent psychologically as individuals, or contain difference and conflict within their groups. For instance, individual members of Hamas may differ considerably in their willingness to negotiate their differences with the Palestinian Authority and, ultimately, with certain factions in Israel. Ultimately, the core

problem that extremism presents in situations of protracted conflict is less the severity of the activities (although violence, trauma, and escalation are obvious concerns) but more so the closed, fixed, and intolerant nature of extremist attitudes, and their subsequent imperviousness to change.[4] The Commission for Countering Extremism supports society to fight all forms of extremism. It advises the government on new policies to deal with extremism, including the need for any new powers.

The Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) will not look at terrorism, and has no remit on counter-terrorism policies, including Prevent. On integration issues, the Commissioner will discuss findings that may benefit the wider integration agenda with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. The CCE is a non-statutory expert committee of the Home Office. It operates independently, at arm’s length from government. In its first phase the CCE will: 

 

engage widely and openly on extremism and our fundamental, pluralistic values across the public sector, communities, civil society, families and legal and academic experts publish a study into the threat we face from extremism, and the current response advise ministers on the CCE’s future structures, work programme and the appointment of further commissioners – the Lead Commissioner’s engagement with stakeholders will inform this advice

https://www.dhs.gov/terrorism-prevention-partnerships

http://duma.gov.ru/news/29223

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