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Jammu and Kashmir’s Monthly Magazine

RNI : JKENG/2007/26070

ISSN 0974-5653

Now Telling The J&K Stories

Epilogue because there is more to know

Jammu, November 1, 2009 / Vol 3 / Issue 11 || Price Rs. 30 || Postal Registration No. JK-350/2009-11 || www.epilogue.in

BRIDGING Divides Via Talks & Trade Special on First Anniversary of Cross-LoC Trade

An Analysis of Joint Chamber -------------New Delhi's Fresh Peace Initiatives --------------Perspectives on Harnessing Indus Waters

INTERVIEW : NYLA ALI KHAN

RESEARCH :

Author of Islam Women & Violence in Kashmir

Socio-Cultural and Economic Changes Among Muslim Rajputs

Z ARCHITECTS Z INTERIORS Z DESIGNERS

HOME-N-HOME

RAKESH KUMAR GUPTA B.Arch, MCA [email protected]

Office : Hall No. 4, Auqaf Complex, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu - 04 Tele. : 0191-2430867, 2453710, Fax : 0191-2453710, Cell : 9419187337 Resi. : 42-C/C, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu. Tele. : 0191-2432255

B R I D G I N G

T H E

I N F O R M A T I O N

D I V I D E

Taking J&K Closer to World Bringing World Closer to J&K

Epilogue because there is more to know

35 Volume : 3, Number : 11 ISSN : 0974-5653

RNI : JKENG/2007/26070 www.epilogue.in F O R

T H E

M O N T H

O F

N O V E M B E R

2 0 0 9

The present issue coincides with two most important events in Jammu and Kashmir: 62

nd

anniversary of state's accession to the Union of India and first anniversary of Cross-LoC trade. Subjects touched upon are of timeline significance. An interview with Nyla Ali Khan unveils the mind of the author of a fresh and authentic study on Kashmir.

www.epilogue.in

Vol. 3, Issue 11

Epilogue, November 2009

J&K MOVING FORWARD ay issue was one of the rare collections of ideas where 12 natives from both sides of Jammu and Kashmir poured their ideas out of the heart on how boundaries can be blurred and relations can be strengthened.

M

May 2009

LOK SABHA POLLS 2009 ith Prof Rekha Chowdhary looking into various aspects, the May issue offered a complete view of the Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir. An interview with Finance Minister Abdul Rahim Rather explained most critical questions on the state's economy

W

June 2009

THE FUTURE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR uly 2009 issue offered a rare insight into the whole gamut of Kashmir issue. An ACDIS, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign sponsored study, which was the cover feature, examined Kashmir issue from different perspectives. July 2009

UNFOLDING THE LAND OF MOON ugust 2009 issue was one of the path-breaking in the life of Epilogue magazine. The cover story explored many aspects of life in Ladakh and carried a first hand of research on the state of media in the Himalayan cold desert.

A

August 2009

UNDERSTANDING J&K ECONOMY lost has been written and debated on politics of Jammu and Kashmir but nothing much on the economy. Reading into J&K's annual budget that was presented in August, Epilogue's September issue focused on developmental and economic profile of Jammu and Kashmir.

A

September 2009

JAMMU AS IT IS ammu, along with Ladakh, has often complained of neglect within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. October 2009 issue focused on regional identity of Jammu. This issue was in follow-up to similar special issue on Ladakh in August.

J

October 2009

A limited number of unbound back volumes is available in our stocks. For booking your copies call us at 9797599365

A R E Y O U M I S S I N G O U R PA S T S T O R I E S

J

3

Epilogue because there is more to know

g n i g d i r B s e d i Div

www.epilogue.in Editor Zafar Iqbal Choudhary Publisher Yogesh Pandoh Consulting Editor D. Suba Chandran Associate Editors Irm Amin Baig Tsewang Rigzin

CONTENTS Contributors to this Issue Essential Entries Prologue Letters

4 10 13 14

Books/Authors Nyla Ali Khan

Challenging Hegemony of Static Versions of History

38

Volume 3, Issue 11, November 2009

General Manager Kartavya Pandoh

IN FOCUS

Manager Adarsh Rattan Bali (Marketing & Advertisement)

Bridging Divides

Art Editor Keshav Sharma

9

Research Officer Raman Sharma

10

Phones & email Office : +91 191 2493136 subscriptions : +91 99060 27136 Editorial: +91 94191 80762 Administration: +91 94191 82518 [email protected] [email protected] Printed and Published by Yogesh Pandoh for Epilogue NewsCraft from Ibadat House, Madrasa Lane, Near Graveyard, Bathindi Top, Jammu, J&K - 180012 and Printed at : DEE DEE Reprographix, 3 Aikta Ashram, New Rehari Jammu (J&K)

A Window of Opportunity

Research Socio-Cultural and Economic changes among Muslim Rajputs: A case study of Rajouri District in J&K

44

Dr. M. Mazammil Hussain Malik

B.G. Verghese

14 30

PM in Kashmir An Olive Branch from Position of Strength

Features A Journey to Himalayan Enclave

54

Manisha Shobarjani

Epilogue Report

Spreading the Lamp of Learning - the Ladakhi Way

Promoting Cross-LoC Trade An Analysis of the Joint Chamber

A Trek Through Life

55

Zainab Akhter

Moeed Yusuf

Thinlas Chorol

Harnessing the Indus : From Treaty to Governance Perspectives from India

J&K In Numbers Power Sectors

57

59

D Suba Chandran

34

Harnessing the Indus Perspectives from Pakistan Nausheen Wasi

Disputes, if any, subject to jurisdiction of courts and competitive tribunals in Jammu only. RNI : JKENJ/2007/26070 ISN : 00974-5653 Price : Rs 30 www.epilogue.in

Vol. 3, Issue 11

Epilogue, November 2009

4

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Chandran, D Suba (In Focus, P..), is Deputy Director at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi and a Consulting Editor with Epilogue Chorol, Thinlas (Features, P..), is a Fellow with Charkha Communication and Development Network working on Ladakh Khan, Nyla Ali (Books & Authors, P..), is Associate Professor of English at the University of Nebraska-Kearney in United States. She is first Kashmiri woman scholar to have written a highly researched book on Kashmir conflict Malik, Dr M Muzammal Hussain (Research, P..), a research scholar, is presently Associate Professor of Sociology at Government Degree College Ramnagar in Udhampur district of J&K Sobhrajani, Manisha (Features, P..), is a Delhi based independent researcher working on the various aspects of Kashmir conflict. She divides her time between Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir

Varghese, BG (Perspective, P..), one of the most respected journalists, authors in India, has remained an Editor of the Indian Express and Hindustan Times. He was also Advisor to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Wasi, Nausheen (In Focus, P..), is Lecturer at the University of Karachi Yusuf, Moeed (In Focus, P..) is a Fellow at the Frederick S Pardee Center at Boston University, a Research Fellow at the Mossavar Rehmani Center at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a Research Fellow at Strategic and Economic Policy Research in Pakistan. He has been involved in track II meetings on Kashmir supported by United States Institute of Peace Zainab Akhter (Features, P..), is a Fellow with Charkha Communication and Development Network working on Ladakh

Readers' requests for getting in touch with the authors, for feedback, comments and further discussions on their subjects of interest, are welcome. Since all authors/contributors are not interested in taking mails directly, the readers are requested to send us interview requests at [email protected] for passing on to the authors

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Vol. 3, Issue 11

Epilogue, November 2009

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NO T I C E

BOARD

Essential Entries ON RECORD

ON REGISTER APPOINTED: Wajahat Habibullah is appointed as State Chief Information Commissioner of J&K on Oct 22. Until then CIC of India, as an IAS officer he earlier served J&K for nearly three decades ELECTED: Raja Farooq Haider Khan is elected on Oct 22 as Prime Minister of Pakistan administered Kashmir replacing Sardar Yaqoob Khan. HONOURED: Maharaja Gulab Singh, the founder of J&K, is honoured with a commemorative stamp on his 217th birth anniversary. Stamp is released in Jammu by MoS C&IT Sachin Pilot on Oct 21. AWARDED: Noted journalist, author and human rights activist Balraj Puri is nominated for Indira Gandhi Award for National Integration for year 2008. Puri also runs Institute of J&K Affairs at Jammu and is a leading public figure of the country RELEASED: Separatist leader Shabir Ahmed Shah is released from prison on Oct 20 after 14 months detention. He was arrested in August 2008 while leading the symbolic march to Muzaffarabad during Amarnath land row ARRESTED: A journalist and Editor of a Jammu based News Agency called NAK is arrested by Police on allegations of passing on security information of Pak intelligence agency ISI. He is booked under various sections of Enemy Act and IT Act

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Nation is committed to provide latest weaponry and other sophisticated gadgets to the troops for maintaining sanctity of borders in J&K President of India, Pratibha Patil during his visit to Rajouri on Oct 9

There is a political problem in Kashmir and it has to be solved through dialogue…there will be dialogue with every section of opinion on Kashmir…there will be a quiet diplomacy Indian Home Minister P Chidambram, at a Press Conference in Srinagar on Oct 14

It is a good and welcome sign. Hurriyat Conference is committed to dialogue with both India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir issue Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, reacting to Home Minister's offer for talks

Our tourism potential is biggest economic advantage. West is already enjoying Kashmir, now we need to adopt Look East policy to tap tourist from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore etc Chief Minister Omar Abdullah while inaugurating Kashmir festival on Oct 10

'The acts of terrorists across the globe underscore that terrorism is a global threat which transcends borders and religions and is not linked to any specific sect or religion or creed Union Health Minister and Former J&K CM at Conference on 'Terrorism --National and International' organised by Jama Masjid United Forum in New Delhi on Oct 27

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Epilogue, November 2009

6

P R O L O G U E

From the Editor

J&K and October Jinx Zafar Choudhary

Every year, towards the end of October, Jammu and Kashmir is found engaged in serious debates, discussions and introspections. Two prominent regions of the state, Jammu and Kashmir Valley, are seen divided in opinions as people attend symposia and seminars; they participate in celebrations at some places and protests at others. Elsewhere, in parts of India, in Pakistan and in many parts of world, Jammu and Kashmir is at the center of discussions. They discuss the past to take cues for future. It was in this year in 1947 that this state acceded to the Union of India. Many discussions revolve around accession –was it final or conditional. And then comes the day of October 27 –the anniversary of landing of Indian Army in Kashmir. The Valley shuts down to reiterate that there is a problem awaiting resolution. In Jammu, crackers are burst and sweets are distributed to mark the event as a historical victory. In rest of India, the day is celebrated as victory of Indian secularism and defeat of two-nation theory floated by Pakistan's founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In Pakistan this day is reminds the nation that one important agenda still remains unfinished. Seen from different places, there are different perspectives. For half of the October, every year, editors of newspapers in Jammu and Kashmir don't have to pursue with the writers for the op-ed page columns. There is a flood of articles with two sets of

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opinion –'accession was subject to ratification', 'accession was full and final'. The same story has been repeating year after year for last 62 years. The tragedy of Jammu and Kashmir can be located in most of these articles which are repetition of almost exactly the same what these writers had written and published 15 years back or 20 years back. Any discussion or writing going beyond these two well formed opinions is seen with contempt. It can be called unpatriotic in some parts of state or disrespect to hundreds and thousands of martyrs in other parts. It is now the third generation engaged in these discussions. Nothing has changed much. At Epilogue, we have strongly been of the opinion that all stakeholders will have to look beyond the status quo to move forward in Jammu and Kashmir. Some will have to do a little climbing down the ladder, others can take few steps upward to tell the world that Kashmir is no more any troubled region of the world awaiting intervention of world powers. There are two successful examples: militancy, of course, has not ended but a ceasefire on borders has been largely successful since November 2003. This reflects a will for restraint. Following initiation of Cross-LoC travel between parts of the state in 2005, the trade was launched in October 2008. Without even the basic facilities of banking and communications, it has now almost

Vol. 3, Issue 11

OCTOBER 2007

become a Rs 50 Million weekly trade. This reflects that peoples on both sides of the LoC are eager to shun the past and step into future arms-in-arms but they want the barriers to be removed. In context of J&K, Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh have often reiterated that redrawing of boundaries is out of question but making them irrelevant is the way forward. Translation of these words into action can certainly change the discourse Jammu and Kashmir is engaged in for 62 years. How many more Octobers we need to turn our backs to the past and face the future? Feedback : [email protected]

Epilogue, November 2009

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L E T T E R S

Readers Write Communalism, Jammu's own enemy Rekha Choudhary's argument “in Jammu region there is a political discourse that revolves around the issues related to regional deprivation and neglect. Kashmir in this discourse forms the center of power within the state and is perceived to be dominating not only the power structure of state but also controlling the economic and material issues” is an objective assessment of the regional problem (The Politics of Regional Identity, Epilogue, Oct 2009). The feeling in Jammu that Kashmir behaves as a big brother is lingering on for six decades but the regional leadership (if there is any) needs to share its responsibility. What defeats the cause of Jammu is the fact that every agitation in the region launched for the balance of power is based on communal premises. SHEIKH NISAR AHMED Kishtwar

Leadership vacuum Had Viveyata Sharma been wrong in her opinion (The Limits of Duggar Desh) on mass leadership in Jammu, there would have been any complaints in the region. Where is the political leadership in the region? The BJP has a clear communal agenda and therefore can never enjoy trust of entire region. The Congress always negotiates power in its interest with whosoever calls shot in Srinagar –yesterday it was PDP, today National Conference, tomorrow it may be Hurriyat Conference. We are reminded of 2002 assembly election campaign when the grand old national party of Nehru and Gandhi compromised with its political ideology to make regional empowerment of Jammu as a poll plank and later succumbed to the pressure of PDP. Its leader Ghulam Nabi Azad referred to mainstreaming of Assam and compared Mufti Mohammad Sayeed with Lal Denga to justify Congress decision of offering power to PDP. Leaders in Jammu region have been the representatives of their own assembly constituencies or at the most individual districts. The one from Bhaderwah does not know about aspirations of Kathua and vice versa. They have failed us.

OCTOBER 2009

Selective use of statistics Happy to note that Prof Hari Om stuck to just statistics (Jammu Region, the Story of Neglect, Epilogue, Oct 2009) and did not go much into the politics of regional bias on which he has written millions of words in past couple of decades. The problem, however, is that every issue can't be addressed be figures alone. Even as Hari Om makes out strong arguments on discrimination against Jammu with his figures, he has always chosen to use only one set of statistics which serves his standpoint. He would never talked about industries in Jammu, the upcoming of mega skyscrapers and most importantly the difference in total annual development expenditure in Jammu and Kashmir Valley.

ARUN JAMWAL University of Jammu, Jammu

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Mushtaq Ahmed Ganderbal, Kashmir

Epilogue, November 2009

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L E T T E R S

Readers Write Dangers of quiet diplomacy

Needed a follow-up

Union Home Minister P Chidrabram's policy statement, recently in Srinagar, on New Delhi's intentions to get engaged with different shades of opinion in Jammu and Kashmir in a 'quiet diplomacy' to find out solution of Kashmir issues has been widely welcomed barring few exceptions from BJP and the likeminded parties. Chidrambram's opinion that Kashmir is a political problem and needs to be resolved through dialogue, though criticized by BJP and likeminded parties, is again a welcome statement. It is this part of his statement (political problem) which has inspired the separatists to join the dialogue as Government of India has always refused to recognize Kashmir as a political problem. However, what confuses in Chidambram's statement is the proposed craft of holding dialogue in complete secrecy and revealing its contours only when the results are known. This is not fair. Is there is a problem that is about the people of Jammu and Kashmir and those people who do not fairly represent the people have no right to get engaged into a secret dialogue which peoples don't know about. What happens when Mirwaiz Farooq of Hurriyat Conference (or for that matter any other leader) arrives at an agreement with the Government of India but the peoples refuse to accept that. Will they (New Delhi) discard the previous decision and initiate a fresh exercise? Any formula discussed about the future of Kashmir should be first put to the public debate for getting feedback. Secret parleys can help the Government of India bring few separatist leaders into mainstream and not resolve the issue.

The effort to discuss Jammu (Jammu As It Is, Epilogue, Oct 2009) is appreciated but much more could have been done. There are set of perceptions which discuss certain problems of development and politics but the broad contours of Jammu region, diversity and clash of identities still goes unexplained. For example, problems and aspirations in Chenab Valley region –districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban have not been discussed properly. These regions have found just passing references. Editor may consider doing a follow-up on Jammu.

MIR IRFAN Srinagar

VIJAYAN MK Kottayam, Kerala

SUNAINA KOTWAL Bhaderwah

Where is news? Besides insights into issues of topical importance, we always look forward to read about important developments of the month in Jammu and Kashmir. Since there are no other media outlets in this state informing us about Jammu and Kashmir, Epilogue's section on essential stories would bring us a dossier of monthly developments which kept us informed about state's strides on development and politics. It was disappointing to see news section missing in October issue.

Honest statement Anmol Sharma's article (Discrimination Symptoms in our DNA) is an inspiration for the youth. It calls for breaking far from the narrow and divisive discourse of the so called leaders of regional empowerment and charting our own course with an intellectual capital. His article, as bitter as always, bring home a fact that how every Kashmiri contributes to the making of Kashmir and how every in Jammu is responsible for the poor plight of the region. His understanding, “Kashmiri has now started exerting himself as more academically…but on the other hand we (in Jammu) have no taste for reading good books which espouse wisdom, world-craft etc”, is an honest statement on the state of affairs in Jammu. NITIN KAPOOR, Jammu

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Epilogue, November 2009

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IN

FOCUS

Bridging Divides

A Window of Opportunity B.G. VERGHESE

There is a window of opportunity opening in J&K that must not be missed once again. This follows the Union Home Minister's statement that the Government intends to open and persevere with quiet talks with all sections of J&K opinion, including those outside the mainstream like the Hurriyat and . None can claim a veto or set conditionalities. Spoilers will be exposed.

EXCLUSIVE TO

Epilogue www.epilogue.in

The first and more important part of a J&K settlement is an internal resolution on matters of human rights, disappearances, displacement, autonomy, livelihoods and development generally. This must include bridging regional divides. Pakistan can have no role in this and must, rather, put right its own house in order in that part of J&K under its control which lacks the autonomy and freedom enjoyed on this side. The other part pertains to an external settlement with Pakistan which can now realistically only be along the LOC on the basis of making boundaries irrelevant (with no derogation to sovereignty on either side) as basically agreed in principle. This means halting the trans-border infiltration and mindless violence that Pakistan has wantonly indulged in, extending jihadi terrorism far afield to other parts of India, of which 26 /11 was a horrendous example. There are no true non-state actors as the jihadi organizations and Taliban have all been trained and sponsored by Pakistan and cannot masquerade under new names. To say that Pakistan is itself a victim of terrorism means little as it is the monster Pakistan has long bred, and even now patronises in part, that has turned on it. No one either in J&K or Pakistan can plead for more time to formulate their views. Nor can it be argued that “Kashmiris” must meet to decide on a common position before the internal dialogue commences. What will they discuss that they could not discuss earlier or have

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already discussed in recent years? Cross-border relations in turn will unfold and evolve over time. One urgent new issue is climate change that will hit J&K and the entire Indus basin. This will respect no boundaries and offers both a challenge and an opportunity. The Indus Treaty has worked fairly well. Both sides now need to avail of Article 7 of the Treaty on “Future Cooperation” to move towards joint investigation, development and management of the three Western rivers allocated to Pakistan (in which the Indian part of J&K has a modest share) but whose upper basins are controlled by India. This alone will permit the optimal development and utilization of the full potential of the Indus basin for the mutual benefit not only of all the people of J&K but also of India and Pakistan. Together with this, the Siachen issue can easily be settled by acknowledging the specific and unambiguous 1949 Karachi Agreement delineation of the LOC beyond the last demarcated point at grid reference NJ 9842 and “thence north to the glaciers”, without leaving any part as no-man's land as stipulated. Once this is done, the triangular area from NJ 9842 running NE to the Karakoram Pass and NW to K2 could be declared a Peace Zone and a scientific park for joint Indo-Pakistan glaciological, hydrological and meteorological studies, with international collaboration, in order to monitor and respond to climate change on the basis of real time data. This is the way forward.

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IN

FOCUS

Bridging Divides PM IN KASHMIR

An Olive Branch from Position of Strength EPILOGUE REPORT After months of mistrust and confusion, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has again warmed up the atmosphere for peace politics in Kashmir. Along with Congress President Sonia Gandhi, his two-day visit to the Valley has certainly put into motion a process to shorten distance between New Delhi and Srinagar. The ball is now seen to have rolled down in the court of separatists.

I

ndependence Day addresses of Indian Prime Ministers are heard with rapt attention in Kashmir. It was the historic speech of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on August 15, 2002 that that turned around the political landscape in Kashmir. Vajpyee recognized space of all shades of political opinions and promised free and fair elections. He lived up to the expectations. The following months of 2002 saw most credible elections in the history of Jammu and Kashmir and then began rounds of dialogue with separatists. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too carried forward legacy of Vajpayee and always addressed key issues from the ramparts of the Red Fort except for this year's Independence Day address which left the Kashmiris, particularly the separatists stunned. The Prime Minister said that successful two rounds of elections in Jammu and Kashmir –Assembly polls in late 2008 and Lok Sabha polls in early 2009 –with vigorous public participation is a proof that there is no space for separatist thought in the state. It was quite significantly different from Dr Singh's speeches in the last over five years as he had repeatedly stated that his UPA government believed in talking to all

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sections of opinion, including the separatists. While his unexpected statement made the separatists to accuse him of speaking in the “language of power”, the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah too was seen in a spot as on the same day he had called for a dialogue with separatists. PDP leader and former Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, a strong votary of dialogue, was blunt enough in disputing Prime Minister's interpretation of the massive public participation in elections. Observers believe that Prime Minister's statement was not quite out of place as he sought to underline the significance of electoral democracy and honour the people who participated in elections against all the risks involved. However, for separatists the Prime Minister's statement marked the end of the road to dialogue before Home Minister P Chidambram rekindled hopes in the middle of October. Chidambram's announcement of quiet diplomacy opened a new chapter in the peace process which earned an across the board welcome in Kashmir. Separatists have always been averse to the large assemblies of dialogue (like the roundtable conference which they boycotted); Chidambram's statement in

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Srinagar on October 14 allayed those fears. Much to the pleasure of separatists he said the dialogue will be on one-to-one and two-to-two basis and its results shall be known only after some conclusions are arrived at. Even if the talks fail, such exercise gives face saving to the parties engaged in the process. As Prime Minister unveiled his mind during his two-day visit to Kashmir, it appeared that Chidambram's visit, a fortnight back, was ground preparation exercise. Had Chidrambram not unveiled the dialogue blueprint in Srinagar, Prime Minister's would have landed in a Valley of mistrust and confusion as it was since August 15. Responding to Chidambram's offer of dialogue, the separatists, particularly the Hurriyat Conference headed by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq had set some conditions –downsizing of troops from the civilian areas, release of political detenues and recognition of Kashmir issue as a political problem. Half of it was done by Chidambram during his October 14 Press Conference when he said “there is a political problem in Kashmir and it has to be solved through dialogue”. Perhaps first such statement from any Indian leader in several

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IN

FOCUS Bridging Divides

decades. In the time between Chidambram's departure from Srinagar and Prime Minister's arrival on October 28, two formations of Indian Army had been pulled out of Kashmir Valley, a prominent separatist leader Shabir Ahmed Shah was out of the jail after 14 months and the unrelenting hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani was seen roaming about freely, first time since March this year. Then comes the Prime Minister's visit who invites all for the dialogue who have some meaningful ideas. His olive branch extends to separatists as it also goes to Islamabad. “I call upon the people and government of Pakistan to show their sincerity and good faith. As I have said many times before, we will not be found wanting in our response”. Exhibiting the sincerity to initiate dialogue on Kashmir at both levels –with separatists and also with Pakistan, the Prime Minister appeared quite concerned about the question of governance in Jammu and Kashmir. He made a specific mention of local governance and the development process. “I would urge that time has come for elections to local bodies be held quickly. This will increase the people's participation in the process of development”, said the Prime Minister in his speech on inauguration of Anantnag-Qazigund rail link. Refusal to empower the peoples at grassroots has of late become a hallmark of flawed governance in Jammu and Kashmir. Last Panchayat elections were held in the state in 2000, after a staggering gap of more than two decades but Panchayats were never constituted or empowered. Next elections were due in 2005 but never held. It was widely believed that denial of democracy at the grassroots is also a potential alienator. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently said that Panchayat elections will be held in next few months.

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‘Willing to Talk to Anyone who has any Meaningful Ideas

Text of Prime Minister Singh’s speech at the inauguration of the historic Anantnag-Qazigund rail line in the Kashmir Valley October, 28th :

I

am delighted to back in the valley of Kashmir in the lovely season of autumn. We will soon see the beautiful golden hues of the season and the magnificent Chinar will soon be flaming red. I have come today to inaugurate the Qazigund-Anantnag rail link. I congratulate the Indian Railways and the people of Kashmir for this achievement. The day is not far when trains will run from Jammu to Srinagar through the Banihal Pass.

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The last time I came to Jammu and Kashmir, the State assembly elections were going to be held. Later, the Lok Sabha elections were also held. I am happy that the people of Jammu and Kashmir turned out to vote in these elections in large numbers. I believe that it was a vote for a peaceful path to a better tomorrow. I applaud the wisdom and good faith of the common m a n o f K a s h m i r. T h e e l e c t e d government has a golden opportunity to consolidate the peace in the State.

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IN

FOCUS Bridging Divides

In the last five years, the government of India has taken a number of steps to bring development to Jammu and Kashmir. We have tried to revive the traditional connectivity between the people of the region. We took the bold step of reviving the movement of goods and people across the Line of Control on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road on the Poonch – Rawalakot road. I am happy to announce that the Central Government has decided to fund the additional cost of Rs. 385 crore to build the heritage Mughal Road that will connect Shopian with remote areas of Poonch and Rajouri. Unprecedented resources have been committed to the state for its comprehensive reconstruction. But I recognize that the benefits are tricking down slowly. This state of affairs should change. We have to spend up the pace of development in the state. We have reverse the brain drain that has denuded state of many of its teachers, doctors, engineers and intellectuals. We have to create the conditions for them to return and to be the instruments of change and development. We want to strengthen in the hands of the State government so that they can implement an ambitious development agenda. I would also urge that the time has come for elections to local bodies be held quickly. This will increase the people's participation in the processes of development. I appeal to the youth of Kashmir to join in building a new Kashmir. I understand their frustration. But things are changing. I huge them to think constructively about how to build their futures. The Central Government will make all efforts to involve the youth of the State in constructive work. Under the 'Skill Development to Employment'

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Programme, The Ministry Tourism will train 300 youths of the state. In addition, 200 youths will be trained and deployed as tourist escorts during the Amarnath and Viashno Devi Yatras. The ministry of Labour will train 8000 youths in it is every year. As part of the national programme the Ministry of Youth Affairs will deploy around 8,000 youth in Jammu and Kashmir on voluntary basis. They will engage in public service such as cleaning of the Dal Lake. I believe that the It Sector of J&K can be as developed of the country. We will fully support the efforts of the State in this area. I am happy that more than 600 youth of the State trained under a Central Government project have been employed in the IT sector recently. I am happy to announce that the Government of India has decided to set up two Central Universities in J&K, one in Jammu and one in Kashmir. The majesty and splendour of this beautiful valley and culture of hospitality of the Kashmiri people are second to none. It magnificent lakes and forests have charmed travelers for centuries. It offers the solemnity of the Budghist monasteries of Ladakh, the treasures of the Hazratbal shrine and the piety of the Raghnuath Temple. Let us build Kashmir into one of the world's top tourist destinations. The picturesque Dal Lake is the icon of the tourism have been funding a project for the conservation of the lake but progress has been slow. I would urge the state Government to set up a task force to expedite the project. The Centre has decided to commit additional funds of Rs. 356 crore for this project. We will also discuss with the State Government how to expedite on going projects for the conservation of Wullar Lake and Manser Lake. The Government is concerned

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about reports of receding glaciers. I am happy to announce the launch of the National Mission on Sustaining the Himalayan Eco-System. We wish to preserve the sacred heritage of places like the Amarnath Shrine. The era of violence and terrorism is coming to an end. The public sentiment is for peace and for a peaceful resolution of all problems. When I came to office in 2004, I had said that our Government is committed to having unconditional dialogue with whoever abjures violence. We had discussions with different groups. We had a number of round table conferences. All issues were discussed. WE tried to give voice to the demands of all sections of the people. We have implemented a number of initiatives as a result of this process. I wish to say again today that we are willing to talk to anyone who has any meaningful ideas for promoting peace and development in Kashmir. We want to carry all sections of the people with us in resolving the political and economic problems of Jammu and Kashmir. I had also said that I was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan. I did so not because of weakness but from a position of strength. We had the most fruitful and productive discussions ever with the Government of Pakistan during the period 2004-07 when militancy and violence began to decline. Intensive discussions were held on all issues including on a permanent resolution of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. For the first time in 60 years, people were able to travel by road across LoC. Divided families were re-united at the border. Trade between the two sides of Kashmir began. In fact, our overall trade with Pakistan increased three times during 2004-07. The number of visas that we issued to Pakistanis dou-

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bled during the same period. An additional rail link was established. These are not small achievements given the history of our troubled relationship with Pakistan. In side the valley, as militancy decline, trade, business and tourism began to pick up. We were moving in the right direction. For the first time there was a feeling among the people that a durable and final peace was around the corner. However, all the progress that we achieved has been repeatedly thwarted by acts of terrorism. The terrorists want permanent enmity to prevail between the two countries. The terrorists have misused the name of peaceful and benevolent religion. Their philosophy of hate has no place here. It is totally contrary to our centuries old tradition of tolerance and harmony among faiths. I strongly believe that the majority of people in Pakistan seek good neighborly and cooperative relations between India and Pakistan. They seek a permanent peace. This is our view as well. The Cross-LoC initiatives have been well received on both sides of the border. But I am also aware that they are not as people friendly as they cold are. Trade facilities at the border are inadequate. There are not banking channels. Customs facilities need to be strengthen. There are no trade fairs. The lists of tradable commodities need to be increased. Clearances for travel take time. Pioneers of India and Pakistan are languishing in each other's jails even after completing their sentences. The fact is that these are humanitarian issues whose resolution requires the cooperation of Pakistan. We are ready to discuss these and other issues with the government of Pakistan. I hope that a s result things will be made easier for our traders, divided families prison-

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ers and travelers. For a productive dialogue it is essential that terrorism must be brought under control. We will press the government of Pakistan to curb the activities of those elements that are engaging in terrorism in India. If they are non-state actors, it is the solemn duty of the government of Pakistan to bring them to book, to destroy their camps and to eliminate their infrastructure. The perpetrators

For the first time in 60 years, people were able to travel by road across LoC. Divided families were reunited at the border. Trade between the two sides of Kashmir began. In fact, our overall trade with Pakistan increased three times during 2004-07. The number of visas that we issued to Pakistanis doubled during the same period. An additional rail link was established.

cal conclusion. They should destroy these groups wherever they are operating and for whatever misguided purpose. I call upon the people and government of Pakistan to show their sincerity and good faith. As I have said many times before, we will not be found wanting in our response. In the words of the poet : 'There are moments in history when wrong decisions are taken; the effects of which are felt for ages'. I appeal to the government of Pakistan that the hand of friendship that we have extended should be carried forward. This is in the interest of people of India and Pakistan. In conclusion, I wish to convey my good wishes to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. I hope that the future will bring a new ear of peace, reconcillation and development.'

Epilogue Available at Jawahar Book Center Jawahar Lal Nehru University NEW DELHI

--India Book Center THIRUVANTHAPURAM

of the acts of terror must pay the heaviest penalty for their barbaric crimes against humanity. It is a misplaced ideas that one reach a compromise with the ideology of the terrorists or that they can be used for one's own political purpose. Eventually they turn against you and bring only death and destruction. The real face of the terrorists is clear for the people of Pakistan to see with their own years. I hope that the government of Pakistan will take the ongoing actions against the terrorist groups on their logi-

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--CNA Enterprises DN Road, MUMBAI --KC Enterprises Himayat Nagar, HYDERBAD --EBS News Agency Sector 22-B, CHANDIGARH --Bhargave Book Center University Center, ALLAHABAD

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Bridging Divides

Promoting Cross-LoC Trade An Analysis of the Joint Chamber

MOEED YUSUF

S

ince 2005, Pakistan and India have pursued out-of-the-box thinking on Kashmir and have allowed nominal human interaction and economic exchanges across the Line of Control (LoC). One of the most promising recent developments has been the formation of the Federation of Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Joint Chamber), the first formal joint establishment across the Line of Control, which is poised to play a central role in future efforts at increasing economic collaboration. The Joint Chamber is still in its infancy and faces a number of critical challenges that are indicative of the potential stumbling blocks any effort at enhancing economic collaboration across the Line of Control is likely to face. Currently, a consensus is missing on the future direction of the Joint Chamber. Not only are the central governments in Islamabad and New Delhi skeptical about according this new body a pivotal position in cross–LoC trade, but even the business communities in the Indian and Pakistani parts of the state suffer from internal differences on the scope of the Chamber's activities. Perhaps most worrisome is the Kashmiri business community's reluctance to lobby proactively for expansion of ties beyond trade in goods. Investment, joint ventures, and transit trade through Pakistani Kashmir and Pakistan hold the real potential if economic interdependence is to ameliorate the long-standing political tensions over Kashmir. The Joint Chamber members need to agree on a clear vision for the Chamber, preferably including concerns not only relevant to goods trade but also to trade in services, investment, joint ventures, and transit trade. To cover this broad horizon the Chamber would have to increase its capacity by involving entities such as trade associations and the civil society at large. Before tangible gains can be made, the Joint Chamber needs a number of scoping exercises to determine the true potential for economic collaboration on all fronts. The current dearth of information is a major shortcoming in determining the specific areas that could expand the hitherto nascent cross–LoC interaction. The Joint Chamber is already engaged in advocating for an increase in the nominal goods trade initiated across the LoC in October 2008. Protocols for physical travel and communication between traders, marketing and banking facilities, and an expansion of the scope of engagement are obvious next steps for this process. The key to the Joint Chamber's success is to strike a delicate balance between nudging the governments to open up and remaining pragmatic about the necessarily incremental nature of the gains.

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The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir has proved to be one of the most intractable in the world. Traditionally, these two countries have remained preoccupied with concerns about territoriality, sovereignty, principle of equality, and moral legitimacy when approaching the issue. However, their failure to find a breakthrough and the high costs associated with maintaining the status quo have nudged Islamabad and New Delhi to consider fresh ideas for resolving the dispute. Perhaps the most promising development in recent years has been their amenability to normalizing the state through enhanced economic and human interaction between Pakistani and Indian Kashmir—previously no direct contact was permissible between the two parts of the state. The hope is that enhanced economic interdependence would act as a catalyst for ameliorating the conflict by creating a strong, indigenous constituency that can push the two states toward peaceful resolution of the dispute. Commendably, Pakistan and India have not only proclaimed the goal of enhancing cross–Line of Control ties but have already made tangible progress toward this end. Shortly after the initiation of the bilateral peace process in 2003, a mutually agreed cease-fire was enforced along the LoC. Since then, bus service was initiated between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in 2005 and between Poonch and Rawalakot. Fourteen months later, five LoC crossing points were opened for relief assistance in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in the region in October 2005, and an understanding was reached to conduct cross–LoC trade in selected primary products of Kashmiri origin in 2006. Although critical in their own right, all stakeholders, including the Indian

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and Pakistani governments, acknowledge that these steps are only the beginning of a process of economic collaboration that could ultimately make the LoC irrelevant for economic and human exchanges. Most analysts remain convinced that only such expanded cross–LoC interaction can generate the kind of interdependence necessary to stabilize the area. While intermittent tensions between India and Pakistan since 2006 have dampened the initial euphoria regarding cross–LoC ties, two developments in October 2008 have provided renewed impetus for normalizing relations across the divided state: Islamabad and New Delhi initiated cross–LoC trade and business communities from Indian and Pakistani Kashmir established a joint body to promote economic interaction—the Federation of Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry (hereafter Joint Chamber). Although still tenuous and not yet an effective platform to facilitate cross–LoC business interests, the chamber is still the first formal joint establishment across the LoC and thus poised to play a central role in any future effort to enhance economic exchange. Moreover, the organization is the first non-governmental body of note; its presence complements the hitherto exclusively The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions. To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, e-mail: [email protected] top-down approach to cross–LoC collaboration. In essence, the Joint Chamber provides a concrete opportunity to push forward the dream of an “irrelevant” LoC. This report examines the Joint Chamber in detail. It outlines the basic features of this new structure, analyzes

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the outlook of the key stakeholders regarding its potential, weighs the challenges ahead, and recommends means to transform the Joint Chamber into a body capable of playing an instrumental role in expanding cross–LoC economic collaboration. The report is designed to provide both the business communities and policymakers with a clear sense of the steps needed to optimize the role of the Joint Chamber in enhancing cross–LoC interaction. The analysis carries a broader message: the case study of the Joint Chamber— independent of the fate of the Chamber itself—highlights the clash of interests among the key stakeholders as well as the constraints on them, factors that constitute stumbling blocks for any effort to expand cross–LoC economic exchange. The Joint Chamber In September 2008, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly session in New York, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to implement the previously reached understanding to allow trade in primary products across the LoC. The Pakistan-India Joint Working Group on cross–LoC confidence building measures, which had already held meetings to negotiate the issue, was tasked to finalize trade modalities; subsequently, October 21, 2008, was set as the initiation date for cross–LoC trade. The decision to commence trade also provided an incentive to the business communities on both sides of the LoC to come together and discuss ways to optimize trade relations. Thus, from October 9–16, 2008, a nineteenmember delegation from the Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited Srinagar and Jammu to meet their counterparts. The deliberations between the

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business communities during the AJK Chamber's visit led to the creation of the Joint Chamber. The presidents of the Chamber of Commerce of Pakistani Kashmir, Indian Kashmir (Valley), and Jammu formally agreed to set up a joint body to bolster cross–LoC economic interests. The Joint Chamber is limited to the three Chambers; other business entities such as traders' associations or sector-specific groupings from the region are not represented in the body. The new structure's board will comprise thirty-two individuals, sixteen of whom will be nominated by the AJK Chamber and sixteen jointly by the Indian Kashmir and Jammu Chambers. The Joint Chamber is headed by a president who is appointed on a rotational, twoyear basis, with the Pakistani and Indian Chambers alternating the title. The president will act as the executive and will be assisted by two senior vice presidents, one each from the Pakistani and Indian part of the state, and four vice presidents, two from each side. As a goodwill gesture, the Indian side offered the inaugural presidency to Mr. Zulfiqar Abbassi, the current president of the AJK Chamber, for an initial oneyear term. He is to hold the title until October 2009, after which the Joint Chamber members will select a new president for a full two-year stint; the next term is likely to be awarded to a nominee from the Indian side of the LoC. Neither side had envisioned creating a joint body prior to their meetings. The Kashmir Chamber in the Valley had only planned to offer a memorandum of understanding to the AJK Chamber. However, the AJK group, encouraged by the positive mood during the meeting, suggested taking the arrangement a step further by instituting the joint group. After some hesitation, the Kashmir Chamber accepted the pro-

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posal. The Jammu Chamber was not part of these discussions; it was only brought on board when the AJK delegation visited them following their visit to the Valley. The absence of any prior internal deliberations by either side regarding a joint set-up, however, meant that the Joint Chamber could not move beyond mere formal agreement during the delegation's visit. As it stands, the organization exists only on paper: the Chamber has not been launched formally, neither side has finalized its list of members, no formal charter or mandate exists, no decision has been made on establishing a physical presence, no meeting sched-

The national governments on both sides reserve the right to prevent the state governments from recognizing the Joint Chamber. ule has been determined, and financing for the body remains uncertain. The Chamber also faces potential legal complications. For example, in Pakistani Kashmir, article 8 and 31 (3) (d) of the Constitution prohibit the AJK government from starting any international joint trade venture on its own; the Government of Pakistan retains complete jurisdiction over such matters. Similarly, article 370 of the Indian Constitution enables the central government to take charge of international trade in Jammu and Kashmir when it deems it necessary. In short, the national governments on both sides reserve the right to prevent the state governments from recognizing the Joint Chamber. These stipulations also imply

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that the Chamber cannot be officially registered as a joint entity unless Islamabad and New Delhi are on board. While both sides could separately register the new body without approval from the national governments, doing so would render the entity no different than the individual Chambers that already exist. Although the three relevant business communities realize that the decision to set up the Joint Chamber is a beginning, their vision to solidify the body's presence lacks coherence. That said, the following themes do find widespread support as potential future objectives for the Joint Chamber: To increase contact between the two business communities through regular meetings; these interactions would allow the members to discuss avenues for closer cooperation. To gain greater exposure to each other's markets and peoples. To provide a forum to raise mutual concerns as well as a symbol of progress in intra-Kashmir relations. To act as a pressure group to nudge state and national governments to implement their official vision of enhancing cross–LoC collaboration beyond mere symbolism. To serve as an expert body that deliberates issues related to trade and investment and provides concrete advice regarding trade modalities and avenues for trade expansion to the governments. To lobby for improved “governance of cooperation”; this amounts to easing restrictions that do not strictly fall within the trade and investment ambit—primarily security and bureaucratic hurdles—but directly affect business activity. To galvanize other stakeholders in the economy—small-scale producers, retailers, transporters, marketing out-

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fits, technical experts, academics, and civil society at large—to support the initiative, thereby creating a sense of ownership and empowerment among a large section of the population on both sides of the LoC. Since the Srinagar and Jammu meetings, the Joint Chamber has remained largely dormant. The body's only tangible output thus far has been a set of recommendations, heavily focused on improving the current cross–LoC trade regime, which were passed on to the Pakistani and Indian governments for consideration. Apart from this, the Chamber's decision to form working groups to identify items that could be added to the current cross–LoC trade list has been held in abeyance. Similarly, a proposed reciprocal visit by the Indian Kashmir and Jammu Chambers across the LoC is on hold. The present lull stems from the sudden spike in Indian-Pakistani tensions in the wake of the terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The sense of despondence that has prevailed among the business community on both sides since the Mumbai attack suggests that the status quo may remain until political tensions diminish. The Lay of the Land: the Actors and their Preferences The preferences of the key stakeholders, namely, the Chambers on both sides of the LoC, the state governments in Indian and Pakistani Kashmir, and the Pakistani and Indian authorities in Islamabad and New Delhi respectively, are paramount to the evolution of the Joint Chamber. Other entities such as traders' associations, small-scale producers, and retailers— which are known to wholeheartedly support enhanced cross–LoC cooperation—remain outside the loop. Moreover, there seems to be little interest in exploring the possibility of expanding representation in the

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near term; a leading figure from the Kashmir Chamber in the Valley told the author that the business community strongly preferred other, smaller bodies to explore options of similar arrangements with their counterparts independently of the Joint Chamber. The AJK Chamber The decision to form the Joint Chamber was a bold turnaround for the business community in Pakistani Kashmir. Previously, the business enclave as well as the state government in Muzaffarabad had been reluctant to pursue trade liberalization. For over two years, the AJK Chamber had deferred an invitation from their Indian counterparts to visit Srinagar and Jammu to discuss trade related issues, it did not extend a reciprocal invitation until recently, and its members did not attend workshops intended to allow the two business communities to interact. The AJK business community's skepticism was in large part driven by market realities. Pakistani Kashmir has significantly weaker economic prospects than the Indian part of the state; the situation was further skewed toward the Indian side after the 2005 earthquake that devastated Pakistani Kashmir's economy. The Pakistani side of the LoC is severely underdeveloped: approximately 88 percent of the 4.4 million people there depends on agriculture and forestry as their principal source of livelihood while the manufacturing sector is in poor shape, with many of the 917 industrial units having been declared “sick.” Although Indian Jammu and Kashmir is one of the least developed states in India, its agrarian economy is rapidly industrializing—particularly in Jammu—and it already has a multifold advantage in productive capacity over its Pakistani counterpart. In short, there is little doubt that in the near-to-medium term, the

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direction of trade would overwhelmingly favor Indian Kashmir. The proactive approach taken by the AJK Chamber in proposing the idea of the Joint Chamber then is somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, there is general agreement across the region's business community that economic interaction with Indian Jammu and Kashmir should increase. It also appears certain that the AJK Chamber will not reverse itself on the issue of the Joint Chamber's existence when the ongoing deliberations among the region's business enclave are completed. On the other hand, the business community is not unanimous on the pace at which they would like cross–LoC ties to expand or on the role they envision for the Joint Chamber. Two competing visions exist in the AJK Chamber. In addition to the philosophical difference on the utility of trade expansion, these two visions also reflect the fault line along which power politics plays out within the Chamber. The political economy dimension is obvious when one examines the makeup of the two groups. Those involved in industries such as textiles and apparel in which their Indian Jammu and Kashmir counterparts are more competitive tend to be circumspect about swift liberalization. On the other hand, individuals interested in areas such as power generation where potential for mutual gains is high form the most vocal support base for enhanced interaction. At the core, all AJK Chamber members remain mindful of the necessity to cater to local industry interests. However, those supporting swift movement toward relatively free trade are upfront in stating their belief that enhanced ties would ultimately benefit consumers and producers on both sides; for Pakistani Kashmir they see the interaction providing impetus to investors

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from Pakistan-proper to set up manufacturing units in the state, thereby enhancing productive capacity and employment. This group views the Joint Chamber as a stepping stone to fulfill this ambition. Perhaps not surprisingly, the AJK delegation that proposed the joint body had strong representation from proponents of this view. While proponents of the opposing view do not challenge the logic of this argument, they are much more focused on the short term. This faction calls for a more graduated approach whereby Pakistani Kashmir's own potential is taken into account before putting promises on the table and is less enthused about the Joint Chamber's abrupt announcement. At least one influential businessman who shares this outlook conveyed to the author his bitterness about the body's formation, arguing that the possibility of a joint body was not on the list of talking points communicated to Pakistani Kashmir's business community prior to the delegation's departure. This more cautious cohort is likely to push for a thorough internal debate on the scope of the Joint Chamber's activities before developing a unified stance on the issue. Indian Kashmir (Valley) and Jammu Chambers An interesting dynamic exists regarding preferences on the Indian side of the LoC. Both the Chamber hosted in Srinagar as well as the one in Jammu remain committed to expansion of economic ties. Individually, both entities have voiced support for the Joint Chamber. This makes sense given the disproportionate gains in the short- tomedium term for the Indian side. However, somewhat counterintuitive is the absence of any joint efforts by the two entities to capitalize on their mutual interest. Thus far, the Kashmir and Jammu Chambers have not met to

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discuss the body's future. The anomaly has at its root the brewing tensions between the two Chambers. The palpable political differences between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley, which led to a rupture between the Muslims of the valley and the Jammuites in May 2008, resulted in the two Chambers being hesitant to establish any serious contact with each other. It was because of this falling-out that the AJK delegation had to meet separately with the Kashmir and Jammu Chambers; it ended up conducting the bulk of its negotiations in the Valley and only later sought concurrence of the Jammuites. The internal politicking

This situation leads to a conundrum whereby both Indian Chambers remain committed to the existence of the Joint Chamber yet are unwilling to complement each other's lobbying efforts between the business entities on the Indian side also explains concerns among segments of the business community, especially in the Valley, about including the “other” Chamber in the arrangement (some members of the AJK delegation returned with this perception). The Federation of Chamber of Industries in Kashmir (FCIK), a Valleybased group also showed reservations about handing over the founding presidency to the AJK Chamber even though the Jammu Chamber had accepted the arrangement without any apparent reservations. This situation leads to a conundrum whereby both Indian Chambers remain committed to the existence of

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the Joint Chamber yet are unwilling to complement each other's lobbying efforts. Unlike Pakistani Kashmir, however, the challenge in Indian Jammu and Kashmir is not to convince the Chambers of the merit of liberalizing cross–LoC economic ties. Rather, it is to disaggregate the broader political tussle within the state from the relationship between the business communities. Only then can the Valley and Jammu Chambers arrive at an internal understanding about the division of labor in their roles within the Joint Chamber and develop a combined negotiating stance for devising strategies with their Pakistani counterparts. Finally, some level of goodwill on the part of the Jammu and Indian Kashmir Chambers is necessary to accept an equal representation and voice since the AJK group has a significantly less impressive portfolio. The State Governments The Joint Chamber can expect a much more conciliatory attitude from the state governments on both sides of the LoC. Authorities in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad seem committed to exploring avenues to further liberalize cross–LoC interaction. The government in Pakistani Kashmir that left office in January 2009 had made cross–LoC interaction a major pillar of its political program. Arguably, the AJK delegation's offer to set up a Joint Chamber rather than just signing a memorandum of understanding in Srinagar was a reflection of their confidence in the state government's support for moves designed to expand cross–LoC economic ties. Indeed, the relationship between the outgoing government and the AJK Chamber's leadership is widely believed to have been the most cordial in recent history; the latter exercised substantial clout in political circles, a fact that led the already amenable government to

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wholeheartedly back the Chamber's ambitions to play a proactive role in cross–LoC trade. The business community does not expect the incoming government to fundamentally change its predecessor's stance, although it may have to face renewed lobbying efforts by proponents of both views—accelerated versus gradual liberalization—that exist among the AJK Chamber members. The mindset is even more encouraging in Indian Jammu and Kashmir. The lopsided near-term gains make it natural for the state government in Srinagar to view the prospect of enhanced trade favorably. The enthusiasm of state officials was evident from their outright support of the idea of the Joint Chamber during the AJK Chamber's visit. Barring any negative directives from New Delhi, the Indian Jammu and Kashmir government is likely to remain proactive in its efforts to expand cross–LoC interaction. The National Governments The national governments in Islamabad and New Delhi continue to hold the key to the future of intraKashmir relations. Notwithstanding the ultimate ambition of allowing Kashmiri civil society to have a larger stake in decision-making, both the Indian and Pakistani governments remain unchallenged in their ability to veto any Kashmiri aspirations. Without their agreement, developments like the Joint Chamber are highly unlikely to succeed. That said, neither Islamabad nor New Delhi has yet signaled its intentions regarding the joint body; neither capital has responded to the list of recommendations the Joint Chamber communicated to them after the creation of the body. Of course, it seems unlikely that the business communities would have gone ahead with formation of the Joint Chamber had they known that

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such a measure would cross Pakistan or India's redlines. Yet, the fact that the national governments are amenable to the structure in principle, encouraging as it is, does not imply that they would quickly buy into its ambitions. This is not to say that either side is likely to attempt to undo the process. In fact, the symbolism of the development suits them; it is in line with their official stance of allowing interdependence between the two parts of Jammu Kashmir. Beyond mere symbolism, however, realizing the Joint Chamber's vision is likely to prove extremely challenging given that both Pakistan and India, despite having moved away from

The two countries see each other through a zero-sum lens whereby granting unilateral concessions is a sign of weakness. The strongest opposition on both sides comes from the bureaucracies their traditional maximalist stances, remain wedded to a security-centric paradigm in their outlook toward the dispute. The two countries see each other through a zero-sum lens whereby granting unilateral concessions is a sign of weakness. The strongest opposition on both sides comes from the bureaucracies—the Foreign Office and the military in Pakistan and the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs in India—even though the political leadership seems to have softened their stances considerably. Various elements within the Indian bureaucracy remain wary of Pakistan's propensity to use freer human and economic exchange as a means to create greater unrest in

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Indian Kashmir. Both parties also feel that increased interaction would lead to heightened intelligence deployment by the other across the LoC. These concerns apply not only to trade between Pakistani and Indian Kashmir, but even more so to transit trade, investment, and join ventures through which relocation of personnel across the LoC for extended periods would be legalized, trade and investment facilitation would become necessary, and, consequently, the governments' hold on the process would inevitably be diluted. Therefore, while a process that crawls along under the close watch of the two governments is diplomatically attractive, fast-track liberalization is not. Concerns from Islamabad and New Delhi are not just security related. Within the economic realm, one concern that both India and Pakistan have—Pakistan more so than India—is the potential for intra-Kashmir trade to become an excuse for Indian goods to find their way into the Pakistani market and vice versa. At the core, the worry stems from a realization of the weak trade governance capacity in the two countries: both sides know that irrespective of the monitoring and policing measures put in place to check flows beyond the border of Jammu Kashmir, a truly liberalized trade regime would lead to products from the other's heartland flowing into theirs. Pakistan has already had a bitter experience with the Afghan Transit Trade facility whereby goods destined for Afghanistan regularly make their way back into Pakistan, creating significant perversions in the local market. This fear, combined with the absence of any Rules of Origin agreement specific to Jammu and Kashmir, has forced officials in both countries to exercise extreme caution when negotiating cross–LoC trade modalities.

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Current Cross–LoC Trade The current trading arrangement is fraught with stringent bureaucratic impediments. Trade is restricted to duty-free access for twenty-one items, all of which are primary products produced within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, goods on the positive list do not seem to correspond to market realities. A number of items defy trade rationale as they are already available at lower cost within the importer's market or the exporter has a more lucrative market available domestically. Moreover, there is no marketing setup to promote goods from across the LoC; this limits the appeal even for goods not suffering from an adverse cost differential. At present, trade can be cond u c t e d o n l y o n Tu e s d a y s a n d Wednesdays between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. Transportation is another major impediment. No more than 1.5 metric tons (MT) per truckload can cross the LoC due to infrastructural constraints on both sides. The small consignment size makes trade unviable as the fuel, handling, freight, insurance, and other miscellaneous costs are not necessarily proportional to the consignment weight. In addition, neither side has permission to transport goods to their final destination. Trucks must be unloaded at checkpoints near the LoC, then reloaded onto local trucks and hauled to the destination. Apart from the cost element, this is especially problematic for perishable items. Furthermore, traders have no means to meet regularly. The visa restrictions continue to be extremely stringent for all residents, including businessmen. Even members of divided families, for whom cross–LoC buses were instituted in 2005 and the visa regime supposedly liberalized, have underutilized the service—only nine

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thousand people have traveled in over three years—due to the highly cumbersome clearance procedures.16 Moreover, people in Indian Kashmir do not even have the international direct dialing facility to communicate with their counterparts across the LoC via phone. The absence of banking facilities and the lack of permission to use Pakistani and Indian rupees for transactions is another concern shared by the business communities on both sides. The Joint Chamber has already voiced its preference to trade in the local currencies, with the U.S. dollar as the reference for exchange purposes. On the

The Joint Chamber should be looking to explore avenues that would provide the business community with attractive returns, thus creating a genuine economic rationale instead of merely a symbolic one. banking front, the situation is even more troublesome as neither the Jammu & Kashmir Bank on the Indian side nor the AJ&K Bank on the Pakistani side has branches across the LoC; they also have no direct correspondence and thus do not allow cross-referenced transactions. In essence, apart from cash purchases or informal credit mechanisms, no official closure is possible. There is already empirical evidence of the impact of the glaring banking anomaly. Fruit growers from Indian Kashmir suspended cross–LoC shipments within twenty days of the initiation of the process, citing lack of proper communications and payment mechanisms

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as the major reason. The transaction closure and payment process continued to cause confusion, ultimately resulting in arrears of around 3.5 million Indian rupees. Traders of other products have also threatened to follow suit. The Challenges Ahead: Looking Beyond the Current Trade Regime In the Kashmiri context, the underlying rationale for bodies like the Joint Chamber is to create bottom-up pressure to hasten the process of normalization between the two parts of the state. Ultimately, permanent improvement in intra-Kashmir relations presupposes substantial economic interdependence across the LoC such that the costs of reversal become unbearably high. Interdependence, in turn, requires not only a robust cross–LoC relationship among the stakeholders in the economic sphere but also a streamlined focus on specific aspects within the overarching relationship that are capable of creating the interdependence. Ideally, the Joint Chamber should be looking to explore avenues that would provide the business community with attractive returns, thus creating a genuine economic rationale instead of merely a symbolic one. The absence of such a focus at present stands out as a critical challenge to the entity's future viability. Currently, the business communities are focusing almost exclusively on trade in goods between Pakistani and Indian Kashmir. It is only within this traditional trading sphere that businessmen seem to have a concrete action plan; virtually all other avenues are considered too far-fetched to receive any serious attention at the moment. The impulse to focus on trade in goods is understandable and welcome given the stringent restrictions in place under the current regime. That said, the Joint Chamber cannot afford to con-

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centrate its energies so narrowly, especially when goods trade between the two parts of the state is the least attractive aspect of the economic relationship. Two critical links missing from this picture are the potential for Indian Jammu and Kashmir to use the Pakistani part of the state as a transit route and exploring trade in services, investment, and joint ventures. The expected gains for the Srinagar and Jammu Chambers from trading with Pakistani Kashmir notwithstanding, Indian Jammu and Kashmir's business communities have often raised concerns about the market across the LoC being too small for it to be a major attraction. Indeed, this is legitimate, not only because of the limited size of the population on the Pakistani side of the LoC but also because of its meager purchasing power. Ideally, the Indian side is vying for a passage through Pakistani Kashmir to Pakistan-proper, the Persian Gulf countries, and beyond. This is true for both Chambers in the Indian part of the state. Jammu would like to make use of Pakistani transport infrastructure to export from the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, which are much cheaper and more efficient than Mumbai, the port Jammu producers currently utilize. In fact, given Jammu's strength in industrial production and its geographical location, the option of exporting manufactured goods through the historic Jammu-Sialkot (Pakistan) route is even more attractive than trading across the LoC. For the Srinagar Chamber, the appeal of the transit facility is twofold. For one, the current transport route available to the geographically isolated Valley is highly undependable. There are frequent complaints of perishable items being damaged by the time they reach their final destinations in India. Second, transiting through Pakistani Kashmir implies

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reduced dependence on Jammu as the Kashmir Valley's sole outlet to the rest of India. In light of the above, it is highly surprising that the Joint Chamber has not deliberated the possibility of transit trade and that there has been no push from the Chambers on the Indian side, jointly or individually, to advocate early approval of the facility. The dynamic is rather interesting. On the one hand, the keenness to move from the “to” to the “through” arrangement with Pakistani Kashmir is evident among the Indian Jammu and Kashmir business community. In fact, some members are categorical in highlighting that transit trade

The internal contradiction in the stance of the business enclave is obvious: while they are bitter about government restrictions, they have been unable to formulate a unified position. is their only real interest. However, leaders of the respective Chambers argue that the decision not to include transit trade in the list of recommendations communicated by the Joint Chamber to the governments was deliberate; it was believed to be too controversial for the authorities to consider seriously. The disconnect between the desire for tangible gains among the business community on the Indian side—hence the interest in transit trade—and the passive effort to move to the “through” arrangement implies that there is insufficient pressure on the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi. This is selfdefeating because the present trade

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arrangement is bound to disillusion many in the business community; the danger is that an extended period without movement beyond cross–LoC goods trade will cause the Chambers to lose interest altogether and thus make them indifferent to a de facto reversal of the minor gains achieved thus far. This is a concern that some influential businessmen acknowledged during conversations with the author. The concern is even graver on the trade in services and investment fronts. Past studies have established that the real potential for a holistic cross–LoC economic relationship lies beyond goods trade. The similar nature of the economies on the two sides of the LoC makes trade in goods useful only as a starting point. The prospects for real long-term gains lie in eight service sectors: tourism, forestry, waterways, power generation, information technology, education, anti-poverty programs, and disaster management. Although the Joint Chamber mentioned joint ventures in tourism, exchange in software industries, and contact between educational and technical institutions as potential avenues for consideration in its recent communication to the governments of Pakistan and India, the business communities are unprepared to pursue these ventures seriously. There is a lack of information on the specific avenues to explore regarding investment and joint ventures in the short to medium term. The business community often mentions broad areas, focusing only on the macro, sectorallevel picture. Thinking about non-goods exchanges remains extremely tentative. The lack of movement within the community is evident in the fact that the Joint Chamber set up working groups to identify items that could be added to the current trade list, but

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ignored the need to start parallel work on investment and joint ventures. The internal contradiction in the stance of the business enclave is obvious: while they are bitter about government restrictions, they have been unable to formulate a unified position, let alone pursue it, on issues related to transit trade, services trade, investment, and joint ventures. The business leaders seem willing to take a more conservative approach than is perhaps ideal for a body set up to alter the status quo in an intensely hostile environment. In fact, an overwhelming majority seems resigned to the fact that politics will continue to trump the aspirations that underlie the Joint Chamber. While that is certainly true at present, and is likely to remain so in the near-to-medium term, deferring the future of the Joint Chamber to the political domain undermines the very rationale for its existence, that is, to create bottom-up pressure despite the adversarial framework. In essence, those who are Areas of Interest for Investment and Joint Ventures as Identified by a Previous Pugwash Study (supported by USIP) Tourism: (1) Establish a Joint Travel Management Board; (2) Set up hotel management training institutes in Indian Kashmir where individuals from both sides would be allowed to train; (3) Set up vocational training institutes specific to the tourism industry on both sides. Forestry: (1) Involve communities in Joint Forest Management projects with assistance from civil society; (2) Institute public-private partnerships in the forestry sector; investors from the same or opposite side of the LoC could lease out land for regeneration and harvesting. Waterways: (1) Hold joint environmental clean-up exercises; (2)

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Regularly exchange data on water flows and quality. Power generation: (1) Conduct a careful study of the power generation potential to gauge the amount of electricity that can realistically be brought to the grid; (2) Explore the possibility of a joint power generation project on the LoC. Information Technology: (1) Pakistani Kashmir should utilize the software development capacity across the LoC by outsourcing assignments; (2) Request Indian IT professionals to teach at small IT training centers in Pakistani Kashmir; IT students from Pakistani Kashmir could also be sent to study in the proposed Indian Technology Institute in Indian Kashmir; (3) The Indian side could help their Pakistani counterparts in setting up software technology parks and other such IT ventures. Education: (1) Initiate a small student exchange program for postgraduate institutions; (ii) Share experiences on improving the quality of education; educational administrators (including nongovernmental ones) on the Pakistani side could build on their existing programs for teacher training, either by sharing best practices or exchanging master trainers at teacher training institutes across the LoC. Anti-poverty programs: (1) Replicate the Rural Support Program (RSP) from Pakistan's Federally Administered Northern Areas structure in Pakistani and Indian Kashmir; RSP top brass could conduct orientation and training courses for their Indian counterparts and/or set up the program in a few model villages in Indian Kashmir most desperate for tangible gains—the business communities—are unwilling to follow the path that is most likely to lead to those very dividends. The current mindset creates a selffulfilling prophecy.

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Source: Moeed Yusuf, Exploring the Potential for Economic Development and Cross–LoC Collaboration in Jammu Kashmir, Pugwash, Issue Brief, March 2007 The Way Forward: Making the Joint Chamber Deliver The following recommendations suggest both steps the Joint Chamber itself needs to take and areas in which the body needs to lobby the state and national governments. Viability of the Joint Chamber Bringing the Stakeholders Together The very idea of the Joint Chamber presupposes a consensus within the business community on the existence and objectives of the body. Neither side can claim to have fulfilled this prerequisite yet. The foremost requirement then is for business communities to be on board in unison. In Pakistani Kashmir, an internal convergence of opinion is required whereby proponents of both views discussed earlier (accelerated versus gradual liberalization) are comfortable with the entity. As for Indian Jammu and Kashmir, both Chambers have to work out a mechanism to ensure that their interaction in the Joint Chamber is immune to intrastate political turbulence. Specifically, the Kashmir Valley and Jammu businessmen need to chart a common negotiating stance vis-à-vis New Delhi. The Joint Chamber's creation notwithstanding, business communities from the two sides also suffer from a trust deficit thanks to decades of stateled propaganda. The fragility of the relationship was evident during the AJK Chamber's visit across the LoC. For instance, the delegation found it offensive that Pakistani Kashmir was referred to as Pakistan “Occupied” Kashmir in one of the post deliberation communiqués issued by the hosts. As mentioned, the FCIK was also not too

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enthused about granting the first presidency of the Joint Chamber to an AJK representative. These minor episodes signal the need for dedicated efforts to trust building. While increased contact should help, both sides need to remain mindful of each other's sensitivities and exercise caution in their interactions. Moreover, the Indian Chambers might consider making initial concessions in their trade and investment approach even if they defy economic logic. Such goodwill toward the weaker side could go a long way to increasing trust and diluting skepticism in Pakistani Kashmir. The Joint Chamber must take the national governments into their confidence. This is essential to satisfy legal concerns as well as to ensure smooth functioning of the entity. An immediate task concerning all Chambers is to create a strong constituency in support of the Joint Chamber in Islamabad and New Delhi. Chamber delegations should meet with relevant ministry officials periodically in the coming months to explain the rationale of the joint body and ease concerns harbored by the bureaucracies. Regular contact with the national governments should allow the business communities to gauge Islamabad and New Delhi's redlines. Keeping these in mind, the Joint Chamber should develop a stance that neither ruptures their relationship with the respective governments nor defers wholly to the authorities on issues of utmost business interest. At present, their outlook errs substantially toward the latter. Permanence and Vision of the Joint Chamber The Joint Chamber needs to bring permanence to its own existence. Based on the internal convergence of opinion on both sides, working groups from the thirty-two-member body should determine the precise nature of the entity

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and its activities. The body should formulate a concise vision and specific aims and agree upon issues such as the Chamber's physical presence, funding, meeting schedule, and other relevant concerns. Specifically, Chamber members should seek legal advice to work out means to register and locate the body as a joint entity. The Joint Chamber should also issue a formal charter. Delineating a clear vision for the Joint Chamber would also require a fundamental decision on the body's scope. As previously mentioned, there is currently a disconnect between the normative aim of acting as the pivot for any

Business communities from the two sides also suffer from a trust deficit thanks to decades of state-led propaganda.

issues related to cross–LoC economic interaction and the overwhelming focus on goods trade. The Joint Chamber, being the only common platform, must approach the issue holistically by including concerns relevant to trade in goods, services, investments, and joint ventures in all sectors of interest. Without such an approach, the business community is certain to lose interest. Should the above course be pursued, the Joint Chamber members would have to revisit their capacity. Currently, the body suffers from an extremely narrow membership base. The Chamber will have to bring within its fold representatives of service sectors with cross–LoC potential, investment consultants, smaller trade associ-

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ations, technical experts, academics, and perhaps even members of the media. Although these representatives do not need to be permanent members, they should be invited regularly to provide guidance. Such input could often end up having a multiplier effect by generating new ideas for cooperation. Broadening the Joint Chamber's representation will assist the new entrants as well. Their inclusion will provide them a channel to voice their sector-specific demands. For example, members of the education sector have not even lobbied for implementation of recommendations by previous working groups on the subject in part because they lack organization and a platform to do so, something the Joint Chamber would be able to provide. Addressing the Communication Gap The above tasks presume an ability on the part of the Joint Chamber members to remain in contact, and meet physically and relatively freely. Business communities on the two sides cannot afford to wait while governments consider requests for relaxation of visa and communication restrictions. Even a favorable decision in this regard will likely only come after protracted negotiations between the national governments. Two alternatives could be pursued. First, outside actors could assist in creating opportunities for business community representatives and other relevant stakeholders to meet periodically. Donor groups and independent facilitating organizations could arrange meetings such as dedicated workshops and conferences where one or two days are reserved for Joint Chamber meetings. A second, less preferable, but innovative idea is to set up a joint Web site to exchange information and negotiate trade deals. A model exists in the form of the Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of

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Traders and Manufacturers Cooperative Limited. This is a limited liability entity conceived by the president of the Jammu Chamber, Ram Sahai, to promote cross–LoC interaction. While the cooperative is largely symbolic at this point, a key aspect of it is a “joint Web site,” which is supposed to symbolize cross–LoC unity. Taking this idea as a starting point, the Joint Chamber Web site could become an interactive communication and data center for businessmen: it would contain updated information allowing businessmen to gauge market price data, trends, and other relevant statistics. If agreeable, it could also house a secure portal where business deals could be negotiated and closed. The information gap between the business communities on both sides of the LoC and organizations such as the United States Institute of Peace, Pugwash, Conciliation Resources, and South Asia Free Media Association who are committed to facilitating intraKashmir normalization must be overcome. The business communities should be forthcoming in communicating requests for assistance that can be addressed by these outside actors. By the same token, interested parties should continue to explore avenues for supporting the process. Clearly, the Chambers remain the key actors to tap. However, these organizations should also consider broadening their contacts to include much the same cohorts as the Joint Chamber: smaller trade associations, technical experts, service sector individuals, and investment consultants. Furthermore, greater attention should be paid to sector-specific expertise. For example, academics from both sides, who remain tentative in approaching their counterparts across the LoC, could be brought together to discuss publishing joint papers or hold-

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ing conferences at neutral venues that could be implemented within a set time frame. Likewise, members from the tourism sector could be brought together to discuss specific avenues, modalities, and requirements to jumpstart the industry. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR EXPANDED TRADE AND INVESTMENT Information Collection The Need for Concrete Research Arguably, the most serious impediment to a long-term plan for trade expansion is the absence of accurate data on the market structure in Kashmir. Lack of interaction between the two sides over the years has meant that neither has specific information about the precise nature of the market across the LoC. More alarming is the fact that information is scant even within the respective parts. For instance, Pakistani Kashmir lacks a detailed market study of its own potential as well as up-to-date, disaggregated data capturing production and trade information. This makes it virtually impossible to project the impact of trade liberalization, and thus convince skeptics—be it businessmen or governments—about the potential gains from enhanced interaction. Only detailed market studies on both sides will highlight the respective comparative advantages and allow traders to sensibly agree on the amount and scope of trade in the short- to-medium term. That said, none of the Chambers have the wherewithal to conduct such a comprehensive study themselves. Independent organizations or consultants would have to undertake the work in collaboration with the respective Chambers. Ideally, researchers from within the state should be identified to participate; the AJK and Jammu & Kashmir Universities would be the obvious institutions to tap. That said, these

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exercises could be designed such that they maximize the involvement of and interaction among Chamber members, thereby simultaneously building trust and enhancing capacity. The need for a scoping research exercise is as acute in the investment sphere. Currently, virtually no information exists at the subsector level, a necessary prerequisite to identifying the viability of specific investment and joint venture projects and the steps required to enact them. Again, researchers, preferably from within the state, should be tasked to conduct detailed investment studies at the subsector level. The potential flow of trade through Pakistan, should Islamabad allow Indian Jammu and Kashmir to use its territory for transit purposes, should also be researched. A scenario-based exercise could forecast the potential revenue gains for Pakistan and Pakistani Kashmir under various royalty tariffs. This would give Islamabad and Muzaffarabad a clear sense of the benefits likely to flow from the arrangement. Thus far, no concrete information is available due to data deficiencies on the Indian side, where disaggregated data for trade and production is not easily accessible. Approaching the Governments The suggestions put forward thus far are required to make the Joint Chamber a viable entity as well as to provide it with an empirical basis to pursue its agenda of cross–LoC economic interaction. Once the joint body is on a sound footing and has a clearer agenda of specific measures it would like to see implemented, it should begin lobbying the state and national governments. Its efforts should span the entire economic spectrum—trade in goods and services, investment, and joint ventures. The Joint Chamber is already focused on the present trade arrange-

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ment. Some of the trade facilitation measures that need to be pursued have been communicated to the national governments, both by the Joint Chamber as well as sanctioned groups such as the Indian Working Group on strengthening cross–LoC relations. Overall, the following measures deserve attention; a number of these are applicable to aspects of the economic relationship beyond traditional goods trade. The Composition of Current Trade Trade should be allowed seven days a week. In addition, the number of items on the approved list should be increased and these items should be selected based on market realities, not arbitrary choices by Pakistani and Indian officials. The India-Pakistan Joint Working Group on cross–LoC Confidence Building Measures is mandated to review the list of items periodically. The Joint Chamber should lobby the Working Group to expand the list at their next meeting, if not sooner. As a start, items proposed by one side but not included during the negotiations should be revisited. From India, these would include cricket bats, silk products, pharmaceuticals, gems and jewelry, honey, and cut flowers while from Pakistan the expanded list would contain precious stones, salt, marble, onions, garlic, and pine nuts. Other items which could potentially be traded across the LoC (the actual scope for doing so will depend on the results of the market studies recommended earlier) include: silverware, copperware, seeds, sewing machines, fluxes and chemicals, juices and jams, canned food (from India), fertilizers and rice (from Pakistan), and leather and leather shoes (two-way flow). Moving beyond primary goods would be a natural and urgently needed subsequent step. The FCIK has already communicated to the state government

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in Jammu and Kashmir that cross–LoC trade would only be attractive to it if the export of manufactured products from the state were allowed. The group has forwarded a list of fifty-two items that it wants included on the approved list. If the two sides allow the trade of manufactured goods across the LoC, a mutually acceptable Rules of Origin framework specific to Jammu and Kashmir will have to be devised by India, Pakistan, and the state governments. While the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) provides a ready framework, it is highly unlikely that New Delhi and Islamabad would allow the respec-

Once the joint body is on a sound footing and has a clearer agenda of specific measures it would like to see implemented, it should begin lobbying the state and national governments. tive Chambers to issue certificates of origin. The concern is obvious: the other side could allow goods not meeting the origin criteria to be exported in the guise of intra- Kashmir trade. That said, as technically challenging as this issue may be, without a Rules of Origin agreement, it would be impossible to move beyond trading in primary items produced wholly within Jammu and Kashmir. One option could be to allow the Chamber from the opposite side to verify each Certificate of Origin after examining facts about a particular product's supply chain. However, this assumes transparency in information sharing and physical access to the other side. Finally, to allow local ownership of

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the trade facilitation process, a Kashmir Trade Agent, nominated by the respective business communities and approved by the state government, should be appointed on both sides of the LoC to oversee the process and act as a liaison between the business enclave and the national governments. Facilitating Transport and Travel A number of actions could be taken to improve movement and access: Currently, only the SrinagarMuzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot routes are operational. All historic routes, including Mirpur-Naushara, Tithwal-Chilhan, Gurez-Astore-Gilgit, Chumb- Pallanwalla, Kargil-Skardu, and Kotli-Rajori, should be examined for traffic and trade potential and reopened where appropriate. If transit of Indian Kashmiri goods through Pakistan were permitted, the SialkotSuchetgarh route, both road and rail, would also become appealing. Full truck loads of twelve to fifteen MT should be allowed in order to lower per unit expenditures for the traders. Necessary infrastructure should be prepared to ensure smooth operations, including strengthening roads and bridges. Trucks should be allowed to carry goods to their final destination rather than having to unload at the LoC; specific truck companies and drivers could be issued security clearances and passes that would be renewed periodically. Trucks could still be subject to security checks. The trade centers and truck terminals that are already planned at each LoC crossing point must be designed with the expansion of trade volume in mind. Specifically, trade centers should be able to host cross–LoC business meetings, trade fairs, and small-scale retail markets rather than serving simply as formal facilitation complexes.

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A travel permit system should be initiated whereby traders (and other stakeholders relevant to economic facilitation) could be issued security clearances and trade passes; cleared businessmen could then be allowed to travel across the LoC in their own vehicles rather than having to use the bus service or at least be allowed to cross over and park at the trade centers and use local transportation to reach their final destination. In order to enhance interaction and exposure to the other side, periodic trade fairs and industrial exhibitions should be organized on both sides. As mentioned, these could be held at the trade centers if the infrastructure permits. Small-scale retailers of products on the permissible list and edible items could be issued a cross-over permit and allowed to set up daily bazaars in the trade centers across the LoC. The Essentials for Trade: Marketing, Communications, Banking If the items to be traded and the infrastructure to move them are the “hardware” of trade, then marketing, communications, and banking are the “software.” Legal provisions should be made to allow marketing companies from both sides to operate across the LoC. As a start, exporters from one part could be allowed to hire local marketing companies from the other side. Efficient trading patterns are unlikely to develop without regular phone contact. Indian Kashmir must allow international direct dialing to enable Jammu and Valley businessmen to call their Pakistani Kashmir counterparts freely. At present, cell phones can be used but most individuals avoid these given the potential for harassment by intelligence agencies. The absence of postal and courier

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services between the two sides is also a hindrance to trade. Postal services should be allowed as they are across the international Indian-Pakistani border; local and international courier agencies should also be allowed to operate. In the absence of banking services, trade and investment ventures cannot be expected to flourish. The Joint Chamber should continue to press the Indian and Pakistani governments to allow AJK Bank branches in Srinagar, Jammu, and Poonch, and Jammu and Kashmir Bank branches in Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, and Rawalakot. Furthermore, SAFTA's currency stipulation allowing for trade to take place in local currencies should be applied to intra-Kashmir trade. Beyond the Traditional Trade Sphere Regarding services trade, investment, and joint ventures, the scoping exercises suggested previously are a necessary prerequisite to formulating a concrete action plan going forward. In light of the facts revealed by the market and investment studies, the Joint Chamber should put together a priority list of future actions—related specifically to concrete projects—and lobby the governments in parallel with their efforts on the traditional goods trade front. Initiatives that are less likely to be controversial in the current securitycentric environment in Islamabad and New Delhi should be given preference. Finally, accurate estimates of the potential revenues from transit trade may spur interest in the Pakistani Kashmir and Pakistan governments. This will be especially true if the multimillion dollar Gwadar port project undertaken by Islamabad fails to deliver the kind of dividends Pakistan expects from the inflow of Central Asian goods transiting the facility. The turmoil in Afghanistan makes this all but inevita-

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ble; estimates of future returns are already being scaled back. Therefore, the Pakistani authorities are likely to look for other potential clients; Indian Kashmir, and India-proper, are obvious choices. Depending on the outcome of the number-crunching exercise suggested in this report, it is not inconceivable that the potential returns from a transit facility arrangement would trump concerns about some of the goods leaking into the Pakistani market, especially if the modalities allow the Pakistani side complete logistical control once the consignments have entered its territory. Conclusion The six-decade-long Kashmir dispute has caused tremendous human and economic costs. This is an aspect of the conflict that is often overlooked. The present thaw in Indo-Pak relations has provided an opportunity to use crossLoC relations as a means not only to increase the prosperity levels of Kashmiris on either side but also to use the interaction as a means of ameliorating conflict. This hope is based on the liberal theory of economic interdependence, which argues that by increasing the economic incentive for peace, trade-driven interdependence brings amelioration of interstate conflict as a welcome political externality. Allowed to reach its true potential, cross-LoC trade in Jammu Kashmir could produce the kind of interdependence liberal trade theorists envision. While further expansion in trade in goods is the obvious next step, the mainstay of the interaction over the medium-to-long term is likely to be in the trade in services, joint ventures, and cross-LoC investment spheres. Moreover, transit trade facilities for Indian Kashmir are certain to create an added incentive to maintain normalized

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ties. Finally, the human interaction between these divided peoples that economic ties will inevitably create will perhaps be a potent force against regression toward active hostilities over the territory. This is where efforts from a body like the Joint Chamber become so important. Presently, the governments of India and Pakistan manage issues regarding cross–LoC activity closely. Given their security-centric outlook, the economic interaction remains unpredictable, and indeed unattractive. Under such circumstances, it is only bottom-up pressure from nongovernmental bodies that can hope to inject a broader perspective into the official mindset. This requires a delicate balance in the Joint Chamber's approach; the body's members need to remain pragmatic, avoiding an overly aggressive attitude that would unnecessarily provoke the governments to

clamp down on their aspirations and an overly deferential posture that would leave the Joint Chamber at the mercy of political relations between Pakistan and India. No matter how challenging, measures necessary to keep the business community interested in cross–LoC interaction must be pursued; the enormity of the challenge cannot be allowed to dissuade the business enclave. After all, few believed prior to the initiation of the peace bid that duty-free cross–LoC interaction, as it stands today, would be possible. And certainly no one could have imagined that a joint platform would be formulated and accepted, even if notionally, by the governments of Pakistan and India. Yet both are reality today. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FROM AUTHOR The author wishes to thank Zulfiqar Abbassi, Ch. M. Saeed, Masood-ul-Hasan, and Mubeen Shah for detailed inter-

views and several other members of the business community in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry for their valuable inputs. He is also grateful to Mr. Happymon Jacob for soliciting information from the business community in Indian Jammu and Kashmir and to the Research Society for International Law, Lahore, Pakistan for providing their opinion on the legality of the Joint Chamber. Finally, he wishes to thank Marie Pace, A. Heather Coyne, David Smock, Jonathan Cohen, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FROM EPILOGUE Epilogue express sincere gratitudes to the United State Institute of Peace for granting us permission to reproduce this exclusive report. This report was commissioned by USIP’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution.

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TIMELINE Described as second biggest intra-Jammu and Kashmir, the Cross LoC trade was launched on October 21-22, 2008 between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and Poonch and Rawalakote after an agreement between India and Pakistan. A team of traders from Pakistan Administred Kashmir visited Jammu and Kashmir in October last year to finalise the trade modalities with their counterparts on this side. A similar visit of traders from Indian side to Pakistani side still awaits clearance. Largely seen as a placating measure after two months of political turmoil in the state in 2008, the Cross-LoC trade is being run purely on trust and barter in complete absence of banking and communication facilities. There has not been even a single review meeting of Indo-Pak Joint Working Group on Cross-LoC trade since it was launched. Traders from both sides also never had an opportunity of a formal meeting to review progress. Reopresentatives of PaK Chamber visted J&K in October 2009 on invitation of Center for Dialogue and Reconciliation a Mumbai-Haryana based NGO. They had meetings with their J&K counterparts but there was no official participation. While the trade volume on Poonch-Rawalakote route is improving week after week, it has almost come to neglible on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route. Lack of proper roads on Pakistani side is stated of the reason, even as traders in the Valley admit that they are more interested in transit trade. Since April 2009, many Kashmiri traders switched over to the Poonch-Rawalakote route as the cross-LoC trade on Uri-Muzaffarabad route was virtually suspended in few months after launch. On September 30, the Cross-LoC trade on Poonch-Rawalakote route touched an all time high at Rs 5.34 crore amidst a very high demand of moong dal among the traders of Indian side Jammu and Kashmir. Out of Rs 3.31 crore imports from PaK, moong dal alone valued Rs 2.5 crore volume. he Cross-LoC trade on Poonch-Rawalakote route ran into trouble in the middle of July after traders on both sides started retruning trucks load of goods after blockage of good in barter by many traders. The matter was later reolved through meeting at the crossing point the next week. Cross-LoC trade suffered another roadblock towards the end of May when custom authorities blocked exchange of items which did not have the certificate of origin within Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese garlic, coconut kernel and brown cardamom were three such items. Trade was resumed on June 7 when authorties allowed temporary exchange of these items. Truckers were accused in August of smuggling Pakistani SIM cards of mobile phones and subsequently four drivers were arrested on August 4. While security agencies believed hand of Pakistani Army to send in communication gadgets for use of militants but some traders were of different view. This may have been done to facilitate communication between traders near LoC as there are no direct phone links. Onion, garlic, dry fruit, fresh fruits, prayer mats, Peshawari sandals, moong dal are among the major items of import from PaK. Vegetables, particularly tomato, fruits, honey, spices and coconut kernels are among the major export items from J&K

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CARRYING FORWARD Traders from both sides of state say that they have invested in peace at the cost of their businesses but now it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to carry on the trade under present circumstances. They have called for immediate meeting of the Indo-Pak Joint Working Group on Cross-LoC trade to review progress and remove bottlenecks for future trade. Among the major recommendation made by the traders from both side, at a meeting organised by the Center for Dialogue and Reconciliation in Srinagar on October 11, included: FACILITATION Ø There should be provision of multiple trade passes for the engaged traders. Once this is agreed upon, the Joint

Federation of Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry should be given the authority to recommend the members from their respective sides for multiple entry trade passes. Ø Visit of traders to either side of the Line of Control should not be made hostage to the Cross-LoC bus services. The

traders should be allowed to use their own cars untill the LoC crossing points. Ø There should be hassle free clearance of goods. Ø There should be provision of meetings between the traders to make a periodic review of progress on trade. This

meeting should involve the stake holders from both sides. INFRASTRUCTURE Ø There should be free and open channels of tele-communications between both sides of the Line of Control. When

people from PaK already have the facility of calling up in J&K, the government should consider on priority making it a two way process. Ø There should be an expansion of loading and unloading areas at the LoC clearance points. The authorities may

probably consider making warehousing facilities where traders are allotted sheds to park their 8 to 10 trucks at a time for loading an unloading at convenience. Ø Immediate provisions of banking and postal facilities. Ø Roads and bridges should be improved on both sides so that at least trucks carrying 15 tonne load can pass over.

EXPANSION OF SCOPE Ø The prerogative of selecting items, whenever, should exclusively rest with the stakeholders. Ø LoC trade, for all practical purposes, should be purely driven by the market demand. Ø All items produced and manufactured in both sides of Jammu and Kashmir should be allowed for trade but again

stakeholders should be allowed to fix the priorities. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS Ø There should be involvement of the stakeholders from both sides in all decisions pertaining to the LoC trade. Ø All traditional routes between both sides should open with express priority to the routes with trade potential. Ø The LoC trade should not be limited to fixed days and it should be declared as an all-days trade.

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Bridging Divides HARNESSING THE INDUS :

From Treaty To Governance Perspectives from India D SUBA CHANDRAN

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nvariably every comment on the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan have focussed that despite the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 and a border confrontation during 2001-02, India and Pakistan have not violated the Treaty. Besides, this is seen as the only success story, between India and Pakistan; hence there is a hesitancy to tinker/amend the treaty. True, the treaty has survived the four wars, a border confrontation and military stand offs; however, if the Treaty could be violated, it can be done only by one party to the contract – India. Pakistan, being a lower riparian state, cannot violate the treaty, unless it prefers to pursue a military action, to implement the Treaty. A radical section within Pakistan has been claiming that Islamabad should even consider the use of nuclear bombs, to protect its water rights. Though India claims that it has not violated the treaty in principle, some of its constructions, especially relating to barrages and dams, are seen by Pakistan as against the Treaty. India put forwards its own reasons to undertake those constructions, to make better use of the water systems in J&K and the surrounding region. It is also interesting, while on the one hand people on both sides talk about the IWT as the most effective one (comparatively) in the last five decades, on the other hand, there have been numerous complaints on how

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those who actually negotiated the treaty in the 1950s, on both sides failed to achieve the interests of their respective countries. Finally, the Treaty was signed in 1960, almost fifty years back, in a different political, economic, demographic, ecological and energy environment. Today there has been a considerable change in all these five areas. Should India and Pakistan take into account the contemporary issues/ problems/challenges in managing the Indus Waters, or keep it aside, for the fear of not tampering something that is believed to be working smoothly? How can India and Pakistan work together to make optimum use of the Indus Waters? How can both countries get ready to address the impending environmental, demographic, economic and political challenges, through efficient management of the Indus Waters? Finally, should India and Pakistan, waste all their energies in accusing and defending, what could be done and not done, legally under the IWT, or should both countries think beyond pure legal terms? In short, should the focus be “legal” interpretation of the IWT or Indus Water “Governance”? SHARING THE INDUS WATERS: MAJOR ISSUES/PROBLEMS The Indus Waters Treaty is likely face greater stress in the near future, for the following reasons. Changed History The IWT was signed in 1960, after a

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prolonged negotiation in the 1950s, led by the World Bank, in a different regional and international environment – immediate pangs of partition, settlement of refugees, Kashmir in the United National, Cold War and Pakistan being a part of the US led pact, while India insisting on pursuing a nonalignment approach to its international affairs. Regional pulls/pressures within India and Pakistan along the Indus Waters basin were relatively less, if not totally non-existent during that period; hence neither the Indian government in New Delhi nor the Pakistani government in Rawalpindi/Islamabad had to take into account the regional political demands for “their share” of water on a particular river system. Also, during the 1950s the federal governments in India and Pakistan were strong vis-à-vis provincial governments. The latter was more dependent on the former and in most cases, regional politics was very much controlled by the governments at federal level. In India, the towering personality of Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress played an important role on this process, while in Pakistan the pressure at the national level between the military and polity, kept the regional politics at a low key level. Today the situation is different at political level, in terms relations b e tw e e n f e d e r a ti o n a n d p r o vinces/states in India and Pakistan. Regional politics and parties play a

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larger role at national level, and the federal governments have to take into account the regional aspirations. On the Indus Water basin, Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, NWFP, Northern Areas and the governments on both sides of the LoC in Srinagar/Muzaffarabad play an important role in the national politics. Clearly, the political situation in the Indus Water basin today, is not what it was fifty years back. Given the progress in the last two decades, one is likely to see more problems in the next decade. Both New Delhi and Islamabad should consider this important change, and what is likely to happen in the next decade. On the positive side, one should also consider the positive breakthroughs that have taken place in the last one decade, despite the military and political upheavals at the bilateral levels. Both countries have matured and taken certain measures, for the first time in the last sixty years, for example opening the LoC for the movement of people and goods. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has made a statement on making the borders irrelevant between the two countries. Despite the negative happenings, the political atmosphere today, is not how it was sixty years back. Both countries should be willing to pursue a bold political step, in terms of harnessing the Indus Waters. Demography, Industrialization and Increased Emphasis on Water Unlike the 1950s, both countries have grown tremendously, in terms of their population and industrialization. Despite the expansion of various sectors, agriculture still remains the primary focus of occupation for many in rural India and Pakistan. In this decade, both India and Pakistan have achieved new heights in their economic growth and have a high expectation for the next decades. Manmohan Singh has categorically stated that 9 percent growth rate

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will be his primary emphasis – at the national and international levels; his domestic and foreign policies are likely to reflect this basic exposition. Clearly, this has already placed enormous stress on the effective use of water in both countries – for the purposes of irrigation and generation of electricity. Worse, these demands on the water resources for agricultural and industrial purposes are likely to expand in the coming decades. Pakistan in particular has been facing an energy crisis in the last couple of years; given the

The political situation in the Indus Water basin today, is not what it was fifty years back. Given the progress in the last two decades, one is likely to see more problems in the next decade. Both New Delhi and Islamabad should consider this important change, and what is likely to happen in the next decade. problems associated with the energy production and the equation between the independent power producers and the government of Pakistan, one could only conclude the energy crisis will continue. For India, to achieve and sustain a nine percent growth as Manmohan Singh has envisaged, energy security is equally important; with the IranPakistan-India gas pipeline now placed in a limbo and the Indo-US nuclear deal unlikely to produce large scale electricity in the near future, India's energy demand is no less.

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Indus Waters will become an increasing bone of contention, not only between the two countries, but also between the regions/states/provinces in these two countries. In fact, there are already clear signs of an impending disaster on managing the waters at national and bilateral levels. For J&K, on both sides of the LoC, Indus rivers are likely to be primary source of energy production. Invariably all the projects – Baglihar, Kishenganga, Mangla and Diamer-Basha are facing political and technological problems, in terms of creating electricity, besides issues between the provinces and federation, in terms of governments of Srinagar and New Delhi, Muzaffarabad and Islamabad, and the Northern Areas administration and Pakistan. Besides the huge uncomfort that the lack of electricity creates for the ordinary people, it energy insecurity also affects industrial production and any new investment and tourism sectors. Who would like to visit those hill stations, how ever scenic they are, if there is electricity only for a few hours, every day? Differences Within and the Disasters Without As mentioned above, internal differences within India and Pakistan have the potential to become a major crisis, straining the IWT at the bilateral level. First, there is a clear divide between Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the federal governments on the nature and use of IWT. The people and government of J&K, where the Indus and most of its important tributaries flow through, are against the IWT, as they feel it is against their interests. A resolution was passed in J&K Legislative Assembly in 2002, calling for annulling the IWT. A section inside J&K even considers the IWT as an Indo-Pak conspiracy against the Kashmiris. The Kashmiri grievances are based on emotional and economic

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issues; for Kashmiris, water and land have always been an emotional issue. Second, J&K also considers the IWT as an economic liability. Majority in J&K consider that the IWT discriminates the Kashmiris by not letting them tap the potential of Indus and its tributaries in terms of using the waters for agriculture, transport and energy. It is believed that the losses that the IWT cause to J&K are around 8000 crores annually. In the recent months, there appears to be a politicisation of waters, by the opposition party against the government, purely for political reasons. Mehbooba Mufti, the leader of the opposition, has been making statements on the “Loot of Water”, primarily to embarrass the government. Given the fact the ethnic Kashmiris are extremely emotional about “land” and “water”, this is another powder keg. Third, the people of Northern Areas consider the IWT against their interests. The controversy over the construction of Diamer-Basha dam highlights the tensions between Northern Areas and Islamabad on sharing the Indus Waters. Many in Northern Areas feel that Islamabad has not provided any political status to the region, precisely to exploit them over the Indus Waters. They argue, had Northern Areas been a political entity, Pakistan then would have to share the waters and royalty. Worse, a section also believes, that while the Basha dam will submerge parts of its land and result in displacement, the royalties will go to the NWFP. Fourth, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, has a serious problem with the rest of Pakistan on Mangala dam. Muzaffarabad feels exploited by the rest of Islamabad over the Mangala dam; the construction in Mirpur has dislocated the entire city, whereas the benefit goes to Pakistan. Islamabad is too sensitive about any water related issues involving PoK and

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the Northern Areas. A government official was suspended for writing a book on the Mangala dam; subsequently all his books were banned during 2002-04 and accused for “anti-state and an attempt to promote nationalist feelings amongst Kashmiris.” Fifth, the four provinces of Pakistan are deeply divided within, in terms of sharing the Indus waters. The controversy over the construction of Kalabagh alone will amplify internal problems relating to the water conflict. While Punjab wants to build the dam at any cost, leaders of Sindh has warned Islamabad to choose between Kalabagh and federation, meaning that construction of the dam will result in Sindh walking out of the federal structure. Ineffective Water Governance South Asia as a whole has a serious deficit relating to water governance. All countries in SAARC fail to use water judiciously; as a result, there is a huge water wastage. Besides, despite knowing that water is previous commodity, South Asia has failed to evolve alternate modes of irrigation; canal and river irrigations are the most preferred in South Asia. Methods like drip irrigation and crop rotation to use the available water judiciously, are yet to be effectively evolved. South Asia as a whole, wastes water. Receding Glaciers & Shrinking Sources All the above mentioned issues/demands focus on the increasing demands on the Indus Waters, based on the presumption that the supply will continue, as it has been in the past. What if there is a reduction in supply, purely on geological/environmental reasons? Studies on the Himalayan glaciers highlight the possibility of a decline in water flow in the Indus and its tributaries. Invariably every one agrees today,

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that the glaciers are receding and all the major Himalayan river system – Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra are likely to face shortage of water supply. Unfortunately, neither India nor Pakistan, at the governmental levels have initiated any major studies – either independently or jointly. While the environmentalists in India and Pakistan have undertaken some excellent studies, their acceptability by the governments is yet to happen. With an expanding population and growing energy and economic needs, any decline in water flow will only increase the stress on the IWT. Given the inter-state and intra-state political and emotional issues along the Indus river basin, the possibility of water scarcity resulting in water wars between the states and within them, cannot be completely ruled out. It is imperative, that India and Pakistan and their sub regions work together to address the growing concerns and avoid any future conflict over the sharing of waters. IWT has an inbuilt provision to rework sections of this treaty. India, Pakistan and its sub regions should work together towards creating Indus Water Treaty – II, addressing the issues mentioned above. IWT-II could very well be a conflict preventive measure relating to water issues along the Indus river basin.. DEBATING THE OPTIONS What are the options available for India and Pakistan? The extremists in India have already talked about the abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty. Nothing would harm India more than abrogation of a treaty, which was negotiated along with the World Bank, and withstood the sea-saw relations of the two countries. Besides, the international ramifications, in terms of India adhering to treaties and agreements that it has signed, it would have a series of implications for similar treaties it had

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signed with its other neighbours. India has similar treaties on water with Nepal (Mahakali Treaty) and Bangladesh (Ganges); any abrogation of the IWT will affect the confidence India's neighbours on similar treaties relating to water. Internally, it will also set a bad precedent for the states, that are fighting over sharing of water; for examples, Karnataka and Tamilnadu, with the former being the upper riparian and the latter being the lower riparian, in terms of sharing the waters of Cauvery river. Second, unilateral abrogation of the IWT is also unlikely to make the energy situation better in J&K. Given the level of bad governance and corruption involved in many of these projects, abrogation of the IWT is not likely to result in J&K becoming a gainer in terms of harnessing the waters. Pakistan, has been threatening to use even nuclear weapons to secure their water rights. It is a political rhetoric aimed at local audience. Pakistan is unlikely to do anything like that, except objecting to any and every project relating to the western rivers, and perhaps give more support to the movement of militants. None of these options are likely to benefit Pakistan in the long term, in terms of effectively harnessing the Indus Waters. Indo-Pak history has numerous examples of where the Pakistani military exercises have led them to, ever since the IWT was signed. It is neither in India's interests to unilaterally abrogate the IWT, nor in Pakistan's interests to wage a water war. The extremists on both sides, in worst case scenario may pressurize for such an option, which could be undertaken, but with no positive results. Both the above options, will only hamper the water relations further and negate, whatever has been achieved so far. Clearly, the only option is engage with each other to

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effectively harness the Indus Waters jointly. RECOMMENDATIONS India and Pakistan could consider the following, given the issues/ problems related to the IWT, and those which are likely to arise in the next decade. Debate on Indus Water Treaty – II From New Delhi's perspective, it is important to realise that internal political and emotional situation regarding the sharing of water in Pakistan and in J&K is likely to have a negative impact on the IWT as a whole. Experts like BG Verghese have already pitched for an Indus Water Treaty – II, which is important from New Delhi's perspective to look into and prepare for the future. IWT-II does not call for the abrogation of IWT, or a parallel treaty; it only aims at, making the existing treaty more effective, taking into account political, economic and environmental developments in the last five decades, and those changes likely to take place in the coming decades. A collaborative background research Clearly, neither India nor Pakistan has a vision, in terms of what needs to be done, except for reacting to a domestic audience. There is a need for a joint, but impartial research that would provide alternative approaches to address the present and future challenges emanating from the Indus Waters Treaty. Indus Waters Experts Group As a corollary of the above exercises, there is a need to form an Indus Water Experts Group (IWEG), comprising six to ten experts, from different backgrounds, who have been working with the governmental and nongovernmental sectors like BG Verghese, Ramaswamy Iyer and Arshad Abbasi, who have undertaken some pioneering

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work on these issues. The IWEG should spearhead independent meetings in India, Pakistan and both sides of the LoC, with a larger group, in terms of addressing the main concerns of the stakeholders in the national and regional capitals. Joint Study of Glaciers and Effective Use of Waters Both India and Pakistan should jointly invest in encouraging independent scientific/environmental studies on the Himalayan glaciers and give them the necessary access. There have been numerous proposals already on converting the Siachen into a peace/science park, and monitor the developments. There is a need for such a focus on all the glaciers of the Himalayas, from which most of the perennial rivers of India and Pakistan originate. Given the fact that countries like Nepal and Bangladesh also depend on the Himalayan source, it would be prudent to include them, along with China, which also has a stake here on the Brahmaputra system. it would be prudent to include them, along with China, which also has a stake here on the Brahmaputra system. Reducing the Water Rhetoric Both in Pakistan and India, along with both sides of LoC, there is so much of political rhetoric, which is actually harming everyone, including those who are making this statement. There is a clear need to avoid “the loot of our waters,” “decide the dam over federation,” “we will use any weapon, including nuclear to secure our water rights,” and “abrogate the treaty, for we give them the waters, but they send terrorists.” While the extremist elements are unlikely to reduce their rhetoric, nothing is stopping the moderate elements to raise their voices in favour.

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Harnessing the Indus Perspectives from Pakistan

NAUSHEEN WASI

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he Indus Water Treaty (1960) brought to an end, the 12 year old canal water dispute and became the basis of resolving any water disputes which appeared after that. The treaty consists of three parts: the Preamble, twelve articles and Annexes A-H. Almost, fifty years after the Treaty has been in signed, today, it is under stress. The following questions need to be addressed from an Indo-Pak perspective: Does the Indus water treaty address the issue of river waters between India and Pakistan today? What are the new issues/ problems emerging, in relating to water ? What specific measures need to be pursued to effectively harness the river waters? How do we address future water needs of both countries? Indus Waters Treaty: A Short Introduction The Indus flows through the northwest of India and Pakistan. It arises within Tibet from a holy lake called Mansarovar, the mouth of the lion. After rising in Tibet, the Indus runs northwest between the Karakoram and the Himalayas. In Kashmir, the river crosses the Line of Control (LoC) and enters Baltistan. The principal tributaries of the Indus in the west are Kabul and Khurram rivers, while its five main tributaries in the East are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers. The British laid the foundation of the Indus Basin River System in the late 19th Century. The system did exist prior to

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the British annexation of the area but in a rudimentary form. The irrigation network constructed during the British rule, especially after 1885, was based on perennial canals which led off from river-spanning weirs and headworks. Vast areas which had remained inaccessible under the traditional irrigation system were brought under cultivation by this canal system. In the Punjab, two major systems of irrigation

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were developed --- Bari Doab and the Sutlej Valey Project. Originally designed as one scheme. With the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 , including the province of Punjab, the Indus system was also divided; while the headworks fell to India, the canals ran through Pakistan With a view to attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus basin and recognizing the need for

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fixing and delimiting the rights and obligations of each country in relation to the other , both states, as a part of the Indus Waters Treaty agreed to: All the waters of the Eastern rivers, namely Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, shall be available for the unrestricted use of India except for domestic, nonconsumptive and agricultural use by Pakistan. Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers namely the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. India shall be under an obligation to allow the flow of these waters and shall not permit any interference except for domestic use, non-consumptive use, agricultural use and generation of hydroelectric power. If a party is to plan an engineering work on any of the rivers, it will first notify the other party about its plan. A Permanent Indus Commission shall be constituted comprising one Commissioner as representative of each country. The Commission will meet regularly at least once a year alternately in India and Pakistan. Any question which arises between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission. If the Commission fails in reaching an agreement on the question then a 'difference' will be deemed to have arisen. A 'difference' at the request of either Commissioner shall be dealt with by a neutral expert; if the neutral expert informs the Commission that in his opinion, the difference should be treated as a dispute, then a 'dispute' will be deemed to have arisen. A court of arbitration shall then be established to resolve the dispute. Dams on the Indus: Major Challenges Almost all the disputes over water that have arisen between India and Pakistan are about dam projects

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constructed or being constructed by one of the two parties. The negotiations over these issues involve divergent concerns and interests, based on their interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. The major disputes have been over the following projects: Salal Dam After the signing of Indus Waters Treaty, the first dispute India and Pakistan were engaged in was over the construction of the Salal Dam by India on the Chenab River. Under the terms of the Treaty, India submitted its plan to

Almost all the disputes over water that have arisen between India and Pakistan are about dam projects constructed or being constructed by one of the two parties. The negotiations over these issues involve divergent concerns and interests, based on their interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan's approval in 1968. A run of theriver hydroelectric project, Salal was deemed crucial for the agricultural needs of the Indian Punjab and economic progress of the country. In 1974 Pakistan officially objected to the design of Salal project arguing that it did not confirm to the criteria for design of such hydroelectric projects laid down under the Treaty. During the course of the negotiations, several options were discussed for reaching to a final settlement including resort to the arbitration procedure provided in the Treaty. Finally, India agreed to make

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some changes in the design of the dam including reducing the height of the dam and to the permanent closure of the diversion canal after the hydel plant had been commissioned. The resolution of this dispute was hailed in both countries and is still quoted as a case of successful dilpomacy over water sharing between Pakistan and India due to the concessions made under the Salal Agreement signed in April 1978. Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project The second challenge to the treaty came regarding the construction of the Wullar Barrage, as it is called by Paksitan, or Tulbul Navigation Project as termed by India. The dispute arose in 1984 when India began to build the barrage and navigational project at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on the River Jhelum. In 1986, Pakistan referred the case to the Indus Commission, and in 1987 work was halted on the project by India. The main point of dispute is that Pakistan views the project as a storage work while India claims that it is a navigational project. These divergent positions are further urged in the light of specific provisions of the Indus Waters Treay. For Pakistan, the project violates Article I (11) that prohibits both parties from undertaking any 'manmade obstruction' that may cause a change in the volume of water. Article III (4) prohibits India from storing any water on the western rivers. Further, sub-para 8 (h) entitles India to construct incidental storage work on the western rivers only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acre feet of water. Pakistan argues that the existing water level in the Wullar Lake is enough for small boats to navigate between Baramula

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and Srinagar, so there is no need to store additional water. It further argues that the dam's storage capacity was 32 times more than the 10,000 maf capacity provided under the Indus Waters Treaty. India, on the contrary, contends that despite the broad principles governing the Treaty, India has been allowed, under certain conditions, to construct a barrage in the light of Article 3 (4) conditions, which are enlisted in Annex D and E of the Treaty. India views the project as an attempt to make the Jhelum navigable, not a reservoir. Controlling water for navigation is permissible under the Treaty. More than a dozen rounds of talks have been held to date over the construction of this barrage but it remains the oldest and longest lasting water dispute between India and Pakistan. Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project The Kishanganaga project is another controversial water issue between the two countries. The 330 MW hydroelectric project is located about 160 kilometers upstream of Muzaffarabad and involves diversion of Kishanganga or Neelum River, as is known in Pakistan, to a tributary, Bunar Madumati Nullah of the River Jhelum through a 22-kilomtre tunnel. Pakistani objections are based on the grounds that the project will have an adverse effects on the NeelamJhelum link project that Pakistan initiated in 1988. A second diversion of the water of Kishenganga river to Jehlum would ruin the Neelam valley in Pakistan. It is feared that the project could reduce Pakistan's total water availability from an estimated 154 maf to about 140 maf, a shortage of about 89 per cent. Further, it is also expected to reduce the flow of water in the River

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Jhelum in Azad Kashmir by 27 per cent, affecting power generation capacity of the 1.6 billion Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project in Pakistan. By May 2004, India confirmed that it had started constructing some components of the project. On severe critisicm in April 2006, India offered to modify this project and submitted a revised plan in July 2006. In the revised plan India agreed to convert the storage and power generation project into a run-of-the-river project and construct pondage in accordance with the Indus

Hostile anti-Pakistan segments in India view the Indus Waters Treaty as giving undue concessions to Pakistan, which Prime Minister Nehru signed to 'purchase peace'. Since it did not bring peace to Kashmir, they want to revisit the concessions given to Pakistan under the Treaty. Waters Treaty. However, Pakistan rejected the plan maintaining that the project still had objectionable aspects. Pa k i s t a n c o m m u n i c a t e d t h e s e objections to India later in a detailed report. The issue figures on the agenda of talks every time between the two countries; however, bilateral talks have so far failed in reaching a settlement. Baglihar Hydel Power Project Located on the River Chenab in Doda district, the Baglihar hydropower project is one of the nine major hydroelectric projects identified by India on the Chenab. Divided into two phases, the project would install 900

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MWs of electricity capacity. The design of the dam was submitted to Pakistan in 1992 and, without much delay, Pakistan protested over the design of the dam and demanded a halt to its c o n s t r u c t i o n . H o w e v e r, t h e construction continued as the two sides exchanged further details. The Baglihar water dispute is the most specific of all these disputes between the two countries foregrounding their, fears, perceptions and dilemmas on water sharing. For the first time, the neutral expert clause in the Indus Waters Treaty was invoked. In May 2005, Raymond Lafittee, a Swiss civil engineer, was appointed by the World Bank as the neutral expert. After a detailed analysis of about 13,000 dams across the world, talks with both parties and visiting the dam site, he gave his verdict on Baglihar in February 2007. Both parties agreed to abide by the final verdict. Yet, this decision was not followed. IWT: Internal Problems Besides these dam project, there are several internal and regional issues that strain the Indus Waters Treaty. The most important is the view of the people in Jammu and Kashmir who see the Treaty as exploiting their rights by both India and Pakistan. And their call for its annulment as an economic liability. People of the northern areas in Pakistan are also opposed to n dam projects in Pakistan like the Mangla dam. Second, hostile anti-Pakistan segments in India view the Indus Waters Treaty as giving undue concessions to Pakistan, which Prime Minister Nehru signed to 'purchase peace'. Since it did not bring peace to Kashmir, they want to revisit the concessions given to Pakistan under the Treaty. Third, Pakistan also has serious

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problems regarding the sharing of Indus waters among its four provinces. This is evident with entrenched controversy being present in the country on every planned dam. The shortage of water has deep political, economic and social effects. For example, farmers in Sindh point their fingers at Punjabi landlords, and accuse them of 'stealing their share' of the Indus's water. Finally, there are environmental and ecological changes which call for consideration. Because of climate change, the Himalayan glaciers are melting at an alarming rate. For water resources, this means an increase in water initially due to flooding. Within the next 50 years, however, experts believe there will be a 30 to 40 percent drop in glacial melt because the glaciers will have receded. A strategy to create more storage capacity for water is the only option available, but one has to remember that glacial melt is not only water but also silt that will reduce the capacity of the reservoirs. This aspect has not been considered at the political level or at least has not gained prominence. Essentially the following two features have shaped Pakistan-India water politics: The underlying concern of both states is the political aspects that water entails. This aspect is believed to be the catalyst behind the hydropolitics in which both countries are engaged. Thus, the discussion on water issues has always been there in almost every dialogue between India and Pakistan, and now it figures in the high level talks that reflects the dominance of water issues. Most of the time, Pakistan being the lower riparian follows up on these issues on sharing of waters more vigorously. It has objected to almost all

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the projects planned by India on the western rivers calling them a violation of the Indus Water Treaty. Nonetheless, India does not accept this view and takes defensive positions. RECOMMENDATIONS Keeping in view the different dynamics of the water problem, experts are talking of an Indus Water Treaty II both in India and Pakistan. One feels that this issue should be taken up seriously and negotiations on the Indus Waters Treaty II be taken up in good faith. If India and Pakistan take a political decision to restructure their relations, they will have to ensure that water serves as a link to bring them together, rather than taking them further towards conflict. Water needs to be managed as a commodity. It is essential to jointly set up an organization with representatives from both countries, whose functions would entail identifying short term and long term supply capacity of the basin and its integrated development, setting up of infrastructure and coordinating activities of the different technical agencies. India and Pakistan should adopt a transparent approach to development problem relating to sharing water and invite interdisciplinary communications. Often, the findings of geologists escapes the notice of sociologists, anthropologists and economists, but the reverse is also true. Therefore, a holistic approach is required to understand the background and functioning of highly sophisticated irrigation systems. Besides, it is time that India and Pakistan along with other countries in the region come up with conservation policies, instead of creating more storage, that they have focused on for long. Dams are environment issues of

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great complexity. They are expensive to build, involve destruction of habitat and heritage, and relocation of whole communities. They also need water, and storage strategy does not consider where the water to fill dams and reservoirs will come from. It is time for the strategy to harness our water resources to change from being a largescale capital- and technology-intensive and environmentally degrading option to management-intensive and ecologically balanced development relying on indigenous technology. Political considerations, of course, cannot be ignored while dealing with the water issue on technical grounds, especially keeping in mind the present distrust in India-Pakistan relations and their history of antagonism. Hence, the two countries should seek international support, perhaps again with the World Bank taking the lead to negotiate a sound water sharing and usage mechanism. Mediation in case of water disputes resolution has worked between India and Pakistan in the past and would solve another great concern -- financing the projects if India and Pakistan agree on something.

KNOWLEDGE Ø Jama Masjid is one of the oldest and the

most spacious of all the mosques in Kashmir, situated in the heart of the City. The area of the mosque is 384 ft x 381 ft spacious enough for over thirty thousand people to offer prayers at a time. Ø The Railway network in J&K State is the

highest altitude railway network in India. Presently the railway network in the State exists upto Udhampur district and the rest between Udhampur to Qazikund is under construction. Intra Kashmir railway line from Qazigund to Baramulla is near completion and has been laid open for railway traffic from (Nowgam) Srinagar to Anantnag on 11th October in 2008. Ø Tulip Garden in Srinagar is the largest

garden of Asia.

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B OOK S / AU T HOR S

Conversation NYLA ALI KHAN

Challenging Hegemony of Static Versions of History

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n literary intellectual and political circles of Jammu and Kashmir a new book is making waves these days. To say that “Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir :Between India and Pakistan” more or less picks up the threads where Aatish-e-Chinar (Flames of Chinar) had left around three decades back won't be amisstatment. The new book not only tells the remaining story of Kashmir but also goes down the history bringing about fresh perspectives through a painstaking research. “Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir” is therefore a scholastics work, first of its kind of any Kashmiri woman scholar, who goes through hundreds and thousands pages of history, travels across length and breadth of the state and revisits the hearts and minds of key players and eye witnesses to tell the world the story of Kashmir. The author, NYLA ALI KHAN, Professor of English at the University of Nebraska-Kearney in United States, says that her book is a tribute to the resilient spirit of the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir. What makes Nyla's book most credible is the fact that her work does not reflect anywhere that she is granddaughter of the illustrious leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. With this issue, Epilogue launches a three part conversation series with Nyli Ali Khan as she responds to questions posed by ZAFAR CHOUDHARY. We are also reproducing excerpts from her book and readers are welcome to send questions for the author.

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Since your book “Islam, Women and the Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan” hit the bookstalls, it is being described by readers and reviewers as first of its kind. First in depth study by a woman…. first thorough study of the tragedy of Kashmir” etc. How is it first of its kind? Although there is a plethora of richly nuanced books on the complexity of the Kashmir issue, Islam, Women, and the Violence in Kashmir, is the first book written by a Kashmiri woman from an interdisciplinary perspective seeking to challenge the hegemony of statist versions of history and foreground the versions of history that have been relegated to the background. My book, Islam, Women, and the Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan is a labour of love into which I put my heart and soul. It is an interdisciplinary work in which I have deployed not just literary analysis but political critique; history as a revisionist project; erosion of the cultural syncretism of J&K; significance of retrieving our rich cultural heritage and building a whole new edifice on our legacy; role of lay women during the awaking of nationalist sentiment in J&K in 1931, during the resurgence of the separatists movement in 1989, the increase in gender violence because of the brutal militarization of the State; and finally, the nuclearization of J & K. I have used self-reflexive and historicized forms, drawn on my heritage and kinship in Kashmir in order to explore the construction and employment of the Kashmiri political and cultural landscape, and gender in secular nationalist, religious

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nationalist, and ethnonationalist discourses in JK. In my book, I seek in the collision of modernity and communal memory a horizontal relationship producing intersectional spaces between different cultural realities, times, and ways of reflecting upon the construction of my own subjectivity. I have tried to underscore the dire need to retrieve and renew contact with our national culture but also recognize the dangers of mythologizing historical and cultural pasts. Acknowledging our complicity in oppression,

My book, Islam, Women, and the Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan is a labour of love into which I put my heart and soul.

reconceptualizing paradigmatic structures, and mobilizing cultural and political coalitions is riddled with conflict but it is the need of the day for us to engage in these processes, in doing which I have employed all my energies. It appears, unlike most of the members of your family, you are scholar first and then anything else. What was the primary motivation for writing this book? First off, the interdisciplinary approach in my book is designed to

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help readers think critically and constructively about the ethical implications of various approaches to research selection, evidence gathering techniques, inextricable link between social power and structures of inequity, and the production of knowledge. The reprehensible endeavours of the Indian and Pakistani establishments to rewrite history impelled me to undertake the booklength study of the politically tumultuous situation in the state of J & K which has led to an increase in gender-based violence. In my book I have made an honest attempt my to provide my interviewees with a legitimate forum at which they voice their political, cultural, and social ideologies without fear of reprisal or erasure. The ethnographic field research, which I undertook, was a method of seeking reconnection by simultaneously belonging to, and resisting, the discursive community of traditional Muslim Kashmiri and Gujjar rural women. I was further motivated by the desire to critically observe the sociopolitical discourse in Kashmir through from the margins instead of from an elitist center. My goal was to engage in reflective action as an educator working with diverse cultural and social groups. I wanted to examine the systems that have generated the culture of silence, in which the political elite has been complicit. “…… Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan”, the title clearly suggests Kashmir a victim, in equal parts, of India and Pakistan. This is contrary to the popular perception, at least in Kashmir valley. Your comments.

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Kashmir is a parchment on which various discourses, nationalist, ethnonationalist, secular nationalist, Islamist, militaristic, have been inscribed and reinscribed for several decades. Since the dawn of the Independence and Partition of India, the aspirations of the people of J&K have gone unheard in the cacophony of the vacuous political rhetoric voiced by Indian and Pakistani mainstream politicians, who have made no bones about their myopic political agendas and political strings attached to any developmental aid given to J&K. The long history of discriminatory treatment of the populace of J&K, the discriminatory nature of which was further aggravated by the visibility of their perceived difference of, has created a negative self-image in many Kashmiris, which hasn't been redressed by the militarization of the region. Kashmiris have time and again attempted to chart a viable course in the choppy waters of duplicitous subcontinental politics but have always been subjected to political and social constraints. We still have a long way to go in recognizing the dire consequences of trauma brought on by political turmoil, military brutality, the dadagiri of militias and paramilitary divisions of the police, and fear psychosis created by such happenings. There are people who do not have recourse to the judicial and administrative machinery. It is unfortunate that the more unaccountable state-sponsored agencies have become in J&K, the more aloof and gluttonous our bureaucratic, military, and administrative machinery has become. The culture of impunity has grown around India and Pakistan like nobody's business. Given the reality of the two

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nation-states, I emphasize that it is upto us, the people of J&K, to bring about restitution in a war-weary and battle-ravaged society. We cannot confuse the idea of the nation with the practices and power of the nationstates of India and Pakistan.

While researching I was fortunate to have access to the priceless archival material collected by my maternal uncle Sheikh Nazir Ahmad, who was a young and zealous political activist during the heyday of the Plebiscite movement You have depended significantly on the oral history. You met people and have named them. After all your family is also an essential part of Kashmir's history. Who do you relied most (in the family) on in gathering information for your work. History is not a seamless narrative in which all the pieces effortlessly fit together. On the contrary, History with a capital “H” is replete with gaps, omissions, erasures, and strategic manipulations. The use of oral history in my book addresses the complex ways in which challenges to an established or state-sponsored discourse might be voiced from the periphery, which recognizing the power of centrist discourses to defang the theory and practice of resistance. While researching I was fortunate to

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have access to the priceless archival material collected by my maternal uncle Sheikh Nazir Ahmad, who was a young and zealous political activist during the heyday of the Plebiscite movement and was persecuted during the autocratic repression of the autonomous status of J & K. He has a well-developed sense of the various historical discourses, dominant and peripheral, which have been inscribed, erased, and reinscribed on the political and sociocultural matrices of Kashmir. I also talked with Ghulam Mohammad Shah sahib about the nationalist awakening in J & K in the 1930s and later the duplicitous policies implemented by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and his ilk to break the revolutionary spirit in the State. My mother, Suraiya Ali Matto, who spent invaluable time with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah sahib while he was in externment in Kodaikanal from 1965 until 1968, reminisced about that period. Last but not least, my father, Mohammad Ali Matto, was generous with the scholarly materials in his library and enriched me with narratives of the consciousness movement, beautifully interweaving the personal with the political and social. One of the good things about you book is that it originates from margins and touches upon perspectives of varied hues. You are essentially from elitist background. How you have able to keep your self away from your background in leading with objectivities. Working on my book enabled me to critically appraise political, cultural, and social discourses which my

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locations of privilege hadn't allowed me to question previously. I have been conscious of the limited representations in some other works on Kashmir which reflect the power relations between those who represent and those who are represented. For me, my maternal grandfather, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah sahib, has always been a larger than life figure, whom I revere. I question some of his political decisions but am fully cognizant of the collision of the ideas of selfdetermination, identity, and unity propounded by the young members of the Reading Room Party and the Plebiscite Front with the brutal force and suppression wielded by the Indian and Pakistani nation-states. I have

appraised not just the history of the Kashmiri nationalism dominated by the elite but I have carefully looked at the politics of the people and the political mobilization engendered by such politics. Popular mobilization in J & K during the 1930s and 1940s took the form of uprisings, which was a primary locus of political action. This potent political resistance was led by people like Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Chauhary Ghulam Abbas, Mirza Afzal Beig, Maulana Masoodi, Ghulam Ahmad Ashai, Kasap Bandhu, who did not have access to the echelons of power and spoke vociferously from the margins. Their activism made substantive forays into established discourses and structures of power. I have engaged constructively with

issues of representation and knowledge production. The primary question for me is “Who is speaking and who is being silenced?,” enabling me to recognize the legitimacy of knowledge produced from the point of view of the local subject, like the vaakhs of Lalla-Ded; the cultural and religious knowledge disseminated by Nund Rishi; the determination of the women's militia in 1948; the stoicism and perseverance of the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons; the conviction of the workers of political parties who maintain the vibrancy of the credo of selfdetermination; the collision of the idea of self-determination with military oppression on the contentious site of nationalism.

Islam, Women, and the Violence in Kashmir:

Between India and Pakistan BOOK Excerpts

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he once paradisiacal region coveted by kings and mystics alike, albeit for different reasons, where snow-covered peaks majestically tower over flowing rivers and streams bordered by lilies gently swaying to the cadences of the gentle breeze, by a quirk of fate, has become a valley of guns and unmarked graves. The paean of the Mughal emperor Jahangir in 1620 to the enthralling and spiritually healing beauty of Kashmir bespeaks the passionate longing it engendered: "If one were to praise Kashmir, whole books would have to be written. Kashmir is a garden of eternal spring, or an iron fort to a palace of kings – a delightful flower-bed, and a heart-expanding heritage for dervishes. Its pleasant meads and enchanting cascades are beyond all description. There are running streams and fountains beyond count. Wherever the eye reaches, there is verdure and running water. The red rose, the violet and the narcissus grow of themselves; in the fields, there are all kinds of flowers and all sorts of sweet-scented herbs, more than can be

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calculated. In the soul-enchanting spring the hills and plains are filled with blossoms; the gates, the walls, the courts, the roofs, are lighted up by the torches of the banquet-adoring tulips. What shall we say of these things or the wide meadows and the fragrant trefoil?" (Rogers 1914: 114) The breezes of Kashmir, which once had the power to heal every trauma, now cause searing wounds. The throes of pain, palpable in every withering flower and trembling leaf, can lacerate the most hardened person. The ripe pomegranate trees that once bespoke a cornucopia now seem laden with an unbearable burden. The liturgies in mosques, temples, and churches that once provided spiritual ecstasy are now jarring cacophonies. The comforting solitude that one could thrive on in various spots of the Valley now seems like a psychosis-inducing solitariness. What happened to the Valley that provided inspiration to poets, saints, and writers? Where is the beauteous land in which even a dull-witted writer could find her/his muse? Where are the majestic chinars, the fragrant pine trees and the

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luxuriant weeping willows that provided harbour to those buffeted by the fates? The mesmerizing Mughal gardens in the Valley with their refreshing springs and breathtaking waterfalls bemoan the state of the riven land, the polluted streams and the devastated people. The se ductive beauty of the Valley of Kashmir that evoked a desire to live to the hilt, untarnished by sordid passions and murky politics, is now blemished with army camps and militant hideouts. The plight of the repressed Kashmiri is similar to that of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, after their wilful defiance of Jehovah. The palpable contrast between the enchanting beauty of Kashmir and the glazed eyes of its people is cruel. The redness of roses that once awakened sensuality now evokes the violent bloodshed and loss of innocent lives that mangle the landscape. The land in which dervishes meditated to willingly renounce the self is now a chessboard for wily politicians. The strains of mystical music are now drowned out by the cacophonous sounds of hate and virulence. The lush meadows carpeted with daisies and lupines now reek of death and destruction. The soothing fragrance of pinecovered hills has now been overwhelmed by the odour of false promises and false hope. The tranquility of the region has been shattered by the heavy hand of political and military totalitarianism. The region resembles a vast concentration camp, swarming with soldiers. Police or military barriers abound in both urban and rural areas, and intimidation is a rather common occurrence at these checkpoints. The Valley seethes with a repressed anger generated by the humiliating brutality inflicted by Indian troops. The history of Kashmir is replete with egregious errors. As one scholar, Vincent H. Smith (1928: 176), wrote, 'Few regions in the world can have had worse luck than

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Kashmir in 20th matter of government.' The saga of Kashmir has been one of oppression, political persecution, and undemocratic policies. Since the pervasion of an exclusive cultural nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and rampant political corruption it has become a challenge to lead a dignified existence in J & K. The armed conflict has changed political combinations and permutations without either disrupting political, social, and gender hierarchies or benefiting marginalized groups. The social, economic, political, and psychological brunt of the armed conflict has been borne by the populace of Kashmir. The uncertainty created by fifteen years of armed insurgency and counter-insurgency has pervaded the social fabric in insidious ways, creating a whole generation of disaffected and disillusioned youth. Lack of faith in the Indian polity has caused Kashmiris to cultivate an apathy to the electoral process because it is a given that persons best suited to carry out New Delhi's agenda will be installed in positions of political import, regardless of public opinion. The earlier enthusiasm that accompanied democratization seems totally futile in the current leadership vacuum in the state. Lack of accountability among the J & K polity and bureaucracy has caused a large number of people to toe the line by living with the fundamental structural inequities and violence, instead of risking the ire of groups and individuals in positions of authority. Political organizations in the Valley have eroded mass bases and are in a moribund state. There seems to be an unbridgeable gulf between figures of authority and the electorate, who have been deployed as pawns in the devious< /o:p> political game being played by Indian and Pakistani state-sponsored agencies. The glaring lack of a wellequipped infrastructure in the Valley makes unemployment rife and underscores the redundancy of the educated

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segment of the population. The counterinsurgency operations undertaken in J&K by the Indian military and paramilitary forces were ferocious and cruel, and have alienated the disillusioned populace. I start from the premise that the syncretic ethos of Kashmir has been violated by the outburst of religious nationalism, secular nationalism and ethnonationalism that have facilitated political and social structural violence. The well-crafted theoretical fiction of a syncretic culture by the advocates of a Kashmiri polity empowered them in a circumscribed fashion to choose an idiom within which they could arbitrarily remove the distinction between religion and politics. I consider the shape of women's empowerment or lack thereof in the syncretic ethos of Kashmir, and the new languages of resistance, negotiation, and empowerment it adopts in the cacophonous social and political situation created by various nationalist discourses. I draw from the cultural and ideological spaces I was raised in; the cherished verses of the Sufi poetess LallaDed, in whose immortal poetry the legendary beauty of Kashmir endures pain and strife but lives on; conversations with my maternal grandmother that are etched in my memory; informative and enlightening discussions with my parents, who have continued to live in the strife-torn Valley through years of unbearable hostility and the psychological trauma of armed conflict with an unparalleled stoicism; informal conversations with friends and acquaintances who are victims of the politics of dispossession; the extensive reading that I have done over the years on the conflictual history and politics of J & K. I also draw from the field work conducted during my annual trips to Kashmir in July 2005, 2006 and 2007 among predominantly agricultural communities in areas bordering the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. Against the backdrop of the

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politically tumultuous situation in J & K which has led to an increase in genderbased violence, I attempt to show that the muted voices of marginalized laypeople, particularly women, have not been raised loud enough against the atrocities to which they are subjected by Indian paramilitary forces, Pakistansponsored insurgents, counterinsurgency forces and religious fundamentalists. I also emphasize the necessity of foreg-rounding women's perspectives in issues of nationalist ideologies, religious freedom, democratic participation, militarization, intellectual freedom, judicial and legal structures, in a milieu that does not co-opt them into mainstream political and cultural discourses or first-world feminist agendas. Using self-reflexive and historicized forms, drawing on my heritage and kinship in Kashmir, I explore the construction and employment of the Kashmiri political and cultural landscape, and gender, in secular nationalist, religious nationalist, and ethno-nationalist discourses in J&K. I question the exclusivity of cultural nationalism, the erosion of cultural syncretism, the ever-increasing dominance of religious fundamentalism, the irrational resistance to cultural and linguistic differences. I also question the victimization and subjugation of women selectively enshrined in the prevalent regressive social discourse and the uncritically rendered folklore of traditional Kashmiri Islamic and Hindu cultures. The upsurge of gender-based violence has circumscribed the mobility of women who are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. I, for one, would not have been able to conduct my field research without the armed bodyguard my parents provided for me. As a woman, it would have been difficult and dangerous for me to venture into secluded rural areas which are cordoned by paramilitary troops. The ethnographic field research that I undertook was a method of seeking reconnection sans con-

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descension by simultaneously belonging to, and resisting, the discursive community of traditional Muslim Kashmiri and Gujjar rural women. I was further motivated by the desire to critically observe the sociopolitical discourse in Kashmir through an oblique focus from the margins instead of from an elitist centre. My goal was to engage in reflective action as an educator working with diverse cultural and social groups. I was challenged to examine my own locations of privilege and seek emotional empowerment in order to understand the systems that have generated the culture of silence. This culture generates problematic stereotypes, alliances, and biases within and outside the community. I seek in the collision of modernity and communal memory a horizontal relationship producing intersectionalities between different cultural spaces, times, and ways of knowing the self in relation to the family, society, and the larger cultural landscape. Acknowledging our complicity in oppression, reconceptualizing paradigmatic structures, and mobilizing cultural and political coalitions is riddled with conflict, but it is the need of the day for us to engage in these processes. In chapter one of this book, 'Conflicting Political Discourses', I delineate the origins of the Kashmir conflict and the perspectives on it. I look at the discourse of 'Kashmiriyat' as a significant attempt to form a national consciousness in order to name its cultural alterity through the nation. In the second chapter, 'Cultural Syncretism', I analyse the recorded poems and paradigmatic sayings of Lalla-Ded, a Sufi mystic. I retrieve the rich details of her life that have been relegated to the background in the documented version of history. I incorporate hitherto unpublished opinions of scholars of Kashmiri and Urdu literature as well as of scholars of mysticism in the Kashmir Valley on the impact of Lalla-Ded on the Kashmiri Muslim and Kashmiri Pandit communities. I also foreground the revival of

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indigenous cultural institutions in J & K. In chapter three, 'Political Debacles', I underline the repercussions of India's anti-democratic strategies in the state which instigated oppositional and dissident responses. In chapter four, 'Militarization of Indian-Administered Jammu and Kashmir', I delineate the fundamental structural inequities in the J & K polity, exacerbated by political and military intrusions of the Pakistani administration and the engendering of political resistance. In chapter five, 'Negotiating the Boundaries of Gender, Community, and Nationhood,' I analyse the effects of nationalist, militant, and religious discourses and praxes on a gender-based hierarchy. I write about the radical political and socioeconomic changes in the role of Kashmiri women between 1947 and 1989. I report the reminiscences of two of the three surviving members of the women's militia that was formed at the height of the struggle against political and military tyranny. I address the traditional freedoms and prerogatives of Kashmiri women in the land of a spiritual luminary like Lalla-Ded. I have chosen to deploy oral evidence in my book, which has allowed me to approach events, notions, and literatures about which there was meagre evidence from other sources. The use of oral history has empowered my interviewees/correspondents; people of J & K, in significant ways, bringing acknowledgment of hitherto disregarded opinions and experiences. In some instances, I have taken the liberty of reproducing email responses, which I received from my interviewees, verbatim. I was keen on providing personal reminiscences from participants about landmark events without mediating between oral evidence/historiography and more elitist versions of history. My primary goal is to ensure that future generations of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir do not forget, because if we stop remembering, we stop being.

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RESEARCH

Sociology Socio-Cultural and Economic Changes among Muslim Rajputs:

A Case Study of Rajouri District in J&K DR. M. MAZAMMIL HUSSAIN MALIK

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he present Paper deals with socio-cultural and Economic changes among Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District. The efforts have been made to explore the historical background of the Rajouri as well as Muslim Rajputs, their socio-cultural and economic conditions and changing pattern. The Paper accommodates the concept of Rajputs, historical background of Muslim Rajputs, their conversion to Islam, caste stratification and socio cultural and economic changes. Primary social institutions like Family, marriage, education, polity and economy have been used as parameters to limit the broader concept of sociocultural and economic setup. The process of change has been examined in the traditions, customs and rituals related to family and marriage, educational standard and opportunities, political activities and economic status of the Muslim Rajputs before and after 1989. Rajouri and Poonch are the twin hilly districts of the Jammu and Kashmir state having rich Historical background of their own and previously considered as the land of 'Rajas'. The district headquarter of Rajouri is located in the South – West of Jammu and Kashmir State situated at the distance of 153.km, from Jammu. It lies between 700 to 74o-4, East longitude and 32o-58 to 330-35, North latitude and was separated from the erstwhile backward District Poonch. The District Rajouri is

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bounded on the north side by District Poonch, on the south by Jammu, on the east by Udhampur and on the west, by Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (Mirpur area). Rajtarangni, the anicient chronicle of Kashmir which was written during the period of Sultan Zain ul Abdin mentioned its old name as Rajapuri, from which the present name has been derived. Albruni visited Rajouri with Sultan Masaud in 1036, AD., he has also stated in his book “India” the name of Rajouri as Rajavari. The socio- cultural and economic history of Rajouri goes back to the Vedic period. In Maha Bharata there was a kingdom which was known by the name of Panchal Desa. The king of that State was Panchal Naresh whose daughter Daraupadi was married to Pandavas. Most of the historians identify Panchal Desa as the region in the mountains of Panchal Range which cradled the whole districts of Rajouri and Poonch. F.F. Pargitor has stated that second branch of immigrants crossed Himalayas in the north- west and settled in Rajouri and Poonch areas. Rajouri, Bhimber, and Naushera, were included with in the territory of Abhisar which was earlier one of the hill State of Punjab Kingdom. The early fragmentary record indicated that in the 4th century B.C., there was a federal type of political set up in the north west of India, which included Abhisar with Rajouri its capital. At the time of Alexander's invasion, Rajouri was at the height of its glory. During

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Muryan period, the town of Rajouri was a great trading centre. Hiuen Tsang who traveled through this area in 7th century A.D., mentioned about the hill State of Rajapuri, the land of the kings. Still earlier in the Budhist period it formed a part of Gandhar territory (Afghanistant, Ghandhar and Tashkent) and latter it was included in the domain called Darabhisanga which comprised the hilly stretch from Poonch to Kashmir during that period Laharkote (presently Loran Mandi) in Poonch and Rajouri had emerged as two independent and powerful states of the area. In 11th century A.D. Rajouri was ruled by chiefs of the Paula Dynasty under the suzerainty of Kashmir in 1097A.D. Rajouri emerged as principality in about 1003 A.D., the first ruler of the Paul dynasty was Raja Prithivi Paul, and last was Raja Amna Paul (1194 AD)., later on the Paula dynasty was Concluded by Raja Noor ud Din, he migrated from Punjab and Killed Raja Amna Paul, he was the first Muslim Jarral Rajput Raja who laid the foundation of Jaral Muslim Rule in Rajouri in (1194 AD), Kingdom Remained in the hands of his clan for seven centuries. Rehiemullah Khan with his son Raja FaqirUllah Khan were the last Muslim Jaral Rajput rulers of Rajouri, when Maha Raja Gulab Singh Captured Rajouri on 21 of October 1846. Rajouri was merged in to a tehsil of Bhimber District. Rajouri bifurcated from Bhimber District and affiliated with

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Reasi District in 1904 A.D., after independence, Rajouri Became part of the newly constituted Poonch-Rajouri District. On 1st. January 1968, Rajouri was declared as new district in the map of Jammu and Kashmir State. Social Structure of Muslim Rajputs: Presently Rajouri town is the administrative headquarter of the District It lies at both the banks of the river and is a meeting place of different roots leading to Kashmir, Poonch, Lahore, and Jammu etc., it is at the elevation of 3094 ft. from the sea level. According to Census 2001, 6 Tehsils 7 Blocks and 77 Panchayats covering 381 villages constitute Rajouri District. Nearly 45% of the geographical area of the District is covered with forest. Administratively whole District of Rajouri has been divided into seven tehsils, these are Rajouri, Kalakote, Naushera, Sunderbani, and Thannamandi, and in addition to that Dharal Malkan is the 7th tehsil declared in 2007.All the tehsils of the district have their own socio cultural and economic importance. The whole District is populated with different religious and caste communities with deeply rooted customs and traditional system. The whole population of the area is comprised of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. The total population of the district Rajouri is 4, 83000 out of which Hindus constitute 39%, Muslims constitute 58%, Sikh and others constitute 03% of the total Population. Total Muslim population of the District Rajouri is 2, 80,140 and Muslim Rajputs estimated population is about 1, 45,672 which constitute 51.99% of the total Muslim population. Muslims of Rajouri District have been classified into four categories, such as Rajputs, Gujjars, Kashmiries and 'others' The Gujars and Kashmiries are the linguistic divisions of

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the area, where as, the whole Muslim population of the district is stratified into various caste groups. RAJPUTS: The term Rajput is derived from Sanskrit word “Rajputra” found in the Vedas, the Ramayana, and Mahabharata. It has been used by the warriors and the Rulers, with passage of time there were many kshatriyas. The primogeniture allowed only the oldest male offspring of a king to succeed him, the rest were known as Rajputras.The word Rajput is claimed to be a changed term of Rajputra. Gradually it became a caste. Rajputs regard themselves as being descended from the vedic warrior class known as the Kshatriyas. To differentiate them from ordinary Kshatriyas the word Rajput was used, which literally means "son of a King." Rajputs are divided in to 36 major clan belong to one of the three great patrilineages, which are: The Suryavanshi lineage claiming descent from Surya, the Hindu Sun god, in English it is called Solar Dynasty, it is one of the oldest dynasty of the kshatriyas. The chandravanshi lineage, claiming descent from “Som” which literally means "Moon." In English called This Lunar Dynasty, it is also old but younger than the Sun Dynasty. Som was the first king of this dynasty. The Agnivanshi .lineage, this lineage claming descent from Agni, the Hindu God of fire. Only four Rajput clans are expected to be belonged to this lineage, they are Chauhans, Parmara, Solanki and Partiharas. Some scholars also include Nagvanshi and Rishivanshi a separate lineage. Literally, Muslim Rajputs are the Rajputs that converted to Islam The Raj-Puts (Sons of King) were ruling royal warrior clans of South Asia from ancient times has a long and well documented history of warrior kings and a strong

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martial reputation. They are in Pakistan and northern India, In Pakistan Muslim Rajputs generally took part in government services and in politics, Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, Governors of Provincial states, Ministers, such as Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah the father of Pakistan his ancestors belongd to Bhatia clan of Rajput from Paneli village in Kathiawar, Gujrat. Many Pakistani politicians belong to Rajput clans who served as Prime Minister of Pakistan. First elected Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Bhutta Rajput of Larkana, Sindh Momammad Khan Junejo the 11th Prime Minister of Pakistan was Junejo Rajput of Sindh. In politics of Pak occupied Kashmir, Muslim Rajputs played a significant roles the leading politician in POK, Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan belong to Muslim Rajput clan. Muslim Rajputs have been recognized in history as the warrior aristocracy, and were designated by the British Empire as a Martial Race and recruited into the Imperial Army. Muslim Rajputs have been engaged in the Pakistani military in large numbers, reaching ranks of Generals and the highest grade, as 7th Chief of Army Staff General TikkaKhan and the 10th Chief of Army Satff General Asif Niwaz Khan Janjua. Conversion of Muslim Rajputs: Various Rajput clans had converted to Islam during the early 12th century and since conversion have remained loyal to their faith. They were converted to Islam by the Muslim Sufi missionaries of the famed Chistiya, Qadriya orders and many others reasons. Some conversions also took place for political reasons. The Delhi Sultanate and later Mughal Dynasty encouraged the martial clans to convert to Islam. Conversions to Islam continued into the 19th century even during the period of the British Raj.

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Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned, “The fact of subsequent conversion to other faiths, did not deprive them of this heritage; just as the Greeks, after their conversion to Christianity, did not lose pride in the mighty achievements of their ancestors, of the Italians in the great days of the Roman Republic and early empire...Christians, Jews, Parsees, Moslems. Indian converts to these religions never ceased to be Indian on account of a change of their faith.” ('Discovery of India' oxford unipress, 1985). He also mentioned his personal experience about the Muslim Rajputs as, "I grew to know; the Rajput peasant and petty landholder, still proud of his race and ancestry, even though he might have changed his faith and adopted Islam. More importantly he bears testament to the fact that despite his change of faith, a Rajput is still a Rajput.” Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru has also referenced the impact of mass appeal of the Islam in the process of conversion, as, "The impact of the invaders of the north-west and Islam on India had been considerable. It pointed out and shown up the abuses that had crept up into Hindu society-the petrifaction of caste, untouchability, exclusiveness carried to fantastic lengths. The idea of brotherhood of Islam and of the theoretical equality of its adherents made a powerful appeal, especially those of the Hindu fold who were denied any resemblance of equal treatment.” He also indicated the conversion of Hindu upper castes to Islam, "Some individuals belonging to the higher castes also adopted the new faith, either because of a real change of belief, or, more often, for political economic reasons though all their social structure was based on the group

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(caste/social class), in matters of religion they were highly individualistic. It is worth noting as a rule, conversions to Islam were group conversions. Among the upper castes individuals may change their religion almost an entire village would convert...group life as well as their functions continued as before with only minor variations with regards worship etc.” Sir Denzil Ibbetson repre.(2002) has referenced the prominent positions of the Muslim Rajputs and indicated their courage and valiant martial tradition, and similarity with the Hindu counterparts in some regions. J.M. Wikeley in 'Punjabi Muslman' (1991) has stated, “The general conversion of the Muhammadan Rajputs from Hinduism is supposed to have taken place towards the end of the 13th or early 14th century AD. The Muhammadan conquests undoubtedly accelerated this change of religion, but the preaching of several renowned Muhammadan saints, especially Bawa Farid of Pakpattan, whose eloquence drew large numbers to hear him, helped considerably to this end” The majority of Rajputs in Rajouri District is Muslim Rajputs their origin is claimed from Rajisthan, Gujrat, Punjab, Haryana and H.P. Though the Muslim faith is against belief of a person being born from Sun, Moon, and fire, but even Muslim Rajputs feel proud of being belonging to Rajput Clan. They often reference the bravery of their ancestors in the battle fields of the past and they extend equal status to the parallel clan that is Hindu Rajputs. At the time of any conflict with non Rajput communities, the Hindu and Muslim Rajputs communities emotionally unite to protect their prestige. Still they like to serve in armed forces. While observing the attitude of the Rajputs of

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Rajouri district that is martial in spirit with a fierce pride of lineage and tradition it is not out of place to mention here quotation of Encyclopedia Britannica, (1911edition), “The tradition of common ancestry permits a poor Rajput yeoman consider himself as well born as any powerful landholder of his clan, and superior to any high official of the professional classes. No race in India can boast of finer feats of arms or brighter deeds of chivalry, and they form one of the main recruiting fields for the Indian army of the day. They consider any occupation other than that of arms or government derogatory to their dignity, and consequently during the long period of peace which has followed the establishment of the British rule in India, they have been content to stay idle at home instead of taking up any of the other professions in which they might have come to the front”. Rajputs of Rajouri District have been divided into two religious communities, i.e., Hindu Rajputs and Muslim Rajputs. Both the Rajput communities have common caste titles and common origin. Caste Stratification Among Muslim Rajputs: Historically Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District have been classified into two major groups represented by two linguistic division i.e, Pahari and Gojri, on account of regional variation the clan speaking Gojri language is not considered Rajputs in the area. The Muslim Rajputs have been stratified into various sub castes such as, Jarral, Malik, Chauhan, Janjua, Chib, Domal, Gakhar, Feerozal, Khokhar, Manhas, Bhatti, Thakkar, Kamlak, Salahria, Manial, and Thakyal etc. As such there are more than 36 subcastes of Muslim Rajputs exist in Rajouri District. Still the caste hierarchy has been maintained by the Muslim Rajput clan on the pattern of Hindu Rajputs.

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Jarral Rajputs: Historically were the Rajas of Rajouri. The majority of Muslim Jarral Rajputs settled in Rajouri, while on the other hand who have not embraced Islam scatteredly settled in Hoshiarpur, Shiwaliks, Kallanoor (Punjab). It is also claimed that Bandala clan of chamba (H.P) also traces its origin from Jarral Rajputs. They are Chandervanshi Panduas Clan. After Paul dynasty Rajouri was ruled by Jarals who happened to be the descendents of Raja “Jir-Rao”. The first Jarral Rajput who embraced Islam was Raja Sab Sinah, from the fifth generation of Raja Jir Rao. He embraced Islam along with some relatives and his own son Neel Sinah, in 1174. A.D., during the period of Sultan Shahab- udin Ghori. Later on the name of Neel Sinah was converted as Nooruddin. Nooruddin ruled Rajouri and Kingdom Remained in the hands of his clan for seven centuries. Jarral Rajputs settled in Town of Rajouri (Ander Kote), Badhoon, sunderbani Tehsil, Behrote, Dand Kote, Dahral and Various other Villages of District Rajouri. They extend Matrimonial Relation with parallel Rajput clan Maliks. Malik Rajputs: Malik Rajputs were the Hindus came from Punjab and Haryana. Akbar gave a title of Malik to a clan of Rajputs; they were given preference in Akbar's Army and deputed on the crossing points of Kashmir vally on the high reaches of Pir panchal. Later on, they embraced Islam. This clan is located in the higher parts of Rajouri District lying at the foot of Pirpanchal Range. The place is known by the name of the Rajput clan as Darhal Malkan. They have also settled in the other Districts of the State like Doda, Poonch, Vally of Kashmir and some villages of district Rajouri. Chauhan Rajputs: After the defeat of Prithvi Raj chauhan by Mohammad

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Ghori in 1193 A.D., and consequent downfall of chauchan Kindom at Delhi, the clan was probably split up in to small groups, who, when arrived in other States could not be treated at par with the ruling races. In Kangra the Chauhan Rajputs claim to be first grade Rajputs and have matrimonial relation with Katoch (Bigley, A.H and Cunningham 1972). Most of the Chauhans live in Jammu and Kashmir and some of them have embraced Islam. They are recognized as sub caste of Gujjars. Their conversion is considered to be the period of the down fall of Prothivi Raj Chauhan during the dominancy of Mohammad Ghori in 1193 A.D., they are settled in adjoining area of Pir Panchal, Dodason Bala, Mangota, Fethepur, Behrote, Dharal and Nadian etc. Their means of substances is cattle rearing. Some are leading semi nomadic life they never extend matrimonial relation with other Rajputs except Salaria, Kataria, Soods, Sango etc which are the sub castes of Muslim Gujjars. Janjua Rajputs: Rajput clan claim descent from Raja Mal, a Rathore Rajputs who migrated from Kanoj early in the 10th century during the period of Sultan Mohamood and embraced Islam. Janjua Rajputs are settled in Rajouri and Poonch district have common historical background. They extend matrimonial relation with Khokhar Rajputs. Chib Rajputs: Origin of Chib Rajputs can be traced from Raja Dharm chand alias Shadab Khan of Bhimber. The Name of Chib Rajputs as a clan started after the name of Raja Chib Chand 7th descendent of Raja Dharm Chand. They are mostly settled in Daghwar, havalie, Dehrakote, Rajdhani, Shahdra Shrief, and some other villages of District Rajouri. The accurate period of their conversion is not available but it is expected that like other Muslim

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Rajputs their conversation is believed to be taken place during the Muslim Rule in India. They maintain familial and matrimonial relation with other Muslim Rajputs. Domal Rajputs: Domal Rajputs are originally a branch Janjua Rajputs. Since the time immemorial they were Hindu Rajputs. Among Muslim Rajputs Dharm Chand and Purabh chand were two brothers hailing from the 7th generation of Raja Chib Chand of Bhimber Pakistan. Dharm chand the elder brother of Purabh chand first embraced Islam at Delhi and could not return to Bhimber because of familial conflicts. It is also believed that he was killed on the way while retuning to Bhimber. When the members of the community came to know that Dharm chand embraced Islam at Delhi, they made Purabh Chand the king of the Bhimber. Later on Purabh chand also converted to Islam after becoming the King of Bhimber and changed the name from Purabh chand to Dom Khan, (second son of his father) thus Domal Rajputs claimed their descendency from Raja Dom Khan, after some time he migrated from Bhimber and settled in Rajouri Village Rajdhani. Raja Dom Khan was buried at Narrouni a small village Near Rajdhani. Domal Rajputs still celebrate his death anniversary every year by offering Fateha at his grave. Domal Rajputs reside in various villages of Manjakote block of Tehsil Rajouri and constituting about 35% of total Muslim Population of Tehsil Rajouri. Gakkhar Rajputs: the clan is considered to be the off springs of Sultan Gohar of Asphan Iran, (Tarikh Aqwam e Poonch 1941), Seven generation of Sultan Ruled Tibet and Kashmir, the last ruler of the clan was Rustam Gakkhar. But Sir Lepel Griefen

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disagreed the claim of the clan and stated that two sons of Sultan Sikandar, were Sultan Ali Shah and Shahzada Shai Khan. They were also known by the names of 'Sultan Zainulabedin' and 'Budd shah' they used to quarrel among themselves Shai Khan took support of Hindu Rajput Raja Jasrat Gakkhar, and became the king of Kashmir. Jasrat Gakkhar along with his tribe entered the Kashmir first. Thus Gakkhar Rajputs of Rajouri are the progenies Jasrat Gakkhar. They remained Hindus up to 1008 A. D. and embraced Islam during the period of Shabuddin Ghori '(Tabqat e Akbari vol.3, 1920) after the downfall of Mughal rule in Punjab the Gakkhar moved from Punjab towards different parts of Jammu and Kashmir State. They have matrimonial relations with other Muslim Rajputs. They settled in Shahdra Shrief, Rajdhani, Saj, Behrote Nagrota, Dahral, Budhal and various other villages of Rajouri District. Feerozal Rajputs: the Rajput clan is also considered a branch of Gukhar Rajputs. Feerozal Rajputs of Rajouri District are the generation of Gukhar Firoze Khan. This Rajput clan embraced Islam during the period of Sultan Shabuddin Ghori. They settled in various villages of Poonch and Rajouri such as, Kallar morah, Kullutta, Pemrote, Darian Narr Feerozalan etc, Chandyal, Behrote, Lah and Saj. They have established matrimonial Ralation with other Muslim Rajputs. Khokhar Rajputs: There are two branches of Khokhars one is known as Kutub Shai Khokhar and Rajput Khokhar. Kutab Shah married the daughter of Hindu Rajput Raja. The off springs from them are even today known as Kutab Shai Khokhar. Rajputs Khokhar were the domiciles of India and were originally the followers of Hinduism, later on they embraced Islam and with the passage of

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time most of them settled near Jehlam, Pindadan Khan, Ahmed Abad and Pothar. In Rajouri District Khokhars are residing in various villages. Marriage among Kutab shai Khokhar and Rajput Khokhar is permissible. They constitute about 4% of Muslim Rajput population. Manhas Rajputs: Manhas Rajputs claim their descent from lord Rama of Ayodhya. It is also said that Jamwals are also descendants of Manhas Rajputs. Muslim Manhas Rajputs of Rajouri and Poonch are the descendants of Raja Joug Rao, who was from the 58th generation of Raja Jamboo lochan. Raja joug Rao had two sons, Millan Hans and Surej Hans Maharaja Hari Singh was from 35th generation of Surej Hans. Manhas clan belonged to the generation of Millan Hans being descendant of Millan Hans they were known by the title of Manhas. Manhas Rajputs of Rajouri and Poonch are Muslims but those who live in Jammu are Hindu Rajputs. They performed certain rituals similar to that of Hindu Rajputs at the time of Marriage and other occasions. They have matrimonial relation with other Muslims except Gujjars. Bhatti Rajputs: The Rajput clan traces its origin from lord Krishna (Tariekh aqwam -e- Poonch 1941) Bhatti / Bhatti is a Rajput caste and is one of the largest tribes among Rajputs in India. It is also a prominent Gujjars and Jat gotra. They are found in North India and Pakistan. Rawal Jaisal Singh was a descendant of the Bhati Rajput clan. He founded the city of Jaisalmer in 1156 AD., he built a fort on a hill called Trikuta. Bhati Jats were horse riders and warriors. Their reign spread to the Punjab and beyond, to Afghanistan. Most of the Bhatti Rajputs are Muslim along with significant Sikh, Hindu and Christian populations. The Muslim and Christian population of Punjabi Bhatti is

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predominantly in Pakistan. Bhatti Rajputs of Rajouri district are Muslims and claim their origin in Punjab and Rajasthan. A section of Muslim Bhatti Rajputs is associated with Ahmedi School of thought. Other Muslim Rajputs restrict matrimonial relation to Ahmedi and Gujjar Bhatties. Thakkar Rajputs: The clan connects their origin with Hindu Thakers, which is considered to be a superior Hindu Rajput caste in Jammu. Thakkar Rajputs claim that before their conversion to Islam they were Hindu Thakers. In Rajouri District they came from Samba District, due to which both the Hindu and Muslim Thakers use the title of Sambyal Thakers and Sambyal Thakers respectively. Majority of this caste are settled in Rajdhani, Thannamandi and Saj villages of Rajouri District. Kamlak Rajput: Majority of the Kamlak Rajputs settled in Azamatabad a village situated in north of Thannamandi Tehsil. The clan claim that they are the descendants of Raja Azamat Khan Kamlak, who migrate from Budhal to this village, presently some Hindu and Muslim Kamlak Rajputs are residing in different villages of Tehsil Budhal. Both the communities claim common origin and have some common customs and rituals. Socio-cultural And Economic Changes: The socio-cultural and economic condition of Muslim Rajputs has been studied with the reference of familial, matrimonial educational, political and economic aspects of Muslim Rajputs to make the study limited Family and Changing Pattern: The family is a complex and dynamic institution in India and for many decades, several studies were carried out to understand this complexity.

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Family performs same functions every where. In the past joint family was a common pattern among Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District. It consisted of father, mother and two or more married sons, their wives and children. They ate together at a common hearth and shared a single house, owned land in common and worked together in the fields. The young married sons continued to live with their parents and reared their children in common courtyards. The old women enjoyed the commanding charge of giving daily ration of food to daughters in law in extended family. The father runs the farms and remained active authoritative figure until they are very old. Among Muslim Rajputs generally after the death of the father the joint property was divided among his sons, but in some family's property was not divided, rather the eldest sons of the family took charge of the head of the family and all the younger extended full support, cooperation and respect to him. But with passage of time a major changes have taken place in the familial aspects of the Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District. The first break in the joint family system usually comes when a man and his wife decide to have a separate hearth this step may be taken with overt good nature and willingness on both the sides and may be rationalized on the basis of convenience, some time it results from tensions and quarrels among the women of the family. Viewing the change in the family pattern, after 1989, the Data indicated that Majority of the respondents 63% observe nuclear family system and perceive that joint family system cannot justify the needs of all the members according to their income and some partial attitude of the parents

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creates long time strife among the brothers and sisters in the family. Considering the size of the family among (645) respondents 81% of the respondents are of the view that in the past family was comprised of 6 to 15 members, where as at present the size of the family is comprised of 3 to five members, because the community understudy was unaware of the importance of family planning and never adopted contraceptive measure to control the birth rate of the community, but at present the people are aware of the problems caused by large size of the family. While comparing past with the present significant change has been observed in the structure of the family of Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District. In reference to the status of Women among Muslim Rajputs, majority of the respondents 89% have elicited that in the past the women of the community were ignored in various spheres of life and birth of female child is considered as bad omen and did not enjoy liberty in the general familial and matrimonial affairs, 98% of the respondents have expressed that parental property moveable and immoveable was inherited only to the male members of the family and females were ignored in property matters, Where as at present they are dealt with the same way, enjoy the same status with some social restrictions. Thus no change has taken place in the past and present attitude of community understudy related to the female members, as the civil laws and religious citation remain ineffective to change the attitude of the community. Marriage and Changing Pattern: Marriage among Muslim Rajputs is socially considered important, which is performed with certain social customs

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and rituals, the major objectives of the marriage is to perpetuate the lineage. The proposal of the marriage was initiated by the 'Barbers' who also performed allied rituals like calling the participants with the consent of the heads of the family of Brides or Bridegrooms. Hindu Rajput code dictates that Rajputs can only marry amongst other Rajputs. However, tradition of marriages into only one group or clan because of caste restrictions is not permitted in Islam theoretically, though this should lead to a great change in the traditional Rajput marital policy after conversion. But it is not so, as in the case of Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District. The custom of Rajput endogamy is still persists among Muslim Rajputs. They took wives from other dominant Aristocratic Muslim clans except Sayyed. This was observed that some Rajput clans of Punjab intermarried into other clans of foreign descent. However, Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District still follow endogamous pattern of Marriage, rarely they get wives from other castes but don't give daughters to them. In the past only 'NIKAHA' ceremony differentiates the marriage of Muslim Rajputs from Hindu Rajputs' Other customs and ritual were performed commonly by both the communities, such as 'Sehara Bandhi', 'Drum beating', keeping swords on the shoulder of Rajput Bridegroom by himself at the time of 'Baraat', wearing special dress of same colour by all the 'Baraties', taking services of Molvi and Pandits and some other customary mischief were made at the occasion of marriage. Traditionally among the Muslim Rajputs dates of marriage had to be communicated to the relatives and friends eight days before the actual date of marriage, otherwise the invitation was not acceptable to them.

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After 1989 some changes have taken place in the matrimonial systems and allied rituals among Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District due to rapid increase in urbanization in the District and advocacy of 'Jammat Tableegh', in rural areas. In matrimonial context majority of the respondents 86% elicited that presently the services of the barbers are not considered important and now marriage proposal are initiated by friends and relatives. in the process of mate selection 87% of the respondents have stated that in the past educational accomplishment of the boys and girls was not the criteria in the settlement of marriages among Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri, but now the educational accomplishment is taken in to account at the time of mate selection, the respondents 91% are of the view that they observe caste endogamous pattern of marriage and they are against the encouragement of Rajput exogamy. In the pattern of marriage, the performance of rituals and other customs like, divorce and dowry system majority of the respondents 88 % hold the view that on account of the preaching of Jammat Tableegh and impact of the militancy in the area the performance of un Islamic rituals like Sehra Bandi, Drum beating and allied rituals have been restricted, 82% of the respondents prefer monogamy as in the past having more than one wife was a common practice, 91% of the respondents have stated that the rate of divorce were less in the past but increasing presently, due to the increasing number of working women, selection of mate at infancy stage and early marriages due to the threat of terrorism and rapid increase in urbanization in the District. 84% of the

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respondents are of the view that in the past there was no dowry system but now the dowry system among the Rajputs is a common practice. Thus the significant change has taken place in the institutions of family and some aspects of marriage that has been observed by the comparison of past and present familial and matrimonial patterns. Educational Standard and Change: Educational status of Muslim Rajputs of Rajouri District was relatively low since the past. They were not encouraged to send their children to the school by the educated people of the community. The Literacy rate among the Muslim Rajputs is less than the other castes (Gujjars and Kashmiries) of the District. Majority of the Rajput students could not complete even their school education up to the 10th level, so dropped out from the school due to the financial constraints of the parents and uncertainty of future career. The data (M.Phil Dissertation 1994) indicates that, 15% to 20% of the children's population of the Rajputs went to school. Among total drop-out children, Rajputs drop-out children constituted 73% of the total drop-out children of the district from first to primary level. Among total Rajputs drop-out children of the same level, female drop-out children constituted 76%. The major causes behind the victimization, was the geographical location, extreme poverty, traditional beliefs, orthodoxy and mass illiteracy. They were unable to send their wards particularly the girls' children at the distance places to get education and they prefer the children to graze the cattle in the field or (male children) to work as labourer and earn money to fulfill the basic needs of the family. More over, there was lack of educational

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facilities, only one degree college 13 higher secondary Schools and few middle and primary schools were in the District. Change has taken place after 199798 in educational sphere of the community. The educational facilities have been increased in the area by the State government with result that at present the literacy rate in the district is 57.65, total educational institutions in the District are 1250, including 04 Degree colleges( Education department and Digest statistics 2005- 07). A rapid change has taken place in attitude of the people towards education by the dint of mass migration of the people to the town of Rajouri in 1997- 98 due to the impact of militancy in the area. Majority of the Muslim Rajputs took refuge from the hilly and rural areas and settled in the City of Rajouri and Jammu, those who were financially well-off availed the educational facilities of the urban area and poor Rajputs get exposure of the city life and started working as manual labuorer, admitted their children in the city schools. Viewing change in the educational standard of Muslim Rajputs, the data has indicated that 83% 0f the respondents are of the view that in the past members of the community were socially and economically backward due to illiteracy and lack of educational facilities but at present the community members are aware of the values of education due to which they are encouraging their wards to seek more and more education. Majority of the Respondents 96% hold the view that in the past the Muslim Rajputs and their counter parts Gujjars were leading similar way of life but presently Rajputs are lagging behind in all the developmental aspects in general and

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educational sphere in particular due to the provision of Scheduled Tribe reservation to Gujjars and depriving The Rajputs under the banners of 'Paharies' as their children are un able to compete them and feel insecure future career. 82% of the respondents hold the view that in the past Rajputs were not giving preference to the women education and still the problem persists as only few community members are encouraging the girls to go to the schools and collages to seek education, 58% of the respondents are of the view that In the past community members force their children to work in the field or to do manual labourer to fulfill the basic amenity of the family instead of sending school and still the practice is common in hilly and remote areas, they are not aware of the legal restriction on the child labour. Thus little improvement has been made by the government of J&k by providing local reservation to the Resident of Backward Areas and expansion of educational facilities at broader level due to which change has taken place in educational standard of the community in urban area of the District. But Majority of the Rajputs in remote area is not aware of the government facilities that have been granted for them. Thus the change has taken place in the attitude of present generation more over they have the sense of competition. Economic Status and Change: The Economic condition of Muslim Rajputs of District Rajouri was relatively better before 1947; the community members were serving in army or holding agricultural assets. It declined with the impact of war of 1947, Majority of the Rajputs were the land lords and having sufficient land for cultivations, in the past other communities were working in their fields as agricultural tenants some

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were bonded laborer from generations. The Indo Pak war of 1965 and 1971 and land ceiling process in J&K have also badly impacted the major agriculture economy of the community, since the community was economically self sufficient before 1990, due to political turmoil in the state the economy of the community got major setback, the people were forcibly pushed from the villages and their crops were destroyed during peak season by the army in conducting search operation for the militants. The people took refuge in the town in miserable condition. the major occupation of the District's population is agriculture and allied activities (Census 2001), due to the Geographical disadvantage, mass poverty and illiteracy the Rajputs are economically backward, now the small farmers of the community have little pieces of land holdings, kacha houses, most of the agricultural area is located on the hill slopes where irrigation and tractor facilities can not be availed. On the other hand due to snow fall in hilly area only Kharief crop is possible in their fields, in addition to that there is lack of employment, and manual workers go outside the state in search of job. At present Major economy of the people is agriculture but it can be expected that a single source of income which cannot fulfill the basic amenities of a particular community does not deserve to be recognized as the economy of the community. On the basis of the study, the whole economic structure of Muslim Rajputs of the District Rajouri is divided into four categories: (i) Rajputs with Agricultural activities, (ii) Rajputs with Government services. (iii) Rajputs with cattle rearing, (iv) Rajputs working as manual labourer. 48% of the total working population is engaged in agriculture economy while, 13% of the working Population is engaged in

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government services, where as, 23% of the total population depend upon cattle rearing, 16% of the total population is working as manual labourer. Among them 09% of the labourers are working outside the state, as, in Mumbai, Punjab, and H.P., on account of non availability of work avenues in the State. The major portion of the youth is unemployed), the economy of the District is not satisfactory and more than 60% of the population is living below the poverty line.(District Statistic and planning, data 2004-05) The youths of the area is badly effected by the prevailing limited economic resources. Due to extreme poverty and unemployment some people even indulge in illegitimate sources of earning, either they smuggle forest wood or join militancy in the State for their means of subsistence. Viewing the change in the economy of the community under study data has indicated that Majority of the respondents 93% hold the view that in the past, major economy was agriculture but with the passage of time and increase in population, the community members have engaged in other economic activities, like Government services and manual skill and un skilled labour and a section is working out side the State due to non availability of work avenue. 86% of the respondents admitted that in the past their economic condition was not progressive because there were no proper economic planning or programmes actively initiated by the Government, but now the government is expected to be serious in rehabilitation of economic lose which happened during militancy(after 1989),by initiating various developmental and rehabilitative measures and programmes. 89% of the respondents are of the view that the

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women of the community were not permitted to engage themselves in any economic activity outside the home, due to which the community was economically backward but with the mass urbanization (1997-98) and victimization of widowhood due to militancy in the area women have started taking part in economic activities to nourish their children and slightly improving the economy of the family. 76% of the respondents hold the view that in the past youth were not aware of the available government facilities, for improving economic condition, but at present various developmental programmes have been launched at rural level like self employment schemes, IRDP, ICDS, NREGA etc. and people are get aware of the benefits to some extend as well as fast track recruitment scheme have b e e n la u n c h e d to re d u c e th e unemployment by the state government. Thus it is observed that the slight change has taken place in the economic sphere of the community due to the efforts and rehabilitative measures of the government to compensate the economic lose due to militancy in the areas. The political system of the community understudy is not different from other communities of the area, the change has also been observed in the political setup of Muslim Rajputs. Since the past Muslim Rajputs have effective representation in the national and state politics holding position of MLA, Minister and Speaker in state assembly. At present Raja Shabir Ahmed Khan, MOS belongs to Muslim Rajput community of District Rajouri. More over the present youth is politically aware than that of the past. Changing Factors: Social change is the law of nature, it occurs in every

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society. Various attempts are made to analyse socio-cultural and economic changes in terms of specific models which are based on the experience of change in a particular societies. Generally sociologists are focusing on the questions relating to change, direction and rate of change and factors responsible for bringing social change. Viewing the factors of change in sociocultural and economic pattern of Muslim Rajputs, it has been emphasized that socio-cultural changes are brought about due to the cumulative impact of a host of interrelated factors. Generally, the factors like, demographical, technological, geographical, ecological factors and the process of urbanization and industrialization bring about social change in all the societies of the world. After 1997-98 a large scales shifting of the Muslim Rajputs from remote and hilly areas to the city of Rajouri due to militancy allied factors in the areas. The chunk of population from Rajput dominant tehsils of the District has changed demographic structure of the Rajouri town permanently or temporarily to avail the urban facilities of education, and struggling for the improvement of their social and economic condition. Thus urbanization in Rajouri is the major factor of bringing about change in the attitude of the people, the term urbanization refers to the movement of population from agricultural to industrial work and from rural to urban places of residence either by the pull or push factors. It is generally emphasized that the change that has taken place due to the impact of urbanization is considered developmental aspect of change and development is defined not only in terms of economic dimensions but also in terms of socio-cultural dimensions, until recently, the popular notion was that economic growth was a sufficient

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and necessary condition to stimulate development in all other institutions of society. This has been proved in correct in present study. The urbanization has impacted the structure of the family and changed it from joint to nuclear form and also discarded some traditional and futile practices, The marriage pattern and rituals in context of endogamy and other allied rituals are also impacted by the urbanization with the result that 3% to 6% of the marriages among Muslim Rajputs are performed out of castes, with Kashmiries and other non Rajputs in Rajouri District. It is considered a major change among the people of the area. In regard to education the change has been observed in the general out look of the parents and students due to urban social contacts. In economic sphere the impact of urbanization is not proved fruitful but considered as the process of rehabilitation of the economic lose caused by leaving the agricultural land without cultivation, only the government employees and skilled and unskilled manual labourer could manage house holds in the town. Thus abrupt migration of the people from rural to urban led to the both positive and negative consequences. Negative consequences are associated with the state of loss of ones culture, homes, livelihood and economic belongings. The positive consequences are that the people have new perceptions and aspirations in the realms of all aspects of social life. Procedure of the Study: The present study is based on the exploratory design that includes survey of the literature related to the community understudy, experienced survey, contains informal interaction with experienced persons and analyses of insight stimulating cases among a large population of the community

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under study. The Process of change has been examined on the basis of comparison of administrative data related to study of pre and post period of 1989. The primary data has been collected by using Interview Schedule comprised of items related to sociocultural and economic aspects of the community. In all 645 respondents constituting sample of the study as heads of the households belonging to four Muslim Rajputs populated tehsils of the District have been interviewed. The Data has been analyzed and interpreted on the basis of item analysis method. Conclusion: On the basis of the above discussions it can be concluded that Muslim Rajputs of District Rajouri have rich socio-cultural history. Historically whole Muslim Rajputs have two linguistic divisions, i.e., Gojri and Pahari. The Gojri speaking section is not

considered Rajput clan due to regional variation. The community is stratified into various sub castes and still majority is practicing caste endogamy, though some customs and rituals have been changed. The structure of the joint family has been changed into nuclear family. The traditional educational system is also in transformation; change has taken place in political system, still remarkable change cannot be claimed particularly in economy of the community instead of the Government efforts. Socio-cultural and economic backwardness' among the Muslim Rajputs was due to their traditional beliefs and social practices, mass illiteracy, unapproachable geographical region, unawareness, poverty, and orthodoxy. Various factors are responsible for bringing about sociocultural change among the community

but Major factor that played significant role after 1996-97 is Rapid urbanization and allied push factors, due to political turmoil in the State, that uprooted a large section of the community from their settlement took refuge in Rajouri town. Thus it is suggested that the government should provide more and more facilities for the upliftment of the community by providing Scheduled Tribe Status to the community at par with their counterpart Gujjars. Awareness campaign by NGOs and enlightened members of the community should be launched at mass level in the area for general awareness of the community to get the benefits of modern technology and prevailing schemes operative in the area. Political leaders should be sincere to watch the benefits of the Community at state and national level.

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Travelogue

A Journey to Himalayan enclave MANISHA SOBHRAJANI

I

recently travelled by road from Leh to Kargil, and it was a journey unlike any other – either within Jammu & Kashmir or outside. The Indus river came along till Batalik, and then changed course to make its way into Pakistan. The stark naked, brown mountains provided a very unwelcoming terrain, but the curves and turns got friendlier as one got used to them. On my way, I crossed village Nehmo, from where came the Leh Berry juice until it got embroiled in controversies, and the manufacturing stopped. Nehmo is also known for its sole woman Panch (head) who contested the Panchayati Raj elections in 2001, and got elected to the village council. Tashi Yangskit was the first and only female voice in the first and only Panchayati Raj elections held in Jammu & Kashmir. I crossed many Border Roads Organization (BRO) boards which read: 'You are being watched by the enemy'. I briefly stopped over at Khalsti for a quick snack as I was told it was the last point where one would get any food until Kargil. I kept eyeing the apricot trees which dotted the entire route from Leh to Kargil, and were laden with so much fruit that they seemed to be weighed down under the weight. I was keen to visit Darchiks - the last village in the Batalik sector - which is under Army surveillance due to its proximity to the LoC. I had to seek

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permission from the Biama Brigade to go up to the village, which is known for the last few surviving Aryans who live there (Aryans are considered to the seminomadic tribe which wandered in to India from Central Europe around 1500 BC, establishing the beginnings of the 'Indian Culture'). The Army has set up a Women's Empowerment Centre where women from the village are taught tailoring. I have grudged this for all the years that I have been working in Jammu & Kashmir – any civil society initiative for women ends up in tailoring/ embroidery schools, as if women can't do anything else! However, I also do realise that this is something which comes naturally to women; something that does not need too much 'exposure'! The high point of this journey was a visit to the Drass War Memorial. Drass and Kargil became household names after the infamous summer of 1999. National Highway 1D passes through Drass, connecting Srinagar and Leh. Drass also happens to be the coldest inhabited place in India. Situated amongst Tiger Hill, Tololing and Three Pimples - the three ranges captured by the Pakistani Army in early 1999 which led to the war of Kargil - the memorial is awe-inspiring, to say the least. The Kargil war was fought through the months of May and June, and in the soldiers' accounts accompanying the many photographs at the memorial, there is one in particular which struck

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me: The climate was so harsh that 'eggs become tennis balls, and orange juice has to be boiled'. The photo gallery was overwhelming, and I made a mental note of coming back to spend more time there. As I was leaving, I thanked the soldier on duty who had very patiently and kindly answered all my questions, and shown me around the memorial. He even wished me a pleasant onward journey. Overloaded with emotions, I said to him that it was because of him and innumerable other jawans like him that people like me were walking 'free'. He returned the compliment by saying civilians were equally important. He went on further to say that thousands of people worked hard day and night to prepare food and warm clothing, and arranged to carry weaponry etc. uphill so that the soldiers could fight, and eventually win the war. I can't remember a more humbling moment! It made me dwell on the futility of war. Certainly nothing original about this reflection, but something very personalised. Ten years since Kargil, have we – India and Pakistan – moved forward on any front? Leave alone the larger Indo-Pak issues, have we moved any further on the cross-border/ intraKashmir initiatives? Perhaps the only effort which has moved anywhere is the cross-LoC trade – of course not without its controversies. No doubt the cross-border trade is at a very fragile crossroads right now. A

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Life Stories recent visit to Chakkan da Bagh confirmed the same. There was talk of trade exchange of products which are not J&K specific (I understand this is one of the preconditions for the products being traded!). However symbolic it may be, it does exist. And now that it has completed a year, we must extend all efforts towards sustaining it. Perhaps it is the only ray of hope in the sequence of events beginning with the Mumbai attacks, going on to the controversial meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and ending with the very recent meeting of the two foreign ministers – Nirupama Rao and Salman Bashir - in New York. Manisha Sobhrajani is a Delhibased independent researcher working on the various aspects of the Kashmir conflict. She can be reached at manishasobhrajani@e pilogue.in

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Spreading the Lamp of Learning–the Ladakhi way ZAINAB AKHTER

L

adakh in the eastern part of Jammu and Kashmir, a highaltitude desert region, on the upper reaches of the Indus River, shares borders with both China and Pakistan. This strategic position by itself has been the single-most important factor in opening this isolated rural society. With high priority on defence since the 1960's, it has attracted subsidies from the Central government and development activities such as schools and other institutions was initiated. Today Education has taken centrestage in national policy and the priority accorded to it is justified. For any society to develop, Education is the foundation and this stands true for Ladakh where the education system was in disarray. Government schools did not function properly remained in dire need of repairs. There was a complete lack of involvement of the families and village communities in schools This is where the local government “Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) along with some highly motivated NGO'S stepped in to don the mantle to revamp education system at the grassroots. The efforts of SECMOL (Students Educational and Cultural Movement of Ladakh) an organization founded in 1988 by a group of young Ladakhi's with the aim to reform the educational system have been stellar. It attempted to change the attitude and approach of the people towards teaching, from "chalk, talk and stick" to

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child-centered, joyful and meaningful learning activities. And stressed on the use of games, songs, stories, field trips, and low-cost teaching aids. In 1994 SECMOL launched Operation New Hope (ONH), to overhaul the primary education system in the Government schools in Leh district. This addressed the foundational causes of the malfunctioning of the educational system especially in remote villages. The ONH movement rests on the convergence of three sectors on the Government, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the village communities. One of the key components of the ONH was to inculcating a sense of community ownership of the government schools , to ensure accountability. This was the motivation for a concentrated campaign and the creation of VECs (Village Education Committee. VEC's elected by the villagers themselves have one third women members and include at least two students. The move has caught the imagination of the people and the momentum was palpable. It essentially transformed them from passive bystanders bemoaning the crumbling government educational facilities to taking the onus of improving it themselves. From 1997, SECMOL has organized more than 10 batches of intensive training for 1000 VEC members. The training uses group

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discussion, brainstorming and roleplays to develop techniques of problem solving and planning. To promote transparency and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y, m e m b e r s l e a r n accounting and book-keeping. Insights and knowledge gained by the VEC leaders are then shared with the community where the level of receptivity has been found to be high. . After the success in Leh District, a similar reform movement has started in Kargil District For taking the flame of education beyond established villages to remote areas in Leh, SECMOL runs a hostel to groom community representatives who are willing travel and work in such areas. There they combine their educational training with actual developmental work in the villages. It also provides media training to interested students in basics of video including shooting and editing, audio, photography, reporting and layout. The emphasis on reaching out to village communities is accompanied by expansion of reading materials, both course and for extra reading available to teachers and students. Keeping in mind, the region's needs in developing material related to the cultural, social, regional context, SECMOL's sister concern Melong Publications publishes a variety of genres. Books on Ladakhi language, food, children's stories, school books and teaching materials designed specially for Ladakh are its forte. Being culturally appropriate, students find it much easier to grasp the messages than from books suited to other regions. SECMOL has developed an innovative way of training students from remote areas to become teachers while they pursue higher secondary School education in Leh. The idea is to not disrupt the process of regular

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education while instilling in them the spirit and skills to take this learning forward in their respective regions. It has intervened at other levels too, addressing availability of infrastructure. Middle and high schools in several remote villages face problems because of lack of support and infrastructure. In response to one such case in the high mountainous region of Changthang plateau, SECMOL opened a solar heated residential school in September 2001. This combined the resources allocated to middle and high schools and was able to provide free board and lodging for students for whom traversing the mountain terrain on a daily basis was difficult. This was a pioneering move, which has since been picked up by the government to establish similar residential high schools in other farflung areas of Ladakh. Students being trained at SECMOL are being absorbed in the education department of Leh. They are making it to the teacher selection list brought out by the J&K Government. All of this emanates from

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a keen desire, a commitment to education in its widest possible sense. Rather than addressing a single aspect SECMOL has looked at the needs of the region in its entirety. These have ranged from content and syllabus, teacher training, infrastructural needs and community participation. It has then evolved an expansive system which takes into account multifarious needs of a society, a region which remains distinct from the rest of the country and even within J&K in terms of its history , terrain, its culture and language. Today in its 2 decade long journey, this commitment and efforts have paid off, lighting up young lives in Ladakh. A standing testimony to this has been the big jump in enrolment and retention of children in areas of their work had increased to such an extent by 2006, that it was jokingly said that the new problem in the school system was overcrowding! Charkha Features {This article has been written under the “Sanjoy Ghose Ladakh Women Writers' Award 2008-09}

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Life Stories

A Trek Through Life THINLAS CHOROL

Growing up amidst the mountains in Ladakh, the story of a young girl fired by a dream to become a professional trekking guide, a male-dominated field. The rejection she faces from travel companies and the support from individuals and groups mark her journey to realize her dreams.

I

was born in a small village with around 60 houses called Takmachik about 120 km from Leh, Ladakh . In my village, all the 60 families are divided into groups to take turns at grazing the goats and sheep on the mountains.. We also would make trips to collect grass and store it so that during the long harsh winters, the animals have adequate fodder. Sometimes my father used to go up everyday for 3 or 4 weeks to collect grass in the quantities required. As a child during my holidays , I use to go up on the mountain with my father and our herds. I was afraid that something may happen to him if he was alone. My mother had died when I was a baby and I had only my father, whom I cared about deeply. I did not really cut any grass, I just went because of my father and because I loved the peaceful mountains. This was the bliss of my childhood which I still miss in the village which I still love. But then life changed and I went out into the world to get myself an education and explore possibilities for my life ahead. After Class 10th , I had to leave my village to further my studies. I was selected for the SECMOL (Student Educational Cultural Movement of Ladakh) hostel in Phey, around 25 km from the Leh Town.

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In SECMOL I met many volunteers and I went trekking with some of them. One of the women asked me to come with her as a guide. Previously, she had a bad experience with a male guide, who had tried to coerce her into having sex with him. Distraught, she had abandoned the trek and fled. And now was understandably weary of taking a male guide along. She knew that I have trekked before and though I said I did not the route, remained keen to hire me as a guide and offered to pay me my charges. I had been born in the mountains and spent my childhood amidst them. It was natural for me to slip into that mode and become for the first time, a trekking guide! It was an altogether different experience from my childhood wanderings. I found I was attracting a lot of attention with local people coming up to me and speaking to me in English saying they had never seen a Ladakhi female guide ever before. In fact so remote was the possibility of encountering one, many of them thought that I was Japanese! The trek turned out to be wonderful and the woman enjoyed it immensely. She suggested that I think about becoming a guide as a profession. It was the first time, I had got advice of this kind and suddenly the world opened

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up before me. What was a part of my growing up experience could become a way of life, a career option, She pursued this and together we went to meet with the organization “Snow Leopard Conservancy” which runs such programs in the region. Although it did not quite work out with this particular organization, the experience of this foreign women believing in me, left a huge impact on my life. I decided to pursue it on my own steam and approached two travel companies. At one of them, the person in charge asked me if I did monastery tours. He was taken aback on hearing me say categorically, that I wanted to work as a trekking guide. I was rejected. At the second company, it was worse. I was clearly told that local society would not accept a woman going up on the mountains with a group of tourists. These were bitter experiences, leaving me dejected, my dreams seemed on the verge of being shattered. But help was near. I shared my angst with my English teacher, Becky who was from America and found a much needed supporter in her. She encouraged me to pursue my dreams and paid my fees for mountaineering courses. Later, Becky introduced me to a travel agency, she knew well and they

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said they would hire me! It was I knew a turning point for me and I had to prove myself to all those who believed in me. I did a few courses to upgrade my knowledge and skills and also to show the agency that I was really serious about my work. I first did mountaineering course at the Nehru Institution Of Mountaineering and National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS India) . It was here that I really learnt how to live in the wilderness. Generally in Ladakh, students work as a guide without any formal training. Men are hired by company even if they do not have this training, any familiarity with trekking routs or work experience. In spite of my training though, in the beginning it was very difficult for me to get hired by the

travel companies. I faced a similar situation everywhere. But I persisted in my efforts. And my lucky break came in 2004 again through SECMOL. They opened a travel company called “Around Ladakh with Students”. Most of the guides were women, all of them were doing cultural guide and monastery tours, except me. I was for the first time a full-fledged trekking guide! It was a dream come true and my joy knew no bounds. This was the beginning of a journey for me. I observed that generally it was very expensive for individual tourists to travel to different regions in Ladakh and get a sense of the local life there. In my present capacity, we use homestays for taking up groups where tourists can stay in homely comfort and at the same

time experience the real Ladakhi way of life. Over time, a few travel companies came to know about our work and approached me to be a trekking guide and I began to get hired for their treks. This is what I loved doing the most and such opportunities encouraged me and gave me a confidence, a renewed faith in myself. I have learnt a lot on my journey and enjoyed it immensely. Women who are interested in the outdoor field or any field dominated by men should be patient and keep the competitive edge sharp. I have learnt that if a woman has the courage to do something in male world, it will be a lot of hard work, but the sweet rewards of success will surely be hers in time.

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IN

NUMB E R S

Power Sector

20,000 MW Capacity The estimated hydro power potential of the state is 20,000 Megawatts (Mws), of which 16480 Mws have been identified. Out of the identified potential, only 2318.70 Mws or 14 percent have been exploited so far, consisting of 758.70 projects under Central Sector i.e. 690 Mws (Sala Hydro Electric Project) and 480 Mws (Uri-I Hydro Electric Project) and Dulhasti 390 Mws. The prestigious Baglihar Hydro Electricity Project, with a capacity of 450 Mws was commissioned during 2008-09.

2120 MW Peak Demand

Rs 6.19 Per Unit Cost of Supply

The base load requirement of the State is about 716 Mws and peak demand is currently pegged at about 2120 Mws. The sixteenth All India Power Survey has projected an increase in power demand of Jammu and Kashmir from 1706 Mws i.e., 9640 Mus during 2004-05 to 2120 Mws i.e. 14750 Mus during 2008-09. By 2010-11, the demand is expected to touch 2441 Mws i.e. 14321 Mus and 4000 Mws i.e. 19500 Mus by 2020-21.

The power tariff in J&K State is determined by an Independent Regulator known as State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). It came into existence through SERC Act 2000. It has issued two tariff orders for the years 2007-08 and 2008-09. The average cost of supply comes to Rs. 6.19 unit. However, the agricultural consumers have been provided power at Rs. 1.84 unit. During the year 2008-09, 204.88 MUs of power valued at Rs. 126.82 crore (cost of supply to Rs. 6.19 unit) has been consumed by this category of consumers. These consumers have, however been billed for Rs. 37.72 crore @ Rs. 1.84 unit. Thus a subsidy of Rs. 89.10 crore has been availed of by these consumers and it work out to 70.26% of the cost of supply.

1278.99 Cr Proposed Outlay Under Power Sector Rs. 3875.82 crores were approved as outlay for the years 2007-07, against which Rs. 3045.15 crores were spent on all the projects/schemes. An amount of Rs. 8196.95 crores have been earmarked for all this sector under 11th Five Year Plan which is 112 percent more than that of 10th Plan outlay. The approved outlay 2008-09 is to the tune of Rs. 1096.14 crore, out of which 705.76 crore have been spent upto January 2009. However it is anticipated that the expenditure will touch about 1567.82 crore during current year. Proposed outlay for the year 2009-10 is to the tune of 1278.99 crore.

63% Aggregate Losses Management of any Sector determines the health of that sector. An inefficient management leads to chaos and acts as a great hurdle in development of that sector. Only 32.50 percent of the energy through out was realised in the year 2009-07 and it is expected to grow to the tune of 37.18 percent in the year 2007-08, which is one of the lowest in the country. The transmission and distribution losses are about 50 percent while as rest 13 percent are collected loses making it an aggregate of 63 percent. Collection efficiency is only between 65-70 percent.

Around 55.28% Tariff Realisation

95%

During the year 2006-07 an amount of Rs. 395.26 crore were realised against the total target of Rs. 7111 crore, thereby constituting 55.28 percent of the targeted revenue realisation in the power sector. During 2007-08, revenue of 693.24 crore has been realised.

By the end of March 2008, out of 6417 inhabited villages, 6152 were electrified thereby, registering 95.87 percent average. Out of 9278 hamlets, 6600 (71.14 percent) hamlets were electrified. Besides, 1246 Harijans Basties were electrified. Number of installations rose to 1241054 during 2007-08

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Electrification

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Power Sector Rs. 200 Cr Renovation Project The Board of Directors of State Power Development Corporation headed by CM Omar Abdullah has approved renovation and modernization of redundant and outdated power projects. These include: Lower Jehlum Power House which is 30-years old having 105 MW capacity, Chenani Power Project which is 60 years old with 30 MW capacity, Upper Sindh Stage-II which is 24 years old having 105 MW capacity and Ganderbal power plant which is 60 years old with 20 MW capacity. It has been decided to invest Rs 200 Crore for modernization of these projects. The Board also gave approval for starting Baglihar stage –II Project with 450 MW capacity. The earlier phase with 450 MW capacity is already in operation. With the start of the new second stage the Baglihar Project will be able to provide 900 MW of electricity which will play a vital role in strengthening the Power capability of the State and also help in economical development.

1000 Micro Projects The Army is engaged in construction of 1000 micro Hydel electric projects in J&K under BADP and operation Sadbhavana at a cost of Rs 10 crore. Under the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan, hydro electric project Uri phase-II with the capacity of 240 MWs, Nimmo, Buzgo with a capacity of 45 MW, Chutak with the capacity of 44 MW, Bursar with the capacity of 1020 MW and Kishenganga with the capacity of 330 MW are the central sector power projects. Pakal Dul hydro electric project with the capacity of 1000 MW has been taken up as a joint venture between J&K State Power Development Corporation, NHPC and PTC at a cost of Rs 3480 crore. Under Rajiv Gandhi Gramin Vidutikaran Yojna (RGGVY) all un-electrified villages and hamlets are proposed to be covered during the current year at an estimated cost of Rs 700 crore. Under State hydel policy, 10 power projects have been awarded to various IPPS through two stage transparent competitive feeding process. These power projects included Athwatto, Baramulla over Madumati nallah with a capacity of 10 MW, Tangmarg project in Baramulla over Ferozpur nallah, Aharbal project in district Pulwama with a capacity of 22.5 MW over Vishow nallah, Hirpora project in district Pulwama with a capacity of 12.00 MW over Rambhir nallah, Brenwar project in district Budgam with a capacity of 7.5 MW over Doodganga nallah, Kahmit project in district Kupwara with a capacity of 4MW over Kahmit nallah, Bonfyar project in district Baramulla with a capacity of 12MW in Hapathkhai nallah, Mandi project in district Poonch with a capacity of 12.5 MW in Mandi nallah, Ranjala Dunadi project in district Doda with a capacity of 15 MW in Lower Kalnai nallah and Drung project in district Kathua with a capacity of 5 MW in Ujh nallah.

1353 MW Shortfall Total availability of power from all the sources is just around 8170 Mus, the state is under stress to purchase power from other sources. To meet the restricted requirement of 9523 Mus in the current year, the State may require to purchase additional 1353 Mus through U.I. and short term purchased besides banking arrangements with Punjab, Haryana and Chatisgarh.

Rs.18912.25 Cr Programme

Rs 5.12 Cr Invested, Abandoned

Rs. 18912.25 crore have been earmarked under the Prime Minister’s Reconstruction Programme for development of power in the State. This includes an amount of Rs. 14,952.41 crore in the Central Sector for generation of power and Rs 2811.00 crore for strengthening transmission and distribution network/BHEP in the State sector and an amount of Rs. 1148.84 crore under Accelerated Power Development Reforms Programme (APDRP).

The Gurez and Tulail Valley in Kashmir have no availability of hydel power. Presently Gurez and Tulail valley are being supplied electricity 6 hours a day from 15 Diesel Generator sets with capacities ranging from 20 KVA to 320 KVA located at various suitable places. The work on 2 MW Ashtan Nallah was taken up in 1986-87 and an expenditure of Rs. 512.97 lakhs has been incurred on the project till March 2007. Work on the project was abandoned due to upcoming Kishenganga hydro-electric project as the entire Dawar area where Asthan Nallah Project is located was getting submerged due to construction of dam for Kishenganga project. Tenders for another project namely 1.05 MW Tulail were invited under IPP phase II & III but no response was received. Two more schemes namely Achhora Dawar and Bagtore SHPs have been identified for which pre-feasibility reports are under preparation. Therefore, in Gurez, there is no possibility of light at the end of dark tunnel.

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Vol. 3, Issue 11

Epilogue, November 2009

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