Enquiry 2008

ENQUIRY

W ASHINGTON U NI VERSITY ’ S U NDERGRADUATE P H ILOSOPH Y J OURNAL

Alana Miller

2008

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ENQUIRY W ASHINGTON U NIVERSITY ’ S U NDERGRADUATE P HILOSOPHY J OURNAL Steve Kenny, Editor-in-Chief Andrew Wong Alexandra Haar John Ablan Molly Sinderbrand Monica Morrison Sharon Barbour

For this issue, the editors would like to acknowledge the Philosophy Department at Washington University in St. Louis, particularly Arnon Cahen, Dr. Marilyn Friedman and Dr. Mark Rollins. We would also like to thank Mike Rogger at Midtown Printing.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Intuitive Problems for and a Circularity Issue in Kant’s Determination of Imperfect Duties Michael McEvilly

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Untitled Artwork (print) Elissa Rosenbaum

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On Mink Coats and Cheeseburgers: A Reevaluation of the Criterion for Animal Rights in Frans de Waal’s Primates and Philosophers Jessica Goldkind

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Escaping the Mind-Body Problem (photograph) Chris Willcox

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A Proof Enough for Mill’s Utilitarian Principle Min Seong Kim

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Diptych: Fly (ink-sketch) Sharon Barbour

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Causality Between Motivation and Capacity in Individuals with Autism Ariel Savransky 36

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INTUITIVE PROBLEMS FOR AND A CIRCULARITY ISSUE IN KANT’S DETERMINATION OF IMPERFECT DUTIES Michael McEvilly I. Introduction This essay will focus on the first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, with particular reference to his explanation of imperfect duties; those that arise from contradictions of the will. First, I will give a brief overview of this formulation, as well as introduce the second formulation including Kant’s four examples – two contradictions in conception and two contradictions of will. I will attempt to bring into light intuitive problems with Kant's latter examples, as well as show how actions appear meaningless if everyone does duty for duty's sake (which may cause agents to lose their idea of freedom, upon which Kant's theory relies). Finally, we will look at how the will's use in the categorical imperative – which establishes imperfect duties - is circular insofar as it ascertains duties upon which it relies to function properly. II. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant's goal, as he writes in the preface to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, is to "work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology."1 This pure moral philosophy would be ground a priori (synthetic, not analytical, as the predicate adds something new to our conception of the subject) simply in concepts of pure reason. Kant derives this understanding of a moral framework from the concept of morality generally understood: morality is concerned with practical questions - what one ought to do as opposed to what is already - and experience can only tell us how things are but not how they should be. Thus, Kant derives a supreme principle of morality, which he labels the categorical imperative (CI). The first formulation of the CI is that of the Universal Law: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."2 For Kant, a maxim is a subjective policy of volition, taking the form of 'in situation-S perform action-A for some purpose-P.' In other words, he wants you, as the agent, to perform a thought experiment in which you take your specific act, imagine a world in which that action is performed by everyone in that situation, and see if it is still consistent to perform. Two

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contradictions may arise: first, you may not even be able to conceive of your maxim in a world governed by this law; second, you may not be able to rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If neither of these arises, the action is morally permissible. Most scholars correlate Kant's idea of perfect and imperfect duties with the failure to pass the two steps above. In other words, if you cannot conceive of your action in the universalized world, this is a contradiction in conception, resulting in a formal duty not to do that action. If you cannot rationally will to act on your maxim - even if it is conceivable - this action is an imperfect duty. Moreover, as there are duties both to oneself and to others, Kant imagines four cases that serve to demonstrate his first formulation of the CI, one corresponding to each conceivable condition of duty: a perfect duty to oneself, a perfect duty to others, an imperfect duty to oneself, and an imperfect duty to others. For the sake of clarity, I will provide Kant's examples in abbreviated form. To demonstrate a perfect duty to oneself, Kant imagines a person who is sick of life because of a series of troubles and is in a state of despair. But he is still in possession of his reason and asks himself whether it would be contrary to his duty to take his own life. The maxim, Kant says, is "from self- love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness."3 Kant argues that this maxim is not consistent with self-love, whose normal function is toward the furtherance of life. Thus, this world cannot be conceived. (Note that one can conceive of a universalized world in which all people do this in such situations, but relies on an imported notion of selflove.) Second, most convincingly, someone needs to borrow money, but knows he does not have the means to pay the backer back, though he must promise to do so in order to borrow in the first place. If he decides to still make his promise, knowing he cannot repay, his maxim is "when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen."4 But if one universalizes this maxim, it is instantly evident that if everyone did this, the whole system upon which lying relies upon would crumble: no one would believe anyone would ever repay them, so no one would ever be lent money. This is a strong example of a contradiction in conception and, subsequently, a perfect duty. Third, a man finds in himself a talent that by cultivation could make him very useful for all sorts of purposes. But he is comfortable and prefers to sit around comfortably and pleasantly, as opposed to troubling himself with improving his predispositions. This maxim of neglecting gifts could, in fact, be universalized, but Kant claims he cannot will that this become universal law. As a rational being, he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him

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be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for many purposes. Fourth, a man is comfortable, but sees others that have to contend with great hardships. His maxim of not contributing to those who are going through hardships produces a consistent world, however it is impossible to will that this principle hold everywhere. Kant argues that this is because a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since there are times when everyone needs love and sympathy of others, which he would rob himself of if he did not help others now. This is the second example of a contradiction of will. Whether or not you are convinced by these examples, they demonstrate the form of the CI and how one goes about determining whether or not an action is morally permissible, and to what extent (i.e., if it holds in all circumstances (perfectly) or only in some circumstances (imperfectly)). Maxims which fail the test in the vein of the first two examples violate perfect duties, actions or omissions we owe to people, such as keeping promises, telling the truth, and respecting someone's autonomy. From here, Kant intends to prove a priori that there is, in fact, an imperative – a practical law – which commands absolutely of itself, and that the observance of which is duty. He warns that we cannot derive the reality of this principle from the "special property of human nature," as a practical unconditional necessity of action must hold for all rational beings. Due to his view of the good will as the sole, unconditioned good upon which all other goods rely, feelings and inclinations can yield maxims of behavior (subjective) but not law (objective); these can give us propensity but not direction to act. Kant's theory of practical reason is a theory of imperatives for this very reason: since we are not perfectly rational, our desires and weaknesses can tempt us to act irrationally; there can exist therein a separation between the principles upon we actually act and the objective laws of practical reason. If there is a law for all rational beings to appraise their actions by, then it must be connected with the concept of the will of the rational being. In his metaphysics of morals, Kant argues, objective practical laws are determined by a will relating to itself insofar as it "determines itself only by reason,"5 as this eliminates the empirical, and thus, the contingent, from the will. Kant makes further subjective and objective distinctions in relation to the will: what contains the possibility of an action the effect of which is an end is a means; the subjective ground of desire is an incentive, while the objective ground of volition is a motive. To arrive at the second formulation of the CI, Kant states that a human being - along with every rational being - exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will. Other things, such as the objects of inclinations, have only conditional worth. Intelligence may be a talent of the mind, and we may respect a brilliant scientist, but if that scientist sells their products to the highest bidder, without thinking of the destructive

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consequences their invention could have upon others in the hands of a dictator, this detracts from how we view him and his talents. The intelligence is being used improperly (else, by a bad will). In other cases, a good will can make good use of intelligence. Humans, along with other rational beings, alone can contain something with unconditional worth, a good will. The ground of Kant's principle is thus "rational nature exists as an end in itself."6 The second formulation follows form this: "act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."7 This can take many forms: positive (humanity must be cultivated and developed), negative (humanity limits what I may do in pursuit of my goals), and in general respect (humanity has absolute value and thus must be respected).8 Thus, there are two forms of the CI delineated, described as the form and the matter, respectively, and a third – the Kingdom of Ends – combines the others: act as if the will of every rational being is a will giving universal law. Rational agents are therefore both subject to the universalized maxims of others, while also remaining lawgivers of universal laws themselves. III. A Closer Look at Contradictions in Will Both contradictions in conception and in will tell us something about the possible world in which our maxim is made law according to the CI. In the first case, if we cannot conceive of a possible world in which our subjective maxim is made objectively necessary, then it is our duty not to perform said maxim. This is because the CI – at least the form of it in the first formulation – demonstrates how we must act as rational beings; this law shows how any rational being in our circumstance should or should not act. Contradictions in will – which is the very thing that makes a good person good: a will that is determined by moral laws – demonstrate actions wherein the agent is forfeiting their moral goodness to obtain some alternative. As the good will is the only unconditioned good, we cannot will against duty (determined a priori) for our own comfort, something that is contingent and subjective. But if Kant's good will is a will which does duty for the sake of duty, with no motivation from the agent-relative emotions, projects, and concerns, problems seem to arise. This is one of the complaints leveled against Kantian ethics: if my wife is drowning, I don't necessarily think about my duty to her while saving her, but I am motivated to act because of my love for her; even if I am motivated by duty alone, there seems something strange and less human about the action: my wife thanks me, and I respond, "No problem, it was only my duty; I would have done the same thing for anyone." But I think there is something even more troubling, as well as something even more fundamentally wrong with

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contradictions of will, than this. Let us revisit Kant's fourth example, that of the comfortable man who does not assist others. As this passes the contradiction in conception test but fails the contradiction of will test, Kant would say we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent assist others when they need it. One might ask: to what extent and in what situations? While the first formulation is the form of the CI, the second - the Humanity Formula - is the matter of the CI. But let's look more closely at this example to see if it does necessarily fail the contradiction in will test. This fourth man is doing well himself while realizing that those around him are going through hardships. He exclaims: What is it to me? Let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need! 9 If this particular maxim were universalized, Kant argues, the will of the man would conflict with itself, since "many cases would occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others"10 which he would rob himself of. One might not believe this: the man's subjective policy of volition specifically states that he shall take nothing from others and that each should be as happy as one can make himself. It seems dubious for Kant to assume that the man would then want sympathy from others if he needed it – this fact seems psychologically unknowable and, most definitely, unknowable a priori. Even if you do not believe that a man could never want the love or sympathy of others, we could alter the maxim to make the case against Kant stronger. Suppose that the man is, in fact, Emily Dickinson. She toils away writing, a recluse her entire life, and is so separated from others that even if she did need love or sympathy there would be no one to give it to her. If you will this maxim in a possible world, it seems as if it could hold. Kant would probably respond that these complaints are missing the point. He concedes that his examples are not perfect, but what matters is that the agent must act in conformity to himself as an autonomous, rational being, while realizing that other rational beings too are autonomous. The isolated poet who is comfortable and does not act from sympathy fails to acknowledge the good wills of others and their right to legislate law as well. Moreover, Kant claims to reserve the right to divide the duties as he pleased for the Groundwork. It was in the Metaphysics of Morals that he delineates specific duties and their motivations. We might not be compelled by the examples Kant gives for contradictions of the will, but we have been hard-pressed to prove that they do not contradict the will of a rational

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agent. But I argue for two things in response to the example above and to contradictions of will generally: weakly, that agents lose part of their autonomy if they act from the motive of duty alone; more strongly, that there is a circularity issue with Kant's imperfect duties (which presuppose the will before duties are determined, even though duties must be known in order to have a good will). Let us suppose, first, that when my friend is sick at the hospital, I make it my maxim to visit them. This maxim of beneficence does not seem to be a contradiction in conception (the possible world is still consistent with my maxim: I could still will my own beneficence if everyone else did the same). Moreover, it seems as if it is an imperfect duty, as the maxim not to visit my friend in the hospital is conceivable, but fails similarly to the person who does not help others when he is capable. If I am in a position to visit my friend at the hospital and they are sick, I may believe it is an imperfect duty to do so, especially if it will help them psychologically (and even physically) to know that I care enough to visit. We have already seen how this might create intuitive problems: if I visit my friend, she will probably be happy to see me, even though, if I am Kantian, I am doing my duty from the motive of duty alone, which is not the reason that the person derives pleasure from my visit. But there is another problem. If I legislate this law as a rational being, I must be able to conceive of a world in which all people who are friends of the person in the hospital visit them when they are sick. But if everyone who called person X a friend visits X in the hospital, my action, as well as the actions of everyone else, may lose its meaning. If everyone must be motivated from duty alone for the sake of duty, people lose their autonomy insofar as it is their own; the will, if it is determined by universalized maxims, loses its idea of freedom. Whether or not you accept that it need be the case that the person acts because of perceiving the act as a duty, there remains an intuitive problem with everyone acting necessarily under the CI insofar as actions that show character or agent-relativity lose their meaning. But Kant is perhaps more sophisticated than this. Let us suppose that our friend X in the hospital is discerning, and derives pleasure from well-intentioned friends – friends she knows will visit her in the hospital because they care – while remaining critical of those who merely show up because it is customary or part of their duty. In this case, we need to modify our maxim to state that in a situation where X is in the hospital, one needs to determine whether or not person X will derive psychological well-being out of your visit. But it is not clear if maxims, though subjective policies of volition, can be this particular. It is evident that there is something inexplicit about imperfect duties that may or may not be clarified in the Metaphysics of Morals. So, if we are to argue against imperfect duties, it must come from the concept of contradictions of will themselves in relation to the CI.

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Aside from the issue of losing agent-relative concerns, there is a theoretical issue of circularity in Kant's approach to the will that is made evident through contradictions of will. Kant first states that what makes a person good is his possession of a will that acts by the moral law, the CI, and is motivated by the thought of duty. In the Groundwork, the sorrowful moralist acts with moral worth, as he does not want to help others but does so out of duty; contrariwise, the sympathetic man acts out of sympathy and thus has no moral worth, even though the end is the same. (Thus far we have a formulation from Kant in which a person is made good by his possession of a good will. The good will is decided by the moral law.) Next, motivation by duty (the motivation necessary for a good will) is motivation by our respect for whatever law is that which makes our action a duty. So, in a way, we have a will that performs actions and is motivated by duty and by respect for laws that make these actions duties. As rational agents, there are laws that apply to us as laws of rationality. When we do something because it is our moral duty, we are motivated by the idea that we must act only as the fundamental law of reason (CI) determines. While perfect duties are consistent under this formulation, imperfect duties, those that rely on our thought that we cannot rationally will the maxim to take place, presuppose more than Kant explicates. In short, the will can only will moral laws, which are motivated by duty for the sake of duty; duties are created, in a way, by our respect for whatever law it is that makes our action a duty. Some of these duties (i.e. imperfect) are determined by whether or not we can will subjective maxims to take place in a conceivable, universalized world. (Our will, the thing that allows us to determine whether or not these duties exist, is itself determined by the imperfect duties that it seems to create.) Because these are theoretical concerns, it is difficult to grasp the assumption Kant relies upon, namely that our will can, by way of approving actions that then become moral law, determine its own rational worth. Furthermore, the CI determines actions that must necessarily be performed, as a priori morality is necessary and universal. Dutiful actions, if they are to have moral worth and express good will, cannot act from any other motive than duty itself. From the CI, moral permissibility is determined by testing both conception and will, as has already been explained. If the maxim fails to pass the conception test, it tells us that the maxim is not universalizable. But if the maxim does not pass the will test, and the will is a priori good in and of itself, what does this tell us about the maxim? If we use the will itself as a test within the CI—a will that is motivated by the thought of duty—we make an assumptive leap that the very thing that constitutes the good will is already good before it passes the CI. It seems as if Kant is able to turn anything he wishes into an imperfect duty merely by stating - and not demonstrating - that the will acts in a way that conflicts with the maxim. We cannot actually

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see if the will is determined by the CI, we can only assume properties of the will and use that within the CI to determine imperfect duties, without proving the will's content vis-à-vis the CI. In summary: the will depends on acting upon the motivation of duty for duty alone, but duties are demonstrated by the CI, which depends upon the will. It seems as if the causal relationship is contrary to Kant's earlier delineation of the will if imperfect duties are demonstrated only by the will, without demonstrating the existence of duties separately from the will itself, which depends upon duties alone to be good. IV. A Hypothetical, Candid Précis "The good will is supposed to do duties for the sake of duty." — "Well, what are these duties that the will should do? I'd like to have a good will." "If you implement the categorical imperative you can establish both perfect and imperfect duties." —"How do you determine perfect and imperfect duties? What's the difference?" "Perform a thought-experiment. Turn your action into a universal law by imagining a world in which everyone does said action. Then, see if you can still conceivably do your action. If not, you have a perfect duty to not act on the maxim you are testing. If you can, see if you can will yourself still to do the action. If not, you have imperfect duties." —"Wait. The will is supposed to do duties for the sake of duty alone, but imperfect duties are determined by the will in the first place through the categorical imperative? How can you use your will before you determine what duties are if the will does duty for its own sake?" V. Conclusion Kant's metaphysics of morals goes out of its way to remove the agent's motivations from the moral equation, to show us that we are obligated to act out of duty alone. Not only does this seem counter-intuitive, as our motive set is usually comprised by our inclinations, emotions for others, and personal projects, but it seems as though if everyone acted out of duty alone, actions would become meaningless, even if Kant calls them good. Moreover, there is ambiguity in the concept of imperfect duties. If it is my imperfect duty to cultivate not only my own talents but the talents of others, which ones should I cultivate and to what extent and in what circumstance? Even if the second formulation tells me to treat myself and others as ends unto ourselves, this only tells us what is morally permissible, not necessarily what we ought to do in every circumstance. Finally, there is something strange about using

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the will as a test within the categorical imperative, as the categorical imperative determines our duties, but the will is supposed to only do duties for the sake of duty alone. If an agent can will prior to knowing what all of her obligations are, even to the extent of determining other obligations, there seems to be a causal problem in the way Kant lays out his categorical imperative and, specifically, the test for imperfect duties. Notes 1 Immanuel Kant, from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Deontology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing., 2003), 11 2 Ibid. 12. 3 Ibid. 13. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 17. 6 Ibid. 19. 7 Ibid. 8 These three forms are found at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Robert Johnson, "Kant's Moral Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/kant-moral/ 9 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Christine M. Korsgaard. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33. 10 Immanuel Kant, from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Deontology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing., 2003), 14.

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Elissa Rosenbaum 13

ON MINK COATS AND CHEESEBURGERS: A REEVALUATION OF THE CRITERION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS IN FRANS DE WAAL’S PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS Jessica Goldkind I. Introduction Primates and Philosophers is primatologist Frans de Waal's answer to the question of the origin of morality. De Waal reacts to what he calls Veneer Theory, the belief that morality is a tenuous social structure we impose on our selfish, asocial human nature (de Waal 3-12). He argues that humans are social creatures by nature and that morality is the product of evolved, emotion-based mechanisms starting with emotional contagion and empathy (39). His proof is the documentation of these mechanisms and basic senses of retribution, fairness, and community concern in nonhuman primates. In his convincing argument to disprove Veneer Theory, de Waal illustrates the great extent to which apes and some other mammals feel emotional as well as physical pain, are self-aware, have expectations of fairness, and even construct rudimentary cultural and political systems (76). These capabilities call into question the morality of the way humans treat animals, including, for example, the contentious use of animals in invasive medical research. Thus, while de Waal's book illuminates the question of the origin of morality, it complicates the question of the scope of its application. In this paper, I will develop a new approach to the ethical treatment of animals by exploring the underlying criteria we use to determine rights. I will first discuss and criticize the positions on animal rights defended by de Waal and his critic Peter Singer. I argue that de Waal and Singer's distinction between rights and obligation is improper, and I will prove that de Waal's criterion of "responsibility" is not an appropriate criterion for the discussion of animal rights. Next, I will outline what I believe to be a more honest and just conception of rights and their inherence. As will become clear, the conclusions that can be drawn from this debate have profound implications not only for nonhuman animals, which are the newest fringe of our moral framework, but also for everyone affected by society's conception of rights. II. De Waal and Singer on animal rights

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De Waal is sensitive to the implications of the research he presents on the question of animal rights, and he addresses the issue in depth. After evidencing that nonhuman primates have very similar emotional and social lives to humans, he qualifies, it remains a big leap to say that the only way to ensure their decent treatment is to give them rights and lawyers… rights are part of a social contract that makes no sense without responsibilities (76-7).

Here, he establishes that responsibility to the community is the criterion for rights. What does he mean by responsibility? The concept has two components: The first is duty, an individual's expected active and beneficial role in his surroundings, namely society. The second component of responsibility is accountability, which requires that the subject be in physical and mental control of himself and understand the consequences of his actions. I believe that de Waal has in mind the first component, because he uses the plural "responsibilities", i.e. duties – whereas the accountability facet would be referred to in the generic singular, "responsibility." Additionally, one paragraph before the above quote de Waal admits that animals do possess some level of accountability: "We now use terms like 'planning' and 'awareness' in relation to animals. They are believed to understand the effects of their own actions, to communicate emotions and make decisions" (76). In my critique, I will discuss how both components of responsibility factor into the criterion for rights. De Waal also scrutinizes our conception of animal rights in practice: Indeed, giving animals rights relies entirely upon our good will. Consequently, animals will have only those rights that we can handle. One won't hear much about the rights of rodents to take over our homes, of starlings to raid cherry trees, or of dogs to decide their owner's walking route. Rights selectively granted are, in my book, no rights at all (77).

His vivid theoretical scenarios test the bounds of our instinct to give animals rights. De Waal has claimed that emotional instincts such as empathy and guilt are the foundation of morality. Thus, if the above cases (eg. rodents taking over our homes) trigger in us a sense of entitlement rather than guilt or empathy for the animals, this may be an indication that animals do not fit into our schema for rights. Although de Waal rejects the notion of animal rights, he proposes that humans adopt a sense of obligation that would include limiting unnecessary pain. This sense of obligation, or "ethic of caring," is ill-defined; the ambiguity allows de Waal leeway in his admirable tightrope walk between the benefits of animal research for humans, on the one hand, and avoiding the painful maltreatment of animals on the other. "For most people, [– de Waal and

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Singer included – the balance] is a matter of degree, not of absolutes" (78). In his response to de Waal's book, bioethicist Peter Singer agrees that it is best to view "animal rights" in terms of human obligations, although he differs from de Waal in that he sees value in laws that would help prevent animal suffering (153). He rejects de Waal's criterion of responsibility by pointing to cases of humans who are not capable of giving to society or being accountable for their actions, but are nevertheless granted rights (156). Singer also astutely attacks de Waal's argument that "rights selectively granted are, in my book, no rights at all." He reminds us that all rights are selectively granted. Babies don't have the right to vote, and people who, as a result of mental illness or abnormality, have a tendency to violent antisocial behavior, may lose the right to liberty. This doesn't mean that the rights to vote, or to liberty, are 'no rights at all' (154).

In that vein, we must remember that the discussion of morality is an exploration of the ought rather than of the current reality. For instance, it is true that most people do not let their dogs choose their walking routes. Analyzing the example closely, we may decide that either dogs have no claim to the right to choose their walking route, or that we ought to be letting them choose their route or ought not be creating this domestication-induced conflict of interests in the first place. The current nature of reality does not determine what should be the nature of reality. In lieu of a responsibility criterion, Singer establishes a criterion of pain: beings have the right to be spared unnecessary pain. This criterion is self-evident (we should avoid pain simply because pain is bad) and indiscriminate ("we should consider similar experiences of pain to be equally bad, whatever the species of the being who feels the pain") (157). Defining "necessary" pain is a more difficult matter. De Waal and Singer lean toward opposite sides of the spectrum, with de Waal favoring human needs and Singer defending animals' wellbeing. The former asserts that, "our first moral obligation is to members of our own species" (78). He places moral value on loyalty and the contract we hold with those in our group. Singer replies forcefully, "Why should the fact that nonhuman animals are not members of our species justify us in giving less weight to their interests than we give to the similar interests of members of our own species?" (156). In order to apply his stance, we would need be able to understand and then to compare qualitatively the pain felt by animals with the pain felt by humans in cases of conflict. In my critique, I will note the important shortcomings of Singer's pain criterion.

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III. A critique of de Waal and Singer De Waal judges animals against a criterion of responsibility. However, we do not grant humans rights according to their contributions to society. In the United States, the legal age for alcohol consumption is 21, while legal adulthood, voting and the ability to serve in the military begin earlier, at age 18. In this instance, rights are withheld from fully contributing and accountable members of society. Similarly, the right to vote is restricted to citizens even if non-citizen residents have proven to be fully contributing members of the country. Conversely, minors are granted rights but have no legal duties or accountability - in criminal cases, their adult caregiver is generally responsible for their crimes. Singer adds to that proof the rights of "humans with severe intellectual disabilities" who are likewise not accountable for their actions (156). Responsibility is often not the determining factor for rights in practice, and nor should it be. De Waal writes that, "rights are part of a social contract that makes no sense without responsibilities." It is here that I find it necessary to divide rights into two categories: inherent and social rights. Inherent rights are personal freedoms that a social context infringes upon, whereas social rights are those abilities that a social context provides. For example, a being is free to live without being killed until other beings (the social context) threaten that freedom. We do not owe our lives to society inherently. Right to life is thus an inherent right. Freedom to vote is an ability that the social context provides by creating a political system. The right to vote is thus a social right. Inherent rights are dependent on society in that without society threatening a given freedom, it would not be considered a right to maintain that freedom. But, unlike de Waal claims, it is not the case that inherent rights should rely on society granting them in return for a contribution. With regard to the accountability aspect of responsibility, it does not make sense to withhold rights that will not threaten others and therefore do not necessitate accountability. We can argue for an animal's right to freedom of movement without extending that to extremes that would put others in danger. In other words, we may decide that a chimpanzee has the right to not be caged, without giving it a driver's license or letting it roam urban streets. Rights that do not yield potentially dangerous power should not mandate accountability of the subject. Another paramount theoretical argument against the responsibility criterion is what we can call the inherent value criterion. Christine M. Korsgaard, another of the ethicists to comment on de Waal's book, writes, "According to Kant, morality demands that we treat other people as ends in themselves, never merely as means to our own ends" (101). We

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consider an action moral if it is motivated not by self-interest, but by altruism, which recognizes the value of another independent of what we gain from him. De Waal's responsibility criterion values others based on their contribution to society, a means to a self-interested end. A true moral system admits the value of life and happiness (at least the absence of pain) regardless of what an individual gives in return. Therefore, social responsibility cannot be the sole basis for a moral system. When applied to animal ethics, de Waal's rights criterion of social membership assumes an additional flaw. De Waal argues that animals will never be full-fledged members of our society, and that therefore they do not have rights. But they are full-fledged members of their society. In most actual cases, humans entered their lives and societies by capturing them and bringing them into human civilization; considering this part of the picture, it does not make sense to judge animals' rights in terms of their relation to human society. We must return to the distinction between inherent and social rights, or given rights and taken rights. Before entering human society, animals have the freedom to live, move, reproduce, seek pleasure and avoid pain. Because human society did not give the animal those abilities, we should not allow ourselves free reign to infringe on those freedoms until the animals prove their membership in our society. De Waal (and Singer, less so) reframes the debate in terms of human obligations to animals instead of animal rights. I argue that the distinction between a right and an obligation is only semantic. In truth, they are each other's opposite. To have a right means that it is the obligation of others to do or to refrain from doing something that affects you. My right to freedom of movement is equal to your obligation to not cage me, and my right to vote is equal to the government's obligation to provide me a ballot and count my vote. Obligations are subject to violation, but so are rights. And obligations, like rights, have moral weight. That is to say, if someone fails to fulfill an obligation in this context, we judge their failure as immoral. So the discussion of what is moral and immoral to do to animals has the same implications whether it is phrased in terms of obligations or rights. Singer's criterion of pain also leaves questions unanswered. One major gap is that many rights are not based on pain avoidance. Life, which we consider the most basic right, could be justifiably terminated with a painless lethal injection under the pain criterion. The size of cages/"habitats" at the zoo does not cause pain, per se, but it certainly limits what would be the animal's natural course of movement. Perhaps anesthetized neutering of pets does not cause physical or emotional pain, but it irreversibly denies the animal the right to reproduce. The pain criterion, which recognizes similar pain as equally bad between all species,

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seems to promise an apples-to-apples comparison in cases where animal and human interests conflict. But it only aids our debate when what is at risk is single-variable, onedimensional pain. In medical research using animals, consider factors such as the number of animals harmed, the scale of pain dealt, the number of current and future people that could benefit from the research, the emotional pain of the ill humans and their families, whether benefits of the research are a guarantee, who will have long-term memory of the pain, etc. It is near impossible to reduce two situations to similar experiences of pain. Thus, most of the debates within animal ethics are not illuminated by Singer's criterion. IV. Conclusion - Applying a new approach As I presented in my critique, it is honest and valuable to make the distinction between inherent and social rights. The term 'inherent', as opposed to the more commonly used 'natural', expresses both concepts of ownership and value. We can think of an animal as owning its life, because life is inherent and not something that humans gave it. We can apply this concept to neutering/spaying, captivity, and many other instances of human-animal relations. But furthermore, inherency signals that we must value the being for itself and not for how it may benefit us. In contrast to their inherent rights, it is questionable as to whether animals deserve to be part of the human legal system, since that is a social right – an ability they lacked before entering our society. Singer's distinction between having rights and having lawyers may be helpful here (153). However, most of the rights concerned in animal rights advocacy are inherent rights. I must note that a pure inherence criterion yields a troublesome conclusion in cases where human life could be spared by infringing on animals' inherent rights. Is it immoral to conduct fatal research on animals with the goal of finding a cure for fatal human diseases? Is it immoral not to conduct the research? Perhaps I am a speciesist or perhaps I am appropriately loyal to my human brethren in my strong inclination to prioritize human life over animal life in cases of direct conflict. I have not identified a solid, objective philosophical basis to support this prioritization. But it would be revolutionary enough if people surrendered those killing practices for which the only human benefit is pleasure. (I have in mind such practices as the production and purchase of fur or leather, and hunting for sport.) Beyond animal rights, the replacement of responsibility for inherence as a rights criterion will affect discourse on the social contract, which bears on all of our lives. While a successful social system depends on the contributions and cooperation of its members, the support that society gives the individual should generally not rely upon responsibility or

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prior proving of worthiness. It is in fact those who cannot provide even for themselves (eg. children, disabled, impoverished) to whom society should provide the most. Social provision should likewise cross national boundaries. We may judge a country as morally failed if it does not secure human rights, not only for people under its own jurisdiction, but also for people outside of its realm of control and in that of another country. As each new day witnesses an expanding repertoire of what humans can do in terms of controlling our environment, we must be ever more sensitive to what we ought to be doing, which is indeed the core concern of the field of ethics. Sources De Waal, Frans. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006 Korsgaard, Christine M. Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action. In Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, edited by Frans de Waal, Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober, 98-119. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Singer, Peter. "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals." In Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, edited by Frans de Waal, Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober, 140-58. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

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Chris Willcox

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A PROOF ENOUGH FOR MILL’S UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLE Min Seong Kim It is contended that Mill's Proof of Utility suffers from the is-ought problem. The proponents of Mill's utilitarianism rarely attend to the is-ought problem, or so it seems to me. It is almost as if the is-ought problem has been solved, dissolved, or forgotten. Yet, if it has been solved, I have not encountered a solution; if dissolved, I have not heard of a satisfactory account of its dissolution. In this paper I rekindle the problem once again, first, by offering an interpretation of Hume's original presentation of the problem and then by turning to Mill's Proof of Utility and explain why it might be seen as suffering from the is-ought problem. Then I consider the kind of a justification for the Proof that Mill seems to endorse, which I call Psychological Justification. Finally, I will consider an additional justification—a kind of pragmatic justification—for one of the problematic premises of the Proof of Utility. I conclude that despite these efforts to augment it, Mill's Proof of Utility cannot escape the is-ought problem. I. Cashing out the is-ought problem The following may be the simplistic formulation of the is-ought problem: one cannot validly infer an ought-statement from a set of is- statements. I believe that the simplistic formulation of the is-ought problem is inaccurate, since we do in fact derive oughtstatements from is-statements legitimately. For instance, 'ought' implies 'can' is a commonly accepted principle. Some philosophers have pointed out that given that ought implies can is true, we can make the valid inference that not-can implies not-ought; or in other words, 'cannot' implies 'not-ought' (that is, if one cannot do x, it is not the case that one ought to do x)1. Since this is a valid inference, we have legitimately derived a statement of ought from a purely descriptive statement, thus refuting Hume. Other philosophers have proposed the following kind of counterexample to the is-ought problem: Snow is white Snow is white or I ought to work According to the rules of first-order logic, the above deduction is legitimate: a disjunctive statement with at least one true term as a disjunction is itself true. Instead of dwelling on these supposed counterexamples, let us flesh out the is-ought

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problem in more detail. To begin with, I shall turn back to Hume's original formulation of the problem: I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 3.1.1)

What Hume says in the passage deviates from the simplistic formulation in some notable ways. First of all, Hume raises his point with regard to systems of morality. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the kind of 'ought' that is in question is the kind that may be called moral oughts. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to say that moral oughts are actions that are prescribed by an ethical theory. Hume's conclusion in the quoted passage is that "distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason." It seems that what concerns Hume is grounding ethics (which we may say is the philosophy of distinguishing vice and virtue) on naturalistic observations ("relations between objects") or reason. Then what exactly is the problem with inferring an 'ought' from an 'is'? He thinks that he finds it "altogether inconceivable" how an oughtstatement can be inferred from a set of is-statements. I place "altogether inconceivable" inside quotation marks, because I find that this expression is in need of clarification. The simplistic formulation of the is-ought problem stated that one cannot validly infer an ought-statement from a set of is-statements. To be precise, this is not what Hume seems to be saying in the passage. He says that it is altogether inconceivable how one would derive an ought-statement from a set of is-statements. The difference is subtle but one should not underestimate its significance: "altogether inconceivable" isn't "logically fallacious". It would be exaggerating Hume's point if one was to say that inferring an ought-

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statement from a set of is-statements is a logical fallacy. "Inconceivable" is one of those philosophical jargons whose precise meaning is debatable, but I take it quite literally here: Hume is demanding that a reason be given as to why inferring an ought-statement from a set of is-statements is legitimate, because he can't think of any justifiable reason. Thus, it is true for Hume that inferring an ought-statement from a set of is- statements is altogether inconceivable. By stopping short of saying that the is-ought inference is a logical fallacy, Hume is not ruling out the is-ought inference forever from the set of legitimate logical inferences. He is saying that, at present time, there is no reason given to support that sort of inference; presumably, if some acceptable reason could be given—some kind of justification—Hume would have little problem in permitting the is-ought transition. I reject, therefore, the orthodox understanding of the problem as well as the interpretation that the is-ought problem points to a logical fallacy. I find that my understanding of what Hume means by "inconceivable" is the correct reading of Hume's passage. To say that Hume's use of "inconceivability" implies a logical impossibility of the is-ought justification is to take Hume to be claiming something stronger than what he has actually written. There is no reason to think that "inconceivability" in Hume's passage means logical impossibility. I have not yet determined what that reason would look like, or if it is possible to provide that reason at all. These issues are revisited later in this paper. I now turn to Mill's text, which many have claimed to be infested with problems, one of which is the is-ought problem. II. Mill's Proof of Utility Mill offers "a sort of proof" of utilitarianism in Chapter IV of Utilitarianism (I am referring to this proof when I write 'the Proof' or 'the Proof of Utility'). I suppose that an adequate proof of utilitarianism consists in proving the following three points: 1. happiness is a good; 2. happiness is the only good; 3. general happiness is good. The part of the proof that I am interested in is 1, that happiness is a good. This is the part of the proof that is subject to the is-ought problem. The Proof goes like this: P1

P2 C1 C2

"…the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it”2 "…each person…desires his own happiness" (ibid.) (from P1 and P2) happiness is desirable (from C 1) Happiness is good

The move from C1 to C2 may seem problematic at first, but a little interpretive work should prove that the move is not a problem for Mill. He writes that "questions about ends are, in

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other words, questions what things are desirable”3; I believe it is generally accepted that questions about moral ends are questions about what things are good. If these two additional premises are accepted, then the following equation obtains, roughly, at least: moral ends=what things are desirable=what things are good: these terms are largely interchangeable. If Mill is correct about this interchangeability, it would seem that the move from C1 to C2 is unproblematic because he is merely substituting 'desirable' with its conceptual equivalent, 'good'. The real problem with Mill's Proof is in its inference of C1 from P1and P2. The word 'desirable' is used in the descriptive sense (the is sense) in the premises, while the same word is used in a prescriptive sense (the ought sense) in C1 and consequently, C2. Mill's proof seems to be subject to the is-ought problem. The Proof of Utility must establish that one ought to desire happiness, and this is what C 1 and C 2 together imply. For Mill, as it has already been pointed out, it is a simple truth that happiness is desirable (worthy of desire) and what's worthy of desire is what's good and what's good ought to be desired. Yet, 'desirable' as it is used in P1 and P2 merely says that happiness is desirable (capable of being desired), just as something is visible when it can be seen and audible when it can be heard. There is no explanation why this move from 'desirable' (capable of being desired) to 'desirable' (ought to be desired) is legitimate. This problem has been pointed out by countless essays written on Mill, so I believe this brief account suffices. I believe that Mill tries to deal with this problem of moving from one kind of 'desirable' to another kind of 'desirable' in his text. What I offer here is my interpretation of his defense. I will hereafter refer to Mill's line of argument Psychological Justification. Psychological Justification would proceed like this: 'Ought' implies 'can'. What is implied by 'ought' implies 'can' is this: in the statement p ought to do x, the only candidates for x are the things that p is capable of doing. I have stated that, roughly, end of morality=what things are desirable=what things are good. Thus, by saying that happiness is desirable, Mill is saying that happiness is the end of morality. This can be put in other words: one ought to desire happiness. I have said that in statement of the form p ought to do x, the only candidates for x are those that p is capable of doing. Similarly, in the statement of the form q ought to desire y, the only candidate for y are those that q is capable of desiring. That was the groundwork for Psychological Justification. For the details, I turn to the text:

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…if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not

either a part of happiness or a means of happiness…we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality…4

Mill claims that by matter of psychological fact, the only thing a human being is capable of desiring at all is happiness. It follows that the only thing that is even possible to be desired by a human being as an end is happiness. If there is such a thing as an end of morality, then the only candidate for being that end is happiness. It does not make sense, given Mill's view of human psychology, to demand that anything other than happiness be crowned as the end of morality. If one accepts that there is an end of morality at all, then one must accept that happiness is the end of morality. To say that happiness is the end of morality is no different from saying that happiness ought to be desired. Hence the following can be said to be true on Mill's account: if one accepts that there is an end of morality at all, he must also accept that one ought to desire happiness. It seems that the success of the Psychological Justification hinges on the truth of Mill's claim on human psychology, that happiness is the only thing desired by human beings. This is an empirical question. The question that is interesting from a philosophical point of view is this: granted that Mill is correct about human psychology, does it save Mill's Proof of Utility from the is-ought problem? I am skeptical that it does. As I have set it out, Psychological Justification poses a dilemma. The first option is to accept that there is such a thing as an end of morality. Taking the first option, then you must accept happiness is the only candidate for being that end. This is the option that Mill thinks is reasonable and convincing. Yet there is an alternative option that is overlooked by Mill: reject that there is such a thing as an end of morality. I suggest that further considerations of the issues at hand would prompt one to take the alternative option. III. The End of Morality Thesis as a Suppressed Premise of the Proof In Section I, I concluded that what Hume demanded was a reason why a movement from a set of is-statements to an ought-statement should be permitted. I have argued in Section II that Mill commits this problematic move without a legitimate reason. Let us consider the following. Given the Proof, P1 P2

“…the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it” “…each person … desires his own happiness”

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C1 C2

(from P1 and P2) happiness is desirable (from C 1) happiness is a good

We have seen how a move from the two premises to C1 is problematic due to the dual nature of the word 'desirable'; but we can add another premise of the following sort, which I call the end of morality thesis, since it explicitly defines what is good: P0

The end of morality thesis: the good is what is worthy of desire; things that are worthy of desire are the things that are desired.

Mill needs something like P0, that would provide the 'reason' that Hume demands: given P0, the transition from an is-statement to an ought-statement is justified. P0 links the 'desirable' of P1 to the 'desirable' of C1. The resulting proof (the Proof plus P0) is obviously question begging. If P0 is true, then there is no is-ought problem and Mill's proof is deductively valid. Of course, the way I have set up Psychological Justification would avert Mill from begging the question, since he would just have to say that if you accept that there is an end of morality, then accept utilitarianism. Prima facie, he has not begged the question. 5

Nevertheless, Mill must presuppose something like P0 , which would permit the isought transition, in order for the Proof to work. Without assuming something like P0, which would legitimize the transition from the is-statement of P1and P2 to an ought-statement of C1 and C2, Mill's proof would not be valid. I consider, therefore, P0 to be the suppressed premise of the Proof of Utility. The gist of Psychological Justification was that if one accepts that there is an end of morality at all, he must also accept that one ought to desire happiness. It seems that the statement is actually a bi-conditional. Mill takes the consequent, one ought to desire happiness, to be true; but Mill's support for one ought to desire happiness is given by the means of Mill's Proof that includes as its premise P0, which posits the end of morality thesis. Herein lays the problem for Mill: he thinks he can get away with accepting the consequent and leaving the antecedent an open question; but Mill's argument for the consequent (the Proof) presupposes the antecedent(P0 is a suppressed premise of the Proof). So if Mill takes the consequent to be true, he also has to assume the truth of the antecedent. If I'm right about this, the following must also be true for Mill that if one ought to desire happiness, then there is an end of morality. Thus it is shown that the conditional which connects one ought to desire happiness and there is an end of morality is a bi-conditional. Given Mill's position, he is bound to accepting both that one ought to desire happiness and that there is an end of morality (or reject both—a path I doubt he would endorse).

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Hence the bi-conditional relation that I have just uncovered means that if one accepts that one ought to desire happiness, one must also accept that there is such a thing as the end of morality. Since Mill holds that one ought to desire happiness is true, he must accept that there is an end of morality. But that there is an end of morality as stated by P0 cannot be independently argued for (that is, argued for without reverting to the truth of one ought to desire happiness, which would lead to circularity since the argument for one ought to desire happiness presupposes P0). There is neither a proof nor a reason available for believing that P0 is true. P0 is exactly the kind of relation between an is and an ought that Hume finds utterly mysterious. But if P0 is not true, it follows that a key tenet of utilitarianism is not true. One should begin to see why I doubted that Psychological Justification would allow Mill to bypass the is-ought problem. Mill's commitment to the truth of one ought to desire happiness forces him to assume P0 for logical reasons, regardless of whether his claims about human psychology are true or not. The conclusion that I draw is this: something like P0 is needed in order to make Mill's Proof deductively valid; however, there is no proof for P0, thus Mill's Proof is not valid. In the following section, I consider what I call the pragmatic justification for P0, which is intended to give reasons for accepting P0. My consideration leads to the conclusion that one should reject such a way of justifying P0. IV. Why the Pragmatic Justification is Inadequate Responding to my conclusion that the Proof should be rejected because P0—the suppressed premise—cannot be supported, a hypothetical defender of Mill might raise the following issue: "Mill declared that the proof he is going to offer is not meant to be a perfect, deductively valid one… simply because he recognizes, that when it comes to the questions of this kind, no deductive proof can be given. It is unfair to demand of Mill the kind of rigorous, strict, deductive proof of utility when he never made a promise to offer one." Regarding P0 which I have suggested to be a suppressed premise of the Proof, the hypothetical defender might argue that he can offer a pragmatic justification of P0. He says that the pragmatic justification is not quite a deductive proof, but nevertheless a proof enough for P0; therefore, it should compel us to accept P0. What I consider here in the final section of this paper is whether P0 can be justified via this pragmatic justification. Hence it might be argued in favor of Mill that P0 should be granted without a deductive proof for two reasons: 1. there is no deductive proof available for P0;2. (Roughly speaking) since a world lacking in morality is not desirable, one must posit that there is such a thing as the end of morality. I am willing to concede that Mill himself may well have

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adopted a pragmatic justification of P0. What I am unwilling to grant is that the pragmatic justification is a proof enough for P0. The key question is this: under which circumstances does a pragmatic justification count as a proof enough? The reason the defenders of Mill have turned to a pragmatic justification of P0 is because there are no deductive proofs of P0 available. There are two criteria (both of which are necessary conditions but perhaps not sufficient conditions) that determines if a pragmatic justification for a proposition can be counted as a 'proof enough' for that proposition. I think this is the first criterion for a pragmatic justification to be considered as a proof enough: a pragmatic justification for p is a 'proof enough' for p if and only if there is no deductive proof, nor a better non-deductive justification, for p. It is conceivable that questions of certain kinds would be subject only to a pragmatic justification; I have the impression that Mill thinks question about the end of morality is one of those questions (since Mill does state that no deductive proof can be given). At least one more criterion is needed, for the first criterion alone does not rule out pragmatic justifications being given to some absurd propositions. Therefore, I shall propose one more criterion: a pragmatic justification for a proposition p is a proof enough for p if and only if it is agreed that p is a desideratum. When do we consider a proposition p to be a desideratum? I can only offer a rather vague measure at the moment: p is a desideratum when p has a strong intuitive appeal or in cases when our cessation to believe that p would bring undesirable consequences. I will elaborate how the two criteria can be used in practice by providing an example of a pragmatic justification that is often taken to be a proof enough. The example that I provide is that of the justification of induction. The question of justifying induction— another problem posed by Hume—has been a long-standing issue in philosophy. The proposition that is being questioned here is this: relying on induction is rational. Probabilistic solutions, solutions by positing a principle of uniformity, among others, have been proposed as deductive proofs for the proposition that induction is rational. However, all of these proposed solutions have been refuted, leaving no deductive proof of the rationality of induction. Pragmatic justifications of induction have thus been put forth by the likes P.F. 6

Strawson . I forego the details of his argument, but one of the implications of these pragmatic justifications is that if there is a successful method to make accurate claims about the unobserved at all, then that method would necessarily be inductive in nature. I contend that when it comes to the problem of induction, the pragmatic justification is a proof enough, for it satisfies both the first and second criteria: there is no deductive proof that induction is rational;

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establishing that induction is rational is a desideratum because if induction is irrational, then human beings are irrational (since we must rely on induction whenever we make a claim about the unobserved as we very often do). Nevertheless, when it comes to P0, I am doubtful that its pragmatic justification can be considered as a proof enough. I can happily grant that the pragmatic justification for P0 satisfies the first criterion. There is no deductive proof for P0 (if there was one, there would be no is-ought problem). However, I contend that the second criterion is not satisfied. In the case involving induction, the pragmatic justification was a proof enough because human beings cannot do without induction—there is no alternative way of making claims about the unobserved. Failure to justify the rationality of induction undermines our humanity in some significant way (since it can be argued that if induction is irrational, then human beings are irrational). One might argue that utilitarianism cannot do without P0, and since we need an ethical theory, P0 should be granted for the sake of the best ethical theory (and those sympathetic toward utilitarianism would argue that utilitarianism is the best ethical theory). This line of argument is simply not convincing: the truth of P0 would make utilitarianism a coherent theory, but the falsehood of P0 does not rule out all ethical theories. If P0 is false, then we should look to other ethical theories. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the failure to justify P0 would undermine our humanity in any significant way, in the same way as the failure to justify induction might. It is, after all, an open question whether the refutation of utilitarianism would diminish humanity in any way. The lack of justification for P0 might be pointing to a loophole in utilitarianism. This should motivate us either to consider other ethical theories that do not posit P0 or adopt a kind of skepticism about ethics (if one believes that utilitarianism is the only convincing normative ethical theory), not grant P0 for the sake of utilitarianism. It is simply not obvious whether the truth of P0 is a desideratum, whence I conclude that a pragmatic justification of P0 is not a proof enough for P0, according to the criteria I have proposed. V. The Is-Ought Problem and Its Bearing on Normative Ethics I began with Hume's presentation of the is-ought problem, which leads one to be skeptical about any transition from is-statements to ought-statements. An examination of Mill's Proof of Utility revealed that Mill makes such a transition, which can only be legitimized by justifying something like P0, a thesis that essentially permits a transition from an is to an ought. Finally, I have argued that P0 cannot be justified, either deductively or pragmatically. This leaves the Proof of Utility with an unsolved problem. I shall conclude this paper with a brief discussion of an interesting issue that is

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closely related to the failure of Mill's proof. I do not intend this last part of the paper to be a philosophically rigorous analysis; rather, I intend it as an impressionistic response to the issue at hand. It is not difficult to see the connection between the is-ought problem and a longstanding question in normative ethics, that is, the infamous question of why one ought to be moral. Mill's Proof of Utility, if it had been successful, would have shown why one ought to be moral, where being moral means performing the actions recommended by the utilitarian calculus. Yet, I have argued that it fails to withstand a rigorous analysis; hence, no reason has been given why one ought to act morally. I believe that many would say that the why be moral question has never been satisfactorily answered. Does this mean that the ethics is founded on an unjustified fiat that one just ought to be moral? I do not think so. I believe that it is precisely this lack of a compelling reason why one ought to be moral that makes morality possible. There exists no reason why one ought to be moral, especially if that reason is supposed to be compelling reason. Nothing compels one to act morally; morality is possible because there is no reason that compels one to act in accordance with morality. Although this is an issue that should be set aside for a future discussion, let me dwell on this point just a little longer. Suppose that acting morally means acting to obtain what is good. The good is, however, something that has avoided unequivocal characterization. Then, let us tone it down a notch, and say that a good moral agent acts, at the very least, to obtain what he thinks to be good. But if there were always a compelling reason to pursue what is good, then the agent would be acting, when acting in accordance with morality, for a reason that is provided something other than goodness itself (I shall ignore the question of what exactly is goodness). The agent might act for the sake of some further happiness, for his own integrity, or say, to attain eudaimonia. Just as dodging a bullet is a very easy decision to make for an agent because the compelling reason to dodge a bullet is provided by the fact that the agent wishes to avoid death, a compelling reason to act morally would make acting morally very easy; anyone who accepts compelling reasons as basis for one's actions would come to the very "easy" conclusion that he should act morally in so far as there are compelling reasons to do so; I call it "easy" because compelling reasons rarely fail to convince a rational being. However, we often take actions done for the sake of goodness in spite of the lack of any foreseeable benefit to the agent himself to be noble acts. I contend that the reason we take these to be noble is because there existed no compelling reason for the agent to perform that act, except the fact the agent believed that performing these acts is what morality—or what he thinks to be morality—required. Again, in our intuitive thoughts, acting in accordance with morality does not solely

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mean acting in accordance with what is required by some normative ethical theory; rather, it is the agent's attitude, or his motive, "I ought to act morally, and because I take this particular act to be the act that is required by morality, I ought to perform this act" that is fundamentally integral to our intuitive picture of a morally good agent. Kantianism and utilitarianism may recommend different courses of action in different circumstances; but regardless of whether we agree with Kantianism/utilitarianism or not, we would say that both a Kantian agent and a utilitarian agent are still somehow more moral then, say, a non-deliberating agent whose actions always turn out to be morally good acts but does not hold this fundamental attitude to act in accordance with morality. Therefore, I think that it is the agent's motive to act morally, regardless of what morality may actually require, that first and foremost is a precondition of the agent's being a moral agent. It is not the content of the normative ethical theory the agent acts in accordance with that makes him moral, but rather his innermost motive to act in accordance with morality. The noble agent, or the truly moral agent, is the one who sticks by his innermost attitude toward morality, specifically that "I ought to act in accordance with whatever that morality requires, regardless of the circumstances". If there were compelling reasons that explained why an agent did act morally or ought to act morally, then it would seem that this fundamental attitude toward morality is in some way diminished; for instance, a moral agent who acts morally only because he sees a compelling reason to act morally would cease to act morally, if he ever comes to realize that there is no compelling reason to act morally. Such an agent does not fit our intuitive picture of a truly moral agent, for I have suggested that the unflinching commitment to act morally in any situation is the fundamental precondition of a truly noble moral agent. I further add that only when the agent lacks a compelling reason to act morally does he come to face the difficult decision to do what he takes to be moral, and being able to make that difficult decision to act morally is what makes him a noble agent and his acts done out of a noble commitment to doing moral good. Hence, I find that we should not look for an answer to the question why we ought to be moral, for the answer is that there is none, for truly moral acts are performed in the absence of any compelling reason in the agent's part to perform them. All that need to be asked is why one ought to embrace utilitarianism, or Kantianism, or any other normative theory as one's principle of action; and whatever normative ethical theory one decides to embrace as one's own principle of action does not diminish nor increase one's nature as a moral agent, as long as there is, somewhere deep inside him, the attitude, the motive, or even a desire, to act morally solely for the sake of morality, in any situation.

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Notes 1 I can see how one might object that 'not-ought' is not 'ought not', and that a 'notought' statement is not a type of ought-statement at all. 2 John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism" reprinted in Consequentialism, ed. Stephen Darwall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 50. 3 Mill, 50. 4 Mill, 54.

5 I am inclined to say that Mill actually does presuppose P0. Recall that he wrote: "questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable" (Mill 50). P0 is a restatement of this thought, when 'desirable' is read as 'desired' (whereas in section II, I read 'desirable' as 'worthy of desire.') In any case, what Mill actually meant by this statement is not much of a concern for me, because I think Mill must presuppose something like P0. 6 Peter F. Strawson. "The 'Justification of Induction'," in Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity: Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic, ed. M. Foster and M. Martin (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966), 440-450.

Sources Mill, John Stuart. "Utilitarianism." In Consequentialism, edited by Stephen Darwall, 32-63. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. Strawson, Peter F. "The 'Justification of Induction'." In Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity: Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic, edited by M. Foster and M. Martin, 440450, New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966. Cohon, Rachel. "Hume's Moral Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/. (accessed March 29, 2008).

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Sharon Barbour

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CAUSALITY BETWEEN MOTIVATION AND CAPACITY IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM Ariel Savransky Abstract Social deficits in autism are viewed as functions of core disabilities in social cognition or as impairments in fundamental motivation to engage socially. Recent research in autism has partially informed the resolution of these competing perspectives but more work needs to be done. We reviewed the recent literature concerning the neurobiology, neurophysiology and genetics related to social cognition and social motivation and attempted to interpret the findings in light of what is known about the development of human motivation. Based on the existing studies, there is no question that early deficits in motivation can lead to impairment in cognition and also that cognitive deficits can lead to impairments in motivation. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate motivation and cognitive deficits. The next advances will likely come from accepting autism as a disorder combining motivation and cognition, propelling the investigation of the early development of children. Possible methods for future studies are proposed. Characteristics of Autism Autism is a disorder characterized by "disturbances in cognition and behavior in the absence of obvious physical and brain dysmorphology" (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). According to the DSM IV, the three major features of autistic individuals are impairments in social interactions, impairments in communication and "restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities" (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). In order to further define these three broad attributes, the DSM IV specifies certain actions which qualify as fulfilling the umbrella characteristics. Autistic individuals display irregular behavior in engaging in nonverbal actions including those actions which define social interactions such as gaze fixation and gestures. Additionally, autistic individuals are unable to form relationships with peers due to their failure to reciprocate actions of their peers. It is also observed that autistic children "do not know how to make friends or to engage others in their activities or play. They tend to be rigid and do not easily learn socially appropriate behavior, such as initial greetings" (Tager-

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Flusberg, 1999). Furthermore, the essential component of relationships, language, is usually abnormal in autistic individuals. The ability to conduct a conversation is impaired. Autistic individuals also fail to partake in "make believe play" and "imitative behaviors" which are characteristic of one's age group. They also tend to be abnormally occupied with certain interests as well as displaying an attachment to irregular routines which do not serve a purpose. Autistic individuals may also display irregular motor movements such as flapping of fingers when excited. They may also display an irregular focus with certain parts of objects. There are also various other abnormalities including irregular sleeping and eating patterns as well as certain behavioral issues, which may be representative of certain individuals with autism. Abnormalities in Brain Symmetry in Autism Autistic children may also be born with a certain difference in brain asymmetry. There may be a right cerebral hemisphere dominance present in autistic children that is not seen in normally developing infants. This dominance is thought to be present in the processing of autistic children from birth. Unless there is an unexpected turn of events, this right hemisphere dominance is thought to persist throughout the social development of these autistic children. (Blackstock, 2005). This touches on the idea of abnormal processing of socially relevant information which will in turn affect one's preferences, as shown in the diagram. Effects of Holding Certain Preferences from Birth These studies discussed are thought to be talking about an infants' preference from birth, suggesting that these preferences are aspects with which the infant comes into the world. If an infant does truly come into the world with a preference to orient to social stimuli as evidenced by their preferences for faces, then this initial preference is going to affect the early social experiences in which a child chooses to engage. Because a normally developing infant demonstrates the preference for visually orienting to face-like stimuli, the infant may choose to pay more attention to experiences which involve these face like stimuli, specifically social experiences. However, if an individual does not choose to orient to these social stimuli, he or she will not engage in these early social experiences, as compared to the normally developing individual. Motivation Imbalance It is thought that by ten months old, a system which is key in ensuring that a child is

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able to participate in activities which involve approach tendencies, emerges involving the frontal area of the brain. If this area is disturbed early on, the reward value of certain stimuli will not be appropriately normal which will create an "affective social motivation imbalance that results in a robust decrease in the tendency to direct attention to social stimuli." (Mundy). Because of this imbalance, the autistic infant will not initiate joint attention interactions which will then lead to a "reduction in social information input to the child that results in a marginalization of subsequent social-cognitive and social behavior development" (Mundy & Neal, 2001). A child's preferences are going to be abnormal from this early age. A child will choose not to pay attention to social stimuli and will in turn not have certain social experiences. A child's early social experiences affect the information which enters into their brains, which further affects their ability to socially interact and thus will affect their preferences for certain social stimuli. They will then not pay attention to the stimuli which would affectively condition a child to develop the ability to initiate joint attention and advance further in social development. Preferences Shaping Early Social Experience In order to examine how ones preference may shape one's early social experiences, we can look at a study which discusses the links between social and linguistic processing of speech in preschool children with autism (Coffey-Corina et al., 2005). This study is based on the idea that the ability to learn language may be affected not only by the possession of the ability to discriminate among different phonemes, but also through one's inherent interest in learning language. It has been found that infants possess a social interest in speech known as motherese, which is directed towards them specifically (Pegg, Werker & McLeod, 1988). Additionally, an infants' ability to perceive speech may be related to the clarity of the mother's speech when she communicates with her infant (Liu, Kuhl & Tsao, 2003). Therefore, the preference to orient to these socially occurring stimuli actually influences the social experiences which an infant will have. Abnormalities Regarding Interest in Speech in Autism However, in autistic children, there is thought to be a lack of social interest in communication (Baron Cohen, 1993), as they are thought to orient themselves more towards superimposed voices as compared to their mother's voice (Klin, 1992). This preference may be caused by deficits in the central auditory system which controls the ability to distinguish inflections in speech. The MMN, an ERP which is activated in response to changes in speech inflection, was not activated or was activated to a lesser degree in children with

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autism (Kraus et al., 1996; Bradley et al., 1999). This preference is documented in differences found in brain measures. After looking at event related potentials, it has been observed that there is abnormal activation in autistic individuals in the area P3. This area is thought to be involved in orienting to specific environmental stimuli (Kemner et al., 1995). The finding that there is a different pattern of activation in this area lends support to the proposal that autistic individuals may not be paying attention to speech stimuli in the same way as a normally developing infant may be engaged with this stimuli. Because this social interest in speech may affect ones ability to "enhance speech production development…children with autism, who lack a social interest in communication, may be at a distinct disadvantage in language learning based on social factors" (Kuhl, 2003). If this initial preference for language is influential in dictating ones ability to learn language, this provides evidence that ones early preferences do in fact shape ones early social experiences. The fact that autistic individuals do not pay attention to these social stimuli suggest that they will not develop language to as great of an extent as normally developing individuals and thus will not be able to interact socially as they get older. Early preferences shape ones early social experiences and thus affect the development of social capabilities in children. Components of Joint Attention The ability to initiate joint attention would be the next component in the loop of the process of early social development. As seen in the diagram, the ability to initiate joint attention can be affected by preference, early social experience and social cognitive deficits. Joint attention involves a combination of different attributes constituting an episode of joint attention. The three characteristics of joint attention according to Bratman (1992), are that "the interactants are mutually responsive to one another, there is a shared goal in the sense that each participant has the goal that we do X together and the participants…understand both roles in the interaction and so can at least potentially help the other with his role if needed" (Bratman, 1992). These episodes of initiated joint attention also emphasize the idea of the infant being much more proactive in their bids for joint attention. The infant is therefore beginning to not only follow the adult leads in interactions, but also "directing adult behavior and attention" (Tomasello, 2005). This is thought to spring from the infants understanding of the actions of others. Development of Joint Attention in normally developing infants It is observed that by fourteen months of age, when an adult stops participating in

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shared activities, the infant will attempt to reengage the adult in these activities, or take over the role of the adult (Ross & Lollis, 1987). This demonstrates that infants, from a very early age, possess "a very strong motivation to share emotional states with others, and before the first birthday they express motivations for sharing goals and perceptions with others..by 1214 months they form joint attentions and participate in joint attention" (Tomasello, 2005). This serves as a building block in shaping ones social experiences, but also what cues enter into the social construction of a child's experiences. Joint Attention in Autistic Children When looking at this aspect of initiating joint attention episodes in children with autism, it is evident that children with autism may possess an ability to understand that human beings are beings that act spontaneously and they may even understand that others have goals and see things from different perspectives. However, although these children may possess a limited understanding of the intentions of others, this understanding does not seem to translate into the motivations and the skills necessary to share experiences with others. This understanding which motivates those normally developing individuals to initiate joint attention, does not fulfill this responsibility in individuals with autism (Hobson, 2002). With regards to joint attention, studies done have indicated that children with autism "show very little coordinated joint engagement, and initiate very few bids for joint attention with others by declaratively pointing or showing objects" (Baron-Cohen, 1989). There have also been studies which demonstrate that an autistic child engages in little cooperative play with others (Lord, 1984), as well as evidence which suggests that the communication of autistic children is not at the level of being collaborative, thus suggesting a deficit in emotional relatedness. This refers to the "human motivation to share emotions, experiences, and actions with other persons" (Tomasello, 2005). This motivation can be termed motivation 2 as opposed to the initial motivation to socially orient to faces as discussed previously. Ability to Initiate Joint Attention in Some Autistic Adults When considering this ability to initiate joint attention, it is also important to look at the performance of adults with autism later in the life. According to clinical experience observations of adults, it appears that many of these higher functioning adults have an interest in others thoughts and feelings, and spend time analyzing the meanings of the actions of others. They become stressed because they cannot understand the meaning of

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other's actions. When analyzing this behavior, it becomes clear that these adults "do not suffer from a lack of motivation to share things psychologically with others, but rather from the conflict between their desire to understand others and their inability to do so adequately" (Verbeke, et al., 2005). This implies that these adults have the desire to initiate this joint attention episode, but for some reason do not possess the capacity to do so. The Enactive Mind Theory concerning Joint Attention This ability to initiate joint attention can also constitute a part of another loop which involves the cues in ones environment and the information that is registered from ones environment. At the center of this loop is the enactive mind theory. This posits that ones mind may be affected by interactions with the environment. According to the enactive theory of mind, ones interactions with the environment based on what an individual decides is important to pay attention to, shapes the individuals understanding of the world in which he lives. Autism when described in light of this view proposes that social cognition is impaired early on because an autistic child fails to pay attention to important social stimuli in his environment. The enactive mind theory arises from the proposed finding that when presented with all the relevant aspects of a social situation, an autistic individual is able to make sense of the situation. However, in a real world setting, when it is demanded that the individual decide what stimuli are relevant versus irrelevant, the individual is unable to efficiently decipher the important stimuli. Therefore, it appears that while an autistic individual can be taught to make sense of stimuli, this teaching does not transfer to real world situations. It seems that the only way that autistic individuals may be able to function effectively is to create an environment composed of unchanging rules and habits. This rigidity proposes an example of how multiple deficits can flow from an early developmental insult. In this manner, nothing happens unexpectedly and no social adjustments need to be made. However, this is not the case in reality. One needs to be aware of social cues to assess situations and usually these occur rapidly and unexpectedly. The Role of Motivation in the Enactive Mind At the heart of the enactive mind theory, the role of motivation is highlighted as essential in selecting salient social stimuli and as the underlying feature leading to the development of understanding social situations. In contrast to computational models which suggest that the social world is stagnant and all the necessary elements used to make sense of this world are "fully represented and defined" (Klin, Jones, Schultz & Volkmar, 2002), the enactive mind theory emphasizes change. The mind is changed as a result of its desire to

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understand the social world. Within this framework, it is important to pay attention to how the individual goes about acquiring the tools to make sense of the environment. The importance of certain cues may be based on priority placed on these cues because of previous experience as well as occurrences of the moment. The ability to make sense of the social world is thus a learned concept based on background experience just as much as it is a moment to moment experience. However, autistic children do not seem to generalize skills to different situations. This is extremely important in this approach, as the enactive mind "enacts the social world, perceiving it in terms of what is immediately essential for social actions" (Klin, Jones, Schultz & Volkmar, 2002). Implications of Differential Processing of Facial Stimuli Specifically, the findings of these studies indicate that there is a difference in the way in which individuals with autism process facial images and this differential processing causes hypoactivation of the fusiform gyrus in response to facial stimuli. It was found that diminished gaze fixation is the cause of the hypoactivation of the fusiform gyrus in the autistic group. The autistic group was also found to display greater activation in the left amygdala and orbitofrontal gyrus as a response to emotional facial stimuli as well as greater right amygdala activation when viewing familiar as opposed to unfamiliar faces. This suggests that an autistic individual is responding to the emotional content of faces and not to the actual face in general. The activation of the amygdala is also not specific to emotions but to faces in general (Dalton et al., 2005). These two findings collectively indicate that this differential reaction to faces may be caused by the way in which an autistic individual scans a face. This is because there is no correlation found in the control group between face and eye fixation and activation of the fusiform gyrus. However, eye fixation is positively correlated with activation of the amygdala in the autistic group but not in the control group. Therefore, it can be concluded from this study that "face processing deficits in autism arise from hyperactivation in the central circuitry of emotion that produces heightened sensitivity to social stimuli, leading to characteristic diminished gaze fixation, which in turn results in atypical activation of the fusiform gyrus" (Dalton et al., 2005). An autistic child therefore processes faces differently than normally developing children. There may be certain cues in their environments such as facial stimuli, but they process these stimuli differently and therefore the way in which they register stimuli differs from the way in which a normally developing individual may register stimuli. This may contribute to the child's ability to initiate joint attention. If a child is processing and registering cues from the environment in a different way compared to the way in which a

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normally developing child may be processing and registering these social cues, it may hinder the autistic individual's perception of a situation and therefore, will affect the way in which they react to certain situations. A child may not pick up the social cues in his or her environment and therefore, would not respond to the cues in the same manner as a normally developing individual may respond to these social cues. This will therefore affect the way in which an autistic child interprets his or her environment and therefore will affect the way in which he or she responds to his or her environment. The Modifier Model of Autism and Social Development The modifier model of Autism and Social Development concerning those with higher functioning autism (HFA) builds on the idea of the reward system as being deficient in those individuals who are characterized as autistic. This model specifically posits differences in activation of the Behavioral Inhibition and the Behavioral Activation Systems in an individual, as assessed through observations using anterior EEG asymmetry. The Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) concerns the "aversive motivational system" and is responsive to "punishment, nonreward and novelty" (Mundy, et al., 2007). If one has an overactive BIS, they tend to display behaviors which make it harder to move towards goals, cause feelings of anxiety and fear when entering new situations and cause withdrawal from certain new and social situations. This system is controlled by the amygdala and hippocampal systems with have connections to the brainstem and the frontal lobes. The Behavioral Activation System, (BAS), on the other hand, refers to the "appetitive motivational system," which provides the motivation to "initiate movement towards goals, pleasurable experiences or both" (Mundy et al., 2007). This motivational system also causes a person to feel a sense of pleasure from social interactions and positive thinking when the possibility of reward arises. This system is the one which involves dopamine as discussed previously. The dopaminergic system is thought to involve left middle-superior frontal and precentral gyrus, the left inferior parietal lobe and the orbital frontal and anterior cingulate cortices. Abnormal Joint Attention Episodes in Autistic Children According to Mundy (1995), "joint attention deficits in autism were more profound in the domain of initiating joint attention (IJA) bids than it was in the domain of responding to the joint attention bids of others (RJA)." Mundy also found that IJA involved a "positive affective" aspect that was not a part of RJA and also that this ability to be positively affected by social stimuli may be a part of what inhibits IJA in children with autism. This led to the proposal that the abnormal social interactions and joint attention bids may be a result of

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complications in the neural systems which are associated with the BAS, thus leading to the idea that motivation may cause these impairments in the initiation of social behaviors. EEG Responses Correlating With Reward Circuitry When looking at EEG studies, it has been found that more activity in the left frontal area of the brain is responsible for an increase in "reward seeking and approach behaviors as well as positive or anger affect" (Mundy et al., 2007). On the other hand, individuals with "greater right frontal asymmetry display less activity and greater tendencies toward withdrawal, avoidance, as well as anxious dysphoric affect" (Mundy et al, 2007). This finding contributes to the idea that if motivation is the cause of autism, autistic individuals should display a greater right versus left frontal asymmetry. According to findings by Sutton, there were fewer social symptoms reported for children with HFA who displayed greater left versus right frontal asymmetry. However, this finding was also linked to reports of more social anxiety in relation to limitations of social interactions of autistic children. This posits that the motivation to interact with others is there when left frontal asymmetry is present, yet this anxiety develops because autistic individuals are unable to interact socially in the ways they desire. These individuals are more self aware and thus, know about their impairments, which causes them to feel increased self-consciousness in social situations. The Effects of One's Environment in Social Interactions Now there is also a third aspect of the loop that may dictate they way in which an individual responds to stimuli. This has to do with the effects of one's environment. If a child is interacting with the stimuli he or she receives from his or her environment, but not receiving the response he or she wants from the people he or she is interacting with, he or she will not be inclined to respond positively to the social cues. Thus they may not be registering the same reward value from social interactions and will therefore not be motivated to continue to interact with his or her environment. An autistic child may not receive positive information in their social interactions with the environment and may therefore not have their BAS activated and this may lead to their withdrawing from their social environment. This may be thought of as motivation three. If an autistic child does not gain rewards from interacting with his or her environment, they may not value these interactions and will therefore, not function socially because they have lost the motivation to function socially. There is not a reward which they gain from functioning in these social situations, but rather they may be getting activation of their BIS, inhibiting them from interacting socially.

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Implications of Reward Expectation According to studies done by Roesch and Olson, "activity of neurons might be related to the value of the expected reward or to the degree of motivation induced by expectation of the reward" (Olson and Roesch, 2004). Therefore, if a stimuli does not produce an expectation of reward, neurons may not be as active which would make it less likely that an individual would respond favorably to certain stimuli. If an autistic child is attempting to interact with his or her environment, and receiving negative feedback, this child will begin to condition himself or herself to not connect a reward value to social stimuli and thus these neurons will not fire as rapidly, leading to no response being generated to these social stimuli or a negative withdrawal response may replace what should be a positive social response. Connecting this back to the ability to initiate joint attention, if this child is receiving negative feedback from his or her environment, the neurons will not fire properly and thus the child will condition oneself to lack a response to social stimuli. Conclusions Thus once again, capacity and motivation become intertwined in an inseparable loop, which equally affect the social development of autistic individuals. A deficit in either the domain of capacity or the domain of motivation would be potent, contributing to the further development of the course of this disorder. Capacity and motivation interact in order to guide the course of social withdrawal which occurs with a diagnosis of autism. Thus, upon this conclusion, it is important to consider both the capacity and the motivation aspects when thinking about the next steps to take in deciding how to minimize the symptoms of those individuals with autism. When taking into account capacity and motivation, it is essential to target motivational aspects and capacity aspects of acquiring social information in order for there to be a chance that an individual born with autism may overcome the social deficits of this disorder. Conclusion After considering the question of whether autism is a disorder of capacity or motivation, it is apparent that in order to effectively target the major deficits present in autism, both capacity and motivation must be taken into account. This allows for multiple explanations of the disorder to be involved in the methods that are used to work with autism. When looking at the disorder from these different perspectives, ways in which we can work on detecting autism at an earlier stage in the life of an infant can be proposed. This early

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intervention, as a key to effectively treating this disorder, seems more probable after incorporating the implications of autism as a disorder of both motivation and of capacity. Diagram

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