Elecciones Rusia 2008

Boletín mensual: BOLETÍN MARZO 2008 http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/

ESPECIAL ELECCIONES EN RUSIA 2008

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El Observatorio Eurasia es un proyecto que se encuadra dentro de la línea de “Historia de la propaganda y análisis de la comunicación política” del Grupo Interdisciplinario de Estudios en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social (COMPOLITICAS), y tiene como principal objetivo el estudio, investigación y difusión de los principales fenómenos políticos, culturales y comunicacionales que tienen lugar en el antiguo espacio soviético. Coordinador Miguel Vázquez Liñán Responsable del número Francesco Evangelisti Maquetación del número Fernando Márquez Herrero

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ELECCIONES EN RUSIA 2008- Titulares de Marzo 2008 Éxitos Propagandísticos De La Era Putin www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com (08/03/2008) Election Sans Surprise En Russie http://monde-diplomatique.fr (01/03/2008) Time To Modernize http://www.iht.com (04/03/2008) Democracy Is Ill Served By Its Self-Appointed Guardians http://www.guardian.co.uk (05/03/2008) Russia's New President: A Putin-Shaped Throne http://www.economist.com (06/03/2008) Feeling Of Vertical Satisfaction http://en.novayagazeta.ru (07/03/2008)

ÉXITOS PROPAGANDÍSTICOS DE LA ERA PUTIN Miguel Vázquez Liñán, Observatorio Eurasia, 08/03/2008, (www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com) Si bien el mandato presidencial de Vladímir Putin puede (y debe) ser muy criticado en la mayoría de sus facetas, no es menos cierto que el presidente saliente ha cosechado éxitos nada desdeñables en lo que a propaganda política se refiere. Putin ha logrado, por ejemplo, ser percibido por buena parte de los ciudadanos rusos como el vencedor, pacificador y reconstructor de Chechenia, y esta imagen prevalece sobre aquella que apuntaría a que fue el propio Putin quien comenzara, en 1999, y sin dar ninguna oportunidad al diálogo, una guerra que podría, posiblemente, haberse evitado. Al mismo tiempo, Putin ha conseguido que se le identifique como el azote de los oligarcas, a pesar de que durante su mandato el número de éstos ha aumentado exponencialmente. El presidente ha demonizado la política (y a los políticos) de los años de Yeltsin, y esta versión sobresale por encima de la que recordaría el ascenso político meteórico de Putin precisamente en esos años y su promoción a la presidencia sólo porque el propio Yeltsin, en uno de sus delirios, lo nombró primer ministro. En política exterior, el presidente ruso queda en la retina de buena parte de sus ciudadanos como el que ha levantado a una Rusia arrodillada ante Occidente, plantando cara a Europa y Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, un análisis más detallado muestra que, sin negar los enfrentamientos (sobre todo retóricos), Rusia ha colaborado, y en muchas ocasiones se ha plegado a los dictados de la política exterior estadounidense. La lista de éxitos propagandísticos es larga, e incluiría la difusión de mitos como el del Putin luchador contra la corrupción, protector de los más desfavorecidos y reconstructor de políticas sociales, entre otros. ¿Y cómo lo ha conseguido? Si tuviéramos que resumirlo en un titular, posiblemente éste sería “la imposición del monólogo del poder”. Como dictan las recetas clásicas de los regímenes autoritarios, la administración presidencial ha intentado implantar, con notable éxito, una única visión de la Rusia contemporánea, que se ha difundido machaconamente a través de la mayoría de los medios de comunicación, incluyendo todos los canales de televisión, a nivel nacional. Por otra parte, y como si se tratara de la aplicación práctica de los planteamientos de Maurice Joly en el Diálogo en el infierno entre Maquiavelo y Montesquieu, el Kremlin ha construido su propia “oposición”, tanto política como mediática, que le ha permitido mostrar a las audiencias, nacionales e internacionales, una cierta fachada (acartonada, eso sí) de pluralismo. La verdadera oposición, independientemente de su tendencia política, aquella que tiene otra propuesta para Rusia ha sido, simplemente, reprimida, hostigada policial y judicialmente, además de acusada de antipatriota, enemiga de Rusia y quintacolumnista (léase vendida a Occidente). Así las cosas, y tras la coronación de Dmitri Medvédev, que tendrá lugar en mayo, queda por ver qué hará con la estructura propagandística heredada. Por ahora, la construcción de la imagen del nuevo presidente

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ha empezado, y pretende ser la de una nueva y dinámica generación de políticos rusos. De él se nos ha contado que no es del KGB, que es un empresario eficiente, que viste vaqueros y chaqueta de cuero, y que entre sus grupos musicales preferidos está Deep Purple. Podría tener su gracia pero, por algún motivo, produce (al que escribe) náuseas. Ante estas afirmaciones, habrá quienes piensen que estas prácticas no son privativas de Rusia, sino habituales en cualquier país del mundo, con independencia de su régimen político o situación geográfica. Tendrán razón, desde luego, aunque en estas cuestiones los “grados” son importantes (hablando de represión, no es lo mismo una multa que una bañera con electrodos, ¿verdad?). También estarán en lo cierto quienes recuerden la sempiterna hipocresía occidental, siempre con esa altanería que recomienda democracia sin practicarla en su territorio. La respuesta, sin embargo, no debería ser silenciar la crítica ante países que, como Rusia, se alejan cada vez más de las prácticas democráticas (en su sentido más etimológico), sino exigir a los gobiernos occidentales, con mayor fuerza y compromiso, que cumplan con lo que recomiendan a otros. El Comité de Seguridad Estatal de Osetia del Sur, que investiga el incidente, ya había advertido a la población de los posibles actos subversivos que está preparando Georgia contra la república independentista. FUENTE: http:// www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com

ELECTION SANS SURPRISE EN RUSSIE Le Monde Diplomatique, 01/03/2008, (http://monde-diplomatique.fr) C’est sans surprise que, dimanche, le dauphin du président Vladimir Poutine, le libéral Dimitri Medvedev, lui succèdera à la tête de la Fédération de Russie. Cette absence de suspense tient d’abord aux conditions très particulières dans lesquelles se déroulera cette élection présidentielle : non seulement le candidat officiel n’a pas de concurrent significatif autre que le communiste Guennadi Ziouganov et l’ultranationaliste Vladimir Jirinovski, mais le Kremlin a mobilisé comme jamais les grands médias et multiplié les intimidations à l’égard de tous les opposants. Le directeur de Human Rights Watch, qui voulait présenter un rapport de l’association sur la dégradation des conditions de travail des organisations non gouvernementales en Russie, s’est même vu refuser un visa. La victoire annoncée de M. Dimitri Medvedev résulte aussi de la popularité qu’ont value à M. Poutine les aspects positifs de son action à l’intérieur comme l’extérieur depuis son élection en 2000. Il a d’ailleurs annoncé, lors d’une conférence de presse à la mi-février, qu’il était « prêt à travailler comme chef du gouvernement » aux côtés de son successeur « aussi longtemps que Dmitri Medvedev sera président », ajoutant : « Le pouvoir exécutif suprême dans le pays, c’est le gouvernement. » Reste à savoir si le nouveau président se pliera à la volonté de son prédécesseur. La Russie, a-t-il déjà rétorqué, « a été et restera une République présidentielle [dans laquelle] il ne peut y avoir deux, trois ou cinq centres ». FUENTE: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2008-03-01-Election-sans-surprise-en-Russie

TIME TO MODERNIZE Mikhail Gorbachev, The Internacional Herald Tribune, 04/03/2008, (http://www.iht.com) Russia has elected a new president. I voted, and I urged not only my friends and family but all citizens of Russia to go to the polls and cast their ballots, despite the fact that the result was predictable and even programmed. The popularity of President Vladimir Putin, who backed Dimitri Medvedev and then agreed to serve as his prime minister, made the result a foregone conclusion. Many in our country were critical of this unique feature of the election.

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Voters were not given a real chance to compare the candidates' proposals on how to deal with the problems facing the country. The field of candidates itself left much to be desired. And yet, people went to the polls and voted - another tribute to the Putin phenomenon. But however important the elections to the Duma and for the presidency have been in recent months, I am now thinking about what happens next. We now have a unique opportunity to take advantage of the stability and confidence achieved in the past few years and of the favorable international markets to move decisively on the path of modernization. This means much more than modernizing our industry. We need to modernize governance, create an innovative economy, reemphasize education and health and, as top priority, work to narrow the gap between rich and poor while fighting corruption and bureaucracy. In a welcome move, both President Putin and candidate Medvedev focused on those challenges during the final days of the campaign. I have no doubt that they will do their utmost. But their efforts alone will not be enough to succeed. At all levels - federal, regional and even local - we need major personnel changes. I am not calling for a "kick-the-bastards-out" campaign. We need to educate the officials in new ways of solving new problems; even more, we need to open the way to the young. Unless this is done, many of the promises made to the people will not be kept, and no PR campaign will be able to hide that fact. We know from other countries' experiences that problems of such magnitude can only be sold in an environment of real democracy, in a civil society where the government is accountable to the people, and the people are not afraid to take the initiative. Some would object to this, saying that we cannot afford to "loosen the reins," that what Russia needs is not more democratic experiments but strong authority and a "firm hand." But strong authority without real support from the people can be impotent. Putin received support because he correctly identified what people wanted - restoring stability and rebuilding the Russian state. We are now facing even more daunting, truly historic tasks, and to accomplish them we need a new level of feedback between the state and society. Which brings me to the point I have been making again and again: To have an effective system of governance, we must reform our election system. Not just by tinkering with it, but by making major changes in the mechanisms of presidential and parliamentary elections and in the election of governors. As the first priority, I suggest a return to a mixed system of parliamentary elections, so people may vote both for party lists and for individual candidates. People must be sure that their chosen deputy will work for them. After December's Duma elections, 113 leading candidates from the lists of the winning parties ceded their mandates to little known surrogates. One-hundred and thirteen - that's a quarter of those elected! Voters deserve more respect. I believe that the threshold for a party's passage to the State Duma should be lowered from 7 percent to 5 percent, where it was in the 2003 elections, before the legislation was changed in 2006. The governors must again be elected in a popular vote, instead of the president's choice being approved by regional legislatures. The election campaign included some discussion of Russia's foreign policy. It is now recognized that in recent years Russia has in large part rebuilt its international standing. With that comes even more responsibility - but also a need to reconsider our positions on some issues as well as our foreign policy style. Russia's partners, too, need to do more to achieve mutual understanding. Some of them, instead of objective analysis, insist on blaming Russia for problems real and imagined. And some Western media have become obsessed with anti-Russian stereotypes and wholesale criticism of our country. To this I respond: Our people are more democratic than you think, despite the vicissitudes of Russia's history. This nation endured 250 years of Mongol domination, followed by serfdom under the tsars and decades of life without freedom under the communists. But our people can learn from their past. They will make the right choices - what to accept and what to reject. This will take time, but Russia has only one future - democracy.

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Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, is president of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies.

FUENTE: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/04/opinion/edgorbachev.php

RUSSIA'S NEW PRESIDENT: A PUTIN-SHAPED THRONE The Economist, 06/03/2008, (http://www.economist.com) Uncertainty surrounds Dmitry Medvedev's rise to power OVER the past few weeks Russians have been treated to an election show with all the trimmings: televised political discussion, opinion polls and live coverage of the votes coming in. The only missing bit was the election itself. The real selection of Dmitry Medvedev took place last December, when Vladimir Putin announced him as his successor, while promising also to become Russia's next prime minister. The balloting on March 2nd, when 70% of voters endorsed Mr Putin's choice, was mere ritual. It was not so much the election that was rigged (though figures were massaged), but the whole political process leading up to it. Had Mr Putin picked anyone else, the result would have been the same, for this was his election. On the night, Mr Putin and his protégé walked on to a concert stage in Red Square. Mr Medvedev, wearing jeans and a leather jacket, tried his best to sound cool and victorious. Then Mr Putin took the microphone and the audience erupted, chanting his name. So who will really be in charge of Russia? Many Western politicians hope that Mr Medvedev will, with time, become friendlier to them, and even to his own people. But apart from some liberal rhetoric about freedom and the rule of law, Mr Medvedev has done little to justify such expectations. Indeed, he has gone out of his way to stress continuity with Mr Putin's policies. Two post-election events seem to confirm his pledge. First, Gazprom, Russia's gas giant, which Mr Medvedev has chaired since 2000, briefly reduced its gas supply to Ukraine this week, conjuring up memories of a gas war two years ago. Gazprom insists that the dispute was purely commercial, but its timing was surely not. The second was the violent suppression of a protest in Moscow and the detention of a liberal politician in St Petersburg. The arrest gave new meaning to law enforcement. Maksim Reznik, an activist of the liberal Yabloko party, came out of his office, saw a street squabble between a colleague and a group of thugs, and tried to pull them apart. When the police arrived, they arrested Mr Reznik and let the provocateurs go. Mr Reznik is now in pre-trial detention for two months, charged with assaulting representatives of the state. Neither Mr Reznik nor a small and unarmed group of protesters in Moscow pose any threat to the Kremlin. The only possible explanation for its overreaction is that it was a deliberate show of force. The most frequently cited reason for optimism about Mr Medvedev is that he was not, like Mr Putin, a member of the KGB. But the danger is that Mr Medvedev might try to compensate for his perceived liberalism by being even more ruthless than his predecessor. It is easier to look tough by beating up a few opposition leaders than taking on the security men. Even if Mr Medvedev has liberal instincts, he has no independent power base and is certainly more of a team player than a maverick. This means he will only be as liberal as Mr Putin and the system will allow him to be, at least for now. Another question, less discussed, is not how much independent power Mr Putin will grant his successor, but how much of it Mr Putin actually wields. Neither dictatorship nor democracy, Mr Putin's system is dysfunctional. Yulia Latynina, a Russian commentator, argues that his wishes have often not been carried out, particularly when they have run against the interests of other Kremlin clans. Mr Putin is certainly responsible for political developments in Russia, but he may be a hostage of the system he created: “If a drunken driver crashes a car, he is responsible for it,” says Ms Latynina, “but it does not mean he is in control of it.”

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Mr Putin chose his successor not because he was deemed to be a liberal, but because he was a compromise figure, second best to Mr Putin staying in power. As one Russian official put, it is one thing to become president in Russia. Leaving the post alive is quite another. FUENTE: http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10808981

FEELING OF VERTICAL SATISFACTION Pavel Voshanov, Novaya Gazeta, 07/03/2008, (http://en.novayagazeta.ru) In the country of controlled opinions every institution has its own function, and the common function is playing up to the Kremlin Till yesterday Russia had elected the head of state four times. This is what we can call a kind of experience. But what happened on the fifth occasion just goes beyond any limits. It’s not only because that majority of Russians gave their vote for the candidate who had the weightiest vote, defining everything and making all that just ridiculous. The uniqueness of the last campaign is that nothing was really promised for the first time in our post-soviet history. Medvedev only assured that he would follow the “Putin’s course” in all the aspects of his activities. In the mean time, his rivals argued with obvious apathy among themselves about their own ways. Never before had we had such a dull election campaign. Well, one can say we have had a sort of election and elected a sort of a president. There are two kinds of politics in Russia, one protecting the Kremlin and the other struggling with it. The relations between those two sometimes aggravate very sharply nearly coming out of decency limits. But “luckily” for us, there is the third force, the almighty Kremlin, the force for which those two were created. Every time the Kremlin settles the conflicts leaving no one out. And everyone seems to be content. It happens to be difficult to judge if this or that party’s Mr. Big is “for” or “against”. Politics in Russia has become a kind of business which main function is to render services to the Kremlin. When it is needed to secure one’s left flank or right flank, the Kremlin just pays for relevant spoiler servicing. Every time there’s a lot of those willing to execute any responsible political order, as every political group needs proper financing. This past presidential campaign was also made according to the “equal terms” principle. Long before 2 March the authority presented Medvedev as the future president and his opponents were allowed – as compensation – mere imitating struggle with political course by Putin. While Medvedev was making a tour around the country, getting used to his new image, his opponents were playing diligently the part of garnish which is always left untouched on the plate. Actually, it wasn’t even garnish; it looked like bamboo leaves on a Japanese dish, placed there just for decoration purposes. Unfortunately, big policy is impossible in Russia without big money. Is it good or bad? Actually, all the countries are featured with similar rule. Our trouble is of different kind: today’s Russia has no capital uncontrolled by the Kremlin. When the opposition manages to find a political sponsor, he is immediately summoned to the Kremlin and is asked a question “What is dearer to you, those babblers or your profile business?” Of course, those sane choose retaining their businesses. This way it turns out that the fighters for “people’s trust mandates” have no choice but going to the Kremlin to agree about terms and prices. Good bowing and scraping is the key to success. Such is the slogan of today’s Russian politics of both mentioned above kinds. All of them come at the first summons and eat out of the authority’s hands. Everyone wants to have as much as possible as no one knows when one will be invited next time. How and when did it happen that we came to such an ugly configuration? And we used to have real political struggle. If one looked back and took the Yeltsin’s “I’m leaving. I’ve done my best” as the reference point, one would see the successive steps by Putin leading his team to the current role of the “regnant” family, “family 2”, that replaced the Yeltsin’s one. Clearly, everyone is concerned about one’s own grief, but I must say that degradation of the Russian democracy began with the media. After exchange of control of NTV station for Mr. Gusinsky’s freedom, all other non-government TV stations just collapsed as no wealthy people wanted to get engaged in such a risky business. Gaining control over the advertising market, the authority reduced the number of copies of the independent press to insignificant figures. Radio broadcasting underwent so many licensing restrictions and regulations that radio stations can survive only broadcasting music and

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nothing else. What happened to the press in the regions is just outrageous. It found itself to be under doubled yoke: one exercised by the local bureaucracy and the other made by federal officials. What a Russian journalist has turned into? No respect, no money, no prospects. Those who managed to fulfill themselves in other spheres, they just left the profession. Mass drift began, and during 10-15 years the press lost the best workers and most experienced ones. Appearing vacuum was filled with rollicking dilettantes who was only able to entertain the public. The country got overfilled with the glamour. What happens to the society when the independent press disappears? It gets deaf and blind. It turns gradually into content-with-all population. This is what happened to us. The other day I talked to an old acquaintance of mine, an engineer at one of the large plants in the city of Vladimir. He seemed to be just happy about Putin’s wish to increase labor productivity in Russia with the factor of 4! Any objections of mine were perceived by him almost as an insult. And that man is quite clever and is used to think logically. What has happened to him? This is a kind of social blindness: he admires Putin’s today which was created in Yeltsin’s yesterday. Like millions of others having suffered much and having had nothing out of the “radical reforms” he was happy with all the previous undertakings of the current authority. There were many promises then like doubling GDP in 10 years, administrative reforms with significant reduction of the apparatus, overtaking Portugal in terms of standards of life, eliminating of the orphanage, revival of the mass physical culture movement, and housing and communal sector reforming. What has been really done out of that above mentioned? Nothing. And some aspects have become even worse. The number of officials has increased, while the struggle with poverty resulted in increased number of domestic billionaires. Has anyone laid the blame on the authority’s shoulders for promising the moon? Probably people murmur in their kitchens, but there is no large public protests made. Absolute majority is generally content and even if they blame someone, that’s not the president. At the beginning of our way to the market, citizens were promised that soon all of them would become wealthy. That didn’t happen. Who was nobody, stayed nobody. And again, like it was at the beginning of the last century, the poor got to dislike the rich. And 10 years ago they were put an idea in their heads that rich people are oligarchs who had seized the power and robbed the entire country. Oligarchs of different levels appeared in peoples’ mind – federal, regional, municipal, rural. The appeal “Away with oligarchs’ rule!” got in great demand. This appeal was adopted by the standing president as soon as he got control over the press. All what happened further was associated in the average Russian citizen’s mind with the combat allegedly carried out by Putin against “bloodsuckers”: — the authority, especially its financial and enforcement structures were filled with presidential friends and acquaintances: “One must go to battle being supported by those one can trust to!”; — highly remunerative companies got to be headed by Putin’s acquaintances, and people said “Putin does not trust aliens as they may embezzle everything!”; — reliable “St Petersburg’s people” were sent to supervise investigative bodies and federal courts as “everything is so corrupted there that Putin has no other choice!” The list of the Kremlin’s “innovations” approved by society can be continued. One may mention, for example, giving up elections of the regional heads, restrictions put on the non-government organizations, strict regulation of the street actions, investing the police with more powers for repressing disturbances. Incidentally, now any police sergeant has the right to decide on his own if something can be recognized a disturbance. All that is justified with virtual combat against oligarchs and terrorism. Terrorism seeming to be defeated, the oligarchs are still waiting in the wings! So it’s too early to replace top officials. “Never swap horses while crossing the stream”. Awakening will come later, and probably it will be quite painful. But at the moment it’s just impossible to convince the nation (at least its major part) that the political construction made by Putin is exactly the oligarchy in its logical completeness. The power and the capital are controlled by same people – what other arguments do you need? Yeltsin laid the foundation of the domestic oligarchy, and Putin built the walls and the roof. Probably, his successor will be engaged in finishing works. It is very likely to be so. What is more terrible than corruption? That’s the legalized corruption. Never before have had the officials of the top level such an easy and legal access to the money of the largest commercial companies.

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The Russian bureaucratic organism is getting ail due to the lack of inflow of the fresh blood. “Petersburg’s pack” has been shuffled so many times that it just got worn. With the time, the Kremlin’s personnel decisions seem to be more and more ridiculous. Striking is the principle “no matter who, but it must be our man”. There are many examples, but the brightest among them is the furniture seller becoming the defense minister in the country possessing nuclear weapons. And the worst is still to come. Next president Medvedev also has a lot of acquaintances standing at the Kremlin’s approaches: people he studied with, went for lifting weights, business partners, and colleagues in the St Petersburg’s city hall. No one doubted Medvedev’s “brilliant” victory at the past election. But many doubt if this victory would bring any improvements. It’s not because the successor is weaker than his predecessor, or they both may get confused about who of them is the boss now. The problem is that clan systems have never been longlasting before. So what is proposed to us instead of “standard” democracy? It’s a sort of political surrogate, a mix of formal democracy and quite real authoritarianism, rather poor, though. If we peel all the gibberish off it, we shall see its essence to be a governable succession to the throne. What would it mean? The standing president chooses someone from his entourage to become the new president, and the population confirms his choice with formal voting. That’s all. Russians didn’t have to puzzle over problems similar to those Americans have – Obama or Clinton, democrat or republican? We don’t like such unpredictability. Medvedev was announced, so it had to be him to become president. The press secured the governable love for the successor. The church secured for the governable belief in his piety. The Public Chamber provided for the governable opinion by “the people masses”. The Central Elective Commission provided for governable campaigning intrigue. And the system-belonging opposition provided for governable indignation about perverted democracy. Everyone just performed one’s part with the common strategic objective being playing up to the Kremlin. While the supporters fell down in adoration to the new master, the adversaries “only” kowtowed. Amazingly, they managed not to lose their dignity with that. Why? The matter is that the “tow” pose is politically universal. Keeping it one can knit one’s brows and even spit with abomination – no one would notice it standing on the Kremlin’s wall. Noticeable from there are only backs obediently exposed to the master’s lash. Very convenient. FUENTE: http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/15/06.html

DEMOCRACY IS ILL SERVED BY ITS SELF-APPOINTED GUARDIANS Simon Jenkins, Guardian, 05/03/2008, (http://www.guardian.co.uk) Our sonorous moralising lies behind so much bloodshed in the past 50 years. A sense of history surely counsels humility. This week's Russian elections were "limited" and "less than free and fair", according to western monitors. The last elections in Iraq, by contrast, were "a triumph for democracy". The forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe and Iran have been pre-emptively dismissed as a travesty. Those in Pakistan were, by general consent, an affirmation of freedom. Democracies are like two-year-olds: adorable when they belong to you, but you never see them as others do. Downing Street had a problem with the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, since the procedure by which he was chosen was little short of feudal. Yet Gordon Brown could hardly slap him on the back as the victor in some great electoral tourney. Medvedev might hit back with a joke about western leaders also being slid into office by friends and predecessors - and at least he had an election of sorts. The British prime minister wisely muttered something noncommittal and put down the phone. We are in the midst of an astonishing festival of elections in countries as diverse as Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Taiwan, Kenya, Georgia, Armenia, Cyprus, Thailand, Serbia, Zimbabwe, Spain and Italy. And then there is the daddy of them all, America's primaries. Only one generalisation can be made of them, that no generalisation applies. Democracy is the new Christianity. It is the chosen faith of western civilisation, and carrying it abroad is the acceptable face of the Crusader spirit. In reinterpreting Tony Blair's interventionism, the foreign secretary, David Miliband, spoke recently of the west's "mission" to promote democracy, even by economic and military warfare. With his eyes fixed on Iraq and Afghanistan, Miliband contrived both to assert that "we cannot impose democratic norms" and then demand that we do just that.

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The truth is that neither Blair nor Miliband, nor the rest of us, has any idea of what we are about. We expect far too much of democracy, and of others who claim to espouse it. We treat it as a rigid set of rules from which no wavering is tolerable. The ballot is a sacred rite and any contamination is blasphemy. We incant the Nicene creed when we should stick to the Sermon on the Mount. Let us upend the customary analysis. At one extreme stands an ideal: democracy as the full table d'hôte of secret ballots, civil rights, a free press, freedom of assembly, balance of power and discretionary local government. It applies in pathetically few states, even in the supposedly democratic west. Menken reasonably dismissed it as "a dream, to be put in the same category as Arcadia, Santa Claus and Heaven". At the other, more crowded extreme is a rough and ready electoral process exerting some form of restraint on a ruling elite. One of Africa's nastiest dictators, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, regards as a genuine threat the electoral challenge of his former finance minister, Simba Makoni, in an election Mugabe feels he cannot avoid. In Kenya what is significant is not that the leadership rigged an election but that the outcome was denied popular consent, and order collapsed as a result. The same happened in Serbia in 2000. Even Hugo Chávez, hero of Venezuela, had to concede defeat last autumn after a referendum denied his bid to rule for life. Likewise Pakistan's military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, felt obliged to hold reasonably open elections, despite the likelihood that they would lead to his downfall. In Iran, thoroughly polluted elections still threaten to undermine the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is milking the popularity bonanza America has handed him in Iraq. In all these cases some ideal of democracy is exerting its mystic force. Even where consent is presumed, as in Russia, the ballot is the ghost in the machine. It is the ultimate legitimiser, the point to which all power aspires and from which it measures its own backsliding. Russia's elections were imperfect, their casual and crude corruption by Vladimir Putin yet another way of displaying his autocratic machismo. He may have failed to live up to the standards the west "expects". But he appears to have correctly read the mood of his people, who simply want a strong hand on the wheel for as long as possible. I cannot see what purpose is therefore served by hurling abuse at these states. Russia's path to political emancipation is tentative, if not in reverse. That country has never ticked more than a handful of democracy's boxes, yet is still incomparably freer than under communism. Its pastiche of monopoly capitalism - Putin's "managed democracy" - so contrasts with the chaos of the 1990s that even sophisticated Russians tell western interviewers that they would happily buy stability and discipline at the expense of another such gamble. We can tell them they are wrong until the cows come home. But we did not live in Russia in the 1990s. Western leaders, as they beat a cringing path to the door of China's dictators, buy this argument from Beijing. Why do they expect Moscow to behave differently? The famous "raising of human rights issues" by western visitors to China, before talking hard cash, now has the familiarity of a tea ceremony. It is these same leaders who, having destroyed order in Iraq and Afghanistan, hail them as democracies when in reality they are anarchies, failed states. To vote for a ruler in a fortress is not to participate in a democracy. There is just no point in the sonorous moralising of western NGOs characterised by the (normally admirable) Human Rights Watch. It complains that "by allowing autocrats to pose as democrats, without demanding they uphold the civil and political rights that make democracy meaningful, influential democrats risk undermining human rights". What are these words "allowing ... demanding ... undermining"? Their major premise is not just western superiority, to which I might subscribe, but western potency and, most extraordinary (and illegal), a western right to global sovereignty. The assumption behind "demand" has lain at the root of so much useless bloodshed over the past half century that a sense of history might surely counsel humility. And this from a Europe whose rulers in Brussels propose using opinion polls as the basis for their legislative legitimacy, without a peep of complaint from democracy's self-appointed guardians. Democracy is an invitation to hypocrisy. Let us practise it ourselves and, if we must preach, preach by example.

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FUENTE: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/05/russia.iran

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ELECCIONES EN RUSIA 2008- ¿QUIÉN ES MEDVEDEV? Medvedev, Le Gentil Héros Que Le Kremlin Se Fabrique http://www.lefigaro.fr (28/01/2008) Putin’s Anointed Heir Shows Hints of Less Icy Style www.nytimes.com (28/02/2008) Medvedev Sous L'œil Des Réseaux De Poutine http://www.lefigaro.fr (29/02/2008) Medvedev, Da Gazprom Al Cremlino http://corriere.it (02/03/2008)

MEDVEDEV, LE GENTIL HÉROS QUE LE KREMLIN SE FABRIQUE Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, 28/01/2008, (http://www.lefigaro.fr)

C'est désormais officiel, Dmitri Medvedev, le dauphin de Vladimir Poutine, archifavori de l'élection présidentielle russe du 2 mars, n'affrontera aucun opposant libéral. La commission électorale a rejeté hier la candidature de Mikhaïl Kassianov au motif qu'il n'a pas présenté deux millions de signatures valables. Kassianov, qui fut le premier ministre de Poutine de 2000 à 2004, a appelé au boycottage du scrutin. Dmitri Medvedev n'aura que trois adversaires : le communiste Ziouganov, le nationaliste Jirinovski, et le «démocrate » inconnu Bogdanov. Portrait du futur maître du Kremlin. Sur deux pages du quotidien populaire Tvoï Den, Valentina, la vieille enseignante de Saint-Pétersbourg, raconte comment son ancien élève Dmitri Medvedev l'a sauvée par le passé d'une «grave maladie» en payant l'opération de ses deniers. Depuis que le premier vice-premier ministre russe, Dmitri Anatolievitch Medvedev, a déposé, mi-décembre, sa candidature officielle à l'élection présidentielle, la machine médiatique à façonner le nouveau héros national tourne à plein régime. Il est un autre sauvetage, beaucoup moins médiatisé, qui expliquerait l'ascension spectaculaire de ce terne juriste de 42 ans. L'histoire se situe là encore à Saint-Pétersbourg, en 1992. Le premier adjoint au maire, un certain Vladimir Poutine, est mêlé à un scandale financier. Une commission du parlement local le soupçonne, comme d'autres fonctionnaires, de s'être enrichi sur le dos d'un marché de troc, en pleine pénurie alimentaire. Une enquête judiciaire est ouverte. Les poursuites seront abandonnées. «C'est Medvedev, jeune juriste de la mairie, qui a sauvé Poutine en trouvant des failles juridiques au dossier», raconte Alexei Moukhine, politologue, auteur de livres sur les élites de la Russie. «Difficile de dire si Poutine s'est vraiment enrichi. Mais il a eu la légèreté de signer des documents qu'il n'aurait pas dû signer », poursuit l'expert. Reconnaissant et impressionné par les qualités professionnelles de Medvedev, Poutine l'appellera à le suivre au Kremlin. Entre 1996, date du départ de Poutine pour Moscou, et 1999, Medvedev fait une incursion formatrice dans le privé, au sein de l'entreprise de bois Ilim Pulp. Propulsé à la tête du conseil d'administration de Gazprom en 2000, chef de l'administration présidentielle en 2003, Medvedev était inconnu du public jusqu'à sa nomination en tant que premier vice-premier ministre fin 2005. «En tant que subordonné, Dmitri Medvedev est un fonctionnaire génial, une véritable aubaine pour n'importe quel système», commente Andrei Jeldak, un psychologue sollicité par le quotidien Nezavissimaïa Gazeta. Les éloges pleuvent sur ce fort en thème, fils d'enseignants, «travailleur acharné», «hyperefficace». Mais comme chef? Les avis divergent. Certains observateurs estiment qu'en tant que président du conseil d'administration de Gazprom, Medvedev prend tous ses ordres de Vladimir Poutine qui connaît par cœur le diamètre du moindre gazoduc. D'autres jurent qu'il s'est imposé comme dirigeant du géant gazier, notamment sur son secteur financier. Il exercerait son autorité, à l'écoute des autres, sans jamais un mot de trop. Pourtant, diagnostique le psychologue Jeldak, «l'autocontrôle permanent peut engendrer des crises de nerfs». De fait, Dmitri Anatolievitch se montrerait en réalité «capricieux», voire «injurieux», confirme un ancien collaborateur qui se cache derrière l'anonymat. Au Kremlin, on l'a surnommé «le vizir», assure le politologue Alexei Moukhine. Voire le «grand vizir», un clin d'œil perfide à sa petite taille. De l'avis d'un ancien collaborateur, son mètre soixante-deux le

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complexerait terriblement. En plus des chaussures à talonnettes, des cadrages complaisants en légère contre-plongée permettent de modérer ce handicap à la télévision. Des détails importants lorsque l'on sait qu'entre le 20 décembre et le 13 janvier, les chaînes nationales lui ont consacré 12 h 18 minutes d'antenne (contre 3 h 23 et 2 heures à ses adversaires Jirinovski et Ziouganov). C'est ainsi que l'on a vu Dmitri Medvedev féliciter la maman d'un nouveau-né dans un modeste appartement, aux côtés du patriarche orthodoxe Alexis II ou écouter des marins de Mourmansk. Logement, santé, famille, pouvoir d'achat, tels sont ses thèmes phares de campagne. Dans la mise en scène quotidienne, Medvedev ne cherche pas à tout prix à singer Vladimir Poutine. Difficile de l'imaginer à cheval, aux commandes d'un MiG ou affichant ses pectoraux. Et pourtant, son visage poupin des années 2000 s'est allongé. Et le dauphin aux épaules étroites, en veste cintrée, assure nager deux fois un kilomètre et demi par jour. Malgré les efforts du candidat, «il est difficile de trouver une personne plus terne sur la scène politique russe», résume Elena Koneva, experte des médias. Une dose de glamour pourrait venir de son épouse Svetlana, mère de son fils unique de 12 ans. Cette élégante blonde aux formes généreuses organise des défilés de mode, tout en dirigeant un projet éducatif soutenu par l'Église orthodoxe. Difficile de cerner les authentiques convictions du futur président volontiers présenté comme «libéral», tant il sait se montrer prudent. La semaine dernière, dans la vaste salle d'exposition du Manège, au pied des murailles du Kremlin, devant un parterre d'associations politiquement correctes, Medvedev s'en est vivement pris à la corruption «au sein même des organes de l'État » à une «échelle gigantesque», qualifiant la Russie de pays du «nihilisme légal». Ce latiniste distingué est «spécialiste du droit romain. Cela influence la façon de penser, de réfléchir», commente Vladimir Rijkov, ex-député d'opposition libérale. Stanislav Belkovski, un ancien collaborateur du président, qui dénonce depuis deux ans l'enrichissement personnel de Poutine, n'est guère convaincu par les élans démocratiques de Medvedev. «Il a la même philosophie que Poutine : il croit en la toute-puissance de l'argent.» Le président du conseil d'administration de Gazprom est-il assis sur un tas d'or ? Que nenni ! À en croire sa déclaration de patrimoine publiée la semaine dernière, le modeste «Dima» ne possède même pas d'automobile. Le foyer n'a que la vieille Golf de madame. Quant à ses revenus officiels : environ 4 100 € par mois, le salaire d'un cadre russe dans une entreprise étrangère. Comment s'est-il offert son luxueux appartement de 367 m² ? Pas un citoyen russe n'est dupe, mais le juriste Medvedev n'est certainement pas hors la loi. Le droit russe permet aux sociétés de ne pas dévoiler leur actionnariat, et la pratique des sociétés écrans offshore, immatriculées aux îles Vierges ou à Chypre, est un sport national pour les millionnaires. L'issue du scrutin ne faisant aucun doute, les kremlinologues phosphorent sur la question suivante : le prochain président sera-t-il une marionnette aux mains de Vladimir Poutine, que ce dernier devienne ou non son premier ministre comme il l'a annoncé ? S'imposera-t-il face aux hommes des services et des forces armées ? Pour la consultante Elena Koneva, Medvedev offre «plutôt l'image d'un numéro un suisse ou danois», assez éloigné de «l'esprit russe». «Chez nous, c'est la force qui est appréciée.» Dmitri Medvedev souhaite peut-être faire mentir ce cliché historique, à moins que ne sommeille en lui un ours, qui se dit en russe : «medved».

FUENTE: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/01/28/01003-20080128ARTFIG00357-medvedev-legentil-heros-que-le-kremlin-se-fabrique.php

MEDVEDEV SOUS L'ŒIL DES RÉSEAUX DE POUTINE Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, 29/02/2008, (http://www.lefigaro.fr) Le nouveau président russe, qui doit être élu dimanche, pourra s'appuyer sur un cercle de juristes de Saint-Pétersbourg, de cadres de Gazprom et de fonctionnaires du Kremlin, fidèles au président sortant qui gardera la haute main sur les nominations. C'est le paradoxe de cette élection présidentielle russe : le suspense est nul, et pourtant, comme le souligne un diplomate occidental en poste à Moscou, la période qui s'ouvre dimanche est lourde d'incertitudes. Le fonctionnement du tandem inédit, Dmitri Medvedev, vice-premier ministre appelé à devenir bientôt président, et Vladimir Poutine, président qui va devenir premier ministre, est au centre des interrogations. La réponse dépendra en partie des personnes sur lesquelles le futur chef de l'État s'appuiera pour diriger le pays.

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À 42 ans, Dmitri Medvedev a fait sa fulgurante carrière dans l'ombre de Vladimir Poutine, originaire comme lui de Saint-Pétersbourg. Aussi, ses réseaux se confondent-ils en partie avec ceux de son patron. Il peut néanmoins s'appuyer sur une garde rapprochée constituée d'«obligés», selon une typologie établie par le Centre de la conjoncture politique, cité hier par le quotidien Vedomosti. Ce premier cercle est constitué essentiellement par des Pétersbourgeois. Anton Ivanov, président de la cour d'arbitrage, et Nikolaï Vinnitchenko, chef du service fédéral des huissiers, sont des camarades de l'université de droit de Leningrad. Avec Alexandre Konovalov, représentant du Kremlin pour la «superrégion» de la Volga, et Oleg Koutafin, de l'association des juristes de Russie, ils pourraient, selon Vedomosti, être promus à des postes clefs. Soutien de milliardaires loyaux Au premier cercle s'ajoutent des hommes d'influence que le Centre de la conjoncture politique a baptisés les «alliés». Rouages essentiels de l'administration présidentielle (que Dmitri Medvedev a dirigée, au début de l'ère Poutine) ou oligarques, ils auraient pris parti pour Medvedev lorsque Vladimir Poutine hésitait encore sur la désignation de son dauphin. Sergueï Sobianin, le chef de l'administration présidentielle, et Vladislav Sourkov, son adjoint, présenté comme l'idéologue influent du Kremlin, soutiennent activement le futur président. Alexeï Miller, le patron de Gazprom, dont Medvedev préside le conseil d'administration, compte parmi les alliés, comme Alicher Ousmanov, qui dirige le bras financier de Gazprom, Gazprominvestholding. Ainsi que les milliardaires loyaux tels que Roman Abramovitch (patron du club de football de Chelsea à Londres et gouverneur de la province sibérienne de Tchoukotka) ou Oleg Deripaska (le roi de l'aluminium). Un troisième cercle est composé de soutiens qui ont œuvré en coulisses pendant la campagne pour installer leur champion dans son fauteuil de président. Cette équipe compte elle aussi des piliers de l'actuel Kremlin : Alexeï Gromov, le porte-parole de Vladimir Poutine, ou Igor Chouvalov, «sherpa» du président pour le G8. Pour tenter de percer l'opacité qui enveloppe le Kremlin, chaque expert y va de sa typologie. Olga Krychtanovskaya, du Centre d'études des élites, préfère classer les réseaux Medvedev en trois groupes principaux : les juristes, le plus souvent issus de Saint-Pétersbourg ; les cadres de Gazprom et les hommes du Kremlin, dont certains sont devenus ministres. À l'inverse de la Ve République où le premier ministre ne procède à aucune nomination importante sans l'aval du président, le président Medvedev ne placera personne à des postes stratégiques sans l'accord de son premier ministre Poutine, pronostique Boris Makarenko, du Centre des techniques politiques. Pour maintenir l'appareil du pouvoir sous contrôle, Vladimir Poutine ne devrait pas autoriser beaucoup de mouvements au sein de l'administration présidentielle, croit savoir un haut fonctionnaire cité par Vedomosti. Une manière de dire que les fameux «silovikis», les hommes du FSB et des forces de sécurité, ne devraient pas être écartés de sitôt.

FUENTE: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/03/01/01003-20080301ARTFIG00101-medvedev-sousl-il-des-reseaux-de-poutine-.php

PUTIN’S ANOINTED HEIR SHOWS HINTS OF LESS ICY STYLE C.J Chivers, 28/02/2008, New York Times, (www.nytimes.com) ALABINO, Russia — Dmitri A. Medvedev, the man chosen to be the next Russian president, sat surrounded by soldiers. It was Feb. 23, Defenders of the Motherland Day, and Mr. Medvedev had traveled to the parade grounds of the Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division outside Moscow. The division has long been a fixture of Russian political life. Its battalions have marched for decades in formation in Red Square. Eight years ago, as President Vladimir V. Putin introduced himself to the world, its platoons fought for the capital of Chechnya, helping to forge Mr. Putin’s persona as a leader of icy resolve. Now, Mr. Medvedev, the presidential successor personally selected by Mr. Putin, is creating his own public identity according to a choreographed script. And here, in a mix of Soviet and Russian symbols, the man rising to Kremlin power avoided the stern themes that have often accompanied Mr. Putin’s appearances. He wanted to talk about living conditions, for soldiers and civilians alike. “Let’s talk about the problems that exist,” he said to the soldiers beside him before a bank of television cameras. “Let’s have a normal conversation. Please.” The outcome of the monthlong presidential campaign, which culminates Sunday, when voters will cast ballots, is already known. Barring something extraordinary and unforeseen, Mr. Medvedev, 42, an

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unprepossessing bureaucrat who has never held an elected office, will win by a landslide and become the Kremlin’s new leader. Mr. Medvedev, who lacks the imposing K.G.B. résumé of his sponsor, has said he will appoint Mr. Putin as his prime minister. As he has become the country’s second most-watched man, he has implicitly presented himself as both a Putin loyalist and a president-in-waiting who will wield power in a manner more gentle than the world has seen under Mr. Putin’s brand of rule. Whether this is a pose is an open question. Mr. Medvedev, in commentary outside of official Russian circles, has been cast as a puppet, a president who will labor according to Mr. Putin’s command. But he has made unanticipated moves. In a speech on Feb. 15, he said liberty was necessary for the state to have legitimacy among its citizens. And he has laid out domestic policy goals in what seems like a communiqué to Russia’s expanding consumer class. Mr. Medvedev has also struck a campy pose — hamming it up with Deep Purple, the British heavy metal band whose music was popular in Soviet times — that suggested a dormitory-life playfulness that is decidedly not Putinesque. His words and behavior have raised unexpected but pervasive questions. Does Mr. Medvedev mean what he seems to say? Can he ease the grip on Russian political life that has been a central characteristic of Mr. Putin’s rule? And if he does, will he clash with Mr. Putin, his principal source of power? Analysts are split. Michael A. McFaul, director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, said Mr. Medvedev had a more Western orientation than many Kremlin insiders. But he suggested that his official embrace of freedom was more packaging than substance. “That’s public relations,” he said. “That’s not strategic shift.” Sergei Markov, a political scientist who is close to the Kremlin and a member of Parliament, said Mr. Medvedev, a lawyer with roots in St. Petersburg, had an affinity for the West. He expects that Mr. Medvedev will push for more political freedom, to a point. “Medvedev will try to encourage political competition within the system without destabilizing the system,” he said. “How he does this, we will see. But I think stability will be the priority.” He also said the model Mr. Putin had chosen for his transition from Russia’s highest office, and Mr. Medvedev’s flashes of liberal inclinations, could lead to unintended divides in Russia’s circles of power. That, he said, is a reason Mr. Medvedev will push only so far. “The Russian government has weak institutions,” Mr. Markov said. “A split between two personalities could destabilize the political situation, and because politics plays a main role in the Russian economy, if there is a split it could destabilize the economy, too. So that is a major risk.” As Russians and analysts contemplate the future with Mr. Putin out of the presidency, the contrasts between him and the president-to-be, and between the Kremlin’s latest words and its recent history, are visible in many ways, no less than in the very context of the discussion. The election season here is not an election season as a Westerner would understand it. It is a certification. Mr. Medvedev, who is a first deputy prime minister and chairman of the board at Gazprom, Russia’s gas monopoly, has toured the country without the distractions of competition, in part because the government blocked the sole true opposition candidate from the ballot. There are three other candidates: Gennadi A. Zyuganov, the Communist Party leader, who has been marginalized in part by Mr. Putin’s popularity and his mastery of Soviet nostalgia; Andrei V. Bogdanov, the almost unknown head of an even less powerful Democratic Party; and Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, an ultranationalist who has served as an unofficial jester in the Kremlin’s court. The remnants of the organized opposition have suggested that these candidates are a troika encouraged to run by the Kremlin to create the appearance of a race. Polls predict that they may capture as little as a combined 20 percent of the vote.

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With no viable candidate to compete against, the Kremlin has used the prelude to the formalities of inauguration to introduce a new leader. Mr. Medvedev, who emanates intelligence and calm but little intensity, is one step short of supreme; only Mr. Putin remains above him. State-controlled television covers him extensively and warmly. There is little public contest over ideas about Russia’s course, much less questioning of Mr. Medvedev’s qualifications to be the next leader of a country with 140 million people, a nuclear arsenal and the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. Instead, Mr. Medvedev has used the campaign as an open microphone, outlining an agenda to make Russia — which has rebounded from the financial crisis of the 1990s but has enduring problems with infrastructure, public health, corruption and an economy that relies on resource extraction — a vibrant and economically diversified state. He has promised to improve schools, build housing, encourage business and amend the tax code in ways that will encourage household and social stability, including offering tax breaks for retirement savings, charitable donations and education and medical costs. Changes, he says, are on the way. He has said he will modify the health care system to allow more choice. And he has challenged the persistent sense that Russia’s government, whose bureaucracy has expanded under Mr. Putin and remained inefficient and corrupt, is inevitably elephantine and beyond the ability of citizens to change. Much of his agenda overlaps domestic plans Mr. Putin has himself outlined, including fighting corruption and reversing Russia’s poor state of public health But the differences between the men’s styles can be stark. When Mr. Medvedev arrived to meet the soldiers here, he had to walk past a huge banner that bore Mr. Putin’s face beside scenes of weapons and combat. “The work of a real man — to defend homeland, family and loved ones,” the banner read. Mr. Putin, an exercise buff and martial arts expert, can emanate a catlike fitness and a comfort with conflict. Mr. Medvedev is trim but has no similar aura. He walked briskly by the poster, looking at the ground. Unlike Mr. Putin, Mr. Medvedev, in most of his appearances, has also avoided dwelling on foreign policy or Russia’s tensions with the West. Western capitals are hoping for a shift from Mr. Putin’s assertiveness. But aside from a statement of support for Serbia and a refusal to recognize Kosovo, Mr. Medvedev has not offered point-by-point proposals of how he will manage Russia’s role in the world. Few analysts expect significant changes. “Personalities change, but that doesn’t change a nation’s interests,” said Boris Kagarlitsky, director of the Institution for Globalization Studies and Social Movements in Moscow. Mr. McFaul, of Stanford, said he also expected the United States and Russia to still face diplomatic difficulties when Mr. Medvedev moves to the Kremlin, no matter what his inclinations may be. “He’s more pro-Western, and more Western in his attitudes, than any of the other candidates out there,” he added. “Having said that, he is weak.” One senior Western diplomat said that those following Russia closely have come up with a possible test of whether Mr. Medvedev will marshal power. In the summer, the Kremlin will send a delegation to the Group of 8 meeting in Japan. Already informal bets are being taken, he said. Will Mr. Putin attend, or Mr. Medvedev, or both? FUENTE: www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/world/europe/28medvedev.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20 Territories/Russia

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MEDVEDEV, DA GAZPROM AL CREMLINO Corriere, 02/03/2008, (http://corriere.it) A soli 42 anni sale al comando della Russia succedendo a Putin, che però sarà il suo primo ministro. MOSCA - Dmitri Medvedev, il nuovo presidente russo eletto al primo turno con circa il 70% dei voti, ha 42 anni. È nato nell'allora Leningrado il 14 settembre 1965 e del periodo comunista ha solo ricordi di gioventù. Raffinato nel vestire, amante della musica rock, appassionato di sport individuali, pare non avere nessun legame con l'Fsb (ex Kgb). È stato scelto dall'attuale presidente Vladimir Putin come suo primo vice premier dopo essere stato per otto anni nel consiglio di amministrazione di Gazprom, il gigante russo del gas e autentica cassaforte del Cremlino. GAZPROM - La sua ascesa nel colosso del gas inizia nel giugno 2000, quando a soli 34 anni venne scelto in maniera del tutto inattesa come presidente del consiglio dei direttori. Dimostrando grande pazienza, per un anno Medvedev condivise il potere con l’amministratore della vecchia gestione Rem Viakhirev, ma a maggio 2001 lo sostituì con Aleksei Miller. Medvedev a febbraio 2002 cede a Viakhirev persino il posto di presidente del consiglio dei direttori. Ma ad agosto 2002 torna, e tiene Viakhirev come consigliere. DA LENINGRADO - A San Pietroburgo Medvedev insegnava all’università e aveva davanti un futuro da brillante avvocato. Il sindaco Sobchak l'8 settembre 1991 cambiò il nome di Leningrado in San Pietroburgo. Ma i diritti sul nome da dare alla città dovettero essere difesi a livello internazionale. E Putin, allora nella squadra di Sobchak, scelse un giovanissimo legale: Medvedev. La sua prima nomina a primo vice premier del governo russo è avvenuta il 14 novembre 2005. A Mosca era stato chiamato da Putin nel 1999 e nominato a dicembre dello stesso anno vice capo dello staff presidenziale. FAMIGLIA - Sposato con un figlio, Ilya. La futura first lady Svetlana è nota alle cronache mondane per la sua passione per l’Italia, l’arte e le sfilate di moda milanesi. FUENTE: http://www.corriere.it/esteri/08_marzo_02/medvedev_vita_4af95662-e887-11dc-a7430003ba99c667.shtml

Boletín mensual: MARZO 2008 17 http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/ [email protected]