Ea Institutions Slides 2009

Gov 1760: Outline • The Six Party Talks as a solution to a prisoners’ dilemma – Iteration – Monitoring – Punishment

• The ASEAN Regional Forum as a socializing environment

– Evolution of institutional features – Evolution of the agenda

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Six Party Talks • Iteration – Not permanent, but design to offer benefits from long-term cooperation • De-nuclearization of DPRK • Energy supplies • Normalization of relations with the US

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Six Party Talks • Monitoring of commitments – Denuclearization -- IAEA, US – Energy supplies -- DPRK – Normalization -- DPRK, US

IAEA inspection team 3

Six Party Talks • Punishment – If DPRK ‘defected’ -- US could cut off energy supplies, stopping normalization process, sanctions etc. – If US ‘defected’ -- DPRK could restart nuclear reprocessing, export nuclear technology

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Six Party Talks • Collapse of 6PT due to internal politics in DPRK beginning Fall 2008? – Showing toughness while internally weak or in a transition?

• Modeling third actors (e.g. take into account domestic political actors) or two different simultaneous ‘games’ can be complicated

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Origins of the ARF • strategic environment in Asia after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 uncertain – concerns about US withdrawal from Asia – concerns about what type of state China might be

• May 1993, ASEAN Foreign Ministers proposes extending dialogue to other states that met under the rubric of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) • July 1993, ASEAN decides to set up ARF • July 1994, first meeting of the ARF 6

The ARF’s structure • institutional features • • • • • •

low-keyed, stressing informality “participants” not “members” no separate ARF secretariat decisions made by ‘flexible consensus’ norm of ‘comfortable’ evolution the use of track II to propose new ideas and to discuss controversial ones (e.g. Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) (CSCAP) 7

ARF 2001

ARF 2007

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The ARF’s attractiveness • for China, a key ‘target’ of the ARF, – traditionally skeptical of multilateral institutions – preferred bilateral negotiations – ARF a ‘low cost’ multilateral institution

• for other Asian states, ARF was low cost, potentially high gain – not very intrusive – clarification of Chinese intentions – possibly changing Chinese intentions and interests 10

The ARF’s effects • Changing PRC ‘comfort’ level inside a multilateral institution • socialization? – the emergence of proto-multilateralist preferences among those most directly involved in regional security dialogues (e.g. the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Department) • interested in protecting China’s participation from internal critics • interested in new concepts of cooperative security

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Evolution of the ARF structure • institutional development – creation of regularized working groups to handle more complex agenda • inter-sessional support group confidence building measures (CBMs) • inter-sessional meetings – search and rescue (SAR), – peacekeeping operations (PKO)

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Frequency of ARF intersessional Track I meetings

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Evolution of the ARF’s agenda • South China Sea – Chinese didn’t stop it from moving onto the agenda in 1995

• Confidence Building Measures – military transparency – defense “white papers” – non-traditional security (CT and crime, disaster relief)

• Preventive Diplomacy – enhanced role for the ARF Chair’s ‘good offices’ – Expert and Eminent Persons group 14

The record of EA security institutions • Mixed success? – PD institutions (6PT, KEDO) have helped constrain proliferation, but not prevent the DPRK from going nuclear – Socialization institutions (ARF) have developed habits of cooperation, but avoided the really dangerous issues

• Yet interstate conflict is relatively low, especially compared to predictions in the early 1990s. Why? – Track I and II have resolved PDs, provided information, changed state goals and appropriate means? – Arms build ups have deterred conflict? – Economic integration has created new benefits and raised costs of political conflict? 15