Dynamics Within Agricultural Rehabilitation

Dynamics of agricultural rehabilitation in conflict and post conflict situation in Sub Saharan Africa: A case of input supplies in Northern Uganda By Rachkara

Background Emergencies caused by armed conflict and natural happening have always had deep affects on the agricultural systems of rural people particularly in sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Sadly these governments, economies and other systems are often incapacitated to withstand the impacts of these pressures. For example in Northern Uganda, as a result exponential increase in displacement; the local farmers lost their seeds stocks, planting materials and tools as well as important livelihood assets. Consequently; the integrated socioeconomic, environmental and cultural elements of the farming system are damaged, the ability of farmers to maintain seed security have been compromised. CRS (2002) noted that the diagnosis of seed unavailability following conflict is based on the recognition that displacement results in a loss of assets, including seed. Although displacement does result in a loss of seed, this determination focuses narrowly on affected families rather than on the larger community seed systems. Seed security is the access by farmers to adequate good quality seed of locally adapted varieties. It is of paramount importance in achieving longterm food security in developing countries and in maintaining sustainable livelihoods (Longley and Richards 1998; FAO 1998). Northern Uganda faced a serious humanitarian crisis for more than two decades with severe long-term consequences. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, coupled with other factors created poverty and collapsing public and private services but without HIV/AIDS the crisis would not be of the same dimensions. While for the last two decades the armed conflict was seen as a threat that pushed more than 1.6million people into the camps, in a near future the HIV/AIDS pandemic is going to be the heart of the crisis. To this day, it is already threatening the lives of many people. The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Northern Uganda is nearly twice as high as the national average and is continuing to increase. Because northern Uganda has been raged with war and internal conflict, capacity within the existing authorities particularly in the local government remains very weak at both technical and managerial levels. In response to these problems, international, national and local organizations intervened in order to help affected communities, save lives, recover and restore their livelihoods and agricultural systems. From 2002, seeds and tools projects were often seen as a cheap and effective way of addressing food needs in protracted emergencies in northern Uganda. Distributing seeds and tools is generally regarded as a way of supporting longer-term food security, and is widely undertaken by agencies operating in disaster and ongoing emergency situations (Humanitarian Exchange Magazine). Due to the lack of preparation and the complexity related to emergency operations, many relief interventions have been unsuccessful in restoring the full agricultural capacity of farming systems (Eberdt, 2000; Bushamuka, 1999; Hines et al., 1998). Longley, who has been echoed by other writers,

argues that a more detailed understanding of agricultural rehabilitation and relief is required (Longley 2001). To ensure that programmes are focussed, food security actor strategies were based on needs analysis and response plans aim to address identified needs taking into account an agency response capacity. In light of the fluidity of the context and to maintain a response focussed on actual needs as they evolve, the humanitarian response must retain a high degree of flexibility. In so doing, saving lives by reducing immediate mortality and morbidity through ensuring an effective and rapid emergency response – including a protection response – in all crisis areas where human lives are at risk due to conflict-related causes, epidemics and other natural disasters was the objective. This paper discusses some of the intervention applied in the agriculture sector between emergency context and post conflict situations. The paper restricts discussions to input supply systems. It analyses some of the challenges that evolve from the various interventions employed in the northern Uganda situations. Seeds and tools interventions The free distribution of seeds and tools has been the standard approach to agricultural and food security interventions in emergencies. The prevalence of the input approach is to a certain extent attributable to the following: (1) perceptions that during displacement, farmers lost their seed stocks, (2) perception that farmer seed quality is poor, (3) Donor regulations and acceptance of seed certification as a proxy for seed and varietal quality, (4) promotion of researcher varieties, (5) misdiagnosis of unavailability, (5) difficulty accessing farmer seed, and (6) support for the commercial seed sector. The free distribution approach that most frequently used in post-disaster situations is the distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural tools; this approach is referred to as the distribution of ‘seeds and tools’ (Longley 2002). Several reasons why this approach is favoured by practitioners are explored here. Seed distribution can help re-establish a ‘selfhelp’ mode within communities by helping families to produce their own food and support their livelihoods. Seed distributions are also often perceived to be a more long-term and effective activity than short-term food aid (Bryce 2001). Furthermore, when rural livelihood systems have been damaged, it is possible to distribute seeds and tools immediately and efficiently thus enabling the benefits of a catch-crop in the first available season (O’Keef and Kirby 1997; ODI 1996; Long 2000). The modality for blanket and free distribution was almost universal for the agencies operating in the area. If an agency (A) was operating in an area, it would register household heads as beneficiaries. This registration was covering all households in a camp. Owing that the Local Councils (LCs) were dysfunctional at that point of massive displacement, all the activities in the camps were coordinated by the leadership of camp commandant 1. Certainly because movement within the camps was unplanned and was very dynamic, the household figures for households for camps were not stable. Agencies had to move a step further to verify whether or not all the registered households were in that particular camp. It is true 1

A camp commandant is a leader elected to leader all communities in the camp system

that some households with more large numbers would split up into two so as to realize a significant amount of the materials distributed. Distribution of seeds and tools were base on the agreed and/or presumed safe-radius 2. Although safe-radius was not homogeneous for all the camps, generally it varied between 1 – 5km. The amount of seeds and tools were also determined by land access, types of crops that the IDP communities were permitted to grow, amount of resources available for and organization, and minimum standards set by actors of food security. By 2005, many stakeholders including donours were not convinced with the sustainability of seeds and tools distribution. Although around this time, nobody had an idea of when and how the situation that has for years been described as one of the worst in the world would normalize. The need to engage farmers to be involved in more meaningful agricultural activities was undisputed. Approaches that worked well in other places or are working well in other emergency situations had to be imported. Food security actors who were not convinced over the free distribution of seeds and tools had started improving their interventions into a more sustaining one. As the number of critiques of seeds and tools distribution grew from within, it was still not possible to rule out the significant of the seeds and tools distribution. Better still; the improved security situation in the sub region late 2006 resulted into increased return process and land access. Soon the Office of the Prime Minister realized that the need to empower returning farming community with seeds and planting materials to kick-start their agricultural livelihood activities was quite important. Some stakeholders called the support inputs that were distributed to the locals and returning farming communities as comprehensive return packages. The three perceptions of that farmer seed quality is poor, donour regulations and acceptance of seed certification as a proxy for seed and varietal quality, and promotion of researcher varieties were the bottom-line. While demands were too high food the seed industry in Uganda to meet, apparently quality would be the last thing to consider by the suppliers. The questions on quality of the inputs did not stop on seeds but also on the tools. As a result, the germination rate for the seeds were very low and consequently the yields. This was justifiable for development partners to switch gears to other innovations, that were used and/or being used in other areas. Up to this point, there was nothing to concretely show that the impacts collectively of all interventions of seeds and tools distribution can be quantified. In other words, the impacts of this intervention cannot be easily seen. It has been evident that some IDP farmers as part of the copying mechanism sold off the tools to buy other basic necessities. Does it mean that development partners distributed seed and tools without considering the community priority/needs? Absolutely not. Arguably, it can be that the farmers’ other needs were more pressing that the needs for seeds and tools.

2

Safe-radius is an area around the camp that HH were allowed to move freely within and agreed period of time (9:00am – 4:00pm)

Delivery mechanisms and proper targeting of recipients are important in seeds and tools initiatives. With respect to targeting, identifying those most in need is critical to providing effective assistance (Betrand et al., 1989). Following Hurricane Mitch it was revealed that the hardest hit were the most marginalized members of society such as small producers, and female-headed households. In Honduras, female headship increased from a predisaster level of 20.4% to 50%. Targeting initiatives should take into account such changing demographics. In this case, distributing seeds solely to male-headed households would have further handicapped a large portion of the population (Delaney and Shrader 2000). Within the literature reviewed, community participation was portrayed as the most effective way to ensure proper and inclusive targeting of seed distribution (Richards 2001; Pratten 1997). Although community participation is vital in targeting, challenges can potentially arise with this approach. Illustrating this, Richards describes targeting methodologies in Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s where relief agencies organized village committees to identify potential beneficiaries for seeds and tools. However, amongst these identified beneficiaries, not all farms were included. In some cases, the excluded individuals were angry enough to threaten joining the rebels (2001). In a similar example of participatory targeting in Ethiopia, the community based organization in charge of targeting excluded women in their seed distributions (Pratten 1997). These case studies illustrate the importance of integrating the unique social and economic make-up of the population into participatory targeting in order to help those who are most in need. Seedfairs intervention With respect to distribution techniques, there are a variety of benefits and drawbacks to delivering seeds by donation, credit or sale. Firstly, when relief is given by donation, it supports farmers who have insufficient funds to purchase materials themselves and is logistically easier for NGOs. However, donating seed has been critiqued because it may reduce farmer incentive to rescue their own production systems and can potentially create dependency upon the donors (De Barbentane, 2001). Northern Uganda started enjoying relative security since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in August 2006 and the start of the Juba Peace Process which resulted in the signing of all but the final part of a multicomponent peace agreement. Despite recent setbacks in peace negotiations and the lack of a final agreement signature, the current security environment provides an opportunity to move toward a process of recovery and to address the development gap between northern Uganda and the rest of the country. The security situation encouraged the IDPs to begin the second leg back home late 2006. Farm activities started at a more active pace than the previous year since land access itself has increased. This compelled the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to massively distribute seeds and tools in the region in order to support farmers with planting materials to kick-start their livelihoods. Because the demands for certified seeds were high, quality of these seeds were highly questionable. This resulted into very low germination rates. Failure of the seeds to germinate in 2007 sparked the thinking to reshape the future of interventions possibly to replace seeds distribution. Although a number of agencies in the region had been facilitating seed access since early 2000, the value attached to seedfairs

methodology was not paramount. Soon after poor seeds of 2007, stakeholders appreciated the saline nature of seedfairs and voucher system. These include the following: farmers’ access seed of their preferred crops and varieties; boosting the local economy; seed quality is left to the judgment of farmers; and the approach can be modified to suit the level of seed insecurity (e.g. slightly scarce, very scarce). Because seedfairs is much more demanding in terms of organisation compared to distribution of seeds and tools, implementation was a big challenge to many development partners. While seeds from seed companies are usually more costly compared to farmer grains, the development partners were putting prices of grains that are sold at the seedfair market as the same as those from seed companies. It is true that in many seedfair markets, the seed stockiest or seed company agents have been present for sales of commodities at the certified seed company price. If the grains/seeds are to be sold at a cheaper price compared to the prices of certified seed companies, there were high chances that the seeds from the agents would not be bought. The option was to follow the prices of the certified seeds. Owing the vouchers that are the medium for exchange were distributed for free, the voucher recipients did not feel cheated for buying seeds/grains twice at the actual amount at the seed fairs markets. On the other hand, a number of agencies that learnt the approach from CRS when it was introduced into the region; were using the approach to promote the production of ground nut that was a major cash and food crop at a time. Perhaps the adopters were moving faster than the initiators. As a result, the farming community understood the approach as buying and selling of groundnuts. Large number of farmers continued to grow groundnuts so as to sell at the seedfair markets. It was evident that production of groundnuts went up at the expense of other food-cash crops. According to land use crop yield assessment for second season 2008, production of groundnuts was 33,932MT compared to 12,870MT of maize, 7,394MT of beans and 3,940MT of rice. Priority was given to groundnut at the expense of other crops. Groundnuts were grown for seedfair markets at the expense of important food crops. Although the above yielded positive indicators such as increased food self sufficiency, reduced number of households who are food insecurity, and reduced levels of global acute malnutrition; the hope that the population would one day after years depending on food assistance came to pass early 2009. Though the above is true, the farmers had banked their harvest for seedfair markets. After a short dryspell in the first rain, it was impossible for the farmers to make it through without the food assistance for just a season. Over the years, IDP farmers, humanitarian community and government blamed to war for farmers’ situations. Three years of relative peace, some local authorities pin pointed development partners for creating dependency syndrome. Humanitarian bodies on the other hand blamed the local governments for not taking charge of the situation and the IDP and returning communities for refusal to work hence counting on the aid. This kind of pressure built up until some aid agencies had to discourage free inputs – whether in terms of distribution or by way of input fairs.

Working for vouchers for inputs An approach of vouchers for work soon replaced the approach of free voucher distribution. Communities are expected to work to acquire voucher that would later be used to purchase inputs of their choice. Buying this idea was very easy for stakeholders such as donours, development partners and local authorities. This has been envisaged as a means of promoting private sector, input dealers, rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructures etc. Owing that many stakeholders bought the idea of the vouchers for work, the approach of distribution of free vouchers of fairs had to be discouraged at a wider scale. In some districts like Pader for example, the voucher for work was used to rehabilitate or open community access roads, protecting springs, rehabilitating physical markets, establishing woodlots etc. It was started by a few and as it was registering success, the initiators had to use this as a means marking the free voucher methodology unpopular. While developing a voucher for work, cash for work and food for work methodology coordination and harmonization guidelines, stakeholders at a workshop noted that free hand out of agricultural inputs etc. should be avoided as it will damage the business for agricultural input dealers etc. Only if there is no market and a market cannot be established should free hand outs be considered. Please note that seedfairs also provide free handouts as the beneficiaries normally have received the vouchers for free. Following the adopted parish approach of the inter-agency standing committee, the implementation of the two methodologies became a challenge. These approaches became conflicting once because communities would prefer free vouchers. Conflicts started within parishes, then sub counties and later on within and between agencies. Although an experience sharing workshop as scheduled to have a set of guiding principles for coordination of the interventions with regard to geographical areas, target groups and type of works done and for harmonization of the implementation modalities, so that different interventions don’t compete and negatively impact each other; the conflicts between and within interventions persisted. Soon afterwards, politics had to play a big role. This would range among many factors to how the district perceives your relevance. In whatever the case, the stakeholders were working together to enhance food and nutritional security to save lives and alleviate suffering and kick-start livelihoods. According to Collinson et al. 2002, if humanitarian responses are to provide effective assistance to food-insecure groups, for example, it has been argued that humanitarian agencies must understand how and why the economic and political processes associated with war have led these groups to become vulnerable As such, a political economy perspective in understanding the dynamic patterns of power and vulnerability that exist within any given conflict situation can help agencies to intervene more effectively and apply an ethical framework to their work (Collinson et al., 2002). If it is accepted that humanitarian action is an inherently political activity (Leader, 2000), then political economy analysis can help humanitarian actors to reach principled and accountable decisions about how to engage with local political and commercial actors.

Within the humanitarian sector, a somewhat confusing array of slightly differing sets of principles of humanitarian action, with differing interpretations, has been put forward by different agencies and different commentators. This continual renegotiation of the principles of humanitarian action is closely related to the changing nature of contemporary conflict described above. It is interesting to consider three core humanitarian principles: impartiality (the provision of aid according to and in proportion to need); neutrality (dealing equally with both sides to a conflict and not discriminating on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class or other traits); and independence (the independence of humanitarian objectives from any political, military or economic considerations). Furthermore, also considering key principles from livelihoods and rights-based approaches is important. The objective of the enhancing food and nutritional security to save lives and alleviate suffering and kick-start livelihoods is a humanitarian objective. Majority of the development partners in the region have deep experiences in humanitarian work. However relating or linking relief to development has been a big challenge. This has been evident in the number of conflicts that emerged in achieving the above objective. Much of the recent literature on humanitarian principles notes the difficulties in applying the principles in practice (e.g. Charny, 2004; Keen, 1998; Weiss, 1999), and events in Iraq and Afghanistan are widely considered by humanitarian actors to have seriously compromised the principles on which the very integrity of humanitarian action is founded (FIFC, 2004). Three broad – and, at times, overlapping – positions have been identified at a conceptual level among humanitarians in relation to humanitarian principles (in particular the role of neutrality) and political agendas (FIFC, 2004; Leader, 2000; Weiss, 1999): (a) ‘Principle-centred’ (FIFC, 2004) or ‘neutrality elevated’ (Leader, 2000). Also referred to as ‘classicists’ (Weiss, 1999), these agencies and individuals share a continuing commitment to the core humanitarian principles, particularly that of neutrality. Proponents of this position argue that the more highly politicized the terrain, the more urgent is unswerving and unabashed fidelity to the core principles (Harroff-Tavel, 2003). In such contexts, the manipulation of humanitarian action by political actors should be minimised through operational rules. They believe that humanitarian action should be restricted to saving lives and protecting civilians, and many also feel that humanitarian actors should avoid becoming politically engaged in activities such as reconstruction or advocacy for human rights. (b) ‘Pragmatists’ (Weiss, 1999; FIFC, 2004) or ‘third-way humanitarianism’ (Leader, 2000). This position accepts that politics and humanitarianism are intimately intertwined in the reality of contemporary conflict. Principles are seen not as absolutes but as reference guidelines: something to be strived for, but not always attainable in all contexts. Although they resist taking sides, pragmatists believe that the principle of neutrality is not an absolute necessity for aid to be effective and impartial. Pragmatists have also been referred to as ‘political humanitarians’, within which a distinction can be made between those who pursue minimalist (‘do no harm’) or maximalist (peace-building) political agendas (Weiss, 1999). (c) ‘Solidarists’ (Weiss, 1999; FIFC, 2004) or ‘neutrality abandoned’ (Leader, 2000). These agencies and individuals hold the view that neither humanitarian principles nor saving lives are enough in aid responses to conflict. They believe that there is also an obligation to become politically engaged (which may mean taking sides) in addressing the root causes of

conflict through actions to uphold justice and human rights. Neutrality and impartiality are seen as an impediment to effective action. Rather than viewing themselves first and foremost as humanitarian agencies, solidarists see themselves as rights-based agencies whose agenda includes poverty alleviation and social transformation, as well as the more traditional humanitarian activities in contexts where other activities are not possible. The politics between the vouchers for work and free voucher methodologies almost came official in a workshop organized early 2009 in Acholi Inn – Gulu district. This workshop attracted donours, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and local governments. The objective was to have a set of guiding principles for coordination of the voucher related interventions with regard to geographical areas, target groups and type of works done and for harmonisation of the implementation modalities, so that different interventions don’t compete and negatively impact each other. It was agreed that free hand out of agricultural inputs etc. should be avoided as it will damage the business for agricultural input dealers etc. Only if there is no market and a market cannot be established should free hand outs be considered. Please note that Seed Fairs also provide free handouts as the beneficiaries normally have received the vouchers for free. Hereafter, beneficiaries started working for vouchers. The first challenge came where beneficiaries preferred cash to vouchers. Where cash and voucher works were in the same sun county, beneficiaries would leave where they are paid with vouchers and go for cash related activities. Secondly, the communities felt that their choices should not be limited to inputs predetermined by an agency or to those found with a particular input dealer. Failure to meet their expectations during the input fairs would result to discontinuation with the work. Thirdly the time for working for vouchers is the same planting season that farmers should be in their own gardens. This later affects the amount of land tilled by a household. Fourth only able people work for vouchers. This does not guarantee that the needy households are the one getting the vouchers. By the end of it all, if the households with seeds work for vouchers, they still find a way of converting their vouchers to cash. On phasing such challenges, most of the districts abandoned the voucher for work methodology. According to UNPRAP (2009), 30.8% of households in the North are female-headed households, compared to the national average of 26.9%. The continuous conflict in the region is a likely explanation. In the voucher for work methodology, it was agreed that the task rate of every for the northern Uganda region is UgX 3,000. However, within the process of work, activities vary and the harder the task, the higher the task rate. The UgX 3,000 task rate is for activities such as bush clearing, ditching, leveling etc. while activities such as removal of tree stumps, trees and aunt-hills etc. do not have fixed prices but the prices depend on the sizes. It is true that such activities are usually handled by men. For example, a man removes three trees and will earn 90,000UgX (30,000UgX/tree). Meanwhile, a woman will earn require 30 days at one task per day to earn the same amount. In rural areas, women comprise the majority of the labour force in agriculture, while men form a substantially higher majority of the labour force in the industry and service sectors (UNPRAP, 2009). In northern Uganda during and after the insurgencies, household food security is a woman’s burden. For all types of livestock, female-headed

households were less endowed compared to male counterparts, and female livestock ownership is typically limited to goats and chicken. The challenge of balancing between working for vouchers and on-farm as well as off-farm activities is prominent. Whereas communities find it very important to work hard to acquire significant inputs (enough seeds and tools), community work has to happen within the agricultural season. To ditch the road sides for example during dry season is close to impossible for women. Labor has then to be balance in the planting season between community work and farm work. Owing that acquisition of inputs have to be timely and in adequate quantity, often many families have to engage more family members into the community work. Particularly of Saturdays and Sundays, school going children often join their parents – particularly in female headed households to work along side with them to earn better voucher rates. In Pader for example, an agency that planned to do input fairs in the beginning of second season could not go ahead because the various agreed task were not yet completed. Because they communities were working on road rehabilitation for vouchers, some communities finished their before others. Convening fairs for a fraction of the beneficiaries while leaving the rest is not very cost effective logistically. The question of whether the farmers who work for vouchers get the inputs they desire cannot be ignored. Because vouchers are medium for exchange, specific input dealers in some cases are the ones who are allowed to deal their inputs in exchange for the vouchers. Where farmers have specific input dealers to buy inputs from, the constraints of failing to buy inputs in time or failing to buy inputs they want. Some farmers have devised their own solutions to such constraints. They have gotten a means of changing the vouchers in to cash without acquiring inputs. Where farmers work for vouchers and the inputs dealers are not restricted, they bring their own items and buy their own items. For example in a livestock fair that took place in Kitgum, a significant number of voucher recipients had their own livestock already. On the day of the livestock fairs, they brought their family members and friends brought their animals and the voucher recipients bought their own animals. By the end of the exercise, the vouchers were redeemed and changed to cash within the same household. In a seedfair with voucher for work component in Kitgum, the able people who had seeds did the work, received the vouchers, brought their own seeds into the market and registered the seeds on their friend and household members, bought their own seeds and converted their vouchers to cash. In voucher for work, restricting who should bring his/her input for sales at the fairs is very difficult. Sometime this happens due to the fact that the inputs from those who did not participate in the voucher for work is not enough. When the farmers are allowed to work and sell their inputs also at the fairs, they end up buying their own inputs. While organizing fairs after voucher for work in Pader, an agency realized that the registered venders could not meet the input demand for the amount worked for. When the voucher recipients were also allowed to bring their various inputs, the market supply was twice the demand with

inputs ranging from small seeded crops to the largest livestock. The probability that nonvoucher recipients would sell their inputs in such a market is very minimum. Conclusion Severe disruption of food production and marketing systems is common during emergencies. Crop destruction and livestock deaths may result from natural events (drought and floods as well as outbreaks of plant and animal pests and diseases), the devastation of war or a combination of events. Access to adequate food becomes difficult, and this hardship contributes to high rates of malnutrition. The provision of food, water, shelter, protection and medical care is essential for survival of refugees and internally displaced persons until the crisis is over and they can return to their homes or establish new ones. Actions are also needed to assist people who remain in their home communities during the crisis. Temporary food distribution and supplementary feeding for vulnerable groups and provision of agricultural inputs are common humanitarian interventions to help people cope when an emergency occurs. Agriculture rehabilitation is a complex, unstable and dynamic process. It depends on a number of factors such as donour influence, politics within and between interventions and organizations, experiences, trail and errors and innovations. Rehabilitation of rural agriculture has no formula. What worked in one area may not be applicable in the other area. It is particularly important to understand the socio-cultural aspects of the communities in agricultural rehabilitation. The communities have mechanisms of making their ends meets within any intervention. They are very fast in learning how to survive within any intervention. In view of all the above, the discourse on agricultural rehabilitation is very slow. Being the major if not the only industry, the possibility to meaningfully make livelihoods sustainable irrespective of the duration of these interventions is far from reaching. Compared to the amount of resources used, there are no solid successes made of the above interventions. Even farmers who used to outstanding have become increasingly difficult to trace. There are always excuses to events and happenings that result into failure to revitalize agriculture.

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