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Team 5 Questions for Attorney General Ashcroft Pre-September 11 1. Summer 2001. When you began receiving increased threat information in the summer of 2001 with which Justice Department components did you share and discuss this information? Did you discuss the problem with the INS Commissioner (Rooney) or ensure that the information got to him, or ask him for a counterterrorism security plan? If not, why not? 2. Goals. When you met with Commissioner Ziglar when he became Commissioner to discuss your goals and objectives for his tenure at the INS, what goals and objectives did you discuss with him? Did you discuss the INS role in counterterrorism border security with him? What was your view of the INS role and ability to address counterterrorism? September 11 3. INS role in PENTTBOM. On 9/11, the FBI immediately began an investigation into the hijackings which became known as the PENTTBOM investigation. What did you see as the value of INS in supporting that investigation? What discussions or directives were put forward as a result? What is your assessment of the INS contribution to the 9/11 investigation? 4. Meeting in the SIOC on 9/11. What was the purpose of the meeting? Who attended this meeting? Please describe what proposals relating to the use of immigration laws in response to 9/11 were put on the table during that meeting, and by whom? Which individuals made these proposals? What as precisely as you can recall, was the response of Commissioner Ziglar? Did you continue to solicit Commissioner Ziglar's views of immigration related initiatives thereafter? 5. White House meeting. On the evening of September 11, there was a White House principals' meeting. During the course of that meeting, what issues regarding border management or INS responsibilities were discussed? Were any border related decisions made? If so, what were they? Did you share any information regarding that meeting with Commissioner Ziglar? If not, why not? Post-9/11 enforcement 6. Arrests. In order to prevent future attacks, the Justice Department pursued terrorism leads and information from foreign Muslims and Arabs in the U.S. through over a thousand arrests of foreign and U.S. Muslems arid Arabs on-immigration, criminal, and material witness warrants, and throu^i voluntary intendewsl_3 • Can you tell us how many people the Justice Department arrested and of those how many you believed to be connected with Al Qaeda or other terrorist threats against the U.S.? How many aliens were issued special entry visas as cooperators? • Can you tell us how many people the Justice Department interviewed and of these how many you believed to be connected with Al Qaeda or through whom you gained information about Al Qaeda or could expect to in the future? 7. Absconder Apprehension Initiative. Commissioner Ziglar proposed an absconder initiative to find and remove criminal aliens with valid deportation orders. Your office

after September 1 1 modified that initiative to prioritize the removal of criminal aliens from countries with terrorist activity, regardless of the basis for their conviction. Can you tell us why you took this step, whether this initiative has removed any terrorists or those with links to terrorists, and if so, how many? 8. NSEERS. The Justice Department initiated a special registration program for aliens from certain countries to identify and apprehend adversaries at the border. Can you tell us whether NSEERS has identified any terrorists who were not already in the existing lookout systems such as State's TIPOFF system? 9. Muslem/Arab-American community. Do you believe that the Justice Department's enforcement tactics have elicited the most cooperation possible from Moslem and Arab communities in the U.S.? 10. Effectiveness. The DOJ stspeiy criticized the detention and processing of the 9-1 1 detainees. Given what you know about the effectiveness of the arrests of Muslems and Arabs on various charges, and the interviews, registration, and absconder enforcement program, if we face another major terrorist attack from Islamic terrorists during your tenure as Attorney General, would you do anything differently? 1 1 . Secrecy. For a period after September 1 1 , you ordered that public records of over 600 arrests of aliens be eliminated. Since then you have announced a number of arrests of suspected terrorists. Can you give us a specific case that illustrates why you believe secrecy of the names was, and continues to be, required for the initial investigative arrests? 12. Namechecks. One of the counterterrorism programs initiated by Justice through the NSC was the Condor namecheck program, which requires that males ages 16-45 from specified countries have namechecks above and beyond checking the listing in the lookout system. According to the FBI, they have found no leads for PENTTBOM through this system, and according to the State Department and CIA, no terrorists have been identified through the approximately 100,000 namechecks conducted so far. In addition, this program has resulted in significant expenditures by multiple agencies, and is the cause of extended delays in the issuance of visas. If no terrorists have been identified, why have you not pushed to have the namecheck process suspended, like NSEERS has been? Post-September 1 1 INS issues 13. INS restructuring. What was your view of the importance of INS restructuring after September 11? When Andy Card called to tell you about the Administration's support for DHS, what was your reaction? Where do you see the problems and what would you recommend DHS should do differently?