Digests For Topic 6.docx

2 ---- SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES ---- 2 TALABON vs. ILOILO PROVINCIAL WARDEN FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: LOPEZ vs. OMBUDSMAN FACTS:      

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Petitioner was the Administrative Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII, Cotabato City. Among his task was to determine whether certain expenses are necessary for the attainment of objectives of the region. Between 1992 and 1993, DECS-Region XII ordered several pieces of laboratory equipment and apparati requested by different school divisions of the region. Such requests were granted by petitioner. However, without seeking the presence of any concerned officials of DECS Region XII of Cotabato, the COA Special Audit Team conducted an investigation and later on claimed that there are deficiencies in the transaction of the mentioned office and implicated petitioner and some concerned officials therewith. The Office of the Ombudsman of Mindanao conducted a preliminary investigation for the complaint filed against petitioner for Falsification of Documents by Public Officers. Petitioner was then ordered to submit his Counter-Affidavit, which he complied on 22 April 1994. More than four (4) years after he submitted his Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner was surprised that, without preliminary investigation and clarificatory question asked, on July 17, 1998, the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao terminated the preliminary investigation recommending that he, together with the other respondents in Case No. OMB 3-93-9791, be prosecuted for violation of Secs. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner’s contention: o He was deprived of due process because he did not engage a certain Atty. Edgardo Camello who filed an “Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Counter-Affidavits” on behalf of the respondents in the case; o that he was not advised by the Graft Investigation Officer of his right to attorney; and o that he filed his counter-affidavit without the assistance of counsel. Respondent’s contention: o Petitioners cannot, by this special civil action for mandamus, compel the ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.

ISSUE: W/N such unjustifiable delay in resolving the case against the petitioner would warrant its dismissal. HELD: Yes, the unjustifiable delay warrants the dismissal of this case. Hence, this Petition was granted and the case was dismissed. The Court held that the constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.” Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or even without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. In this case, the Court held that the failure of said office to resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost four years is clearly violative of this mandate and the rights of petitioner as a public official. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him.

3 ---- RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION ---BPI vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONAL

FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: PEOPLE vs. BOHOLST FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: BELTRAN vs. SAMSON FACTS:    

Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

ISSUE: Whether or not an order requiring to write a sample of his handwriting so that it may be validated as documentary evidence is considered self-incrimination. HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, it is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. An order requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated with the documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. The case at bar is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And such production of documents or chattels by a person may be refused. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO FACTS:     

In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-General against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in support of his defense, six letters. He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's. Bermudez denied that the letters were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted that three others were in her own handwriting. As Castillo believed that the three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the case and as he was determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the three other letters and the other letters already in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree to the decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted be ordered to require and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose.

ISSUE: Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillo’s possession which were allegedly in her handwriting. HELD: Yes. The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. Thus, Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. U.S. vs. TAN TENG FACTS: 

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Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against selfincrimination. HELD: No. As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. U.S. VS. ONG SIU HONG

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Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself.

ISSUE: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the morphine was forced from his mouth. HELD: No. By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. PEOPLE VS. OTADORA FACTS:    

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Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in August 1946, a criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos. They were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on 24 June 1947. Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through Amando Garbo. Thereafter they conversed on several occasions. In the early part of May 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun, procured from one Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a flashlight. Early in the morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of 21 June 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On 25 June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against Otadora and Carreon in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on 3 September 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's criminal connection with the bloody affair was collaborated, among others, by Otodora’s possession of the pants of Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and sentenced to death and other accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hilaria Carreon appealed.

ISSUE: Whether Galos’ fitting of the pants is contrary to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. HELD: When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on, and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly; this gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No timely objection was made, however, upon that specific ground. It is doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMER FACTS: 

In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery.

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On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. HELD: No. Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS FACTS:      

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Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.

ISSUE: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself. HELD: Yes, the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take

the witness stand—with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, cannot compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

4 ---- RIGHTS OF A PERSON DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION ---- 4 PEOPLE vs. RAPEZA FACTS: 

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Rapeza, the appellant, is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house. Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. In two separate informations, Rapeza, together with Regino was charged with the murder of spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Prosecution: o On October 21, 1995, an unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. The officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. o Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. o Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of CULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge). Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was filed against Regino who was likewise arrested. o MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the Trial Court by including Regino in the information, but then the latter had left Culion already. Defense: o Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. He did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. o He was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of Oct. 22, 1995 up to the morning of Oct. 23, 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. Regino too was arrested with him. o While in detention, he told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a document for his release but because he could not sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. o Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot. On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC’s judgement was affirmed. Rapeza appealed.

ISSUE: (1) W/N his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. (2) W/N the constitutional requirements of Art. III, Section 12 of the Philippine Constitution were observed. HELD: (1) No. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, the Court hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. In this juncture, the appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect,

contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes. In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession. (2) No. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver. Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. PEOPLE VS. TING LAN UY FACTS: 

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The accused, Uy, Gamus and Ochoa, public officers being employed by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805,291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the managers check with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). SandiganBayan rendered a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said crime and is ordered to pay the equal amount malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and upon assurance it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated? HELD: No. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter. PEOPLE vs. MAQUEDA FACTS: 

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British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions. Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence. HELD: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be

compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible. Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. GAMBOA vs. CRUZ FACTS:   

Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant, meanwhile, during the line-up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of the complainant while the latter is being investigated. An information of robbery has been filed against the herein petitioner. During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on the other hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the ground that the conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional right to counsel and to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due process was violated during the line up. HELD: No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it be 1973 or 1987. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the investigating officers tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the questions appeases to be innocent. At this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is needed in order to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips fo the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he was not asked any question nor to answer. The police line up is not wart of custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not entitled to right to counsel. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation against the respondent, and even before the adversary judicial proceedings against the accused begins. While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line up, the moment there is a move to elicit admissions or confessions, even a plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. SEBASTIAN vs. GARCHITORENA FACTS:  

Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal service officer in connection with missing postage stamps. During interrogation, they submitted sworn statements. The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence.

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Accused claimed that their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since they were not assisted by counsel.

ISSUE: W/N the statements are admissible as evidence. HELD: Yes. The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers. PEOPLE VS. BALOLOY FACTS:   

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At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3 1996, the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls at the said barangay. Autopsy report found the Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in the nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trail court violated Section 12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his Constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was amissible. HELD: Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinaty manner. It was given before he was arrested or place under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the party of Ceniza, which could have compelled her testify falsely against him. PEOPLE vs. TAWAT FACTS ISSUE HELD PEOPLE vs. GALIT FACTS: 

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The accused was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will has to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take it anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE: W/N the confession is admissible in evidence.

HELD: No. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. PEOPLE VS. ZUELA FACTS: The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. ISSUE: W/N the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution? HELD: The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, “the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velarde’s extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel – that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel – is inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa. Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants’ sworn statements did not leave a void in the prosecution’s case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualda’s testimony. And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that “when the accused talked with the mayor as confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.” PEOPLE vs. ANDAN FACTS:   

Accused-appellant and two other suspects were rounded up in connection with a rape with homicide case. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant’s own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt, disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. The confession was captured on videotape.

ISSUE: W/N accused-appellant’s extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES. The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. Appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. His confessions to the media were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. PEOPLE vs. ENDINO FACTS:    

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Gerry Galgarin, and his nephew Edward Endino, were accused of slaying Dennis Aquino, where the former stabbed him several times and the latter shot him. This was done in the presence of the victim’s girlfriend. Galgarin was arrested, and was interviewed by TV Patrol where he confessed and begged his nephew to surrender as well. This confession was admitted by the trial court as evidence for his guilt. The trial court convicted him of the crime of murder. Accused-Appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed it was induced by threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally informed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. Trial court admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted, and the presence of the newsmen dissipated hostility. They believed the police officers statements that it was Galgarin who begged to air his appeal on TV. Appellant assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and admitting his video-taped confession as evidence against him.

ISSUE: W/N the admission of the videotape evidence is proper. HELD: Yes. Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. PEOPLE vs. AYSON FACTS:  

Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), was charged with estafa for irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. Respondent judge admitted all evidentiary and testamentary evidence offered against Ramos except for the latter’s handwritten note expressing his willingness to settle the irregularities alleged against him as well as his statement during an administrative investigation where he admitted to the offense.

ISSUE: W/N respondent judge is correct in not admitting the note and statement in evidence. HELD: NO. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. He had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded. The note that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. PEOPLE vs. ORDONO   

The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial confession. An interview with a radio announcer was also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for the crime. They now assail their conviction as their confession was attended by infirmities’ i.e. mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation.

ISSUE: W/N the custodial investigation made in the presence of the municipal mayor, parish priest, etc. and/or the taped interview containing the accused’s confessions are admissible as evidence. HELD: The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible. The presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect. However, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news reporter on televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation, and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violate accused’s constitutional rights.

PEOPLE vs. LUGOD FACTS:  

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A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused, Clemente John Lugod, for allegedly raping the eightyear old girl victim, Nairube J. Ramos and dumping her dead body in the grassy coconut plantation area. On September I5, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos, the victim's mother, was asleep in her house together with her husband and their children. Nimrod, Neres and Nairube. At around 12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone. The backdoor of their house was left open where a pair of slippers that did not belong to the family was found. In the morning, the police began their search for Nairube wherein a panty belonging to the victim was found, as well as a black collared shirt belonging to the accused, Lugod. Witnesses testified that both slippers and the shirt were worn by Lugod. Lugod was then brought to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. Although he admitted to SP02 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. On September 19, 1997, the Vice-Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. After trial, Lugod was found guilty and was sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lugod's alleged confession can be used against him? HELD: No. At the time of his arrest, records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his rights to counseL There is also no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Consequently, the accused-appellant's act of confessing to SP02 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellant's rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. Even If we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and thus, not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellant's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused-appellant to the Mayor and VOe-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive. As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Naimbe. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. PEOPLE vs. AMESTUZO FACTS:   

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On February 22, 1991, a group of eight men entered the house of complainant Perlita Lacsamana and robbed the said premises. In the course of the robbery, two members of the gang raped her niece and another employee. Accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape. The trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused. Only accused-appellant Albino Bagas appealed. One of his contentions is the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification. According to Bagas, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to his workplace. They were looking for a certain Mario. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, “Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito” and “Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino”. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. They were brought to the Police Station in Kalookan City. When the complainants arrived, Bagas was brought out. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias. Bagas answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him.

ISSUE: W/N the manner of out-of-court identification was irregular and, therefore, inadmissible in court. HELD: Yes. The complainant’s out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identification, the totality of circumstances test has to be applied which lists the following factors: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.

The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime. It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the police themselves. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity. PEOPLE vs. PIEDAD FACTS: 

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On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had earlier gone. As she was walking by the gate of the company compound where they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo was being mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateo’s head with it. Then, Lito approached Mateo’s side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding Piedad and Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances present, and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00. Richard Palma was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and Garcia appealed.

ISSUE: W/N the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed. HELD: No. The claim by the defense that Piedad’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateo’s death. Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand was identified by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb 5 meters away from the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities. PEOPLE vs. DAGPIN FACTS:

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This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8, convicting the appellant Quirico Dagpin of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The killing incident took place on March 26, 1996 at 1:00 A.M. It was witnessed by the victim’s nephew, Randy and his sisters Rona and Rena who saw and recognized the appellant. On March 27, 1996, Randy, Rona and Rena went to the police station and saw the appellant, whom they pointed to the police as the person who shot their uncle. It was only then that they learned the name of their uncle’s assassin, Quirico Dagpin. They executed sworn statements of their respective accounts of the killing. During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Randy and Rona and obtained their testimonies. In defense, appellant raised alibi that on the night the killing incident took place, he was in the house of Pedro Elcamel and helped the latter in the preparation of a graduation party for Pedro’s daughter. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on the basis mainly of his having been identified by Randy, Rona and Rena at the police station on March 27, 1996. He was not assisted by counsel when the three pointed to him as the culprit in the police station. Hence, according to the appellant, such identification is inadmissible in evidence. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that Randy, Rona and Rena, saw and recognized the appellant as the person who shot the victim at the situs criminis. It also maintains that the appellant was not deprived of his constitutional rights when he was identified by the prosecution witnesses at the police station without counsel, because he was not then under custodial investigation.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant was denied of his right under the Constitution when he was not assisted by counsel at the time the prosecution witnesses identified him as the culprit. HELD: The appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was identified by the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up. Indeed, the appellant even denied that there was no police line-up and that he was merely with the police officers when the prosecution’s witnesses arrived in the police station. NAVALLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: 

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Petitioner Ernesto Navallo, as the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School was charged of malversation. A warrant of arrest was issued, but he was not immediately found. When he was finally arrested, he posted bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court, he pleaded not guilty. In his defense, he contend that he have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article Ill, of the 1987 Constitution. He claimed that he signed the cash count only because he was pressured by Macasemo who assured him that Macasemo would settle everything. The collections in 1976, reflected in the Statement of Accountability, were not his but those of Macasemo, his superior, who had unliquidated cash advances. He also admitted having received the demand letter but he did not reply because he was already in Manila looking for another employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not exert any effort to have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying instead on Macasemo's assurance that he would settle the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared by State Auditing Examiner HELD: No, A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer. Thus he cannot invoke such right for he was not under custodial investigation. Furthermore, it cannot be said that he has been pressured to sign the auditor's report, but may have been persuaded only. PEOPLE vs. GUILLERMO FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: PEOPLE vs. BAGNATE FACTS: 

Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and of Rape with Homicide sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Death in each case.

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There were no eyewitnesses in the crime he committed but he voluntarily issued an extrajudicial confession assisted by a counsel, Atty. Brotamonte. After appellant’s confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and went back to his office. On appeal, Accused repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the crime were his brother-in-law. Moreover, he also alleged that he was maltreated by the investigators.

ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial confession was admissible in evidence against the accused. HELD: Yes. To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or duress was employed by the police authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion. Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime. PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO FACTS:      

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On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death. In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing. The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy (including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene – though not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N the DNA samples obtained from Vallejo’s clothes and those of the victim are admissible as evidence. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Buan (NBI forensic biologist) are conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case. The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that Vallejo is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.

5 ---- RIGHTS OF PERSON DURING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ---- 5 ((RIGHT TO BAIL)) TEEHANKEE vs. ROVIRA FACTS:     

Petitioner was detained for having been allegedly collaborating with the enemy forces during the Japanese occupation. However, no information was filed against her so she sought to be temporarily released under a verbal petition for bail. The Special Prosecutors recommended that the bail should be at Php 50, 000 but one of the respondent-Judge denied the bail for the reason that the recommended bail bond is not at par with the gravity of the offense. Petitioner sought to set aside the decision which was granted by the SC. The SC ordered the People’s Court to decide on the application. At the hearing, the second respondent-Judge asked the prosecution with questions allegedly tending to compel disclosure of evidence. The petitioner’s counsel objected for the reason that the court’s duty is only to grant the verbal petition for bail; however, the Judge reserved its decision. It was again elevated to the SC and the same scenario happened but this time, the special prosecutor was held in contempt for nondisclosure of evidence. The application for bail was left undecided.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be granted bail even if no information was filed against her. HELD: Yes. It is not necessary for a detained person to wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him before he can claim his right for bail. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detained or restraint, he can claim the guarantee of the Bill of Rights. There is no legal or just basis to deny such benefit to one against whom the proper authorities may yet to conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. The constitutional provision includes persons merely arrested with still no information against them as persons before conviction – one who has not been convicted. BAYLON vs. SISON FACTS:  

A case for double murder against several accused was docketed and later raffled to respondent judge. The accused then filed a petition for bail which was heard and granted by the trial court despite opposition from the prosecution.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the prosecution is entitled to be heard in a petition for bail. HELD: YES. When an accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the motion is resolved in summary proceedings or in the course of regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present all the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused before the court resolves the motion for bail. Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing, or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Respondent judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. OLALIA FACTS:    

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. 

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail. HELD: Yes. A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence. ((“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.”)) MEJIA vs. PAMARAN FACTS:  

Petitioner was found guilty of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for using her position as branch clerk of court to demand and receive money from the persons involved in certain cases in consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. Under P.D. No. 1606, petitioner is only afforded one stage of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process. HELD: NO. If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. Petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. ROQUE vs. OMBUDSMAN FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: WEBB vs. PEOPLE

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The petitioners in this case were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on the occasion thereof, killing Carmela herself and her mother, Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer. Petitioner Webb and his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had sought the disqualification of respondent judge on the ground that respondent judge allegedly told the media words that would seemed to have already concluded for their conviction of guilt for the crime committed, thus, being bias and partiality against them.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge has consistently and repeatedly shown bias and hostility against petitioners HELD: No, the Judge was not bias in this case. A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof. In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. It is true that the respondent judge erred in some of her rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two (132) pieces of evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility have been cured through the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the merits. This correction diminishes the strength of petitioners' charge that respondent judge is hopelessly biased against them. Therefore, the have not consistently shown bias and hostility against petitioners. ALONTE vs. HON. SAVELLANO FACTS:  

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Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified. ESTRADA VS. BADOY; IN RE: BADOY FACTS:    

Justice Anacleto Badoy of the Sandiganbayan is one of the Justices who heard the Plunder Case against Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, “whisked himself” to the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview in the news program Saksi. There, he announced the loss of a Resolution hepenned in connection with the plunder case against former President Estrada and others. The media sarcastically referred to the event as a “staged comedy” or a “television tryst.” Leading newspapers sarcastically remarked on the action resorted to by Justice Badoy. In his defense, Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo. So he requested the NBI to conduct an investigation but to no avail. Thus, on November 29, 2001, agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed that it was sold for afee, he decided to go to GMA-7 and report its loss in order that the

public may know that he is honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and cold, intending to proceed in the hostpital after the interview. ISSUE: Whether or not Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice? HELD: Yes. It has constantly been held that a justice must avoid impropriety or any appearance thereof at all times. Furthermore, justice should not be bound by the individual idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court. Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing norms. There is no reason why he should rush to GMA-7 to inform the public about the loss of a Resolution. It is an internal office incident which should not be reported to the whole nation. Not only did his conduct give an image that he could not manage his work effectively, but it also indicated that he had corrupt personnel. Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits. The loss of such Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed inside his own chamber. If lawyers are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse public opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity. Disclosure of such internal matter/information to the public for purposes of vanity makes a magistrate guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. PEOPLE vs. CRISOLOGO FACTS:     

Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf -mute, was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1 May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged against him through sign language but apparently no sign language expert or representative was available. The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was given due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; against him, and, further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is based. ((PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVEN)) PEOPLE vs. AUSTRIA 

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August 10, 1975, the police dug out of the ground in a sugarcane field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Found near his grave were the traces of blood and a bloodstained piece of wood. Post mortem examination showed that Tomas Azuelo's skull was fractured and his body sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds, fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The payroll, together with the sum of P771.40 intended for the wages of laborers of Hacienda Austria, of which Azuelo was the overseer, was missing. Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police working together with the Philippine Constabulary. One of the suspects, Pablo Austria, was the last person who was seen with Tomas Azuelo. They

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boarded a tricycle together, on August 9, 1975 at about 3:30 p.m., from the poblacion of Sagay and alighted at about 4:00 p.m. at crossing Tupas. The other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement dated September 17, 1975 of Pablo Austria, who imputed to his son Eduardo, his brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, the commission of the crime. On September 17, 1975, Gregorio Eras, Deputy Chief of Police, Sagay, Negros Occidental, filed a complaint for robbery with homicide against Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria, Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, After preliminary examination, Judge Emilio Ignalaga, Acting Municipal Judge, Sagay, Negros Occidental, issued a warrant of arrest against herein appellants. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pablo Austria testified that Tomas Azuelo was his second degree cousin. On August 9, 1975, he was summoned by the wife of Tomas Azuelo to fetch water. He was in Azuelo's house from 11:00 o'clock in the morning, took his lunch thereat upon invitation of Azuelo's wife and waited for Tomas Azuelo up to 7:00 o'clock in the evening for his compensation in plowing their farm. On August 14, 1975, he was picked up without a warrant of arrest by a policeman and a PC soldier while working on the concrete cover of the deceased's tomb. He was investigated without informing him of his right to remain silent and to counsel. After six (6) days in detention he was released upon the intercession of Iluminada, wife of the deceased. On September 17, 1975 he was again picked up by Voltaire Yee at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Jaime de la Torre, who was with him in the PC stockade, struck him in the head with a revolver on orders of a certain Torenas, a PC soldier. Later, he was brought out of the PC stockade and Torenas kicked and boxed him. The following day, Alberto Olario, the commanding officer, again maltreated him as he refused to admit participation in the killing of Tomas Azuelo. On orders of the commanding officer, Voltaire Yee prepared an affidavit. He did not read the affidavit, as he does not know how to read, nor was it read to him. Voltaire Yee forced him to affix his thumbmark in the affidavit inside the office of Judge Ignalaga. (TSN, December 4, 1978, pp. 171-200) In his testimony, Jaime de la Torre disowned the statements attributed to him during the investigation conducted by Sgt. Vicente Aquino and instead declared that it was not Eduardo Austria but Carlos Capitle, Jr. who borrowed his hoe in the afternoon of August 9, 1975. He also contradicted the statements contained in the affidavit that he saw Pablo Austria, Eduardo Austria and another person standing near the body of the deceased. Instead, he testified that in the sugarcane field that day (August 14, 1975), he saw Carlos Capitle, Jr. and Celestino Capitle with another person looking at the dead body of Azuelo. He helped cover the dead with grass on orders of Carlos Capitle with warning not to tell his family or anybody, otherwise his family will be killed. He admitted ownership of the hoe but denied any participation in the killing. He also claimed that he was arrested without warrant and detained for more than a month in the PC headquarters, at Sagay, Negros Occidental. During said detention he was investigated and allegedly maltreated by Captain Olario (TSN, January 22, 1980, pp. 149-170, 210-221, 393-404). On March 18, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants of the imputed crime

ISSUE: W/N the appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution. HELD: NO. In the first place, as stated in the appealed decision, the evidence of the prosecution against appellant Eduardo Austria is merely circumstantial. Aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the deceased appellants, there is neither direct evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the crime. The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To warrant conviction in criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence do not prove an unbroken link of events that could give rise to a reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed offense. To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE FACTS:  

Petitioner was charged with malversation after he failed to produce the missing amount incurred during his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier. He insisted his innocence, claiming that the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other people.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s presumed innocence was not sufficiently proved contrary.

HELD: NO. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the missing money to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. Petition is DENIED. DIZON-PAMINTUAN vs. PEOPLE FACTS: 

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Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when he arrived at his residence, he immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. They were made to lie face down on the floor and thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police and an entrapment was made with their participation. He and his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that the stall is owned by one named Fredo. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but set aside the penalty imposed.

ISSUE: W/N Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 violates the constitutional presumption of innocence. HELD: No. Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 (ANTI-FENCING LAW) expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. The constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the part of the accused to explain his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is "some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639] CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION ANGELES FACTS:  

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Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that respondent continuously defied the court’s Resolution. Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innoncence.

HELD: Yes. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. Court agrees with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. PEOPLE VS BERMAS FACTS:  

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Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape wherein the victim was his own 15-years old daughter. Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death which at that time was in force hence an automatic review by the Supreme Court was in order. In a 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court including the fact the accused was denied his constitutional right to due process specifically the right to effective and vigilant counsel. In the case at hand, 3 different counsels were assigned to handle the case of the accused but all 3 were negligent in handling the case. The first could not give justice to the accused, the second vanished in the middle of the ongoing trial and the third was reluctant and uninspired to handle the case with zeal.

ISSUE: W/N the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. HELD: Yes. In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights. The constitutional mandate is reflected In the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. PEOPLE vs. TULIN     

MT Tabangao, cargo vessel owned by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 404M was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates detained the crews and took control of the vessel, the PNOC logo were painted over with black and was painted over with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore and later went back to Batangas, Philippines and remained at sea Days later, it sailed back to Singapore and later another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navi's crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee sailed back to the Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates and was ordered not to report to authorities. However, the chief engineer reported the incident to the coast guard and thereafter followed a series of arrests were effected and charged the accused of qualified piracy or violation of PD 532.

ISSUE: W/N the accused are guilty of qualified piracy.

HELD: YES. The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing: (a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides: SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom. The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port. We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected. FLORES vs. RUIZ FACTS:   

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Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order of Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of indirect contempt. Flores was actually arrested on August 28, 1972 and has since been detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release by virtue of a bond of P500. The reason for the delayed arrest is that Flores was given a period "to inform the court whether or not he relinquishes his possession over the land in question." The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution to satisfy the award of damages against Flores in a civil case. Flores failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence, Judge Ruiz ordered Flores to place in possession the heirs of Mandac (plaintiff in the civil case). For the refusal of Flores to vacate the disputed land, contempt proceedings were instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention. Flores questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for contempt, and for not having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished a copy of the motion, or properly "arraigned" before trial. Flores claims to have been deprived due process of law which voided the proceedings against him as for lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed on him. Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has waived his right to counsel as evidenced by the transcript of the stenographic notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was not signed by the stenographer. According to Flores, when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel, Ruiz told Flores to deliver possession of the premises within 10 days. In spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, Judge Ruiz, however, demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Pastores, Flores was made to sign an understanding to deliver up the premises within the period indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned.

ISSUE: W/N Flores was denied due process of law.

HELD: YES. The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver. The practice has always been tar the trial court to provide the accused with a counsel de officio, if he has no counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford one. This is because "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he doe; not know how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated." Here, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge, nor was properly "arraigned," since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel of record, Flores could not have willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. It is certainly much easier to believe that Flores asked for postponement, because of the absence of his counsel, but that Judge Ruiz denied the plea. Neither has Judge Ruiz denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly informed of the contempt charge, nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof, as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter-of duty of the court All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that "defendant Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts." Therefore, the proceedings on the contempt charge has been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he seeks. PEOPLE vs. LARRANAGA FACTS: 

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On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape, and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court: o that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, who told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew, who were in a red car. Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing, and were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly, o that after stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal, o that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline, o that Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine, and o that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being followed by the group while boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out. In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following: o that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts, o that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics, o that in the evening of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, Quezon City, o that representatives of four airline companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to July 17, 1997, and o that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard saw him in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997. The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu City, celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening. Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16, 1997, accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only able to finish the work at 10:00 the following morning. Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of July 16, 1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM Bar, and went home at 3:00 the following morning. Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUE W/N the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during the trial of these cases.

HELD: Yes. What appellants obviously claim as having been trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a) right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial. RIGHT TO COUNSEL The appointment of counsel de oficio after the unceremonious withdrawal of appellants' counsel de parte is not proscribed by the Constitution. An examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution. And even if we are to extend the "application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable him to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter. Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just because the trial court did not grant their request for suspension of the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An application for a continuance in order to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accused's right to counsel. The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS EXAMINE THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and prolix questioning. While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice. If some of the prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination, it was not because appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross-examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross examine the witnesses" against them. RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL We cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel. A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct. This is because he is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him. It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases. RIGHT TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. In the present case, there is no showing of violation of due process which justifies the reversal or setting aside of the trial court's findings. TEVES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS:

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On or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

ISSUE: W/N there is conspiracy in the case at bar. HELD: No. Petitioner Teresita Teves must be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators. In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order. ESTRADA vs. PEOPLE FACTS:  

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An Information charging Mary Helen Estrada with estafa was filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City. Estrada signed an undertaking that in case of her failure to appear during the trial despite due notice, her absence would constitute as an express waiver of her right to be present during trial and promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then proceed with the hearing in absentia. When the schedule for hearing and presentation for evidence came, counsel for petitioner failed to appear. Estrada jumped bail and was considered to have waived her right to present evidence. The RTC thus rendered judgment based only on prosecution evidence: o Junimar Bermundo (complainant) applied for employment in Japan with Estrada and paid P68,700.00 for it. o Estrada then told Junimar to proceed to the Japanese Embassy to claim the plane tickets, however, he learned that nothing was filed with the Embassy. o Junimar decided to abandon his plan of going to Japan and just get the money from Estrada— which she failed to return despite receipt of a demand letter. She was convicted of Estafa by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations by the RTC. The CA denied her Petition for Certiorari, thus Estrada filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N trial court denied Estrada of her constitutional right to be heard and be assisted by counsel. HELD: NO. At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was pending should be emphasized. In fact, it appears that from the beginning, the address she furnished the trial court was incorrect. From such facts alone, petitioner’s arguments regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of her constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment in absentia. In Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that such promulgation is valid provided the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or counsel. In the present case, the records bear out the fact that copies of the decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of petitioner and her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez, and there is no question that the judgment was indeed recorded in the criminal docket of the court. From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified of the decision upon its recording in the criminal docket on September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen (15) days therefrom within which to file an appeal. Evidently, the notice of appeal filed only on April 5, 2000 was filed out of time. DUMLAO, IGOT vs. COMELEC

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Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void HELD: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).” And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.F PEOPLE vs. ACURAM FACTS ISSUE HELD ACEBEDO vs. SARMIENTO FACTS: 

It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan.

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As there were no further proceedings in the meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento was not in agreement as shown by his order of denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two more years, came the trial with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for 7 June 1967 such witness did not show up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for Acebedo, however, not only objected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Judge this time acceded, but would likewise base his order of dismissal, orally given, on the crossexamination of complainant not having started as yet. Later that same day, the Judge did reconsider the order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the complainant had already started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N Acebedo is entitled to have the case dismissed based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. HELD: YES. The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. More specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an accused being twice put in jeopardy. Herein, Acebedo not once but twice did seek to have the prosecution for damage to property against him terminated as the matter was pending for at least 6 years, the first time he sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the complaining witness testified on direct examination but made no appearance when his crossexamination was to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had without offending the provision on double jeopardy. ROCO vs. CONTRERAS FACTS: