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CASE No. 1 (Dela Cruz vs. Dimaano) A complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano was filed alleging that respondent notarized an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs. It enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased parents’ property. Respondent explained that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct and that navarro would not lie to him having known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Investigating Commissioner of the Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that with respondent’s admission of having notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as thus established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial Law, the Commission recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. Court’s Ruling We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice5 now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides: x x x Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public

instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution CASE No. 2 (Baysac vs. Aceron-Papa) Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant) owns a property which was mortgage to Sps. Cruz and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 3 was notarized by Atty. Renelie B. Mayuga-Donato. When the complainant went to the RD to get a certified true copy of the certificate of title of the property because the property had a prospective buyer. However, complainant was surprised to find out that their title had already been cancelled, and in lieu thereof, a new title was issued in favor of Spouses Cruz. Complainant found out that the property was transferred in the name of Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as the owner of the property, was notarized by respondent. Complainant denied having ever signed the Deed of Absolute Sale and having ever appeared before a notary public to acknowledge the same. He claimed that he was in Tanza, Cavite that entire day with Ms. Angeles, searching for a buyer of the property. Complainant further stated he allegedly presented to the notary public when he acknowledged having executed the document was his Community Tax Certificate issued on 2006 or three years prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The NBI confirmed that the signature of complainant in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the signatures in other sample documents which he actually signed were not made by one and the same person. Complainant claimed that respondent's act of improperly notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale caused him injustice because he was ousted from his property. In view of these circumstances, complainant filed a Complaint; for Disbarment with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for violation of Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Records show that respondent did not file any answer to the complaint. Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended for two years as notary public. IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. Instead of suspension for two years as notary public, the IBP Board of Governors recommended the disqualification of respondent from being commissioned as notary public for three years.

CASE No.3 (Iringan vs. Gumangan) Court’s Ruling We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively liable, but we modify the penalty imposed. We note that the complainant and the IBP Board of Governors cited Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice28 as basis for the complained acts of respondent. However, we find Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, to be the applicable law at the time the complained acts took place. In this case, however, it would have been physically impossible for complainant to appear before respondent and sign the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 13, 2003. On that same day, complainant was with Ms. Angeles in Tanza. Further, the NBI's findings in its Questioned Documents Report show that the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by complainant. These allegations remain unrebutted despite the opportunity given to complainant to do so.

A civil case was instituted by spouses Renato and Cannen Iringan against Carmelo, who is Renato's brother. Sps. Iringan alleged in their complaint that they are the owners of a piece of land, registered under Renato’s name, a two-storey structure stands on said piece of land, which was used as a restaurant with the name "Emilia's Kitchenette. Pursuant to a Contract of Lease, Renato agreed to lease to Carmelo the land and the two-storey building thereon for a period of one year. The Contract of Lease was notarized by Atty. Gumangan. The lease expired but Carmelo continued to possess the premises upon spouses Iringan's tolerance. Sps Iringan demanded that Carmelo vacate the premises but to no avail. A Final Demand was served upon Carmelo signed by Atty. Gumangan, with Renato's approval and conformity. Carmelo, however, still refused to vacate the premises. Sps Iringan had no other recourse but to file an illegal detainer case.

Respondent should have been diligent enough to make sure that the person appearing before her is the same person acknowledging the document to be notarized. Respondent should have checked the authenticity of the evidence of identity presented to her. Further, she should not have relied on the CTC in view of the ease with which CTCs are obtained these days.

In his defense, Carmelo averred that he and Renato are brothers. The premises actually belonged to their late parents and upon their parents' deaths, the premises descended to Carmelo, Renato, and their other siblings. Hence, Renato is not the sole owner of the premises even though the certificate of title to the land is registered in his name alone. Renato is a mere trustee of the premises for his siblings.

It should likewise be pointed out that the CTC is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.

Carmelo further claimed that the Contract of Lease for the premises was spurious as he had never entered into such a contract with Renato. Carmelo asserted that he did not sign the Contract of Lease nor did he appear before Atty. Gumangan who notarized the same.

By affixing her notarial seal on the instrument, she converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. As a consequence, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that: (1) all the parties therein personally appeared before her; (2) they are all personally known to her; (3) they were the same persons who executed the instrument; (4) she inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before her that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. By notarizing a spurious document, respondent has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment.

MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the Sps. Iringan. “This Contract of Lease is a public document, which needs no further proof of its content and is entitled to much faith and confidence, unless clear evidences show otherwise. Further, the witnesses saw with their own eyes Carmelo and Renato signing the Contract of Lease. These are impartial witnesses.” The RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment. Carmelo instituted the present administrative complaint against Atty. Gumangan, alleging that it is too obvious that the alleged Lease Contract prepared and notarized by [Atty. Gumangan] is fraudulent since the same was executed and subscribed before [Atty. Gumangan] on December 30, 2005, when in fact Renato Iringan's CTC (08768743) was issued on January 17, 2006 and that Carmelo's own CTC does not

appear thereon, meaning that he never appeared to execute it. He only saw him for the first time in the Court. Atty. Gumangan, in his Answer asserted that Carmelo instituted the instant administrative complaint to harass and embarrass him, and to extricate himself, Carmelo, from the felonious acts of dispossessing his very own brother of the latter's property. Atty. Gumangan admitted that he notarized the Contract of Lease, but maintained that Carmelo, together with Renato, personally executed said Contract before Atty. Gumangan. Atty. Gumangan proffered the following explanation for the irregularities as regards the CTCs. That the Carmelo and Renato appeared before him, together with their witnesses, affixed their signature on the Contract of Lease, directed them to produce their CTCs, but they failed to do so, they instead promised to secure their community tax certificates the earliest possible opportunity. Atty. Gumangan belied Carmelo's claim that they do not know each other. According to Atty. Gumangan, after Renato and Carmelo executed the Contract of Lease before him, he frequented Emilia's Kitchenette, which was only 500 meters away from the RTC, and Tabuk City, Kalinga is a small community where almost everyone know each other. Atty. Gumangan also argued that the Contract of Lease was not the principal subject. It was Carmelo who alleged that the Contract of Lease between him and Renato was spurious, but both the MTCC and the R TC found that the notarized Contract was a public document which needed no further proof of its content and was entitled to much faith and confidence, absent clear evidence to the contrary. Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that the complaint for disbarment on the grounds relied on be dismissed for insufficiency of merit to sustain the plea for disbarment and/or suspension. IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the Recommendation. Court’s Ruling The Court wholly agrees with the findings and recommendations of Com. Almeyda and the IBP Board of Governors. Highlighting the importance of the requirement of competent evidence of identity of the parties, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice explicitly prohibited the notary

public, who did not personally know the parties, from notarizing an instrument or document without the same. Atty. Gumangan violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the Contract of Lease without competent evidence of identity of Renato and Carmelo. CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties' identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. onsidering the ease with which a CTC could be obtained these days and recognizing the established unreliability of a CTC in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, the Court did not include the CTC in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized. Per Atty. Andomang's Affidavit, Atty. Gumangan did not submit to the RTC Clerk of Court his Notarial Report and a duplicate original of the Contract of Lease. Atty. Gumangan did not dispute Atty. Andomang's Affidavit nor provide any explanation for his failure to comply with such requirements. The Court holds Atty. Gumangan administratively liable and imposes upon him the penalty of suspension of his notarial commission for two years. CASE No. 4 (Laquindanum vs Quintana) Judge Laquindanum wrote a letter to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents notarized by him had been reaching her office. However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato. According to Judge Laquindanum, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City. She further alleged that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office. Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before the RTC Midsayap, Cotabato. He claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP President. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition.

Further, Atty. Quintana justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire Philippines. Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato. In a hearing, Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004. Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of Death. Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission had already expired in 2005. OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years. Court’s Ruling We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses. There is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time which partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.

Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes. While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so. That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. CASE No. 5 (Tigno vs Aquino) Respondent Sps. Aquino filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria. The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a fishpond. Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property. Bustria died. Petitioner Tigno, in substitution of her deceased father, attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. The Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. The RTC denied the Motion for Consignation. The Aquinos alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were De Francia, the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and Judge Cariño, who notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria.

The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious. the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.

exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria.

CASE No. 6 Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid. Court’s Ruling A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him. Under the law, the Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary public. It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. Municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies. The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial activity. We should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge Cariño is sufficient to

Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law. Judge Rojo argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in his sala. Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit. The OCA found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined. OCA ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.

Court’s Ruling This court finds Judge Rojo guilty. Trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with them. Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.

CASE No. 7 (Jandoquile vs.Atty. Revilla) Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas and Elmer Alvarado. Heneraline is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act per Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he: (c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree. Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards. Hence, prays for his disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. admitted Jandoquile’s allegations. But, according to him, the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally, are not grounds for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. Court’s Ruling We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaintaffidavit. The notarial certificate shows his signature as a notary public, with a valid notarial commission valid. He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants. On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. In this case, Heneraline is a sister of his wife; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaintaffidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule. Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.

To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice. Respondent is reprimanded and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act for a period of 3 months.

CASE No. 8 (Mahilum vs Lezama) The complainant averred that the respondent notarized a Deed of Donation executed by her estranged husband as donor and their common daughter, Jennifer as donee, pertaining to the donor's share of one-half portion of land. She alleged that she has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not have personally appeared before the respondent because during those dates, she was in the USA. In his Answer, the respondent asserted that the donor, donee and instrumental witnesses were all physically present when the document was signed. He stated that he is personally acquainted with Rodolfo and he had no reason to cast doubts upon him when he introduced his daughter Jennifer who came all the way from the USA to visit her father. The complainant submitted a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration showing that Jennifer did not enter the Philippines in the year 2006. Despite opportunity to submit evidence rebutting the foregoing certification, the respondent failed to file any. Respondent only attached to his Answer is an Affidavit executed by Rodolfo attesting that Jennifer was physically present when she signed the deed of donation and that complainant is using this complaint as part of her personal vendetta against Rodolfo. The IBP found that the respondent failed to exercise diligence in ascertaining the identity of the person who appeared before him as donee considering that based on official records, Jennifer never set foot in the Philippine soil at any time in the year 2006. Hence, his notarial commission was revoked and prohibited from being commissioned as a Notary Public for a period of two years. The respondent moved for reconsideration as the penalty imposed is not commensurate with the offense charged. He stressed there was no claim whatsoever that Jennifer’s signature in the deed of donation was forged or falsified and further,

asserted that he did not benefit financially from the notarization of the deed of donation and that the same did not cause any damage or injury to the complainant. IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s MR. Court’s Ruling The Court agrees with and sustains the IBP’s finding that the official record from the Bureau of Immigration showing that Jennifer never traveled to the Philippines in the year 2006 substantially established that indeed she could not have personally appeared before the respondent when he notarized the deed of donation in 2006. It is worthy to note that Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that affiants must personally appear to the notary public. The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended toa private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. Contrary to the IBP’s findings that such failure was due to carelessness, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent deliberately disregarded the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Notarial Law. The affiant was not physically present during the notarization but the notary public nevertheless affixed his seal and signature attesting that the affiant "personally appeared" before him when in truth and in fact, she did not. The Court revoked his notarial commission and he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for 1 year.

CASE No. 9 (Gaddi vs Velasco) According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada Swimming School when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to the COO. Believing that Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the management that

he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelo's complaint, the police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano.

free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act.

Upon hearing about the said incident, Gaddi pleaded with Angelo’s wife and the BLSS Programs Manager for permission to leave their office located in Sta. Ana, Manila and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of acceding to her plea, they commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission that the BLSS in Solano was unauthorized. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten admission and left the office. Subsequently, Gaddi found out that Angelo filed a complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten admission, which was already notarized by Velasco.

In the present case, the notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself indicates: "SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO. __________ ISSUED AT/ON ___________." The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily and refused to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate.

Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Gaddi denied that she personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. She alleged that she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any competent evidence of identity or sign the notarial register. Velasco alleged that Gaddi appeared before him in his notarial office ascertained Gaddi’s identity, through two identification cards – her BLSSID and TIN ID. The Investigating Commissioner gave more credence to Gaddi’s statement that she did not personally appear before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized and found it contradictory to logic and human experience that Gaddi went first to Makati City to have her self-incriminating handwritten admission notarized before proceeding to Nueva Vizcaya and the ID presented by Velasco were computer-generated from the BLSS office. The IBP recommended that Notarial Commission be REVOKED DISQUALIFIED for being Commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years.

and

Court’s Ruling We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations with modification. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory’s

Considering these findings and our previous rulings, Velasco should not only be disqualified for two years as a notary public, he must also be suspended from the practice of law for one year. CASE No. 10 (Bartolome vs BAsilio)

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