Margie's Digest

TOPIC:

CHAPTER V – SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION C. OTHER ISSUANCES WHICH HAVE THE BINDING FORCE AND

EFFECT OF LAWS TITLE:

AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent. (264 SCRA 19, L - 116422 04 NOVEMBER 1996)

FACTS:

Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser were both former employees of SSS who availed of compulsory retirement benefits provided for under RA No. 660. Both also claimed with the SSS “financial assistance” benefits as provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56, Series of 1971. The subject SSS resolution was disallowed by COA in its ruling issued on July 10, 1989 stating that the scheme of financial assistance authorized by SSS is similar to separate retirement plan or incentives/separation pay plans adopted by other government agencies which in turn results in the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws. The SSS thereafter sought presidential authority to continue implementing Res. 56 to which the Office of the Executive Secretary replied that the Office of the President is not inclined to favorably act on the request or let alone overrule COA’s earlier ruling. Petitioners Conte and Boiser sought reconsideration of COA’s ruling disallowing their claim and also sought payment from SSS of benefits as prescribed under Res. 56, both of which were denied by COA and SSS.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the benefits provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56 be considered simply as financial assistance for retiring employees, or does such a scheme constitute a supplementary retirement plan prescribed by RA 4968.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that SSS Resolution No. 56 constitute a supplementary retirement plan, thus, within the ambit of Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 which bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Resolution No. 56 is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, the assailed COA decision is upheld, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is declared illegal, void and of no effect.

TOPIC: TITLE: URDANETA,

CHAPTER V – SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION D. ORDINANCES JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANGASINAN, ET AL. (93 SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS:

A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff Primiscias for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 after being apprehended by a member of the Municipal Police for overtaking a truck. Primiscias thereafter filed for the annulment of the subject ordinance with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from enforcing the said ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered Ordinance No. 3, S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Appellant appealed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is null and void.

HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that subject ordinance has been repealed by the enactment of RA 4316 and has therefor, become null and void stating that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The Supreme Court further averred that local ordinances, in this case, a municipal ordinance, are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state and whenever there is conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.

TOPIC:

CHAPTER VI – LAWS D. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE – ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987 CONSTITUTION

TITLE:

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO and ROMAN OZAETA vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA, and JOSE AVILES (15 SCRA 479, L-23326D 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS:

The House of Representatives enacted into law RA 3836 entitled – An Act Amending Subsection (c), Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty Six, as amended by RA 3096, which will enable members of congress to retire regardless of age after having served as such for at least twelve years of which not less than four years have been rendered as elective officer. After enactment of RA 3836, PHILCONSA, a non-stock, non-profit civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine laws instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and disbursing officers of both congress from passing in audit vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to RA 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of both houses, and their successors in office from paying said vacation and gratuities.

ISSUE:

Is the enactment of RA 3836 constitutional in so far as the said act allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Congressmen and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.

HELD:

No, the enactment of RA 3836 is unconstitutional as it violates three provisions of the constitution, namely – Art. IV, Sec. 14, the prohibition of increase in the salaries of members of congress, as the act provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senator and members of the House of Representatives without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all is members approving such increase; Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1 as it is patently discriminating; and, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par. 1, the title of a bill shall not have embrace more than one subject as the title of the said bill is not in any way related to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 (establishing the GSIS, providing for both retirement and insurance benefits of its members). RA 3836 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

TOPIC:

CHAPTER VI – LAWS D. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE – ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987 CONSTITUTION

TITLE:

BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (21 SCRA 496, l-28089D 25 OCTOBER 1967

FACTS:

RA 4790 creating the Muncipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads: " xxx…SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Tagalog…xxx” Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections citing that the said law included two barrios from the Municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries of the two provinces. Since election are forthcoming, the COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelve barrios from Cotabato Province under the new Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Does the title of RA 4790 conform with the constitutional requirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled, to wit: 1. No,

the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it is misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, both of Lanao del Sur, and dismembers two municipalities of the Province of Cotabato.

2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR DIFFERENT LAWS F. NATURALIZATION LAWS TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY AND ASSURANCE CO., INC. (1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961) FACTS:

The case pertains to an appeal made by the Republic in connection with the granting of certificate of naturalization in favor of petitioner and appellee, Benjamin Co, issued by the Court of First Instance of Abra. Petitioner Co was born on 13 March 1931 in Bangued, Abra to Chinese parents, Go Cham and Yu Suan. He is married to Leonor Go and has a two-month only child. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco which he says has a working capital of P10,000.00 he claims to have accumulated thru savings and part owner of Go Tian Store also in Bangued, Abra. In the year 1956, he earned P1,000.00 from his tobacco business and expects to earn P2,000.00 in an undetermined time frame. As part owner of Go Tian Store, he receives a sum of less than P3,000.00 from his father, representing ¼ of the sales of the said store aside from his monthly salary of P120.00 as salesman therein. Petitioner Co claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes but admitted that he failed to file his income tax return for his earnings from the Go Tian Store and his tobacco business. On cross examination, he was asked if he believed in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution to which he replied that he believed in the laws of the Philippines without mentioning what principles of the constitution he knew. When asked about which law of the Philippines he believed in, he answered “democracy”. When asked why he failed to file his income tax return, he claims that his father has already filed his income tax return and promised to file his. He was only able to present his alien certificate of registration but failed to present those of his wife and child.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner/appellee Benjamin Co should be issued a certificate of naturalization.

HELD:

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision of the CFI of Abra granting petitioner/appellee issuance of certificate of naturalization. Benjamin Co failed to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying the constitution. It averred that the scope of the world law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all principles underlying the constitution.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs FIRST ASSURANCE CO., INC. (1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961) FACTS:

NATIONAL

SURETY

&

The case pertains to an appeal on the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the claim for insurance benefits of plaintiff Diosdado Ty who was employed as Operator Mechanic Foreman at the Broadway Cotton Factory in Caloocan City with a monthly salary of P185.00. On December 24, 1953 two months after the plaintiff got for himself a total of 18 insurance policies, a fire broke out at the factory where plaintiff worked which caused him physical injuries leading to the temporary total disability of his left hand. Plaintiff then filed a notice of accident and notice of claim with all the defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy, which provides for indemnity for total or partial disability due to loss of either hand. Loss of a hand as defined in the insurance policy meant the lost by amputation through the bones of the wrist. Plaintiff/appellant contends that since the injuries he obtained from the fire of December 24, 1953 has prevented him from performing his work or labor necessary in his occupation, he is qualified to claim his benefits on the insurance policies issued to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DIOSDADO C. TY is qualified to claim insurance benefits under Part II of the insurance policies issued to him which provides for indemnity for total or partial disability due to loss of either hand.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila stating that the insurance contract is the law between the parties. The terms in the insurance policies secured by Diosdado Ty were clear, express and specific, that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss. It added that an interpretation that would include the injuries sustained by Diosdado Ty which are mere fractures would be unwarranted.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE TITLE: SIMON DELA CRUZ vs. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., INC. (17 SCRA 559, L-21574 30 JUNE 1966) FACTS:

The case pertains to an appeal filed by Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc. on the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan awarding indemnities to Simon Dela Cruz on the insurance policy of his son Eduardo Dela Cruz of which the older Dela Cruz was a beneficiary. The younger Dela Cruz died on January 1, 1957 while he was engaged in a boxing match which was part of the New Year’s celebration of ItogonSuyoc Mines where Eduardo was employed. During the match, Eduardo accidentally slipped giving his opponent the opportunity to hit him at the back of his head. After being struck in the head, Eduardo fell and hit the rope of the ring. He was brought to the nearest hospital but expired the next day. Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc. denied the claims of Simon Dela Cruz which led to the filing of the instant case before the CFI of Pangasinan. Capital Insurance contends that the death of the insured which was caused the boxing match he participated in, was not accidental in nature and therefore, not covered by the insurance policy. The insurance company claims that the voluntary participation of the younger Dela Cruz in the boxing match was the means that produced the injury, which in turn, caused his death. Therefore, the circumstances of his death should not be considered an accident or accidental.

ISSUE:

Whether the death of EDUARDO DELA CRUZ was accidental in nature or not as prescribed by the insurance policy issued in his favor by Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan granting Simon Dela Cruz indemnity from the insurance policy of his son. It stated that the circumstances of Eduardo Dela Cruz death was not among those declared outside the protection of the insurance contract. It added that where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury from accident. The decision of the CFI of Pangasinan is AFFIRMED.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR DIFFERENT LAWS F. NATURALIZATION LAWS TITLE:

RICHARD VELASCO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (108 PHIL 234, L-14214 25 MAY 1960)

FACTS:

The case if a petition for naturalization which was denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila due to the failure of the petitioner to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner and appellant Richard Velasco was born to spouses Peter Velasco and Miguel Tiu on 12 May 1932 and has since resided, finished school and worked in the Philippines. Although his father has been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, petitioner did not follow his father’s citizenship as he was already 23 years old at the time of naturalization and continues to be a citizen of Formosa, Republic of China. He earns P150.00/month from his current employment at Wilson Drug Store, which was partly owned by his mother, and has savings in Philippine banks and shares of stocks in two Philipppine companies. In the course of the trial, petitioner’s moral character was attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant at the Manila Police Department and who was also a character witness in the petition for naturalization of petitioner’s brother, and, Mrs. Paz Eugenio, a housekeeper and soon-to-be mother-in-law of the petitioner which led the trial court to believe that the petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends. The trial court also found discrepancies in the documentary evidence presented by petitioner with regards to his full name, Richard Velasco, Richard Chua Velasco, and Richard C. Velasco. No evidence was submitted to prove that all three names are one and the same person. His income of P150.00/month was also not substantial to meet the requirement of the naturalization law considering the low purchasing power of the peso and high cost of living in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner/appellant should is qualified to become a naturalized Filipino Citizen.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying the petition for naturalization of petitioner/appellant Richard Vealsco. The Court averred that his employment was merely a convenient arrangement planned by the petitioner and his family in order to comply with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen, one must have a lucrative income or occupation. The court further stated that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”.