Digest 0302.docx

on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that “information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”

AKBAYAN vs. Aquino on 11:38 AM in Case Digests, Political Law 0 G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

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JPEPA Diplomatic Negotiations are Privileged Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of Inquiry Treaty-making Power Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information FACTS: This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc. Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed. ISSUES:

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Whether or not petitioners have legal standing Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process RULING: Standing In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence. JPEPA,

A

Matter

of

Public

Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern xxx From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations 1

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Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security? While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the “informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general. Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a

judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation. Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical. The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confidential. Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative process. Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process? In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose “definite propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Treaty-making

power

of

the

President

xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464. The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx. As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department. xxx While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the 2

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President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation. Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege? That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it. xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof. “Showing

Need”

of

Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights. xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern. Right

to

information

vis-a-vis

Executive

Privilege

xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

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PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008 Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) 3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). (Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. 3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

RULINGS: 1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held: x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the

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Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOAAD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards. Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS) This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. CONCLUSION: In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, 5

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RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017

Facts: This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue: Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

Ruling: The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement 6

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of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.

Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause

1.

Power of Judicial Review

2.

Actual Case or Controversy

3.

Facial Challenge

4.

Locus Standi

5.

Declaratory Relief

6.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

Issue/s: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

IMBONG VS OCHOA G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

1.

Right to life

2.

Right to health

3.

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4.

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5.

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6.

Due process clause

7.

Equal protection clause

8.

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

1.

Actual Case or Controversy

2.

Facial Challenge

3.

Locus Standi

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

4.

Declaratory Relief

5.

One Subject/One Title Rule

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Discussions: 1.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

PROCEDURAL

2.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

protection against hazardous products. 3.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7.

The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

8.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. 7

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Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an

immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.” Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

that individual Members could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down. 2.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Ruling/s: SUBSTANTIAL 1.

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed

3.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)

8

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right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether

or

not

the

RH

Law

contravenes

the

Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. 6.

4.

Section

23A

(2)(i)

of

the

RH

Law,

the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as

which

observed by the petitioners are not vague.

permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy

and

goes

against

the

constitutional

safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures. 5.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. 7.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

Development-Appropriate

Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

8.

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private

and

providers

non-government to

render

bonoRH services does

not

health 48

amount

care

hours to

service of pro

involuntary

servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. 9

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medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and

regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. 3.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals

PROCEDURAL

standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is

1.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case

invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a

or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for

procedural technicality which the Court has, on more

judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and

than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing

its implementing rules have already taken effect and

non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,

that budgetary measures to carry out the law have

taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public

already been passed, it is evident that the subject

interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured

petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated

by the operation of a law or any other government act.

earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now. 2.

In

this

jurisdiction,

originating

from

the

the

application

U.S.

has

of

doctrines

been

generally

4.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs

maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the

and so the Court would just consider them as petitions

Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to

for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original

strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover

jurisdiction.

statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those

implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court

involving religious freedom, and other fundamental

may consider them as petitions for prohibition under

rights. The underlying reason for this modification is

Rule 65.

simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,

5.

Where

the

case

has

far-reaching

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill

under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the

rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various

Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies

provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive

involving rights which are legally demandable and

health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated

enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there

and germane to the overriding objective to control the

has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph

or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

of Section 2 of the RH Law:

instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, 10

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

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SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse; 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RHIRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

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