Dh B2 Andrew Card White House Fdr- Questions And Withdrawal Notice For Handwritten Interview Notes- Classified

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ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: Andy Card [White House] Document Date: 03-31-2004 Document Type: Handwritten Notes Special Media: From: To: Subject:

notes of interview with Andy Card

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Commission Sensitive 3/30/2004 "Day of Questions for Andrew Card Introduction The White House has provided us with the transcripts of six interviews you conducted with various members of the press in August of 2002 regarding your recollection of what happened on the day of 9/11. In the interest of time and efficiency, we would like to use those interviews as a baseline for our discussion here today, and only delve into those specific topics that we need clarification on for purposes of our report. I.

Initial Notification - WTC I

(1) Do you recall who specifically first informed you of the first strike on the World Trade Center, and what information was provided? [NB: Card said it was the "Situation Room" who first informed him - without a name; Deborah Loewer testified that she informed Card, with the President next to him] (2) Your recollection is that Mr, Rove was the first person to inform the President of the /first strike, is that correct? (3) Was there a television set up for viewing the events before the President went into the classroom to do the event? (4) To your knowledge, did the President speak with anyone in Washington about news of the first attack before he went into the classroom? Do you recall him speaking to Dr. Rice? If so, what information was provided? II.

Notification of Second Strike — Decision

As we understand, you informed the President of the second strike and said to him . "America is under attack." Ifal /fa jMV>tb (5) Did you consider advising the President to curtail his classroom visit?

It

(6) In your mind at the time, was that attack still underway? In other words, did you think the two strikes on the World Trade Center were it, or did you think there was more out there? (7) At this time ~ while you are still at the school — did you have any information about other aircraft that were supposedly hijacked or compromised? Had you spoken to anyone at the NMCC or the Pentagon? To your knowledge, had the President spoken to the Secretary of Defense? (8) What actions or decisions were made - by you or the President -- before you departed the school? Specifically, was there any direction to the Defense Department about the

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nation's response to the attacks? Were you aware that fighter aircraft were being scrambled? III.

Threat to Air Force One

(9) When and how were you informed of the threat to Air Force One? [NB: "We were in the limousine, and we heard about the attack on the Pentagon. And we also heard that there had been a threat to Air Force One. Now, it turns out later on that the threat to Air Force one was more imagined than real, but at the time seemed very real. The Secret Service had indicated to us that someone had used the code name for Air Force One, and had indicated it might be a target." Card to Scott Pelley 8/16/02] Our understanding - based on notes and other sources - is that the threat was reported later - once Air Force One was airborne - sometime around 1030. IV.

Decision not to Return to Washington

(10) When and how was the decision made (1) not to return to D.C., and (2) to travel to Barksdale? V.

Shoot Down Order

(11) Were you present for the conversation in which the President spoke to the Vice President about the shoot down order? Was the Secretary of Defense involved in that conversation? Were others present in the room? Where did it take place? ["I was there when he was talking with the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense. And this was not an easy thing - you know, it's a decision that can't be made by others, other than the President. The President is the one that must give those orders." Card to Terry Moran of ABC] What specifically did the President tell the Vice President? Was there any discussion about specific details of the rules of engagement? Was the authorization limited to the D.C. area? In terms of timing of the conversation, do you remember when in the sequence of events the conversation occurred? Was it after the decision to travel to Barksdale? [NB: Follow Up: Fleischer's notes place it 1020.] VI.

Communications Aboard Air Force One

(10) In a number of press interviews, you described the communications aboard Air Force One that morning as "very good" and "outstanding." At the same time, other

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sources -- including the President in his interview with Sixty Minutes - indicate the communications capability was somewhat limited. Could you help us reconcile these competing viewpoints? Was there an "open line" - that is a continuous and dedicated phone connection between the President and the Vice President that morning? Was there an open line between the President and the Secretary of Defense? VII.

Major Decisions What major decisions do you recall the President making that morning? [NB: Decisions from the morning: Establish CSG— principal or deputy level Evacuation of WH Request for fighter coverage for DC Request for fighter coverage for API Decision to implement continuity of government - evacuation of VP Decision to ground all aircraft Shoot down authorization Decision to raise defense level to DefCon 3 Close Border Force Protection Russians/call off the exercise]

VIII. DOT\DOD Coordination In your interview with Scott Pelley of CBS you cited the coordination between DoD and DoT as "one of the great success stories on September 11th." What specifically were you referring to? To your knowledge, did Secretary Mineta and Secretary Rumsfeld speak to each other on the morning of 9/11 ? Can you provide any specific examples of coordination between the two agencies? [NB: "And I think one of the great success stories on September 11th was the fact that the Department of Transportation, Secretary Mineta, worked very closely with the Defense Department, Secretary Rumsfeld - the FAA and the military worked to get all of the planes out of the skies very, very quickly." Card to CBS News (Scott Pelley), May 22,2003]