Crim Law Ii Distinctions.docx

DISTINCTIONS TITLE I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS  Espionage distinguished from treason: - Espionage is a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender. With the amendment, under Art. 114, treason may be committed by a Filipino citizen or an alien residing in the Philippines. But treason is committed only in time of war, while espionage may be committed both in time of peace and in time of war. Treason is limited to two ways of committing the crime: levying war, and adhering to the enemy giving him aid or comfort; while espionage may be committed in many ways.  Piracy under the RPC vis-à-vis Piracy under PD 532 - The first can be committed while the vessel is on high seas or in Philippine waters while the second can be committed only when the vessel is in Philippine waters. The former can only be committed by persons who are not members of the vessel’s complement, or the passengers of the vessel, while the latter can be committed by any persons, including the vessel’s complement, or the passenger of the vessel.  Piracy distinguished from mutiny: - In piracy, the persons who attack a vessel or seize its cargo are strangers to said vessels; while in mutiny, they are members of the crew or passengers. While the intent to gain is essential in the crime of piracy, in mutiny, the offenders may only intend to ignore the ship’s officers or they may be prompted by a desire to commit plunder.  Arbitrary detention distinguished from illegal detention: - As to the principal’s capacity, the principal offender in arbitrary detention must be a public officer while in illegal detention the principal offender is a private person. - As to his duty to detain a person, in arbitrary detention the offender who is a public officer has a duty which carries with it authority to detain a person; while in illegal detention the offender, even if he is a public officer, does not include as his function the power to arrest and detain a person.  Arbitrary detention distinguished from unlawful arrest: - As to the capacity of the offender, in arbitrary detention the offender is a public officer possessed with authority to make arrests; while in unlawful arrest the offender may be any person. - As to the purpose of detainment, in arbitrary detention the purpose for detaining the offended party is to deny him of his liberty; while in unlawful arrest the purpose is to accuse the offended party of a crime he did not commit, to deliver the person to the proper authority, and to file the necessary charges in a way trying to incriminate him. TITLE II. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE  Article 125 (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) distinguished from Article 124 (arbitrary detention): - In arbitrary detention under Art. 124, the detention is illegal from the beginning because of the absence of lawful cause for such arrest; in arbitrary detention under Art. 125, the detention is legal in the beginning but the illegality of the detention starts from the expiration of any of the periods of time specified in Art. 125, without the detained prisoner detained having been delivered to the proper judicial authority.  Prohibition, Interruption, or Dissolution of Peaceful Meetings (Art. 131) distinguished from Tumults and other Disturbances (Art. 153): - In Art. 131, the public officer is not a participant. As far as the gathering is concerned, the public officer is a third party; while in Art. 153 the public officer is a participant of the assembly. - In Art. 131 the offender must be a public officer; while in Art. 152 the offender could be a private person, whether a participant of the assembly or not.

TITLE III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER  Rebellion distinguished from insurrection: - Rebellion is more frequently used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government; while the term insurrection is more commonly employed in reference to a movement where seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters or subjects.  Rebellion distinguished from treason: - The levying of war against the Government would constitute treason when performed to aid the enemy. It would also constitute an adherence to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. The levying of war against the Government during peace time for any of the purposes in Art. 134 is rebellion. - Rebellion always invokes taking up of arms against the Government; treason may be committed by mere adherence to the enemy giving him aid or comfort. - In rebellion the uprising is against the government and the purpose is to substitute the existing government with another; while in treason the levying of war is done to aid the enemy and the purpose is to deliver the government to the enemy.  Rebellion distinguished from subversion: - Subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security. Rebellion is a crime against public order.  Coup d’état distinguished from rebellion: - In coup d’état the essence is a swift attack against the government, its military camp or installations, communication network and public facilities and utilities essential to the continued exercise of governmental powers; while in rebellion essence of the crime is public uprising and taking up arms against the government. - In coup d’état the purpose is merely to paralyze the existing government; while in rebellion the purpose is to overthrow the existing government. - As to its commission, coup d’état may be carried out singly or simultaneously; while rebellion requires a public uprising, or multitude of people. - In coup d’état the principal offenders must be members of the military, national police or public officer, with or without civilian support; while in rebellion offenders need not be uniformed personnel of the military or police.  Inciting to rebellion distinguished from proposal to commit rebellion: - In inciting to commit rebellion it is not required that the offender has decided to commit rebellion and the act of inciting is done publicly; while in proposal to commit treason the person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion and the person who proposes the execution of the crime uses secret means.  Political crimes distinguished from common crimes: - Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquired the political character of the latter.  Sedition distinguished from rebellion: - What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is not the extent of the territory covered by the uprising but rather the object at which the uprising aims. What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is the object or purpose of the uprising. - In both rebellion and sedition, there must be public uprising. While in rebellion there must be taking up of arms against the Government; in sedition, it is sufficient that the public uprising is tumultuous. - While in sedition, the purpose of the offenders may be political or social that is merely to go against the established government not to overthrow it; in rebellion, it is always political, that is to overthrow the government. - As to absorption of other crimes, in sedition the crime associated with sedition can be prosecuted; while in rebellion offenses committed pursuant to rebellion are absorbed.

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Sedition distinguished from treason: - Treason, in its more general sense, is the “violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or liege, lord, or to the supreme authority of the State.” Sedition, in its more general sense, is “the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.” Sedition distinguished from Crime of tumults and other disturbance of public order: - Sedition involves disturbance of public order resulting from tumultuous uprising; while the other there is no public uprising. Illegal association distinguished from illegal assembly: - In illegal assembly, it is necessary that there is an actual meeting or assembly of armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code, or of individuals who, although not armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion, sedition, or assault upon a person in authority or his agent; in illegal association, it is not necessary that there be an actual meeting. - In illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that are punished; in illegal associations, it is the act of forming or organizing and membership in the association that are punished. - In illegal assembly, the persons liable are: (1) the organizers or leaders of the meeting, and (2) the persons present at meeting. In illegal association, the persons liable are: (1) the founders, directors and president, and (2) the members. Direct assault distinguished from resistance or serious disobedience: - In direct assault, the person in authority or his agent must be engaged in the performance of official duties or that he is assaulted by reason thereof; but in resistance, the person in authority or his agent must be in actual performance of his duties. - Direct assault (second form) is committed in four ways: (a) by attacking; (b) by employing force; (c) by seriously intimidating; and (d) by seriously resisting a person in authority or his agent; resistance or serious disobedience is committed only by resisting or seriously disobeying a person in authority or his agent. - In both direct assault by resisting an agent of a person in authority and resistance against an agent of a person in authority, there is force employed, but the use of force in resistance is not so serious, as there is no manifest intention to defy the law and the officers enforcing it. The attack or employment of force which gives rise to the crime of direct assault must be serious and deliberate; otherwise, even a case of simple resistance to an arrest, which always requires the use of force of some kind, would constitute direct assault and the lesser offense of resistance or disobedience in Art. 151 would entirely disappear. But when the one resisted is a person in authority, the use of any kind or degree of force will give rise to direct assault. If no force is employed by the offender in resisting or disobeying a person in authority, the crime committed is resistance or serious disobedience under the first paragraph of Art. 151. Violation of conditional pardon distinguished from evasion of service of sentence by escaping: - Violation of conditional pardon does not cause harm or injury to the right of other person nor does it disturb the public order; it is merely an infringement of the terms stipulated in the contract between the Chief Executive and the criminal. - Evasion of the service of the sentence is an attempt at least to evade the penalty inflicted by the courts upon criminals and thus defeat the purpose of the law of either reforming or punishing them for having disturbed the public order. Making any outcry tending to indicate sedition or rebellion (Art. 153, par. 3) distinguished from inciting to rebellion or sedition: - In the former, the meeting at the outset was legal, and became a public disorder only because of such outcry and the outbursts which by nature may tend to incite rebellion or sedition are spontaneous; while in the latter the meeting from the beginning was unlawful and the words uttered are deliberately calculated with malice, aforethought to incite others to rebellion or sedition. Delivering the prisoners in jail distinguished from infidelity in the custody of prisoners: - In the former, the offender is not the custodian of the prisoner at the time of the escape or removal; while in the latter, the offender is the custodian at the time of the escape or removal. - In both, the offender may be a public officer or a private citizen. In both crimes, the person involved may be a convict or a mere detention prisoner.

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Violation of conditional pardon distinguished from evasion of service of sentence: - Violation of conditional pardon is not a public offense for it does not cause harm or injury to the right of another person nor does it disturb public order; while evasion of service of sentence is a public offense separate and independent from any other act. Quasi-recidivism distinguished from reiteracion: (not yet done) - The aggravating circumstance of “reiteracion” requires that the offender against whom it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses

TITLE IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST  Counterfeiting of coins distinguished from mutilating coins: - Counterfeiting of coins may be of legal tender or old coin; while mutilating coins must be legal tender. - Counterfeiting of coins is an act of imitating; while mutilating cons is an act of scratching the metal content.  Forgery distinguished from falsification: - The term forgery used in Art. 169 refers to the falsification and counterfeiting of treasury or bank notes or any instruments payable to bearer or to order. Falsification is the commission of any of the eight acts mentioned in Art. 171 on legislative (only the act of making alteration), public or official, commercial, or private documents, or wireless, or telegraph messages. - Forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to the bearer or to order the appearance of true and genuine document; while falsification is committed by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means, the figures, letters, words, or signs contained therein.  Difference between falsification of public or official documents and that of private documents: - The essential difference between falsification of private documents and that of public or official documents lies in the fact that while in the former, the prejudice to a third party is primarily taken into account so that if such damage is not apparent, or there is at least no intention to cause it, the falsification is not punishable; in the latter, that is, in the falsification of public or official documents, the principal things punished is the violation of public faith and the perversion of truth which the document solemnly proclaims, and for this reason it is immaterial whether or not some prejudice has been caused to third persons. - As to intent, in falsification of public document mere falsification is enough; while in falsification of private document aside from falsification, prejudice to a third person or intent to cause it, is essential. - As to commission of a complex crime, falsification of public document can be complexed with other crimes if the act of falsification was the necessary means in the commission of such crimes, like estafa, theft, or malversation, i.e., malversation through falsification of a public document or estafa through falsification of a public document; while in falsification of private document there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document. Hence, when one makes use of a private document, which he falsified, to defraud another, there results only one crime: that of falsification of a private document.  Distinction between use of fictitious name and concealing true name: - In use of fictitious name, the element of publicity must be present; in concealing true name and other personal circumstances, that element is not necessary. - The purpose in use of fictitious name is any of those three enumerated (to conceal a crime, to evade the execution of judgment, or to cause damage); in concealing true name Iit is merely to conceal identity.  “Material”, “relevant”, and “pertinent” distinguished: - The matter is “material” when it is directed to prove a fact in issue. - It is “relevant” when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue. - It is “pertinent” when it concerns collateral matters which make more or less probable the proposition at issue.  Tradename distinguished from trademark: - Trade name is a name used in trade to designate a particular business of certain individuals considered as an entity; whereas, trademark is used to indicate the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed. One of the distinguishing characteristics of trade name is that, unlike trademarks, it is not necessarily attached or affixed to the goods of the owner.  Types of confusion, distinguished: - There is confusion of goods when the products are competing. Confusion of business exists when the products are non-competing but related enough to produce confusion of affiliation.  Trademark infringement, distinguished from unfair competition: - Unfair competition is broader and more inclusive; infringement of trademark or trade name is of limited range. As the tort of unfair competition is broader than the wrong involved in the infringement of trademark, one who fails to establish the exclusive property right which is

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essential to the validity of a trademark, may yet frequently, obtain relief on the ground of his competitor’s unfairness or fraud. - In infringement of trademark, the offended party has identified a peculiar symbol or mark with his goods and thereby has acquired a property right in such symbol or mark; in unfair competition, the offended party has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in from those of others, whether or not a mark or trade name is employed, and has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods. - In infringement of trademark, the offender uses the trademark or trade name of another manufacturer or dealer and sells his goods on which the trademark is affixed; whereas, in unfair competition, the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer and sells the same. - Del Monte Corp. vs CA: (1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition is the passing off of one’s goods as those of another; (2) in infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary, whereas in unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential; and (3) in infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary. Making untruthful statements distinguished from perjury: - In making untruthful statements the document must not be subscribed and sworn, i.e., cedula/driver’s license; in perjury the document must be subscribed and sworn to (what is violated is the solemnity of the oath). Perjury distinguished from false testimony: - Perjury is any willful and corrupt assertion of falsehood on material matter under oath and not given in judicial proceedings; while false testimony is given in the course of a judicial proceeding. - There is perjury even during the preliminary investigation; while false testimony contemplates actual trial.

TITLE VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS  Grave scandal distinguished from alarms and scandal: - As to it commission, in grave scandal the scandal is committed with the consent of the offender and without being intoxicated; while in alarms and scandal the disturbance or scandal is committed while intoxicated. - As to its purpose, in grave scandal the scandal involved refers to moral scandal offensive to decency or good customs, although it does not disturb public peace. But such conduct or act must be open to the public view; while in alarms and scandal the purpose is to disturb public peace.

TITLE VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS  Misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance distinguished: - “Misfeasance” is the improper performance of some act which might lawfully be done. - “Malfeasance” is the performance of some act which ought not to be done. - “Nonfeasance” is the omission of some act which ought to be performed.  Prevaricacion distinguished from bribery: - The third form of direct bribery (Art. 210) is committed by refraining from doing something which pertains to the official duty of the officer. Prevaricacion (Art. 208) is committed in the same way. In this regard, the two felonies are similar. But they differ in that in bribery, the offender refrained from doing his official duty in consideration of a gift received or promised. This element is not necessary in the crime of prevaricacion.  Direct bribery distinguished from indirect bribery: - In both crimes, the public officer receives gift. While in direct bribery there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, on indirect bribery, usually, no such agreement exists. - In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise, in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office.  Malversation distinguished from estafa: - As to persons liable, malversation is committed by an accountable officer; while estafa is committed by a private person or even a pubic officer who acts in a private capacity. - As to property involved, malversation deals with public funds or property; estafa deals with private property. - As to its commission, malversation may be committed without personal misappropriation, as when the accountable officer allows another to misappropriate the same; estafa is committed by personal misappropriation only.  Technical malversation distinguished from malversation: - Offenders are accountable public officers in both crimes. - In technical malversation, offender derives no personal gain or benefit while in malversation generally, the offender derives personal benefit. - In technical malversation public fund or property is diverted to another public use other than that provided for in the law while in malversation it is the conversion for the personal interest of the offender or of another person.  Revelation of secrets by an officer distinguished from infidelity in the custody of document/papers by removing the same: - In the former, the papers contain secrets and therefore should not be published and the public officer having charged thereof removes and delivers them wrongfully to a third person; while in the latter the papers do not contain secrets but their removal is for an illicit purpose.  Abandonment of office distinguished from dereliction of duty under Art. 208: - Abandonment of office is committed by any public officer; while dereliction of duty is committed only by public officers who have the duty to institute prosecution of the punishment of violations of law. - In abandonment of office, the public officer abandons his office to evade the discharge of his duty; while in dereliction of duty, the public officer does not abandon his office but he fails to prosecute an offense by dereliction of duty or by malicious tolerance of the commission of offenses.

TITLE VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS  Parricide distinguished from infanticide: - As to basis, in parricide its basis is the relationship between the offender and the victim; while in infanticide the basis is the age of the child-victim. - As to commission, parricide can be committed only by the relatives enumerated; while infanticide may be committed by any person whether relative or not of the victim. - As to application of conspiracy, in parricide conspiracy cannot be applied because the relationship of the offender and the victim is an essential element. A separate information must be filed for the parricide and murder or homicide on the part of the non-relative conspirator. While in infanticide, conspiracy is applicable because the circumstance of age pertains to the victim; only one information shall be prepared for all the conspirators.  Abortion distinguished from infanticide: - Abortion is the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus, or the violent expulsion of the fetus from the maternal womb which results in the death of the fetus. Infanticide is the killing of any child less than three days of age, whether the killer is the parent or grandparent, any other relative of the child, or a stranger. It is infanticide if the fetus (1) could sustain an independent life, after its separation from the maternal womb, and it (2) is killed. - In abortion the victim is not viable but remains to be a fetus; while in infanticide the victim is already a person less than 3 days old or 72 hours and is viable or capable of living separately from the mother’s womb. - As to entitlement of mitigating circumstances; in abortion only the pregnant woman is entitled to mitigation if the purpose is to conceal dishonor; in infanticide both the mother and maternal grandparents of the child are entitled to mitigating circumstance of concealing the dishonor.  Cruelty as a qualifying circumstance of murder (Art. 248) distinguished from cruelty as a generic aggravating circumstance under Art. 14.: - In cruelty under Art. 248 aside from cruelty, any act that would amount to scoffing or decrying the corpse of the victim will qualify the killing to murder; while cruelty under Art. 14 requires that the victim be alive, when the cruel wounds were inflicted and, therefore, there must be evidence to that effect.  Infanticide distinguished from parricide if the offender is the blood relative, e.g. parent of the child: - As to age of victims, in infanticide the age of the victim is less than three days old; while in parricide the victim is at least three days old. - As to liability in conspiracy, in infanticide if done in conspiracy with a stranger, both the parent and the co-conspirator are liable for infanticide; while in parricide the co-conspirator is liable for murder because of the absence of relationship. - Concealment as mitigating circumstances, in infanticide, concealment of dishonor in killing the child is mitigating; while in parricide concealment of dishonor in killing the child is not a mitigating circumstance.  Physical injuries distinguished from mutilation: - Mutilation must have been caused purposely and deliberately to lop or clip off some part of the body so as to deprive the offended party of such part of the body. This intention is absent in other kinds of physical injuries. - In physical injuries, no special intention to clip off some part of the body so as to deprive the offended party of such part; while in mutilation there is special intention to clip off some part of the body so as to deprive him of such part.  Physical injuries distinguished from attempted or frustrated homicide: - In physical injuries the offender inflicts physical injuries, while attempted homicide may be committed even if no physical injuries are inflicted. - In physical injuries offender has no intention to kill the offended party; while in attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender has intent to kill the offended party.  Serious physical injury distinguished from less serious physical injury: - As to capacity of injured party: in serious physical injury, the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days but not more than 90 days; while in less serious physical injury the offended party is incapacitated for labor for 10 days or more but not more than 30 days, or needs medical assistance for the same period.

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Importance of medical assistance: in serious physical injury medical assistance is not important; while in less serious physical injury there must be a proof to the period of the required medical attendance. Old Anti-Rape law distinguished from R.A. 8353: - In the old anti-rape law, the crime of rape is against chastity while in R.A. 8353 the crime of rape is against persons. - In the old law, the crime may be committed by a man against a woman only; while in the new law, under the 2nd type, sexual assault may be committed by any person against any person. - In the old law, the complaint must be filed by the woman or her parents, grandparents if the woman was a minor or incapacitated (private crime); while in the new law it may be prosecuted even if the woman does not file a complaint (pubic crime). - In the old law marriage of the victim with one of the offenders benefits not only the principal but also the accomplices and accessories; while in the new law marriage extinguishes the penal action only as to the principal (the person who married the victim), and cannot be extended to co-principals in case of multiple rape. - In the old law, marital rape is not recognized, in the new law marital rape is recognized. Attempted rape distinguished from acts of lasciviousness: - In attempted rape, there is intent to effect sexual cohesion, although unsuccessful; while in acts of lasciviousness there is no intention to lie with the offended woman, the intention is merely to satisfy lewd design.

TITLE IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY  Kidnapping with rape distinguished from forcible abduction with rape: - As to plurality of crimes: in the former the crime is composite or a special complex crime if the woman kidnapped is also raped; while in the latter the crime is complex under Art. 48 since forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit the rape. - As to lewd designs: in the former there is no lewd design; while in the latter there is lewd design. - As to treatment of rape: in the former rape is not a separate crime but merely a qualifying circumstance; while in the latter rape may be treated as a separate crime. - As to consideration of multiple rapes: in the former even if there are multiple rapes, there is only one crimes of kidnapping with rape; while in the latter if there are multiple rapes, only one rape shall be complexed with forcible abduction because the abduction is a necessary means to commit only the first rape, thus the other rape incidents will be treated as separate crimes. - As to treatment of attempted rape: in the former if rape was merely attempted, 2 separate crimes are committed-kidnapping and attempted rape; while in the latter if rape is merely attempted, there is only forcible abduction, the attempt to rape is deemed merely a manifestation of lewd designs.  Kidnapping distinguished from forcible abduction: - In kidnapping, at the outset, the intention of the offender is merely to detain the victim; while in forcible abduction, at the outset, the taking of the victim is coupled with lewd designs.  Kidnapping for ransom distinguished from robbery insofar as the delivery of money to the offenders is concerned: - In kidnapping for ransom, ransom is paid in exchange for the offended party’s liberty; while in robbery, the motive of the offenders is not to restrain or deprive the victim of his liberty but to divest him of his valuables.  Illegal detention distinguished from arbitrary detention: - The crime of illegal detention is committed by a private individual who unlawfully kidnaps, detains, or otherwise deprives a person of liberty; arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer or employee who detains a person without legal grounds. Illegal detention is a crime against personal liberty and security; arbitrary detention is a crime against the fundamental law of the State.  Unlawful arrest distinguished from other illegal detention: - If the purpose of locking up or detaining the victim is to deliver him to the proper authorities, and it develops that the detention is unlawful, then the offense committed is unlawful arrest. In any other case, the detention will render the culprit liable for other illegal detention.  Unlawful arrest distinguished from Delay in the delivery of detained persons (Article 125): - In the crime of delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authority (Art. 126), the detention is for some legal ground; in unlawful arrest, the detention is not authorized by law. - Under Art. 125, the crime is committed by failing to deliver such person to the proper judicial authority within a certain period of time; in unlawful arrest, it is committed by making an arrest not authorized by law.  Kidnapping and serious illegal detention distinguished from kidnapping and failure to return a minor: - As to relation of offender to the victim: in the former, the offender is not entrusted with the custody of the victim; while in the latter the offender is entrusted with the custody if the minor. - As to acts punished: in the former it is the act of illegally detaining or kidnapping the minor; while in the latter what is punished is the deliberate failure of the offender having the custody of the minor to restore him to his parents or guardians.  Kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Art. 167) distinguished from inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271): - Art. 267 cannot be committed by the parents of the minor; while in Art. 271 parents can commit this crime against their own children.  Slavery distinguished from white slave trade: - In both, the offended party is detained.

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In slavery, the offender is not engaged in prostitution; while in white slave trade the offender is engaged in prostitution. Slavery distinguished from kidnapping or illegal detention: - The purpose must be determined. If the purpose is to enslave the victim, it is slavery; otherwise, it is kidnapping or illegal detention. - In slavery the purpose is to enslave the offended party; while in illegal detention the purpose is to deprive or restrain the offended party of his liberty. Exploitation of child labor (Art. 273) distinguished from services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt (Art. 274): - In Art. 273, the victim is a minor, while in Art. 274 it does not distinguish whether victim is a minor or not. - In Art. 273 the minor is compelled to render services for his supposed debt of his parent or guardian; while in Art. 274 the debtor himself is the one compelled to work for the offender. - In Art. 273 the service of minor is not limited to household and farm work; while in Art. 274 it is limited to household or farm work. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of parents (Art. 227) distinguished from abandoning a minor (Art. 276): - As to custody: in Art. 227 the custody of the offender is specific that is, the custody for the rearing or education of the minor; while in Art. 276 the custody of the minor is stated in general. - As to age: in Art. 227 the minor is under 18 years of age; while in Art. 276 the minor is under 7 years of age. - As to abandonment: in Art. 227 the minor is delivered to a public institution or other person; while in Art. 276 the minor is abandoned in such a way as to deprive him of the care and protection that his tender years need. Exploitation of minors (Art. 278, Par. 5) distinguished from inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271): - In the former the purpose of inducing the minor to abandon the home is to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned; while in Art. 271 there is no such person. - In Art. 278 the victim is under 16 years of age; while in Art. 271 the victim is under 18 years of age. Correlation of exploitation of minors to RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act): - As to its application: exploitation of minors apply to minors below 16 years of age; while RA 761 applies to minors below 18 years old. - As to danger to the child: in exploitation of minors the business is of such kind that would place the life or limb of the minor in danger, even though working for him is not against the will of the minor; while in RA 7610 as long as the employment is inimical – even though there is no physical risk – and detrimental to the child’s interest – against moral, intellectual, physical and mental development of the minor. - As to liability of employer: In exploitation of minors if the child fell and suffered physical injuries while working, the employer shall be liable for said physical injuries in addition to his liability for exploitation of minors; while there is no such similar provision that exists under RA 7610. Violation of dwelling distinguished from trespass to dwelling: - As to offender: in trespass to dwelling the offender is a private person; while in violation of dwelling the offender is a public officer. - As to it commission: in trespass to dwelling the offender enters the dwelling of another against the latter’s will; while in violation of dwelling, the offender either enters the dwelling of another against the latter’s will and without judicial order, searches papers and other effects found therein without previous consent from the owner, refuses to leave the dwelling when requested by the owner after having surreptitiously entered the same. - Circumstance qualifying the offense: in trespass to dwelling the offense is committed by means of violation and intimidation; while in violation of dwelling the offense is committed at night-time, any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned immediately after the search made by the offender.

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Other forms of trespass (trespass to property) distinguished from trespass to dwelling: - In trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person; in other forms of trespass, the offender is any person. - In the first, the offender enters a dwelling house; in the second, the offender enters closed premises or fenced estate. - In the first, the place entered is inhabited; in the second, the place entered is uninhabited. - In the first, the act constituting the crime is entering the dwelling against the will of the owner; in the second, it is entering the closed premises or the fenced estate without securing permission of the owner or caretaker thereof. - In the first, the prohibition to enter is express or implied; in the second, the prohibition to enter must be manifest. Grave threats distinguished from light threats: - It is a grave threat when the wrong threatened to be inflicted amounts to a crime; while it is a light threat when the wrong threatened to be inflicted does not amount to a crime. Threat distinguished from coercion: - The essence of threat is intimidation while the essence of coercion is violence or intimidation. - In threat, the wrong or harm done is future and conditional; while in coercion there is no condition involved, hence, there is no futurity in the harm or wrong done. Threat distinguished from robbery: - As to intimidation: in threat intimidation is future and conditional while in robbery intimidation is actual and immediate. In threat intimidation may be through an intermediary while in robbery intimidation is personal. - As to subject involved: in threat in may refer to the person, honor or property; while in robbery it refers to personal property. - As to intent to gain: intent to gain is not an essential element in threat; while there is intent to gain in robbery. - As to danger of the threat: in threat the danger to the victim is not instantly imminent nor the gain of the culprit immediate; while in robbery the danger involved is directly imminent to the victim and the obtainment of gain immediate. Coercion distinguished from illegal distinction: - When the offended party, who was in the house of the accused for three days as servant therein, had the freedom of the house and left it at times to visit her mother, but it was shown that she was compelled against her will to leave her mother’s house and go with the accused to the latter’s house, there is coercion, not illegal detention. (U.S. vs Quengco, 2 Phil. 412) Coercion, distinguished from maltreatment of prisoner: - In extorting a confession or in obtaining an information from the prisoner by means of violence (Art. 235), the act is similar to that of grave coercion; but the difference lies in the fact that in the crime of maltreatment of prisoners, the offended party is a prisoner. If the offended party is not a prisoner, the offense would be grave coercion. Grave coercion distinguished from unlawful arrest: - While standing at the door of her house, a woman was seized by her wrist by defendant policeman who dragged her from the doorway into the street, along the street for 40 to 50 feet, and, with the assistance of a third person, placed her in a public carromata. She was arrested, because her servants had placed two step ladders in the street for the purpose of cleaning the side of her house, which did not constitute a violation of the ordinance relating to the obstruction of streets. It was held that such acts constitute the crime of grave coercion. Grave coercion distinguished from unjust vexation: - Where the first and the third elements of the crime of grave coercion under paragraph 1 of Art. 286 are present, but the second element thereof, which is the use of violence upon the offended party in preventing or compelling him to do something against his will, is lacking, the crime committed by the accused falls under the second paragraph or Art. 287. Discovering secrets through seizure or correspondence distinguished from public officer revealing secrets of private individual: - In Art. 230, the public officer comes to know the secrets of any private individual by reason of his office. It is not necessary that the secrets are contained in papers or letters. The public officer reveal such secrets without justifiable reason.

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In Art. 290, the offender who is a private individual or even a public officer not in the exercise of his official function, seizes the papers or letters of another to discover the secrets of the latter. It is not necessary that there be a secret and, if there is a secret discovered, it is not necessary that it be revealed. Robbery with violence distinguished from grave threats, and grave coercion - In robbery there is intent to gain, while in grave threats and grave coercion there is no intent to gain. - In robbery there is immediate harm; while in grave threats there is intimidation, promises some future harm or injury; and in grave coercion the intimidation is immediate and offended party is compelled to do something against his will.

TITLE X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY  Distinctions between effects of employment of violence against or intimidation of person and those of use of force upon things: - Whenever violence against or intimidation of any person is used, the taking of personal property belonging to another is always robbery. If there is no violence or intimidation, but only force upon things, the taking is robbery only if the force is used either to enter the building or to break doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle inside the building or to force them open outside after taking the same from the building. (Art. 299 and 302) - In robbery with violence against or intimidation of any person, the value of the personal property taken is immaterial. The penalty depends (a) on the result of the violence used, as when homicide, rape, intentional mutilation or any of the serious physical injuries resulted, or when less serious or slight physical injuries were inflicted, which are only evidence of simple violence, and (b) on the existence of intimidation only. But in robbery with force upon things, committed in an inhabited house, public building, or edifice devoted to religious worship, the penalty is based (a) on the value of the property taken and (b) on whether or not the offenders carry arms; in robbery with force upon things, committed in an uninhabited building, the penalty is based only on the value of the property taken.  Robbery with violence distinguished from grave coercion: - In both crimes, there is violence used by the offender; - While in robbery there is intent to gain, such element is not present in coercion. - The only distinction between these two crimes is just a matter of intention. If the purpose of the accused in taking somebody’s property by force or intimidation is to obtain gain, the crime is robbery; but if his purpose is to compel another to do something against his will, without authority of law, but believing himself to be the owner or creditor, and thereby seizes property, then the crime is grave coercion.  Robbery distinguished from bribery: - It is robbery when the victim did not commit a crime and he is intimidated with arrest and/or prosecution to deprive him of his personal property; it is bribery when the victim has committed a crime and gives money or gift to avoid arrest or prosecution. The reason is, when the victim did not commit any crime, there is nothing that would have required the public officer to exercise his duty or function. On the other hand, if the victim committed a crime and the public officer accepted bribe, the latter thereby agreed to refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do. - In robbery, the victim is deprived of his money or property by force or intimidation; in bribery, he parts with his money or property in a sense voluntarily.  Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation(robbery) distinguished from coercion(grave): - When the offended party is under obligation to sign, execute or deliver the document under the law, there is no robbery. There will be coercion if violence is used in compelling the offended party to sign or deliver the document. - In the former there is an intent to gain and there is an intent to defraud; while in the latter there is no intent to gain and there is no intent to defraud.  Brigandage and robbery in band, distinguished: - Both brigandage and robbery in band require that the offenders form a band of robbers. In brigandage, the purpose of the offenders is any of the following: (1) to commit robbery in the highway; or (2) to kidnap persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or (3) for any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence; in robbery in band, the purpose of the offenders is only to commit robbery, not necessarily in the highway. - If the agreement among more than three armed men was to commit only a particular robbery, the offense is not brigandage, but only robbery, in band. - In brigandage, the mere formation of a band for any of the purposes mentioned in the law is sufficient, as it would not be necessary to show that the band actually committed robbery in the highway, etc.; in robbery in band, it is necessary to prove that the band actually committed robbery, as a mere conspiracy to commit robbery is not punishable.

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PD 532 (Highway robbery) distinguished from Brigandage(Art. 306): - In PD 532 the crime must be committed and one malefactor will suffice; while in brigandage under the RPC mere formation of band is punishable and at least 4 armed malefactors. Theft distinguished from robbery: - In theft, the offender does not use violation or intimidation or does not enter a house or building through any of the means specified in Art. 299 or Art. 302 in taking personal property of another with intent to gain. Robbery and theft compared: - For robbery to exist, it is necessary that there should be a taking against the will of the owner; and for theft (robber), it sufficed that consent on the part of the owner is lacking. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property distinguished from theft or robbery: - While there is taking or asportation (aspiration) in theft or robbery, there is occupation or usurpation in this crime. - In theft or robbery, personal property is taken; in this crime, there is real property or real right involved. - In both crimes, there is intent to gain. Estafa with abuse of confidence distinguished from theft: - But a person who misappropriated the thing which he had received from the offended party may be guilty of theft, not estafa, if he acquired only the material or physical possession of the thing. - In theft, the offender takes the thing; in estafa, the offender receives the thing from the offended party. - If in receiving the thing from the offended party, the offender acquired also the juridical possession of the thing, and he later misappropriated it, he would be guilty of estafa. Estafa distinguished from qualified theft: - Where both the material and juridical possession are transferred, misappropriation of the property would constitute stafa; while the crime is theft if only the physical or material possession of the thing is transferred. Theft distinguished from robbery: - In theft the offender does not use violence or intimidation or does not enter a house or building through any of the means specified in Arts. 299 and 302; while in robbery the offender uses violence or intimidation or enters a house or building through any of the means specified in Arts. 299 and 302. Distinctions between robbery, theft, and estafa: - In both robbery and theft only personal property is involved while in estafa the subject matter may be real property. - In robbery the taking is by means of force upon things or violence against or intimidation or persons; while in both theft and estafa the taking is not by means of force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons. - In robbery the penalty does not necessarily depend on the amount involved; while in both theft and estafa the penalty depends on the amount involved. - In robbery the offender takes the property without the consent of the owner by threats, intimidation or violence; in theft the offender takes the property without the consent of the owner and without using threats, intimidation or violence; in estafa the offender receives the property. Estafa with abuse of confidence distinguished from malversation: - In both crimes, the offenders are entrusted with funds or property. Both are continuing offenses. But while in estafa, the funds or property are always private; in malversation, they are usually public funds or property. - In estafa, the offender is a private individual or even a public officer who is not accountable for public funds or property; in malversation, the offender is usually a public officer who is accountable for public funds or property. - In estafa with abuse of confidence, the crime is committed by misappropriating, converting or denying having received money, goods or other personal property; in malversation, the crime is committed by appropriating, taking or misappropriating or

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consenting, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take the public funds or property. Estafa by means of deceit distinguished from theft: - What materially distinguishes estafa from theft is not the presence or absence of fraud or deceit but whether only material possession or both the juridical and physical possession of the thing was transferred. Estafa by fraudulent means distinguished from infidelity in the custody of documents: (Art. 226): - The crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, as defined in Art. 226, and this kind of estafa are similar in that the manner of committing the offenses is the same. - But while under Art. 226, the offender is a public officer who is officially entrusted with the document; in this kind of estafa, the offender is a private individual or even a public officer who is not officially entrusted with the documents. - In estaafa, there is intent to defraud. This element is not required in infidelity in the custody of documents. Chattel mortgage distinguished from estafa (Art. 316) by disposing of encumbered property: - In both offenses there is the selling of a mortgage property. In estafa under Art. 316, paragraph 2, the property involved is real property; in sale of mortgaged property (Art. 319), it is personal property. - As to commission: in chattel mortgage the selling or pledging personal property already pledged or mortgaged is committed by mere failure to obtain the consent of the mortgagee in writing even if the offender should inform the purchaser that the thing sold is mortgaged; But to constitute the crime of estafa, it is sufficient that the real property mortgaged be sold as free, even though the vendor may have obtained the consent of the mortgagee in writing. - As to purpose: in chattel mortgage the purpose of the law is to protect the mortgagee; in estafa under Art. 316 the purpose is to protect the purchaser, whether the first or the second. Arson distinguished from homicide or murder: - In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson. First case of qualified malicious mischief distinguished from sedition: - This mischief mentioned in the first clause (No. 1) is to be distinguished from sedition (Art. 139), in that the element of pubic and tumultuous uprising is not present in this crime. - The two offenses are, however, similar in that there is present in the commission of the offense, the intent to obstruct the performance of public functions. Art. 316 (1) distinguished from Art. 315 par. 2(a): - Art. 316(1) refers only to personal property and the offender exercises or executes, as part of the false representation, some act of dominion or ownership over the property to the damage and prejudice of the real owner of the thing; Art. 315, par.2 (a) covers only real and personal property and it is broader because it can be committed even if the offender does not execute acts of ownership, as long as there was a false pretense.

TITLE XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY.  Adultery distinguished from prostitution: - Adultery is a private offense and is committed by a married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband; prostitution is a crime against public morals and is committed by a woman whether married or not, who for money or profit, habitually indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.  Acts of lasciviousness distinguished from grave coercion: - But where a woman, 60 years old, was taken from her house against her will, slapped and maltreated, her drawers taken off and her hands and feet bound by the accused to compel her to admit that she stole the shoes of a certain person, the crime was grave coercion. (People vs. Fernando - In this Bailoses case, the compulsion by beating the girl is included in the constructive element of force in the crime of acts of lasciviousness. In the Fernando cases, the compulsion is the very act constituting the offense of grave coercion (compelling the offended party to admit the theft).  Acts of lasciviousness distinguished from attempted rape: - The manner of committing the crime is the same, that is, force or intimidation is employed, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, under 12 years of age or is demented. - The offended party in both crimes is a person of either sex. The performance of acts of lasciviousness character is common to both crimes. - The differences are: (a) If the acts performed by the offender clearly indicate that his purpose was to lie with the offended woman, it is attempted rape but if the purpose is only to commit acts of lewdness it is acts of lasciviousness; (b) In the case of attempted rape, the lascivious acts are but the preparatory acts to the commission of rape; whereas, in the other, the lascivious acts are themselves the final objective sought by the offender.  Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 (without consent) distinguished from Art. 339 (with consent): - In Art. 336 the acts are committed under circumstances which, had there been carnal knowledge, would amount to rape; while in Art. 339 the acts of lasciviousness are committed under the circumstances which had there been carnal knowledge, would amount to either qualified seduction or simple seduction. - In Art. 336, the offended party is a female or male; while in Art. 339 the offended party could only be female. - In Art. 336 if the offended party is a woman, she need not be a virgin; while in Art. 339 the offended party must be a virgin.  Acts of lasciviousness distinguished from unjust vexation: - When the accused merely kissed and embraced the complainant, either out of passion or other motive, touching the girl’s breast as a mere incident of the embrace, it is unjust vexation. - Accused’s acts of kissing the victim, fondling her breasts, and touching her private parts constitute lascivious conduct intended to quench his salacious desire. Accused’s lewd intent was betrayed when he asked AAA, Dalaga ka na ba? as a prelude to his lustful advances on the victim, and thereafter conveyed to her that I am single too. He is guilty of acts of lasciviousness. (Sombilon vs People) - Where the accused touched three times the private parts of the offended woman over her panties, without employing any force or intimidation, he is guilty of unjust vexation, because it might have been committed merely to satisfy a “silly whim”. (People vs. Bernaldo) - But the act of the accused in forcibly placing his hand between the legs of a girl over 12 years old, or without force if she be under that age, constitutes the crime of acts of lasciviousness. 

Qualified seduction distinguished from rape: - If any of the circumstances in the crime of rape is present, the crime is not to be punished under this articles. - Thus, if the offended woman was sleeping, or the offender used force or intimidation, when he had sexual intercourse with her, the crime would be rape.

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Forcible abduction distinguished from grave coercion: - In both crimes, there is violence or intimidation used by the offender and the offended party is compelled to do something against her will. Forcible abduction distinguished from corruption of minors: - Where a 13-year old girl was abducted by the accused without lewd designs on his part, but for the mere purpose of lending her to illicit intercourse with others, the crime committed by the accused was held to be not abduction but corruption of minors. (U.S. vs. Tagle) Forcible abduction distinguished from kidnapping: - When the violent taking of a woman is motivated by lewd designs, forcible abduction under Art. 342 of the RPC is the offense. When it is not so motivated, such taking constitutes kidnapping under Art. 267 as amended. One offense is against chastity, the other against personal liberty. Corruption of minors distinguished from white slave trade: - In corruption of minors it is essential that victims are minors but it is not necessarily for profit and is committed by a single act; while in white slave trade minority need not be established, it is generally for profit and is generally committed habitually. Distinction between adultery and concubinage and seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness: - Prosecution: In adultery and concubinage it must be prosecuted upon complaint filed by the offended spouse and both the guilty parties, if alive, must be included in the complaint for adultery or concubinage; while seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by: (1) offended party; (2) her parents; (3) grandparents, or (4) guardians in the order named above. Generally offended party, even if a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for the above mentioned offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian except if she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her maturity. (If the offended woman is of age, she should be the one to file the complaint.) - Pardon: In the former the pardon must be made by the offended party to both the offenders, pardon may be a bar to prosecution if made before the institution of the criminal action and it may be expressed or implied. In the latter an express pardon by the offended party or other persons named in the law to the offender, as the case may be, bars prosecution. Generally a parent cannot validly grant pardon to the offender without the express pardon of the girl except when she is dead or otherwise incapacitated to grant it, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may do so for her. Furthermore, generally pardon by the offended party who is a minor must have the concurrence of parents except when the offended girl has no parents who could concur in the pardon.

TITLE XII. CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS.  Abandoning of a minor under Art. 276 distinguished from simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment of a legitimate child under Art. 347: - Art. 276 is a crime against chastity while Art. 347 is a crime against the civil status of a person. - In Art. 276 the offender must be the one who has the custody of the child while in Art. 347 the offender is any person. - In Art. 276 the purpose of the offender is to avoid the obligation of rearing and caring the child while in Art. 347 the offender is to cause the child to lose its civil status.

TITLE XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR.  Criticism and defamation distinguished: - Criticisms deals only with such things as shall invite public attention or call for public document. It does not follow a pubic man into his private life nor pry into his domestic concerns. - They may attack or seek to destroy, by fair means or foul, the whole fabric of his statesmanship, but the law does not permit them to attack the man himself. They may falsely charge that his principles re bad, but they may not falsely charge that he is bad. (US vs Contreras) - Hence, if the criticism follows a public officer into his private life which has no connection with the performance of his public duties, and falsely charges him with evil motives, clearly designed to destroy his reputation or besmirch his name, there is defamation.  Slander by deed and acts of lasciviousness (with lewd design) distinguished: - Kissing a girl in public and touching her breast without lewd designs, committed by a rejected suitor to cast dishonor on the girl was held to be slander by deed and not acts of lasciviousness. (People vs Valencia)  Slander by deed and maltreatment distinguished: - The nature and effects of the maltreatment determine the crime committed. If the offended party suffered from shame and humiliation caused by the maltreatment, it is slander by deed.  Unjust vexation, slander by deed, and acts of lasciviousness distinguished: - The common denominator present in unjust vexation, slander by deed, and act of lasciviousness is irritation or annoyance. Without any other concurring factor, the offense would be merely unjust vexation because unjust vexation is equated with anything that annoys or irritates another without justification. If in addition to the irritation or annoyance, there was attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt, the offense would be slander by deed. (Art. 359, RPC) However, if, in addition to the annoyance or irritation, there was present any of the circumstances provided for in Art. 335 of the Code, on rape, i.e., use of force or intimidation, deprivation of reason or otherwise rendering the offended party unconscious, or if the offended party was under 12 years of age, together with the lewd designs, the crime would be act of lasciviousness.  Incriminating an innocent person distinguished from perjury by making false accusation: - Incriminating an innocent person is committed by performing an act by which the offender directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; in perjury, the gravamen of the offense is the imputation itself, falsely made, before an officer. - Incriminating an innocent person is limited to the act of planting evidence and the like, in order to incriminate an innocent person; while perjury is the giving of false statement under oath or the making of a false affidavit, imputing to a person the commission of a crime. (People vs. Rivera)  Incriminatory machinations distinguished from defamation: - In incriminatory machinations, the offender does not avail himself of written or spoken words in besmirching the victim’s reputation, as would be in the case of defamation. In defamation, the imputation made by the offender must be public and malicious, and, besides, must be calculated to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the aggrieved party; this is not so in the case of incriminatory machinations.  Incriminating an innocent person distinguished from intriguing against honor: - In incriminating an innocent person, the offender performs an act by which he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; in intriguing against honor, the offender resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of blemishing the honor or reputation of another person. 

Intriguing against honor distinguished from defamation: - Defamation is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” (Art. 353 RPC) Intriguing against honor may be committed by means which “consists of some tricky and secret plot”. (People vs. Fontanilla)

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Intriguing against honor distinguished from slander: - But where the source or the author of the derogatory information cannot be determined and the defendant borrows the same and, without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others, the defendant’s act is one of intriguing against honor. - In slander the offender made the utterance, where the source of the defamatory nature of the utterance is unknown, and offender makes a republication thereof, even though he repeats the libelous statement as coming from another, as long as the source is identified.

TITLE XIV. QUASI-OFFENSES.  Imprudence distinguished from negligence: - Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action; negligence indicates a deficiency of perception. Hence, failure in precaution is termed imprudence. Failure in advertence is known as negligence. - The wrongful acts may be avoided on two levels: (1) by paying proper attention and using due diligence in foreseeing them, and (2) by taking the necessary precaution once they are foreseen. Failure to do the first is negligence. Failure to do the second is imprudence.  Reckless imprudence and “force majeure” distinguished: - Where immediate personal harm or damage to property, preventable by the exercise of reasonable care, is threatened upon another by reason of the course of conduct about to be pursued by the actor, his failure to use reasonable care to prevent injury constitutes reckless negligence. The expression force majeure has reference to an event which cannot be foreseen, or which being foreseen is inevitable. It implies an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the actor. (People vs. Eleazar)  Effect of accident in relation to Art. 275, par. 2 (failure to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidently wounded or injured) distinguished from Art. 365 (imprudence and negligence): - Art. 275, par. 2 falls under crimes against security while Art. 365 falls under criminal negligence. - Art. 275, par. 2 is committed by means of dolo while Art. 365 is committed by means of culpa. - In Art. 275, par. 2 failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense; while in Art. 365 failure to lend help to one’s victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. It must be specifically alleged in the information.