Crim 2 Part 1.docx

EN BANC [G.R. No. 976. October 22, 1902. ] THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. MAXIMO ABAD, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION LADD, J. : The offense with which the defendant was charged and of which he has been convicted is that defined in section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission, which is as follows: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer of the Army of the United States, or before any officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the affiant in substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."cralaw virtua1aw library The defendant is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty if the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. Assuming, for the purposes of the present motion, that the defendant is guilty of the offense, there is no evidence in the record showing that it was committed pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities, or that it grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities, or that it resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is covered by the amnesty it must be because it is embraced within the words employed in the proclamation to designate the first class of offenses amnestied, namely, "offenses of treason and sedition."cralaw virtua1aw library If these words are to be given a construction in accordance with their strict technical signification, there will be some difficulty in holding that they include the offense in question. Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods certain enumerated objects of a political character. A violation of an oath containing the comprehensive engagements of that in question may be committed without by the same act committing either the crime of treason or that of sedition as thus defined, as, for example, in the case of a conspiracy to commit these crimes or to commit the crime of insurrection. (Act No. 292, secs. 3,4,7.) And, conversely, the crime of treason or that of sedition may be committed, without a violation of the oath of allegiance when it is committed, as it, of course, may be, by a person who has never taken such oath. The act, therefore, by which the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, as defined in section 14 of Act No. 292, is committed, is not necessarily identical, although it may be in particular cases, with that by which the technical crime of treason or that of sedition is committed. And in all cases the offense of violation of an oath of allegiance involves, in a sense, an element, namely, the breaking of an express promise, which may not be present in treason or sedition. In the present case the act by which the defendant is found by the court below to have violated the oath was that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of which he was cognizant at the time of the denial. If this act was a violation of the oath, which upon the evidence in the case may be doubtful, it was probably also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to be regarded as merely an incidental circumstance forming no part of the essence of the crime of violation of oaths of allegiance, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name. We prefer, however, to base our decision upon a broader ground, and one which will cover all cases of prosecution for the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance. There are a variety of offenses in the criminal codes of all countries which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the state, the authority of the government or the general public tranquility. All or nearly all of the offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them are treason properly so called (section 1), misprision of treason (section 2), insurrection (section 3), conspiracy to commit treason or insurrection (section 4), sedition properly so called (section 5 and 6), conspiracy to commit sedition (section 7), seditious words and libels (section 8), the formation of secret political societies (section 9), and finally the offense in question (section 14). The line of distinction between some of these offenses is often difficult to draw. They are all closely related and may all be embraced under the general description of offenses of a treasonable and seditious nature. When the framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the purely political offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without specially enumerating the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under those two general heads. Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or liege lord, or to the supreme authority of the state." (Century Dictionary.) Sedition, in its more general sense, is "the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state." (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, title "Sedition.") Technical terms of the law when used in a statute are ordinarily to be given their technical signification. But in construing an executive act of the character of this proclamation, as in construing a remedial statute, a court is justified in applying a more liberal rule of construction in order to effectuate, if possible, the beneficent purpose intended. Certainly a limitation of the words in question to their literal and technical signification would utterly defeat the unmistakable general object of the amnesty. Upon such a construction treason, the highest of all political crimes, a crime which may be punished by death under section 1 of Act No. 292, would be included in the amnesty, while insurrection, which is a crime of precisely the same nature and differs from it solely in being inferior in degree and punishable by fine and imprisonment only, would be excluded. A construction leading to such manifest inconsistencies could be accepted only when the language admitted of no other. We think the construction suggested as the true one though somewhat less restricted than the precise legal signification of the terms "treason" and "sedition" might warrant, may be adopted without doing violence to the language of the proclamation, and there is no room for doubt in our minds that by adopting that construction we carry out the real intention of the President. We hold, therefore, that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the proclamation. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation, and upon filing in this court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he be discharged. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper and Willard, JJ., concur. Smith and Mapa, JJ., did not sit in this case.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-953 September 18, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant-appealed, vs. PEDRO MARCAIDA, Defendant-appellant. PABLO, J.: An appeal filed by Pedro Marcaidaque was condemned for the crime of treason, after the corresponding hearing, to the sentence of perpetual imprisonment with the accessions prescribed by the law and to the payment of a fine of P10, 000 and the costs of the Juico. The Appellant signaled three errors in which he incurred, according to him, the People's Court. 1. Or By declaring that the citizenship and loyalty of the defendant were sufficiently proven; 2. or By giving credit to the testimony of the witnesses of the accusation; and 3. Or By pleading guilty to the defendant of charge No. 3. The Defense contends that the tests in cars do not prove the Philippine Cuindadania and Alliance of the defendant Commonwealth government. The transcription of the notes Taquigraficas says Aue the defendant is natural of Lopez (a native of Lopez). The Defense alleges that the witness stated in Tagalog saying: "Taga Lopez " and did not say "ay panganak sa Lopez. " Aperece No such thing in the file. If it were true, it is strange that the lawyer did not ask for the Juzgadoque to order the Taquigrafo to record in his notes. When a party is not satisfied with the translation of a declaration of a witness, it must request that it be recorded in cars ne only the translations but also the original statement translated; Failing that, Sepresumira correct the translation of the official interpreter. But even admitting — the defense says — that the defendant was a natural from Lopez, Quezon province, his cuidadaniafilipina is not properly tested. In support of this contention, it invokes article IV of the Constitution, which entered into force on 15 November 1935. (Article XVI, section 6, Constitution.) The view of this case was Lugarel July 15, 1946. If The defendant was born, for example, a day after the Constitution entered into force, in the day of sight would not have more than ten years and eight months of age, and then committed the crime at the age of about nine years. Although it does not appear in cars the date of the birth, we are sure however that it was not a child of such age when it enters in sight. I would Not have querallado the prosecutor of such a serious crime. UnDoubtedly, was born before and not after entering into force the Constitution. It Cannot, therefore, avail itself of its provisions. Article 2 of the Jones ACT approved by the Congress on August 29, 1916, thus stipulates: "That all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that the 11th of April of Milochocientos Ninety and nine were Spanish minions and Quea the Sazon reside in these Islands , and their children born after that date, will be considered and held as citizens of the Philippine Islands, exceptuandose Those who have preferred to retain their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty between The United States and Spain, signed in Paris on the 10th of December of one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and except for those others that after that date have been citizens of some other country:.... Article 4 of the Philippine constituent law of 1. Or of July of 1902, is of the following tenor: "All the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who reside in them and that the eleven ofapril of thousand eight hundred ninety and nine were Spanish minions resident in these Islands and their h Ijos born after that date, they will be considered and held as citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such conrights to the protection of the United States, exceptuandose Those who have Eligado preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, of Agreement with the provisions of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Spain signed in Paris on ten December of the Thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. " The Defendant's name is Pedro Marcaida. For your first and last name, you can be Filipino, Spanish or South American. Nohay proof that he was a resident of the Philippines and a Spanish subdito on April 11, 1899. If He was a resident and was not a Spanish subdito he could not acquire the Philippine citizenship because he would continue being foreign. If She was a Spanish Subdito and resided in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899, she automatically became Cuidadanofilipino unless she opted to retain the Spanish citizenship; But since there is no evidence in that sense, the assumption is that he is Filipino. If born after April 11, 1899 parents who were Spanish subjects would follow the nationality of those: Spanish, if their parents wanted to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, and Filipino, if they opted to lose it. There is No evidence presented in one direction or another: You can serentonces Spanish or Filipino. If born after April 11, 1899 of Filipino parents is Filipino. It Can happen that descendant of a South American that has been established in the province of Quezon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris; If your father did not want to accept the provisions of the Naturalization Act, then the defendant is foreign: Segue the nationality of his father. If you are a descendant of a Spanish citizen who has begun to reside in the Philippines after the Paris Treaty, you will continue to be Spanish unless you have been naturalized. Nor is there any evidence in this regard; So he's Spanish, foreigner. Paz Chua Uang for the mere fact that he was born in the Philippines was declared Filipino because he was not a Spanish Sibdita or daughter of a Spanish minion on April 11, 1899. (Chua against Labor Secretary, 68 Phil., 649.) This doctrine has implicitly revoked that of Roa against the Insular Customs Administrator (23 Jur. Fil., 321) and later. (Vaño against Administrator Insularde Customs, 23 Jur. Fil., 491; United States against Ngo Tianse, 29 Jur. Fil., 352; United States against Ang, 36 Jur. Fil., 915; Go Julian against Government of the Philippine Islands, 45 Jur. Fil., 301; Haw against Insular Customs Administrator, 59 Jur. Fil., 646.) In the matter of Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim, another vezla theory was adopted sitting in the Roa affair, but the Tribunal was divided into the ratio of four by three. Elactual President of the Tribunal and the Imperial Magistrate were dissidents. Magistrate Villareal was of the opinion that the mere birth in the Philippines does not make one cared. The majority says nothing in support of the correctness of theRoa ruling, and seeks simply to justify its continued observance upon the fact that it "had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," and that not "only this Court but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and administrative agencies of theGovernment had theretofore abide by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it. I do not yield to this judicial policy. If we induced the Government and the public to follow and accept an error for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them to follow and accept the same error once discovered. The rule of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error (15 C. J., p. 918.) It is the duty of every court to examine its own decisions without fear and to revise them reluctance (Baker vs. Lorillard, 4 N. Y., 257.) As was well said in a case, "I hold itto be the duty of this court freely to examine its own decisions, and, when satisfied that it has fallen into a mistake, to correct the error by overruling its own decision. An acknowledged error must be more venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the principle of stare decisis." (Leavitt vs. Blatchaford, 17 N. Y., 521, 523.) "Precedents are to be regarded as the great storehouse of experience; not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation." (Per Bartley, C. J., in Leavitt vs. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.) Their "authority must often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to these demands." (Norton vs. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383 , 58 S. 283.) " (Torres y Gallofin contra Tan Chim, 69 Phil., 518.) In the affairs of Tan Chong against Secretary of Labor, p. 249, ante, and Lam Swee Sang v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, p. 249, ante, we have declared definitively abandoned this theory and adopted the deChua against Secretary of Labor. The reason is simple. The theory of jus soli in the United States is absolute: the simple birth in American according to its constitution and the decision in United States vs. Wong Kim Ark (169 U. S., 649). The American constitution never came into force in the Philippines. The theory of jus soli in the Philippines in accordance with the law of July 1, 1902, approved by the American Congress that, according to the Treaty of Paris, is the one that must

determine the conditional: that the Philippine born is considered a Filipino citizen if he was a Spanish resident and subject or the son of a Spanish resident and subject on April 11, 1899. If he was a foreigner or the son of a foreigner on that date, he can not be a Filipino citizen. The accused, then, according to the evidence produced in cars, can be Filipino or foreigner. Under the treason law No. 292 of the Civil Commission, all residents of the Philippines who, owing allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, war or form common cause with their enemies helping and assisting them inside or outside said Islands, he committed the crime treason. Article 1 of this law is a simple transplant of the provisions of the American Criminal Code which is of the following tenor: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within The United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. " (Sec. 1, Crim. Code: R. S., § 5331, Mar. 4,1909, § 321, § 1, 35 Stat., 1088.) "Treason against the United States," dice la Constitucion Americana, "shall consist only in levying against them,or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (Section 3 [1], Article III.) In Americana both foreigners and nationals can commit the crime of treason. Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of America during the time of their residence. (Carlisle vs. U. S., 21 Law, ed., 426, Raditch vs. Hutchins, 24 Law, ed., 409.) The English hold the same theory. (De Jager vs. Attorney General of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) It is not necessary to be an American citizen so that they can commit the crime of treason. But the Revised Penal Code has excluded foreigners, only nationals can commit it. Article 114 reads as follows: "Who, owing allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreign national, makes war on them or forms common cause with their enemies, helping or assisting them inside or outside those Islands. , shall be punished with the penalties of temporary imprisonment to death and a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos. " The executive order No.44, recognizing that it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code to punish for the crime of treason the foreigners residing in the Philippines who have helped the enemies, in article 114, adding a paragraph of the following tenor: "Likewise , any alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos. " (Executive Order No. 44, M. If the defendant is Filipino, he owes allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and must be convicted of treason; but if a foreigner can not be punished for acts committed by him before the amendment of Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the evidence does not clearly establish that the defendant is Filipino, he can not be criminally liable for the crime of treason. It revoked the original ruling. His immediate freedom is ordered with the coasts of office. Moran, Pres., y Briones, M., estan conformes.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-33487 May 31, 1971 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MAXIMO MARTIN, CANDIDO MARTIN and RODOLPO HIGASHI, defendants-appellees. CASTRO, J.: This appeal by the People of the Philippines from the order dated August 2, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of La Union dismissing criminal case A-392 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court, the issues raised being purely of law. The central issue is the proper interpretation of the provisions Section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by Rep. Act 144 and Rep. Act 327, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act. The defendants Maximo Martin, Candido Martin and Rodolfo Higashi were charged in criminal case A-392 of the CFI of La Union with a violation of section 46 of Com. Act 613, as amended. The information dated January 12, 1968 recites as follows: The undersigned Acting State Prosecutor, and Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuse MAXIMO MARTIN, CANDIDO MARTIN and RODOLFO HIGASHI of Sec. 46 of Commonwealth Act NO. 613 otherwise known as Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act No. 827, committed as follows: That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1966, in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and in active aid with Filipino nationals who are presently charged before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 6252-M, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bring in and carry into the Philippines thirty nine (39) Chinese aliens who traveled by the Chinese vessel "Chungking" from the port of Hongkong and who are not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter the Philippines, and from the Chinese vessel "Chungking," accused took delivery, loaded, and ferried the Chinese aliens in the vessel "MARU XI" owned, operated, under the charge and piloted by all the herein accused from outside into the Philippines, sureptitiously landing the said aliens at Barrio Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, Philippines which place of landing is not a duly authorized port of entry in the Philippines. After the thirty-nine (39) illegal entrants were landed in barrio Damortis, as charged in the indictment, they were loaded in a car and two jeepneys for transport to Manila. They did not however reach their destination because they were intercepted by Philippine Constabulary agents in Malolos, Bulacan. For concealing and harboring these thirty-nine aliens, Jose Pascual, Filipinas Domingo, Jose Regino, Alberto Bunyi, Emerdoro Santiago and Ibarra Domingo were charged before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in criminal case 6258-M. The amended information in the said criminal case reads as follows: The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Jose Pascual, Filipinas Domingo, Jose Regino, Alberto Bunyi, Emerdoro Santiago and Ibarra Domingo of the violation of Section 46 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act No. 827, committed as follows: That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1966, in the municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused and several others whose identities are still unknown, conspiring and confederating and aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and, feloniously, bring conceal and harbor 39 Chinese aliens not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the terms of the Immigration Laws, whose names are as follows: Hung Chang Cheong, Hung Ling Choo, Sze Lin Chuk, Chian Giok Eng, Mung Bun Bung, Lee Chin Kuo, Gan Kee Chiong, See Sei Hong Chun, Go Kian Sim, Kho Ming Jiat, See Lee Giok, Uy Chin Chu, Go Su Kim, Go Chu, Chiang Tian, Chua Tuy Tee, Sy Jee Chi, Sy Sick Bian, Sy Kang Liu, Ang Chi Hun, Kho Chu, Chua Hong, Lim Chin Chin, Ang Lu Him, William Ang, Sy Siu Cho, Ang Puy Hua, Sy Chi Tek, Lao Sing Tee, Cua Tiong Bio, Kho Lee Fun, Kho Lee Fong, Ang Giok, Sy Si Him, Sy Lin Su, Lee Hun, Sy SiongGo and Sy Cho Lung, who previously earlier on the same day, thru the aid, help and manipulation of the abovenamed accused, were loaded and ferried to the shore from the Chinese vessel "CHIUNG HING" in a fishing vessel known as the "MARU Xl" and landed at barrio Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, and immediately upon landing were loaded in 3 vehicles an automobile bearing plate No. H-3812-Manila driven and operated by Emerdoro Santiago and 2 jeepneys with plates Nos. S-27151- Philippines, 1966 and S-26327-Philippines, 1966 driven and operated by Jose Regino and Alberto Bunyi, respectively, and brought southwards along the MacArthur highway and upon reaching Malolos, Bulacan, were apprehended by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, the latter confiscating and impounding the vehicles used in carrying and transporting the aid aliens and including the sum of P15,750.00 found in the possession of the accused Jose Pascual which was used and/or to be used in connection with the commission of the crime charged. On July 1, 1968 the three accused in criminal case A-392 filed a "motion to dismiss" [quash] on the ground that the CFI of La Union has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the said indictment as the court had been pre-empted from taking cognizance of the case by the dependency in the CFI of Bulacan of criminal case 6258-M. This motion was opposed by the prosecution. On August 2, 1968 the Court of First Instance of La Union dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence the present recourse. In this appeal the Government contends that the lower court erred (1) "in declaring that the information in the instant case [A-392] alleges conspiracy between the accused herein and the persons accused in criminal case 6258-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;" (2) "in holding that by reason of said allegation of conspiracy in the information in this case [A-3921], the act of one of the accused in both criminal cases is deemed the act of all the accused and that as a consequence all those accused in the two cases are liable and punishable for one offense or violation of section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, although committed by and through the different means specified in said section;" (3) "in holding that the violation of section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, committed by the accused in both criminal cases partakes of the nature of a transitory or continuing offense;" and (4) "in declaring that it lacks jurisdiction and is now excluded from taking cognizance of this case [A-392] and in dismissing it." Section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, reads as follows: Any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the terms of the immigration laws, or attempts, conspires with, or aids another to commit any such act, and any alien who enters the Philippines without inspection of admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a material fact, shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than ten thousand pesos, imprisoned for not more than ten years, and deported if he is an alien. If the individual who brings into or lands in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside herein, or who attempts, conspires with or aids another to commit any such act, is the pilot, master, agent, owner, consignee, or any person in charge of the vessel or aircraft which brought the alien into the Philippines from any place outside thereof, the fine imposed under the first paragraph hereof shall constitute a lien against the vessel or aircraft and may be enforced in the same manner as fines are collected and enforced against vessels under the customs laws: Provided, however, That if the court shall in its discretion consider forfeiture to be justified by the circumstances of the case, it shall order, in lieu of the fine imposed, the forfeiture of the vessel or aircraft in favor of the Government, without prejudice to the imposition to the penalty of imprisonment provided in the preceding paragraph. To be stressed at the outset is the significant repetition, in the second paragraph above-quoted, of basic words and concepts set forth in the first paragraph. Thus, the first paragraph begins with: "Any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien ...;" the second paragraph starts with "If the individual who brings into or lands in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien ..." (emphasis supplied) Scanning section 46 in its entire context, it is at once apparent, there being no indication to the contrary, that the act of bringing into, the act of landing, the act of concealing, the act of harboring, are four separate acts, each act possessing its own distinctive, different and disparate meaning. "Bring into" has reference to the act of placing an alien within the territorial waters of the Philippines. "Land" refers to the act of putting ashore an alien. "Conceal" refers to the act of hiding an alien. "Harbor" refers to the act of giving shelter and aid to an alien. It is of course understood that the alien brought into or landed in the Philippines, or concealed or harbored, is an "alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the terms of the immigration laws."1

The rule is too well-settled to require any citation of authorities that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation. While in the interpretation of statutes, 'or' may read 'and' and vice versa, it is so only when the context so requires.2 A reading of section 46 above-quoted does not justify giving the word "or" a non-disjunctive meaning. Bringing into and landing in the Philippines of the 39 aliens were completed when they were placed ashore in the barrio of Damortis on September 22, 1966. The act of the six accused in criminal case 6258-M before the CFI of Bulacan of transporting the aliens constitutes the offenses of "concealing" and "harboring," as the terms are used in section 46 of our Immigration Laws. The court a quo in point of fact accepted this interpretation when it observed that "it could happen that different individuals, acting separately from, and independently of each other could violate and be criminally liable for violation of the immigration Act, if each individual independently commits any of the means specified under said section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by Republic Act 827. For example, an individual act independently, with the use of a motor boat, brings into the country and lands several Chinese aliens and after doing so he goes away. There is no question that said individual violated said section 46 of the Immigration Act, for bringing into and landing in the Philippines some alien. Now, after the said landing of the said aliens another individual also acting independently, without connection whatsoever with the one who brought and landed the said aliens, and knowing that the Chinese aliens have no right to enter the country or unlawfully conceals or harbors the said aliens. There is no doubt that this is also liable and punishable for another separate violation of said section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613." This notwithstanding, the court dismissed this case on the ground that there is an express allegation in the information of connivance between the three defendant-appellees herein and the six accused in criminal case 6258-M of the CFI of Bulacan. In our view the court a quo incurred in error in reading this conclusion. This error, which is one of misinterpretation of the phraseology of the information, was induced by a reading of the first of the said information which states as follows: That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1966, in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and in active aid with Filipino nationals who are presently charged before the CFI of Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 6258-M, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bring in and ferry into the Philippines thirty-nine (39) Chinese aliens who traveled by the Chinese vessel 'Chungking' from the port of Hongkong ... (Emphasis ours) It is crystal-clear that the words, "the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another," can refer only and exclusively to the three persons accused in this case, namely Maximo Martin, Candido Martin and Rodolfo Higashi. While the unfortunate insertion in the information of the clause reading, "and in active aid with Filipino nationals who are presently charged before the CFI of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 6258M," may yield the implication that the three defendants-appellees and the six accused in criminal case 6258-M before the CFI of Bulacan may have agreed on the sequence of the precise steps to be taken in the smuggling of the Chinese aliens and on the identities of the persons charged with consummating each step, still there seems to be no question that the three defendants-appellees are charged only with bringing in and landing on Philippine soil the thirtynine aliens, whereas the six accused in criminal case 6258-M are charged only with concealing and harboring the said aliens. It is technically absurd to draw a conclusion of conspiracy among the three defendants-appellees and the six accused in the criminal case 6258-M before the CFI of Bulacan who are not named defendants in this case. At all events, the words, "and in active aid with Filipino nationals who are presently charged before the CFI of Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 6258-M," can and should be considered as a surplusage, and may be omitted from the information without doing violence to or detracting from the intendment of the said indictment. These words should therefore be disregarded. Finally, the court a quo erred in maintaining the view that the acts of bringing into and landing aliens in the Philippines illegally and the acts of concealing and harboring them constitute one "transitory and continuing violation". We here repeat and emphasize that the acts of bringing into and landing an alien in the Philippines are completed once the alien is brought ashore on Philippine territory, and are separate and distinct from the acts of concealing and harboring such alien. If the aliens in this case were apprehended immediately after landing, there would be no occasion for concealing and harboring them. Upon the other hand, one set of persons may actually accomplish the act of bringing in and/or landing aliens in the Philippines, and another completely different set of persons may conceal and/or harbor them. The general concept of a continuing offense is that the essential ingredients of the crime are committed in different provinces. An example is the complex offense of kidnapping with murder if the victim is transported through different provinces before he is actually killed. In such case the CFI of any province in which any one of the essential elements of said complex offense has been committed, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense.3 The conclusion thus become ineluctable that the court a quo erred in refusing to take cognizance of the case at bar. ACCORDINGLY, the order of the Court of First Instance of La Union of August 2, 1968, dismissing this case and cancelling the bail bond posted by the three defendants-appellees, is set aside, and this case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. Makasiar, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. L-4533. May 28, 1952.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO MORALES, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION PARAS, C.J. : The defendant, Lorenzo Morales, was charged with the crime of treason in a two-count information, count one of which was abandoned by the prosecution. The other count reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "That on or about December 12, 1944, in San Miguel, Bulacan, the above-named accused Lorenzo Morales, then a member of the MAKAPILI organization, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lead, join, and accompany a group of Japanese soldiers and other MAKAPILI members in a raid in barrio Santa Lucia, San Miguel, Bulacan, resulting in the capture and apprehension of Maximo Ramos, Alejo Velayo, Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo, Fermin Chico, Bonifacio de Jesus, and Arsenio Pacheco, all guerrillas, and in the confiscation of 112 rounds of ammunitions and clothing of said Bonifacio de Jesus; and thereafter all the above-named persons were taken to the Japanese garrison in San Miguel, Bulacan, where they were beaten, maltreated and detained for a period of 22 days after which Bonifacio de Jesus was released, Maximo Ramos was able to escape, and Alejo Velayo, Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo, Fermin Chico and Arsenio Pacheco were killed."cralaw virtua1aw library After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a decision finding the defendant guilty as charged, and sentencing him to imprisonment for 20 years, reclusion temporal, and to a fine of P10,000, plus the costs. From this decision, the defendant appealed. The facts as found by the trial court and supported by the evidence for the prosecution are briefly as follows: In a raid made by a group of Japanese and Makapili in the early morning of December 12, 1944, in Santa Lucia, San Miguel, Bulacan, Ricardo Velayo and Rufino Velayo, brothers, were arrested from their house. During the raid, the appellant, armed with a gun, remained downstairs as a guard. At about 10:00 o’clock in the same morning Ricardo and Rufino Velayo, together with Fermin Chico, Alejo Velayo, Arsenio Pacheco, Maximo Ramos, Bonifacio de Jesus and Salvador Eusebio, also arrested from other places in Santa Lucia, were taken near the house of Rosalina de Guzman where they were tortured to death, with the exception of Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos, and Salvador Eusebio. The dead bodies were buried near the place of the torture, but those of Ricardo Velayo and Rufino Velayo were later exhumed and buried in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The appellant, however, though present on the occasion when the victims were tortured, did not actually take part in the fatal ceremony. All those thus apprehended and killed were guerrillas. The arrest of Ricardo and Rufino Velayo in their house was testified to by Ramon Velayo, their father, and Herminia de San Jose, wife of Rufino Velayo, who lived in the same house. Ramon Velayo declared that, as the raiders approached his house, he jumped out and hid himself among the bushes nearby, from which he was able to recognize the appellant who went back and forth, with a gun, as a guard near the premises. Herminia de San Jose in turn testified that Ricardo and Rufino Velayo were guerrillas; and when the Japanese came to her house, they asked for firearms and arrested her husband and brother-inlaw; that the appellant in the meantime posted himself, with a gun, as a guard around the house. The torture which resulted in the death of the victims above mentioned, except Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos and Salvador Eusebio, is established by the testimony of Maximo Ramos, Salvador Eusebio (two survivors) and Rosalina de Guzman. The latter testified that a group of Japanese and Makapilis brought several Filipino prisoners near her house in Santa Lucia, among whom she recognized Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos, Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo, Alejo Velayo, Arsenio Pacheco and Fermin Chico. All, except Bonifacio de Jesus and Maximo Ramos, were tortured to death. The testimony of Maximo Ramos and Salvador Eusebio is corroborative. The defense presented Cirilo Domingo and Luis Santa Maria, former guerrilla officers, who testified that their investigations showed that the appellant had nothing to do with the crime imputed to him. The appellant also introduced Felisa de Velayo, who testified that she saw Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo and Alejo Velayo while they were maltreated to death, and that the appellant did not take part in the killing, although he was present as a prisoner. The appellant testified that he was working in the field and, while the Japanese conducted their raid in Santa Lucia, he was not molested. The trial court was correct in finding the appellant guilty. The two witness-rule was fully met. Counsel for appellant doubts the veracity of Salvador Eusebio, because the latter was not mentioned in the information as one of the victims. Even without said witness, however, the testimony of Maximo Ramos and Rosalina de Guzman is sufficient. No ulterior motive on the part of the witnesses for the prosecution has been shown, so that it cannot be argued that they were biased against the appellant. There can be no dispute that the victims were guerrillas, because the appellant himself and his witness, Cirilo Domingo, admitted that fact. Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense is materially conflicting, in that while the appellant testified that he was in the field when the raid was made, his own witness, Felisa de Velayo, declared that as the Velayos were being tortured, the appellant was there as a prisoner. The testimony of Cirilo Domingo and Luis Sta. Maria as to the result of their investigations, cannot overcome the positive evidence presented by the prosecution. Appellant also insists that his mere presence is not sufficient to constitute treason. It appears, however, that he was carrying a firearm and was seen behaving as a guard. During the Japanese occupation, nobody could carry a gun freely in the presence of Japanese soldiers, unless he was an agent of or in cahoots with the enemy. "We think it far-fetched to suppose that the defendant happened to be in the place above mentioned as a mere spectator or by accident. Openly carrying a firearm while going with Japanese soldiers can only be reconciled with the idea that the man was in league with and had the confidence of the enemy. (People v. Capacete, 45 Off. Gaz. 2035.)." Appellant’s Filipino citizenship is proven by certified true copies of his identification record card and certificate of citizenship (Exhibits A-1 and B-1), the originals of which (Exhibits A and B) are on file in the Bureau of Prisons. Since these are official records, it was not necessary to identify them. The criticism of appellant’s counsel that they were not properly identified is therefore without merit. Although, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the prescribed penalty should be in the medium period, or reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor General, we are inclined to affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court, it appearing that the appellant admittedly did not have any participation in the torture that resulted in the death of the victims. "We have punished the commission of treason on the basis of the seriousness of the treasonable acts, and of the presence or absence of atrocities on the victims, rather than on the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances." (People v. Caña, 87 Phil. 577.) . Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Labrador, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-2998. May 23, 1951.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAQUIN FLAVIER, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION PARAS, C.J. : This is an appeal taken by the defendant, Joaquin Flavier, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, finding him guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with legal accessories, and to pay a fine of P15,000. The information contained ten counts, but the appellant was found guilty of only counts 1, 2, 7, 8 and 10. Count No. 1 accuses the appellant of having given aid to the Japanese Imperial Forces by serving as an officer to the United Nippon Organization, established to counteract the guerrilla movement and the American liberation forces in Lopez, Tayabas. Under Count No. 2, the appellant is charged with having killed three guerrillas known as Monosea, Talavera and Ramos, in Lopez, Tayabas. Count 7 alleges that the appellant arrested Florentino Salumbides in his house in Lopez, Tayabas, on suspicion of being a guerrilla spy, the said Florentino Salumbides having been taken to the Japanese garrison and detained therein for a period of twenty-two days. Count 8 refers to the apprehension by the appellant of Gerudio Villanesa in his house in Lopez, Tayabas, on suspicion of being a guerrilla, and his torture by the appellant in the Japanese garrison. Count 10 alleges that the appellant arrested Aniceto Iglesia on suspicion of being a guerrilla in barrio Dalangan, Lopez, Tayabas, he having been brought to the Japanese garrison. Counsel for appellant argues that appellant’s citizenship was not duly proven and that none of the overt acts charged against him and of which he was convicted by the trial court is supported by the evidence. Appellant’s Filipino citizenship is, however, satisfactorily shown by the official record in the Bureau of Prisons, Exhibit "A", which was admitted in evidence without appellant’s objection and by the testimony of witnesses who have known the appellant to have been born in the Philippines of Filipino parents. Appellant’s pretense that he did not know whether his parents were Filipinos, is absurd, if not unbelievable, he being a high school graduate and having been a high school teacher and a candidate for municipal vice-president and senator. The case of Jose Tan Chiong v. Secretary of Labor, G. R. No. 47616, invoked by the appellant in support of his contention that mere birth in the Philippines is not sufficient to confer Filipino citizenship, is not applicable, for the reason that said case involved an alien born of an alien father and a Filipino mother. We agree with counsel for the appellant that count No. 1 was not duly proven. But we are convince that appellant’s conviction on the other counts is well founded. The evidence for the prosecution, with reference to count 2, is to the effect that in an encounter between a number of guerrillas and the enemy forces in the town of Lopez, three guerrilla members, namely, Manosea, Talavera and Ramos, were killed. Florentino Salumbides, Epifanio Ardiente, Felipe Cargan, Francisco Caldecara and Lorenzo Ambas, testified about the encounter, in which the appellant fought on the side of the enemy. It is true that there is no direct proof that the appellant actually killed the three guerrillas, but said fact does not exculpate him from criminal liability resulting from his participation on the enemy’s side. With reference to the arrest of Florentino Salumbides as charged in count No. 7, two prosecution witnesses, Florentino Salumbides himself and his brother Dominador Salumbides, testified. The appellant claims that it was Lamberto San Juan who actually arrested Florentino Salumbides, as shown in the transcript. As the two Salumbides brothers have known the appellant since boyhood, it is unlikely that they could have mistaken the appellant for another; and the appearance of the name of San Juan in the transcript must have been an obvious clerical error, especially in view of the alleged denial of San Juan that he ordered the arrest and subsequent release of Florentino Salumbides. The arrest of Gerundio Villanisa by the appellant is confirmed by Gerundio Villanisa himself and Santiago Surbano. Appellant’s defense against this count No. 8 is that while he was present at the time of the arrest, it was Lamberto San Juan who actually made the arrest. Appellant’s allegation is not again sufficient to exculpate him from criminal liability, as he acted knowingly in conjunction with Lamberto San Juan. Neither is there merit in appellant’s pretense that Villanisa was arrested because of a crime, and not because of his guerrilla activities, since the crime imputed to Villanisa consisted in the holdup of the two Japanese trucks. The arrest and subsequent torture of Aniceto Iglesia by order of the appellant, as charged in count 10, is testified to by Aniceto Iglesia himself and David Villapane. There is no point in appellant’s contention that, according to David Villapane himself, the latter was arrested by the "companions of Profirio Jimenez" and not by the appellant, because the appellant was a companion of Profirio Jimenez and the overt act charged in count 10 is the arrest and torture of Aniceto Iglesia, not of David Villapane. Aniceto Iglesia and David Villapane both testified that the appellant was present when Aniceto was arrested and it was the appellant who ordered their captives to be hog-tied and tortured in the garrison. The appealed judgment being in accordance with the facts and the law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered. Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant. TUASON, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs. The information charged: That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows: That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law. The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans." Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating. We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.) At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army. But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth? The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says: In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England. More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act. Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses." In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act. The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed.,

II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'" Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant. The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio. Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur. Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947 ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent. RESOLUTION In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic: (1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526); Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests; Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case; Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own; Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation; Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants; Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or

sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor; Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide; (2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution; Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country. Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines"; This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 1434. February 23, 1904. ] THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION McDONOUGH, J. : The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc., levy war against, adhere to and give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the United States and of the Philippine Islands, in that on or about August 30, 1902, he accepted a commission in the regular army of the "Filipino republic" and served as a captain and carried arms in such army and continued in such office and continued to carry arms as aforesaid between the said dates of August 30, 1902, and November 21, 1902, the said "Filipino republic" being an attempted government organized by various persons against the authority of the United States Government and that of the Philippine Islands and having for its object the overthrow by armed insurrection of the regularly constituted government in said Islands. The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of twenty years and to pay a fine of $5,000. The evidence upon which the court below based this conviction is substantially as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A constabulary detective testified that he met the defendant in Bacord, city of Manila, November 21, 1902; that a companion of the witness told him that the defendant was a captain in the Katipunan Society; that thereupon they detained the defendant and took him aside into a clump of trees where they talked to him and got him to admit that he was an officer of the Katipunan. The officers took the defendant to his house, where they searched his trunk and found in it and took away a revolver and a captain’s commission, under seals. The following is a copy of this commission:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SUPREME PRESIDENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS" "By reason of the qualifications of Antonio de los Reyes and the good service rendered by him to the fatherland, the supreme president has seen fit to appoint him captain in the regular army of these Islands. "It is therefore ordered that all persons render him the corresponding honors and obey all orders which he may issue for the good of the service. "K. K., the 30th of August, 1902. "CENON NIGDAO, "S. K., Minister of War. "A. G. DEL ROSARIO, "S. K., Supreme President. "To DON ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, "Appointed Captain in the Regular Army of these Philippine Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library This Constabulary detective further testified that one Cenon Nigdao was a lieutenant-colonel in command of the whole Katipunan forces, but at that time had been captured and was a prisoner at Pasig. The witness was asked what this Katipunan Society is, and in reply stated that it is an organization for forming an independent government for the Philippines, not letting their headquarters or whereabouts be known to the American Government, and to gain forces and arms by any means they can; sometimes they use force in securing members. When asked if he knew any of the armed forces of the society, he said that they made an attack on May 30 upon a Government upon a government force of the United States Army. He said he had not seen the defendant with the insurgent forces. Another witness for the prosecution testified that he had been informed of this so-called government known as the Tagalog republic, or Katipunan, through captured documents; that they had armed forces approximating 300 men, and that he knew their sales and recognized the seals on Exhibit A, the commission of the defendant, as those of the organization. The next witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he was a tailor, 28 years of age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He identified the signatures on Exhibit A. He states that the Katipunan is the national party. Its purpose is to defend the rights of the country and to ask of the American Government the freedom of this country. He further stated that when he gave this commission to the defendant he told him to keep it, and when the time came for them to ask for liberty the people could not do him any harm. The witness named the secretary of the National Party, the minister of the interior, the minister of the state, minister of war, and minister of justice of the association. On cross-examination this "secretary of war," who had held office only for one week, testified that he commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made any use of his commission; that they did not take up arms because they were here in Manila; and that he was living in the same house with the defendant and gave him the commission there. Another witness sworn for the prosecution stated that he was not a member of the Katipunan, but was a member of the National party ever since he left Bilibid Prison; that the "secretary of war" appointed him a lieutenant-colonel and he held the commission three months but had no soldiers to command; and that there was no army when Cenon Nigdao was living at Bacord. He said he was sent out to Baliuag by one Santiago and stayed there about three months, and when he found out that there was nothing doing he surrendered himself and one revolver to the president.

If we reject, as we must, the confession of the defendant made to the Constabulary officer, because it was not made in open court as required by law (sec. 9, act of Congress passed March 8, 1902), we have put very little in the case upon which to base a charge of treason. Even what there is contradictory. The charge is that the defendant took arms against the government in the regular army of the "Philippine republic," whereas one witness for the prosecution swears that the Katipunan is the treasonable organization, another says that body is known as the "Tagalog republic," and another, the so-called secretary of war, who commanded no troops, but to whom the Government presumably gave credit because he testified for the prosecution, stated that the Katipunan was the "National party" and the object of that party was to obtain from the United States, by peaceable means, the independence of the Philippine Islands. The confession of the accused being disposed, the only other question to be considered is whether the testimony of one witness that he issued to the defendant the captain’s commission above-mentioned, and the testimony of another witness that he found this commission in the defendant’s trunk, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute that "no person in the Philippine Islands shall under the authority of the United States be convicted of treason . . . unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with this charge than to receive this commission. On the contrary the "secretary of war" testified that they did not take up arms because they remained her in Manila. I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant, nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the community) any ,an can possibly commit, it ought, therefore, to be the most freely ascertained."cralaw virtua1aw library The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence — the playing of the game of government, like children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and commissions all on paper, for the purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the vicious — should not be dignified by the name of the treason. Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing an independent government in these Islands, with nothing behind them, without arms or soldiers or money, and without the possibility of success, are simply engaged in deluding themselves and perhaps innocent followers and in filling the cells of Bilibid Prison. Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser crimes. The case of the United States v. Magtibay, 1 recently decided by this court, involved much the same question as this, and is followed. The judgment below is therefore reversed and the defendant acquitted, but without prejudice to the prosecuting authorities to proceed against the defendant for such other crime or crimes as the evidence discloses. The costs are adjudged de oficio. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., disqualified.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 1582 March 28, 1904 THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. DALMACIO LAGNASON, defendant-appellant. WILLARD, J.: The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of treason, was convicted and sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from the evidence. From the time of the occupation of the Province of Occidental Negros by the American troops, there had existed therein a band of men in arms against the Government of the United States, which band was led by the defendant and which in October was campaigning through the northern part of the province. In the southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio Papa. These two parties, though in communication with each other, had formerly operated independently, but in each month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed himself and his forces under the orders of said Dionisio Papa. His band was constantly armed and kept together, and its object was to establish an independent government. On October 29, 1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in said province, but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there stationed. During that night two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with additional forces and early in the morning they left the pueblo in search of the defendant. He was encountered with his party about three kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked by the Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a half. The defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty of his men were killed. On the side of the Constabulary were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were acting as guides. The defendant's band consisted of between seventy and eighty men. They had for arms five or ten rifles, bolos, daggers, and one small cannon. The defendant when captured was armed with a rifle, a revolver, and a bolo. Most of his men wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps. They carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the cannon. Article 3, section, of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows: Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court. The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. L., 112), contained the following provision: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States of elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of the treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and shall suffer death. The statute law of the United States stood in that form, so far as we are informed, until the act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second sections of that were as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That every person who shall hereafter commit the crime of treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or at the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all of the property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the owner at the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding. SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court." In the Revised Statutes of the United States these provisions appear in section 5331, 5332, and 5334, which are as follows: SEC. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies war against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. SEC. 5332. Every person guilty of treason suffer death; or at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States. SEC. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both of such punishments; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission are as follows: SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the United States, or the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars. SEC. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or comfort to anyone so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than ten years and he fined not more than ten thousands dollars. The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes of treason, rebellion, and sedition. Article 236 of that code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of Act No. 292, but that act, as to treason and rebellion, is practically a reproduction of the sections quoted from the Revised Statutes. Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of the country, the question as to what constituted, a "levying of war" within the constitutional definition of treason had been before the Federal courts on several different occasions. In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted the definitions of the phrase "levying war" which had been given by different judges of the United States, and declared through the Chief Justice what the latter afterwards said in Burr's case (25 Fed. Cases, 13), to wit: That part of his disposition which bears upon this charge is the plan disclosed by the prisoner for seizing upon New Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States. That this plan if consummated by overt acts would amount to treason no man will controvert. Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5, 1) constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was "levying war against the United States," and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.) No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or insurgent so far as the act of "levying war" is concerned. All of the cases tried before the United States courts have grown out of insurrection. The case of Mitchell grew out of the "whisky rebellion" in western Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of the Northampton Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of Burr's attempts; the case of Hanway out of resistance to the fugitive slave law; and the case of Greathouse out of the civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made under the second clause of the Constitutional provision, namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It has been said that the word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy and does not include a rebel. If it were not for the provisions of the second section of the act of July 17, 1862, now section 5334 of the Revised Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, the case at bar would present no difficulty. The defendant would be clearly guilty of treason and punishable under the first section of Act No. 292. He was engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was captured after an armed contest. It matters not how vain and futile his attempt was and how impossible of accomplishment. The acts performed by him constituted a levying of war. Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall be punished by death, or imprisonment for not less than five years. Section 5334 declares that one engaging in a rebellion or insurrection

against the United States shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years. As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by both sections and in different ways. This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case of United States vs. Greathouse (4 Sawy., 457 S. C.; 26 Fed. Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting in the circuit court. The defendants in that case were indicted under the second section of the act of July 17, 1862 (New Revised Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No. 292, sec. 3), for fitting out in the harbor of San Francisco a privateer to aid the then existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in charging the jury: But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in the second section which would not constitute treason, except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the Senate, and read the several sections of the acts together, the apparent inconsistency disappears. Looking at the act alone, we conclude that Congress intended (1) to preserve the cat of 1790, which prescribes the penalty of death, in force for the prosecution and punishment of offenses committed previous to July 17, 1862, unless the parties accused are convicted under the act of the latter date for subsequent offenses; (2) to punish treason thereafter committed with death, or fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, unless the treason consist in engaging in or assisting a rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, in which event the death penalty is to be abandoned and a less penalty inflicted. By this construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions of the different sections is avoided and effect given to each clause of the act. The defendants are, therefore, in fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the protection and privileges allowed to parties accused of treason, without being liable, in case of conviction, to the penalty which all other civilized nations have awarded to this, the highest of crimes known to the law. Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said: If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the present rebellion constitutes a levying of war, it follows that in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress has denounced the same crime; and that a party amenable to the second section for having "engaged in the rebellion and given it aid and comfort," must also be guilty of treason by levying war against the United States. As, then, the offenses described are substantially the same, though a different penalty is attached to their commission by the sections referred to, it was held by the court, under the first indictment, which was in terms for treason, that the smaller penalty could alone be inflicted, that the prisoners could not be capitally punished, and could therefore be admitted to bail. On the same grounds it was considered that under the present indictment, which pursues the language of the second section, the offense charged was treason; that both the offense as described and the overt acts charged amounted to that crime, and that the accused were entitled to all the privileges secured by the Constitution or allowed by law to parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding, that in consequence of the legislation referred to, penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In determining, therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted under this indictment, it will be proper to consider whether their acts constitute in law "a levying of war," for an engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort amounts to a levying of war; while at the same time we may also inquire whether their; acts are such as would, if done with regard to a public enemy, constitute an adherence to him, "giving him aid and comfort." As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, "treason against the United States is defined by the Constitution itself. Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense. Its construction is entrusted to the court alone." Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for this crime and the construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of Greathouse was that under both sections the offense was treason, but when the treason consisted of engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it could be punished only by imprisonment for not more than ten years, in other cases it could be punished under section 1 by death, or imprisonment for not less than five years. That the Commission when it used the phrase "levies war," in the first section of Act No. 292, intended to give to it the meaning which it then had in the United States, can not be doubted. It Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following language in speaking of the phrase "levying war:" But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of the same phrase, said: At the time the Constitution was framed, the language incorporated into it from the English statute had received judicial construction and acquired a definite meaning, and that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts of the United States. No one can believe that the Commission intended to abandoned the well-recognized meaning which the phrase then had and give to it a meaning entirely different. If that had been their intention they would certainly have used other language, so that their intent not to adopt the recognized meaning would have been manifest. That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed, can not be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion or insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections can only be reconciled in the manner employed in the case against Greathouse, and that decision should be followed. However, in respect to the penalty, it makes no difference whether the offense called rebellion in section 3 of Act No. 292 in considered an offense different from that of treason defined in section 1, or whether the decision in the case of Greathouse be allowed and the acts punished by section 3 considered as of the same character as those punished by section 1. In either case the punishment can not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine. There would be difference in respect to evidence to prove the two crimes. If rebellion and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be convicted under section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by confession in open court. (Act of Congress, March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not treason he could be convicted upon the testimony required in ordinary cases. In United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the constitutional provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of the act of 1862 (our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the overt act of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase "owing allegiance to the United States," which is found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of the act, makes a difference between the two sections in the case at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both by section 1 and section 3. This court has decided two cases in which treason was charged. In the case of United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes, February 23, 1904,1 the defendant was acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved. In the case of United States vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 9322) the defendant was acquitted because there were not two witnesses to the same overt act. The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty however, from death to ten years and a fine of $10,000, money of the United States, with the costs of this instance against the defendant.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant. TUASON, J.: Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal. The information alleges: 1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly; 2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused. 3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused. The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band. We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question. On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said: The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime. The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning. So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry. But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above paragraphs. For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. Nos. L-5367 & L-5368, June 09, 1953 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CAYETANO MANGAHAS AND MARIANO DE LOS SANTOS MANGAHAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. DECISION PADILLA, J.: Cayetano Mangahas and Mariano de los Santos Mangahas (Cases Nos. 742 and 744 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan) were charged with treason. With their consent both defendants were tried jointly. After trial they were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, the accessories of the law, and each to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs. Both have appealed. At about 11 o'clock in the morning of 13 December 1944 (Saturday), Jose Perez, a runner of the guerrillas operating around Victory Hill in Norzagaray, province of Bulacan, appeared at the house of Martin de la Merced, commanding office of the guerrillas, and informed him that about 30 armed Makapilis raided Lawang, a section of the town of Norzagaray, and apprehended several guerrilla members. Upon hearing the report Martin went down, joined other guerrillas, ran toward the bushes outside the town to escape from Makapilis. While his wife Enriqueta was looking around the house a second runner by the name of Julian Payumo came and informed her that the house of Captain Basilio Leonardo had already been raided, and not long after a third runner by the name of Lucio Ocampo came and told her that the Makapilis were in front of the municipal building. She left her house and went to another across the street from where she could see what they were going to do in her house. The Makapilis, among whom were Cayetano Mangahas, Mariano de los Santos Mangahas and Francisco Castillo, arrived, surrounded the house, some of them went up; and took and brought to the garrison of the Makapilis near the municipal building foodstuff intended for the guerrillas at Victory Hill, consisting of 5 sacks of rice, 2 cans of salted beef, a basketful of camote and another of tomatoes, a small bag of salt and a half sack of sardines, salmon and corned beef. Enriqueta B. de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz testified to the foregoing overt acts. On 30 December 1944 five persons, among whom were the two defendants, came to the house of Moises Legaspi at Norzagaray, apprehended and brought him to the garrison of the Makapilis. Three days after his arrest, or on 2 January, his wife Purita Ramos, together with her children the eldest of whom was Matias Legaspi, 11 years old, went to the garrison of the Makapilis and there saw her husband, but since then he has not returned and has not been seen. Purita Ramos and Matias Legaspi testified to the foregoing overt acts. The foregoing evidence supports counts Nos. 2 and 3 of the information against Cayetano Mangahas and counts Nos. 3 and 4 of the information against Mariano de los Santos Mangahas. In the morning of 29 December 1944 a group of armed Makapilis, among whom were the two defendants, took and carried away rice, shoes, helmet, clothes and anything they could get hold of in the house of Primo S. Cruz at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and at the same time apprehended him and, together with other persons whose hands were tied, was brought to the San Jose garrison where Japanese soldiers were stationed and since then he has not returned and has not been seen. A similar tragedy befell Artemio Nicolas who on 30 December 1944 was taken from his house in Norzagaray by the defendants, was tied up and brought to the poblacion and then to the San Jose garrison and since then he has not returned and has not been seen again. By their own admission the defendants are Filipino citizen. The arrest of Primo S. Cruz and Artemio Nicolas, who as alleged in the information was shot to death by the Japanese while attempting to escape at the time when the Americans began bombing, cannot be deemed sufficient to constitute treason for lack of two witnesses, because the arrest of Primo S. Cruz is established only by the testimony of his widow Maria S. Cruz and that of Artemio Nicolas only by the testimony of his widow Virginia Boluran. Nevertheless, it is a proof of adherence to the enemy. There is no merit in the argument that because there is no evidence to show that the defendants acted as informers or that they were responsible for the arrest of Moises Legaspi (counts No. 2 against Cayetano Mangahas and No. 3 against Mariano de los Santos Mangahas), the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for treason. There is no doubt that the two defendants were present when they arrested Moises Legaspi at his house on 30 December 1944. A mere denial by Cayetano Mangahas that he was with those who arrested Moises Legaspi is not sufficient to outweigh the testimony of Purita Ramos and Matias Legaspi who pointed to the appellants as among the five Makapilis who apprehended Moises Legaspi. On the day his father was taken by the Makapilis from his house Matias Legaspi was eleven years old and was 16 years old when he testified and being then a fifth grade student his senses could perceive and transmit those perceptions to others. The trial court gave him credence. After reading the transcript of his testimony a disregard thereof would be unwarranted. The claim that there is no proof of adherence to the enemy is without merit. The acts of arresting guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the plaza, going around the town carrying firearms, and the fact that before the outbreak of the war they were members of the Ganap Party and in the latter period of the Japanese occupation of the Makapili organization, are more than sufficient proofs of adherence to the enemy. Cayetano Mangahas testifies that he and his brother Mariano de los Santos Mangahas were arrested by the Japanese on 25 December 1944 for they were suspected also of being guerrillas; and upon that it is argued that they could not have been among the group of 30 Makapilis that raided the house of Martin de la Merced on 13 December 1944. The uncorroborated testimony of Cayetano Mangahas cannot prevail over the testimony of Enriqueta B. de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz who on that occasion saw the defendants among the raiders. In People vs. Predilla, G. R. No. L-4407, 25 March 1952, we said: In some cases lack of instruction was taken into account to mitigate treason;[1] in others it was not[2] In People v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-2236. 16 May 1951, lack of instruction was not taken into consideration to mitigate treason, but as it appeared that the defendants had not taken part in the killing of the victims the minimum period of the penalty provided by law was not disturbed. The evidence does not show that the appellant took part in the killing of the victims. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Feria, J., no part.

[ G.R. No. L-1138, December 17, 1947 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE FERNANDO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION PERFECTO, J.: Jose Fernando was found by the People's Court in a decision rendered October 17, 1946, guilty of the crime of treason, as denned and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, and to pay a fine of P15,000, and the costs. The information filed against appellant is as follows: "That on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereinafter stated and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jose Fernando, not being a foreigner but a citizen of the Philippines owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan, with which the United States and the Philippines were then at war, giving said Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines aid and/or comfort in the following manner, to wit: "1. That in or about the early part of 1942, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously join and become an informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, a Japanese military police organization. "2. That in or about the period comprised between 1942 and February 1945, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, as informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, report to the Kempei-tai, a number of persons as members of guerrillas, resulting in the arrest and apprehension, torture, and death of a number of those persons; and still in furtherance of his purpose of giving aid and/or comfort to the enemy, the above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously join, lead and accompany Japanese soldiers in their raids against guerrillas, resulting in the arrest, apprehension and detention of a number of guerrillas. ''3. That in or about May 1943, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest, maltreat and detain Ponciano Briones, for the purpose of finding the whereabouts of Lt. Col. Pacifico Briones of the guerrillas. "4. That in or about August 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously arrest, maltreat and detain Carlos Paz who was suspected of being a guerrilla. "5. That in or about the early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously arrest or cause the arrest of Gregorio Hernandez; and still in pursuance of his purpose of giving aid and/or comfort to the enemy, the above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously investigate the said Gregorio Hernandez charging him with being a guerilla and selling firearms to the guerrillas, and threatening to take him to Fort Santiago, and tried to persuade him to become a spy for the Japanese. "6. That in or about the early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously arrest or cause the arrest of Abraham Albines, and thereafter, the abovenamed accused investigated the said Abraham Albines, charging him with having sold firearms to guerrillas, and threatening to take him to the Japanese officer in Fort Santiago. "7. That in or about May 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously lead, join, accompany and assist a group of Japanese and Filipinos which tried to arrest Consolacion Tongol, and being unable to accomplish that purpose, the above-named accused and his Japanese and Filipino companions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest Gabriel Tongol, a brother of Consolacion Tongol, and detain him for two days and three nights in the Kempei-tai garrison. "8. That in or about May 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously lead, join, accompany and assist a group of Japanese soldiers and Filipinos for the purpose of obtaining the surrender of guerrillas in barrio Candating, Arayat, Pampanga, and not being able to obtain any favorable result, the above-named accused, together with his Japanese and Filipino companions, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously attack the civilian population of Candating, Arayat, Pampanga, resulting in unnecessary hardships to, and in the wounding of, many civilians." The lower court found that during the period comprised between 1942 and 1945, appellant was an informer and a member of the Kempei-tai, and, as such member, he had a group of ten renegade Filipinos whose mission was to make arrests of guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to investigation and torture in order to ferret out whatever information they possessed regarding the activities of the underground forces; he had Gregorio Hernandez and Abraham Albines under his custody; he arrested Ponciano Briones, father of Pacifico Briones, a ranking officer of the guerrilla forces, and subjected him to investigation and torture in order to elicit from him information as to the whereabouts of his son; and that he attempted to arrest Consolacion Tongol, but failing in his purpose, because of the intervention of the guerrillas, he took into his custody Consolacion's brother, Gabriel Tongol. The fact that appellant has been an informer and a member of the Kempei-tai has been established, not only by the evidence presented by the prosecution, but also by the testimony of the accused himself, who, however, claims (a) that he was forced into the service by the enemy and (b) that his employment was a fact known and sanctioned by chieftains of the guerrilla outfits which governed Manila in their spheres of activities. Both defenses were rejected by the lower court. At the hearing of this case on August 16, 1946, appellant made the admission that he is a Filipino citizen. Eleven witnesses testified for the prosecution. Odon Alimañgohan, 42, residing at 1535 Felix Huertas, Manila, testified that during the Japanese occupation he came to know appellant one night in a gambling house at the corner of Oroquieta and Quiricada streets. Appellant was accompanied by three others. The people therein moved to run away, but the visitors told them not to be afraid because they were only looking for a certain person. Appellant often visited Dodong, a friend of the witness, who saw him twice carrying firearm. The witness knows that appellant was a member of the Kempeitai. He asked the witness if he wanted to work with the Kempeitai. The witness did not join it, "because the Japanese refused to accept me." Zoilo Rufino, 22, married, residing at 1255 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that he came to know appellant during the Japanese occupation because their homes are near each other, witness' house located in Sales street, and appellant's in Comandante street. In 1944, the witness was arrested by Domingo Santiago, informer of the Japanese. He was taken to the house of appellant in Comandante street. There he saw five men, including appellant, and a woman. He was detained there for about four days and was investigated and maltreated by Domingo Santiago, who was asking for the whereabouts of his brother. Appellant was staying in the house at night time. On the first night, the witness was placed under the house, but on the following days he was brought up. When he was arrested he was tied but after two days he was untied. Appellant saw the witness being tied. A few hours after his arrival in the house, a Japanese appeared who "told us that we are bad men; but when we refused to admit he told us that it is better for us to die because in that case they will not be taking the trouble of covering our bodies with newspapers." Witness' brother was also arrested. The witness was released by order of appellant who did not impose any condition. The witness was released ahead of his brother. Domingo Santiago was asking the witness P20,000 for his release. The witness told him that he cannot afford that amount because his earning is only enough for his needs. Appellant told the witness that he can be released but his brother cannot because he was an ex-convict. After his release, the witness looked for money and gave it to appellant after which his brother was released. He saw appellant in the place carrying arms. Later on, the witness heard from neighbors that his brother, Laureano Rufino, was arrested by an informer and a Japanese and killed. Santiago Briones, 40, married, 441 Evangelista street, Manila, testified that he had his tailoring shop at 820 Ilaya street, Tondo, and one day appellant, accompanied by one Adriano, came asking for the father of Pacifico Briones. The witness purposely denied knowing where he was, because he knew that Pacifico Briones was a guerrilla leader in the Central Luzon area. Appellant and companion showed that they bore firearms with them. Surprised, the witness admitted that Ponciano, father of Pacifico Briones, was living in the house. They went inside the house and they saw Ponciano, who is also an uncle of the witness. Appellant asked Ponciano for his son, but Ponciano answered that he did not know where his son was. They took Ponciano away. It happened in 1943 but the witness cannot remember the month.

Ponciano Briones, 66, married, unemployed, resident of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, testified that he had known appellant who married in Cabiao. In 1943, he was arrested by appellant at Ilaya street in his house located on a lot to reach which it was necessary to pass through the tailoring shop of Santiago Briones. Appellant was accompanied by Ruperto Adriano. They were armed with pistols. Appellant was asking for Pacifico Briones. He wanted the witness to find his son and to surrender him to them. Appellant and his companion were spies of the Japanese. His son Pacifico was a guerrilla major in 1943. The witness was brought to a building called Meisic. The next morning he was brought to the China Bank at Dasmarinas street . Appellant and companion were forcing him to look for his son and to surrender him. There were many, Japanese at the China Bank. He was investigated by appellant and his companion. Appellant struck him on the ribs with the butt of a revolver. In the afternoon the witness was released on condition that he was to report every morning to the Japanese Mijara at the China Bank building. He reported for about five days. Afterwards he was brought to Arayat, Pampanga. He was brought by appellant together with the Japanese, because they heard that his son was in the mountains of Arayat. He remained in the place for about a week. The Japanese told him to write to his son and go around the town to secure information about his son. From Arayat he was brought to Manila and then to Cabiao by appellant, Ruperto Adriano and Mijara. In Cabiao he remained for about eighty days. He was brought to a Japanese captain named Kimura. Kimura asked him about his son and to look for him and to surrender him. He was required to work in the garrison, to cut grass and fetch water. After eight days he was brought to Manila . He was not arrested anymore and he returned home to the province. His son belonged to Ramsey's guerrilla unit. His son is dead. He was shot at the China Grill when he was a lieutenant-colonel and when the Americans had already arrived. Gabriel Tungol, 49, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant since he took away witness' sister. It was in April, 1943. It happened at Mangakakutud, Arayat. One morning appellant and a companion "came to our house" armed with revolvers. They said that "they were taking away my sister," to surrender her "to the Japanese." His sister Consolacion in the beginning joined the guerrillas. "They were not able to take away my sister because she was sick" and "on that night the guerrillas came and took away my sister and Maria, another sister." The following morning appellant with another companion returned and took the witness to the Japanese garrison in Arayat. "The Japanese took my statement and I was detained there for two days and two nights. They were asking me of the whereabouts of my sister." He was maltreated by the Japanese and at the time appellant was present in the place. After taking his statement and two days' and two nights' detention, the witness was released. In May, he was arrested again by appellant. He was again detained for two days and two nights in the Japanese garrison. After his release, he was arrested for the third time by the Japanese, he did not see appellant anymore, and was again detained for one day and one night. He did not see appellant. He escaped, "because the Japanese tried to kill me. I went to the mountains." Fernando Tongol, 33 married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant when he arrested his brother Gabriel. Appellant and a companion "came to our house" and "told us they will surrender my sister Consolacion in Manila and asked me to go with them. We tried our best to please them in our house. They told us to prepare and after two hours they returned, but at that time my sister became sick because of fright, and because of that sickness of my sister they were not able to take her away. After that they departed, and I also left. That night my sister was taken away by the guerrillas. My brother was taken away the following day," by appellant and a companion. They were armed with revolvers. They brought his brother to the Japanese garrison. Engracio Manese, 27, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that Gabriel Tongol is his brother-in-law. In May, 1943, he was living in barrio Mangakakutud, Arayat. In Manila, appellant took away Gabriel. Consolation Tungol was taken away by the guerrillas. Gabriel was taken to the Japanese garrison. His wife Maria became afraid and hid in one of the houses, then joined Consolacion who was with the guerrillas in the mountains. Juanita Rosales, 24, married, laundrywoman, resident at 1729 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that she had known appellant since the Japanese occupation, Gregorio Hernandez is her husband, who was arrested by appellant. The arrest took place at 1729 M. Hizon street. It was nighttime. Her husband was brought to Comandante street, the place where the office of Jose Hernandez was located. She went to the place the following morning. She saw there Jose Fernando and his men in her house. She talked with Leoncio Fernando one of the accused men and with appellant. She asked appellant why he arrested Gregorio Hernandez and appellant answered "because he was a guerrillero. Jose Fernando told me then that if I do care to live with him he would release Gregorio Hernandez but if not, he will bring Gregorio Hernandez to Fort Santiago. Then, we continued talking. After that, I talked also to Gregorio Hernandez and I told him what Jose Fernando told me and my husband said to me, 'Well, it is up to you, because if that is the only way for my salvation, then you use your discretion.' Then, I told Jose Fernando 'I will live with you on condition that you release Gregorio Hernandez' and he really released Gregorio Hernandez." Gregorio Hernandez was brought to the House of Jose Fernando at Dapitan street. He was released in the afternoon following the day of his release. From that time, the witness came to live at Comandante street with Jose Fernando. "I do not remember for how many months I lived there. I lived with him as his wife in order to secure the release of Gregorio Hernandez. I have seen the men he arrested. I cannot remember how many men were brought there, but I know that almost everyday there were persons who were brought and maltreated there." Jose Fernando and his men were maltreating them by using a piece of iron. The witness saw Japanese in the house. The Japanese were Mijara and Quijacho. They used to go to the place once in a while. About two times a week. It was said that Mijara was an interpreter and Quijacho was the chief of the accused. Everytime they went to the place they used to talk with the accused, who was given rice and money by the Japanese. The witness was brought to Zurbaran street and also to Canton Hotel. In Zurbaran she lived with Jose Fernando under the house of Mijara. They left that street, "because according to them, as they arrested many persons, they were afraid that the guerrilleros may go to that place." She stayed under the house of Mijara "quite long." While there, she saw persons arrested by Jose Fernando. They were maltreated. There were few brought to Zurbaran street but many at Canton Hotel, located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Azcarraga streets. When she was living with Fernando at the Canton Hotel, almost everyday, she saw persons being arrested and maltreated. "It is very seldom that a day had passed by without a person arrested . . . There were many persons living there also. According to them, those arrested persons were guerrilleros. They maltreated them and tied them up. Then they were given to the Japanese." The Japanese just went there. There were three men under Jose Fernando. Among the arrested persons the witness remembered one by the name of Berting. After leaving the Canton Hotel, she went to Jaen , Nueva Ecija with Jose Fernando. "I deserted him without knowing or rather without his knowledge and I went back to my house." Gregorio Hernandez is in Bulacan. When appellant arrested Gregorio Hernandez, he was accompanied by Leoncio Fernando, Carlos Domingo and Johnny. The witness became acquainted with Jose Fernando only at Comandante street before he arrested her husband. It was two weeks before. Since then, "he has been making some propositions to me." She was then working at Comandante street, "because I had a small bar there." The accused was visiting her there. Her husband was arrested because he was suspected as a guerrillero although he was not. Fidel Ferreras, 25, married, laborer, resident at 1226 Lealtad, Manila, testified that he has known Jose Fernando for a long time, since they were in the Buencamino Hacienda. The witness was arrested by Vicente Reyes at Tutuban station because of being a USAFFE arid was delivered at Meisic station to Jose Fernando. He does not remember the date. "Upon my arrival there, Jose Fernando and the Japanese called Simura, conferred with each other, and after their conference, Jose Fernando began to punish me. "I was hanged" by the Japanese, "for more than one hour. While I was suspended and tied in the wire with my face downward, the Japanese was hitting my legs and other parts of my body and this Jose Fernando was talking with that Japanese." The witness showed a scar of about two inches long and one-fourth inch wide located at the right clavicle, for a wound he suffered from the beatings. Jose Fernando did not take part in the maltreatment. "He just asked the Japanese to maltreat me." The witness saw Ponciano Briones, father of Pacifico, when they went to Cabanatuan because they were loaded together in the same train. They were six in all, including Vicente Reyes, a Japanese, and Jose Fernando. They were brought to the house of Captain Kimura. The witness was asked questions there. He remained in Cabanatuan for more than a month in the house of Captain Kimura. "We were free to go anywhere in that house. From Cabanatuan we were brought to Arayat" by Jose Fernando and the Japanese Kimura. The witness does not remember when he was released. "I was released from the Japanese garrison in Arayat." When he was being investigated at Meisic by the Japanese, Jose Fernado acted as an interpreter. Jose Fernando told the witness to confess if he was really an ex-USAFFE. Jose Fernando was armed with a rifle but he wore no uniform. Gregorio Hernandez, 29, single, telephone operator, residing at 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he was arrested by the accused in 1943. He had forgotten the month and date. It must be about October. He was arrested in his house at M. Hizon street . "At night, when I was lying in my bed, at about 10 o'clock, I heard that somebody was knocking our door, and when I went to see who was knocking the door, I saw three men. Only I know the names of the two but not their surnames Johnny and Frank, and the other one is Dominador Rodriguez. They forced me to go down from my house. I was not even able to put my suit. I was in my sleeping outfit." "He was brought to the corner of Oroquieta and San Lazaro. I found there the herein accused Jose Fernando. Frank, referring to Jose Fernando, faced the witness and told him 'Here is your man'." His hands were tied by Frank upon order of Jose Fernando. He was there for about thirty minutes. Abraham Albines and Carlos Francisco arrived arrested. "We were brought to Rizal Avenue and to Comandante street," guarded by five persons including Jose Fernando. Fernando "took us to the house one by one and asked about our activities as guerrilleros." Fernando was armed with a .45. The witness was asked about names and activities of guerrilleros. He answered that he did not know anything about the guerrilla organization. He remained in Comandante street the whole night. Fernando ordered his men to tie the hands of the witness who was brought to Dapitan. There was no misunderstanding between the witness and Jose Fernando before 1943.

Abraham Albines, 28, single, government employee, 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he came to know Jose Fernando after his arrest in the early part of October, 1943. The witness was in a gambling den at the corner of Quiricada and Oroquieta streets when four men raided the place. They asked for Gregorio Hernandez, Carlos Francisco and the witness. Gregorio Hernandez was not there, because he went out. Carlos Francisco and the witness were taken and brought to the corner of Oroquieta and San Lazaro. Among the four persons who raided the place was Jose Fernando. When they arrived at the place they saw Gregorio Hernandez already tied with three men. Then they were taken to Comandante street passing through Rizal Avenue. At Comandante street, they were investigated by Jose Fernando. Fernando asked the witness about his guerrilla activities and whether he wanted to join the Kempei-tai. The witness did not accept the offer. In 1944 the witness was occupied in helping in the laundry at Bambang street. The witness was not a guerrillero. Appellant asked him questions but did not maltreat him. Nine witnesses testified for the defense. Arsenio S. Muñoz, 53, single, Captain, residing at 551 España, knew the accused since before the war. He was the contractor of the River Control between Cabiao and Candaba during the war. He met him as a guerrilla lieutenant, and they often met each other because the witness was also a guerrilla. They used to meet at Cabiao and Arayat. The accused was second in command to Captain Basco in the early part of 1942. The witness does not know whether appellant remained as a guerrillero until the liberation. In 1943, the witness met the accused in Manila at the Central Hotel with other Filipinos and the witness "heard that he was working with the Japanese. Mr. Jose Fernando knew that I passed to Briones organization and he knew also that I am a guerrilla member and also I knew that he was working with the Japanese and he came to me and he induced me to surrender to the Japanese, but I did not approve his proposition, and then I told him: 'I think Joe, I cannot surrender.' Then he replied: 'Well, it is up to you, if you want to surrender or not. Then, one day, while I was taking my lunch in the Plaza Hotel, one Mr. Rufino Buenaventura approached me and he told me that I should go to the Military Administration Office between 12 and 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and I went there and I was brought before a Japanese interpreter and I was investigated about my activities as a guerrilla member and I admitted that I was a guerrillero, and at about 3 o'clock that same afternoon, Mr. Jose Fernando and his companions arrived and Mr. Fernando approached me and he told me that I should not be afraid, because he was willing to help me, and at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon I was released. After my release, I was told that I should go to Nueva Ecija with one Leonor but I told him: 'I cannot go.' My regiment was the one who arrested Jose Fernando and turned him over to the CIC." Roberto Simbol, 32, married, ex-serviceman, residing at 1511 Ipil, Sta. Cruz, Manila, testified that in 1942 he was in a guerrila organization in Arayat with Jose Fernando, who was first lieutenant with the late Lt. Col. Pacifico Briones. Fernando was appointed organizer of the Barrio Defense Corps. In January, 1943, there was a split between the Huks and USAFFE men and by that time Jose Fernando and Pacifico were captured by the Huks but were able to escape. The witness came to Manila when he was sick of malaria and after his recovery in the San Lazaro was captured by a Japanese of the Kempei-tai. Jose Fernando heard about his capture and worked for his release, and once he was released he went back to his outfit "and since then I knew that Jose Fernando was a Japanese agent." Estanislao Ordoñez, 54, married, businessman, residing at 1482 Quezon Blvd., testified that he knew the accused in Cabiao in 1935 or 1937. He met him in Manila. The accused told him that he was working with the Japanese, but he was also working for certain Filipinos. According to him, he was working as an agent of Fort Santiago. He also told me that he stayed there to keep the Filipinos who happened to be there. In 1945, when Texas men came to the house of Jose Ramos, witness' friend, to confiscate rice, they were given money to avoid the confiscation, the witness requested the intervention of the accused, who was able to have the money returned to the owner. The Texas men were agents of Fort Santiago. The incident happened in 1944. Exequiel Lacanlale, 41, married, detained in Muntinglupa, testified that he knows Gabriel Tongol. In May 1944, the witness was in Arayat with the Japanese as a prisoner. Mayor Ramirez of Arayat reported Gabriel Tongol to the Japanese that he had a gun and he was a member of the Huks. Gabriel Tongol was arrested by the Japanese and the witness saw him maltreated. Tongol admitted that he had a gun. Later he told the witness that he had to admit because he could no longer suffer the maltreatment. The Japanese compelled Gabriel Tongol to produce the gun and as a guaranty his wife and children were taken as hostages. He was told that if he could not produce the gun his house will also be burned. The accused had no connection whatsoever with the arrest of Gabriel Tongol. The witness is in Muntinglupa, "because I was suspected being a Japanese spy." In 1943 he was staying in Macabebe, Pampanga and in the middle of the same year he was in Arayat. He worked with the Japanese from 1943 to 1944, "because I was captured by them on December 6, 1942." He was accompanying the Japanese in their raids, "there was no alternative except to go with them." When Gabriel Tongol was captured by the Japanese the witness was present. Consolacion Tongol was not there, but his wife was present. There were about twenty Japanese in the group. Joaquin S. Galang, 26, married, merchant, residing at 1463 Dapitan, testified that about the middle of 1944, the accused was introduced to the witness as a good young man who was acting as agent of Fort Santiago and able to serve friends, by Mr. Tecson, a former companion of the witness at the Liceo de Manila. The accused was also introduced as a guerrillero. The witness stated that in case something might happen he would request the help of the accused, who committed himself to give help and added that he was a grandson of Felipe Buencamino and that he was from Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. One morning in October or November, the accused went to the witness' house to ask him if he was acquainted with Marcos Villa, who was a colonel under General Luna, stating that there was a warrant of arrest from Fort Santiago against him because the Japanese said that guerrilleros went to his house, adding that he did not want that the old man be arrested, suggesting to the witness to see to it that the old man should go to the provinces. The witness, being a friend of Marcos Villa, induced the latter to go to Isabela and even lent him P70 for transportation. The witness also testified about the request of the accused to save Alejo Galang who was about to be arrested that night by the Japanese for helping guerrilleros. Antolin S. Rosales, 34, single, mining engineer, residing at Visiones, Sampaloc, Manila, testified that in September, 1942, he met the accused in the house of Governor Robles. A week after the witness raided the Cabanatuan jail, because there were guerrilleros imprisoned therein. The witness was the captain of a guerrilla organization. The raid was successful. In 1943, while the witness was a prisoner in Fort Santiago, a Japanese asked the accused if he knows the witness. The accused answered that the witness was a good element. After a month, the witness was released. One day, the witness met the accused in the Escolta, where the accused informed him that he was an agent of the Japanese. During their long talk, the witness came to trust him and to give him information about his guerrilla organization and other underground work. But in July, 1944, the witness was arrested. In January, 1945, the witness entered Manila, under Captain Maloles. In 1945, the witness was arrested by the CIC as a collaborator. The witness is relased on bail. He is one of those accused of the crime of treason. Mario M. Bundalian, 41, married, district engineer, Bureau of Public Works, San Fernando, Pampanga, testified that he knew the accused in 1941 as one of the contractors of the government. He met him sometime in 1943 in Manila and the accused reported about his guerrilla activities in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, being in the USAFFE unit, and they discussed about their work, but the conference did not last long. In 1943, the witness was a guerrilla officer assigned in Manila. Jose Fernando, 33, married, testified that at the outbreak of the war he was working in the Hacienda Buencamino at Cabiao. He was a contractor in a government construction job. On December 10, 1941, he helped the Red Cross at Cabanatuan. On June 2, 1942, he went to the. Ramsey guerrilla unit. Since the beginning he was not satisfied with the Japanese occupation, so "I conferred with my townmates to form a body to combat the Japanese administration. We contributed money and we collected arms, and we organized a guerrilla unit." The witness was a first sergeant in June and in the following month he became first lieutenant of the Fourth Squadron. "I was assigned to the area comprising the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlac, up to April 5, 1943. There was a split in the ranks in our guerrilla organization between USAFFEs and Hukbalahaps, and there were encounters between those two factions. My Commander, Dominador Basco, and myself were captured by the Hukbalahaps, and then the group of Hukbalahaps that captured us was raided by the Japanese, and I, together with Dominador Basco, were able to escape; and after escaping I reported to my former squadron. On my return to my former squadron, I stayed there for two days with them and I, Col. Briones and my commanding officer, Dominador Basco, agreed that we should place our respective families in a safer place, so I brought my family here in Manila." He brought his family to Manila on the seventh or eighth of April, 1943. "While I was looking for a place for my family I was apprehended by the Military Police together with Vicente Reyes and Ruperto Adriano. These two persons were formerly attached to our squadron, but at that time they were already with the MPs. I was tied, and I was brought to Fort Santiago. I was maltreated, investigated; they starved me there, and they gave me the water cure treatment. After that they tied me; then they made me rest in a certain room and I was approached by Vicente Reyes. Vicente Reyes asked me to tell them that I am really a Lieutenant Colonel in Central Luzon, because, according to him, he reported that I am the Lieutenant Colonel, because he was under obligation to point out the highest officer of the guerrillas in the Central Luzon area to the Military Police. I told him that it is against my conscience, but he told me that there is no other remedy, because otherwise he and myself will die. After that, I was called again by the MPs and I was investigated and I saw that Vicente Reyes had really presented evidence against me and I saw the evidence were clear, and so I admitted that I am the highest ranking officer of the guerrillas in the Central Luzon. The Japanese officer told me that if really my intention was to help my countrymen, then I should accept a position with them in the pacification of my countrymen. At first they offered me the position of Japanese informer. I refused this position, and what I suggested was employment in the office, in their management of the peace campaign.

The Japanese did not accept my offer to work in their office, and instead they made me the head of ten Filipino agents in the Kempei-tai and they told me that if I would not accept this position, the Japanese would kill me and will behead all the members of my family. I accepted the position that they gave me and after that I reported to my squadron and other guerrilla men and I related to them what happened to me. The emissary whom I sent to different guerrilla units to relate my plight, named Leonor Francisco, came back to me and he told me that those people told him to tell me to continue also to help the guerrillas. I selected real guerrilla men, mostly ex-USAFFES and other people entrusted the communication that I sent to those different guerrilla units." The witness had connections with Squadron 29, USAFFE, that is Ramsey, at that time in Cabanatuan; with Lt. Teofilo Francisco stationed at Meycauayan, Bulacan; with Roberto Simbol stationed at Bataan; with Col. Pacifico Briones stationed at Pinatubo Mountains; he was sending communications to the unit under Dominador Basco; with Squadron 101 under Commander Dominador Tombo. There were also several small units of guerrillas with whom the accused had had connections, among those were the unit at Dapitan, under Col. Marking, the unit at the corner of Oroquieta and Zurbaran, under Wenceslao Lamsen, and that under Capt. Leon Pichay, in Manila. "Upon my employment in the Japanese Military Police, the first step that I did was to select seven trusted genuine guerrillas, and to these seven men I entrusted the communications that I sent to the underground and to several guerrilla units. Then, among the ten men given to me by the Japanese of whom I was the head, I dismissed seven of them, and I retained in my office three ganaps. I cannot dismiss all of them, because this will arouse the suspicion of the Japanese, so I have to retain three in my office. Whenever there was a raid proposed by the Japanese to be made, the first step that I did was to warn the people there to transfer to another place, and after that, I report back to our office and reported to the Japanese that there was no guerrilla in said place; however, if they are not satisfied with the report and they wanted to raid the said place, they can do it, because I am satisfied that they could not find any person there, because I warned them beforehand. Take, for example, the unit under Commander Dominador Tombo. At the beginning of the year 1943, Capt. Tombo and myself were already wanted by the Japanese in the province, so we went here in Manila. This Capt. Tombo, every time he came to Manila, the first thing that he did was to report to me, telling me that they are here, and they came here with ten or fifteen men, and asked my advise or what advise I can give him. Then I told them to go to a certain place, giving him the number of my telephone, so that in case of danger they might call me; and as a matter of fact, up to the middle of the year 1944, when Capt. Tombo returned to the province, nothing happened to them, and even I gave them my revolver and ammunitions. Another case is about the headquarters commanded by Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, in the City of Manila , corner of Zurbaran and Oroquieta. This headquarters was being closely watched by the Japanese Military Police, because there were really trusted men employed by the Japanese Military Police as their informers or agents, and I came to know that this place was closely watched by the Military Police. Inasmuch as one of my activities was to protect the guerrillas, I contacted Capt. Lamsen and I told him that his headquarters was being watched by the Japanese, and I told him that the best way to do, inasmuch as the building that he used as headquarters was composed of two stories, was that I will occupy the second story, so that I can camouflage the activities of the guerrillas, and in case the building will be raided, the Japanese will find out that I am using the first floor as my office. So, when the Japanese came to raid the place, I was confident that they could not find any guerrilla men in said building. When Capt. Lamsen approached me and asked me to do whatever I can, so that he will not be employed by the Japanese, because, according to him, he will not be able to manage his guerrilla unit. I did what I could to prevent the Japanese from employing him, and I succeeded in this. Then, another fact happened to Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, when one night in November, 1944, at about 8 o'clock, the Military Police of the Airport Studio raided the place of Capt. Lamsen. I was the one who happened to be there, and when the Japanese Military Police found me, they asked me why I was there, and I said that I was occupying the place as temporary office; then the Japanese searched the place and found nothing, and they left." The witness testified also that one Manuel Gallego was wanted by the Military Police. He warned him and so Manuel Gallego was not arrested by the Japanese. Gallego was the representative from the Second District of Nueva Ecija. The witness used to help civilians coming from the provinces and arriving at Tutuban so as to prevent their rice from being confiscated by the Military Police. He also used to help peaceful guerrillas when they were being maltreated by the Japanese. Jose Hernandez, a lieutenant in the Ramsey Unit at Meycauayan "was arrested by the Japanese but my runner came immediately and reported to me that Jose Hernandez was arrested by the Japanese so I went at once to a superior officer to tell him that the person arrested is one of my men who is helping me in my peace campaign. I was able to convince the superior officer, and Jose Hernandez was released. The same is true with respect to Vicente Nuñez, of Squadron No. 4, when he was arrested by Vicente Reyes and Buenaventura I interceded in their behalf, and through my intercession, they were released." "While I was under detention in the month of May, Ponciano Briones was arrested by Vicente Reyes and one Ruperto Adriano, and I came to know this fact, because Vicente Reyes and Ruperto Adriano told me that they had arrested Ponciano Briones. After he was investigated he was released." The witness had nothing to do with the detention and maltreatment of Ponciano Briones. In December, 1944, Jose Nogoy, nephew of Ponciano Briones, brought from Cabiao a machinery which was confiscated by agents of the Japanese Military Administration. Ponciano Briones approached the accused requesting him to recover back the machinery or its costs, which was P4,000. The witness was able to recover only P3,000 and for his failure to recover the remaining P1,000, Ponciano Briones harbored resentment against him. Last September 1944, I, together with my men, arrested Gregorio Hernandez in his house because there was a complaint against him that he, together with other Texasmen extorted five thousand pesos from Pablo Pastaño and Estanislao Ordoñez. After arresting him, I brought him to my office, and while I was investigating him he told me that he left the five thousand pesos to his companions. Then I gave him some warning, and then I sent him home after taking the five thousand pesos from him. Since the month of June, 1944, I met Juanita Rosales, in one of the houses of prostitution and Juanita Rosales was one of the inmates of that house and I came to know her and came to have understanding with her: we agreed to live with each other. Her name was not Juanita Rosales she was Juanita Ibañez, according to her certificate. We lived with each other for ten months, since June 1944. While we were in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, about the end of March, 1945, Juanita Rosales told me that Gregorio Hernandez had been her sweetheart before the war. Before April 27, 1945, I discovered that Juanita Rosales returned back to her old business in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, and I scolded her and I told her to leave. She returned here to Manila and I even gave her P20 for her transportation expenses. I met her at the headquarters of the guerrillas at Meycauayan on April 27, 1945. Nothing happened to us. When she came to the headquarters of the guerrillas at Meycauayan she reported to the guerrillas that I was an agent of the Japanese Military Police." The accused had Abraham Albines arrested because he "was in company with Gregorio Hernandez in their thieveries." Because Consolacion Tongol was sick, "she asked Lt. Leonor Francisco to fetch me. Upon my arrival at the house of Consolacion Tongol I asked her why she sent for me. She told me that she was sick and she wants to be hospitalized in the city. Then I told her to be prepared and I will conduct her to the hospital in the city. She told me that her money and clothes were placed at different places, and the best time for her to start was on the following day. I took my lunch in her house, and after lunch, she told me that she will get her clothes in the laundry; but after 30 minutes, a group of Japanese, accompanied by the Municipal Mayor of the town came to raid the house, and I was one among those arrested in the house. When I asked the Japanese why he was arresting me, he told me that I was denounced as a bad man. Then I showed to them my identification card, and the Japanese then found that I was not a bad man. I was conducted to the office of the Military Police in the town and there in the office I saw Consolacion Tongol. We slept in the town of Arayat that night, and that night I learned that Consolacion Tongol was kidnapped by guerrillas, and on the following morning I returned to Manila . Consolacion Tongol was the nurse of our guerrilla unit." The witness does not know anything about Gabriel Tongol. The second time the accused went to Arayat was because he was sent for by the barrio people of Candating and by the head of the guerrilla unit. They asked him to intercede with the Japanese authorities who have committed many abuses against the population. "Upon my arrival I remonstrated with the Japanese military authorities and I transmitted to them the plight of inhabitants of the barrio. On my arrival there in the barrio of Candating, the town mayor gathered the people of the barrio, and about 300 people gathered there, and the mayor separated those who were not guerrillas and he denounced the guerrillas to the Japanese. I interceded for them and explained to the Japanese that those people were not guerrillas, they were simply farmers, and I explained to the mayor that with that system there will be no real peace in the town. I quarreled with the mayor, because the mayor was insisting that those men who were segregated were guerrillas, and as a result of which I quarreled with him. To save those people, I selected one person by the name of Mabini, and I gave him instructions as to what he should do, that somebody should be sacrificed, that he should suffer, because that would be their only salvation. He followed my instructions, and they were saved. I took hold of this person named Mabini, and I investigated him in the presence of the Japanese, and I even slapped both of his face, and this man insisted that he is not a guerrilla, that he is a peaceful farmer. Then the Japanese approached us, and they asked what the person was trying to explain, and I told the Japanese that he was saying that he was not a guerrilla, that he was a peaceful farmer, but that we could not understand each other. Then the Japanese interpreter explained to me. I exerted all my efforts to convince the Japanese that I was really investigating, and because of that they were saved." After his mission in Candating, he returned to Manila, "Upon my return here in Manila, I closely watched the activities of the Japanese Military Police, and I stole the plan and sketches of the places here in Manila and suburbs to be zonified by the Japanese; and one time I was able to steal from the car of Colonel Takano, here in Escolta, the plans and sketches of the different places here in Manila and suburbs that were to be zonified; and as a matter of fact, the loss of those maps created a furor here in the city among the Japanese, and they have offered a reward of ten million pesos for the recovery of said sketches and maps. They were not recovered, because I sent said maps and sketches to the guerrilla officer, Capt. Antolin Rosales; and as a matter of fact what happened then was that even the detectives at the City Hall were arrested here in Manila, and some of them were brought to my office and were investigated. Then I helped in the arrest and investigation of the "texas"

here in Sampaloc and Quiapo. When the American liberating forces arrived here in the city, February 3, 1945, I went with Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, and I indicated to him the places of danger that may endanger the lives of Americans and guerrillas; and after that I proceeded to Jaen, Nueva Ecija." After the witness joined the Japanese Kempei-tai and he was made the head of a group of ten men, he separated seven among them, but he could name only one Johny, one Tony, one Pedro, and one Ruperto. He forgot their surnames. In 1942, he left Nueva Ecija because of the fact that he sensed that he was being pursued and wanted by guerrillas and the Japanese and by the peace officers of Cabanatuan or Cabiao. After he was made head of a group of Filipino agents, the accused enjoyed absolute freedom and he could escape. The Japanese "had not trusted me, so they were always suspicious of me. I had access to their offices, because at times they called us or investigated us." Dominador Panis, 28, married, sportsman, residing at 772 Tayabas, Manila, testified that he has known Jose Fernando before the war. Fernando knew pretty well that the witness was active in the resistance movement. They dined together many times, and the accused told him several times of raiding certain places. In November, 1944, the witness was arrested by the Japanese and brought to the Airport Studio where he was detained for 27 days. Through the intercession of Jose Fernando he was released. At the garrison, he was tortured and several scars of his face show the effects of his torture. I saw the accused once inside the Airport Studio. After carefully weighing the above testimonies, we are convinced that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that appellant, being a Filipino citizen, had adhered to the cause of the Imperial Government of Japan, by giving aid and comfort to their military forces stationed in the Philippines during the enemy occupation, having served as informer and active member of the Kempei-tai, the Japanese military police organization, having arrested Ponciano Briones, Gregorio Hernandez, Abraham Albines and Gabriel Tongol as guerrilla suspects or having immediate connection with guerrilla suspects, in an attempt to suppress the Underground resistance movement. In proving the overt acts imputed to appellant, the two-witness rule provided by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code has been fully satisfied. Appellant's claim that he was forced into the service of the Kempei-tai by the enemy appears to be without merit. The circumstances under which he alleges having been forced by the Japanese to serve them seem to belie his allegation. It is incredible that, while appellant was undergoing detention and maltreatment for his alleged connection with the resistance movement, the Japanese should, without much ceremony, upon appellant's show of willingness to abide by their order to serve them, release him, provide him with firearms, and put under his charge a group of Filipino informers in the service of the Kempei-tai. To place appellant in such a responsible position, full of opportunity and means either of helping the Japanese or sabotaging their military efforts, appellant must beforehand have shown them strong evidence of adherence and loyalty for the Japanese to trust him. If appellant's claim of unwillingness was true and he was helping the underground resistance movement at heart, he offered no explanation for his failure to take advantage of the freedom granted him during the long months of service in the Kempei-tai by fleeing from the enemy to join the guerrilla forces or by sabotaging the military efforts of the Japanese. His uncorroborated claim of having stolen zoning maps appears to be too flimsy to be believed, not only because appellant has not shown any military usefulness in said theft, but also because the Japanese needed no maps for their zonings which they practiced in a haphazard and indiscriminate way. That appellant, instead of fleeing from, or sabotaging the efforts of, the enemy, should have made arrests and investigations to actually help the Japanese in their campaign, for the suppression of guerrilla activities, makes wholly unacceptable his claim of having entered the service of the Kempei-tai involuntarily. Appellant's allegation that his employment in the Kempei-tai was known and approved by guerrilla leaders is a gratuitous allegation without any reliable evidence to support it. Not a single guerrilla leader or guerrilla soldier was called by appellant to support or corroborate him in his claim. At any rate, even on the hyphothesis that appellant's claim of his involuntarily induction into the Kempei-tai, and that said induction was approved by the guerrilla chieftains, have been proved, they cannot exculpate him from criminal responsibility for the arrests and investigations of guerrilla suspects and their relatives and for the punishments and tortures inflicted by him on them, as conclusively proved by the evidence on record, as with said overt acts he helped the military purposes of the enemy, with no other purpose than to show his adherence and support to the Japanese cause in the last war. Appellant never claimed that he made the arrests and investigations and inflicted the punishments and tortures impelled by force or induced by insurmountable fear of the Japanese, which, if proved, would relieve him from criminal responsibility, nor with the knowledge and approval of guerrilla leaders, which, even if accepted, would not exculpate him and rather make said leaders answerable with appellant for the crime of treason. The appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant. Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-2193, February 01, 1950 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FLORENTINO CANIBAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION TUASON, J.: Charged with treason on two counts, appellant Florentino Canibas was found guilty, in a unanimous decision, by the 3rd Branch of the People's Court, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P10,000.00, with costs On count 1, the court found that the accused, a native of Tarlac, arrived in Batangas from Lopez of the now province of Quezon, in November, 1944. Soon after that, a Makapili unit was organized in Lipa by the accused together with one Nicolas Gonzales and others. Gonzales became the titular head of the organization and defendant, its secretary. The accused, as member of the Makapili, wore Japanese uniform and white arm band, was armed with a revolver, mounted guard and did sentry duty, accompanied Japanese soldiers in raids against supposed guerrillas, confiscated foodstuff, and forced male citizens to work for the Japanese army. In support of count 2, the court found that on February 11, 1945, a group of Makapilis, among whom was the accused, accompanied by Japanese troops, raided barrio Marajuy, municipality of Lipa, province of Batangas, apprehended almost the entire population of the barrio, about 300 in all, including children and adults, men and women, and marched them to a citrus experimental station. In that place, the accused and others tied the victims by two's, after which the Japanese slaughtered the prisoners with bayonets, with the exception of a few who were able to escape, one of them being Juan Navarro, who testified at the trial. In the killings, children were tossed up in the air and caught with the points of bayonets as they fell. Besides those who succeeded in escaping, five young girls were spared; they were selected for their good look by the accused and his fellow Makapilis, and taken to Nicolas Gonzales' house in a barrio in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, where they were kept as "servants" for Gonzales and the Japanese. One of those "girls was Lutgarda Tolentino, scarcely 15 years of age at the time of the massacre, also a witness for the prosecution. The first count has not been established by the oaths of at least two witnesses. There are no two direct witnesses to any of the component parts that made up the whole overt act of appellant's membership in the Makapili. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300.)[1] But the testimony on this branch of the case is sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by two witnesses. Clear intent and knowledge may be gathered from the testimony of one of the witnesses, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 980; People vs. Adriano, supra.) The second count has been established in the manner required by the law of treason. There is no proof by two witnesses of the seizure at their homes of the inhabitants of barrio Marajuy by the Japanese and the accused, but there were three eye-witnesses to the fact that the accused was present at the mass killings, taking active part therein in collaboration with the Japanese, by personally tying the hands of some of the victims and directing the same operation with regard to others. The accused, corroborated by Gonzales and another witness, put up an alibi, saying in, answer to various questions that he knew nothing of the charges and of the testimony of the Dvernment witnesses against him. He said he fled to the mountains when the Americans were coming. The People's Court believed the testimony of the prosecution' witnesses and we do not think it committed any error in so doing. The judgment of conviction and the penalty imposed are in accordance with law and are hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-9529 August 30, 1958 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. PER CURIAM: Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death by the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court for the crime of treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of the appeal duly interposed by the accused but also under the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides mandatory review by this Tribunal of all decisions or judgments of the lower courts imposing death penalties. Meantime, it was discovered that the transcript of stenographic notes taken down on October 8, 1947, before the People's Court was missing and unavailable, by reason of which and upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, we promulgated a resolution on August 1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses who testified before the People's Court, namely, Gregorio Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and the accused himself. Thus the case was sent to that court. On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal so as to avail himself of the benefits of the Executive clemency granted to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of First Instance of Iloilo returned the case to us for whatever action we may take in view of the withdrawal requested, for, at all events, the case had to be reviewed by us regardless of defendant's appeal. The case was included in the agenda prepared by the Clerk of Court for September 21, 1953, only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without calling the attention of the Tribunal that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where briefs had not been filed, as in the present case, said petition for withdrawal was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. However, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same date, and after the passing of the resolution, appellant filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating his request for withdrawal of appeal previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching thereto two documents said to be copies of the conditional pardon granted him and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering this second petition when we realized the nature of the case and that the withdrawal of appeal granted on September 21, 1953, was a mistake and contrary to legal precedents. So, in a resolution dated October 19, 1953, this Tribunal reconsidered its resolution of September 21st granting withdrawal of appeal, and again reminded the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimonies above referred to, with instructions that a new decision be rendered based on the said testimonies and on the standing evidence adduced before the People's Court. The resolution of October 19th read as follows: By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court after trial of appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder and sentenced him thus — "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of the complex crime of treason and murders as defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 48 of the same Code, sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia Tambirao in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the proceedings." Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not. It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, could not be located, and following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution was promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimony of said witnesses. Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the case to this Court for whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of the petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant and because the case had to be reviewed by the Supreme Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the defendant. The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court on that date as regards this was prepared by the Clerk of Court's Office only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the defendant. Our attention was not called to the fact that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. So, following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where the briefs have not yet been filed, as in the present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. On the same date, however, and presumably after the passing of the resolution, appellant Villanueva filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating the request for withdrawal of his appeal previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits "A" and "B", said to be copies of the conditional pardon and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the Office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering said petition that we realized the nature of the case and the decision appealed to this Court, the withdrawal of which appeal had been granted by the resolution of September 21, 1953. An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the jurisdiction of this Court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this Court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade. Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of retaking the testimony of those witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the case was virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the evidence and the testimony received during the trial before the People's Court which is still intact and available shall stand and the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the same witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the trial court to render a new decision because the new trial is being held before a new Judge and there is no assurance that the witnesses testifying, altho the very same ones who were on the witness stand on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and in the same manner that they did at the former trial, altho they are supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al, 46 O. G. No. 1, p. 390). Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the said witnesses as far as possible confine themselves to the same points on which they testified on October 8, 1947, because the testimonies of said witnesses including the defendant are referred to and described in the decision of the People's Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129, and that there are only four witnesses including the accused himself. Examining Exhibits "A" and "B" submitted by appellant in relation to his petition for the withdrawal of his appeal, we find that although his name appears in the list of prisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed to be pardoned conditionally, the pardon itself refers to the remission of the "unexpired portions of the prison sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed below who were convicted by the defunct People's Court of treason and committed to the new Bilibid Prison to serve their sentence." It is highly doubtful that the pardon could have contemplated and included appellant herein

because his sentence of death does not merely involve a prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death sentence is not exactly served but rather executed. Moreover, Exhibit "B" says that "those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only after their appeal has been withdrawn." The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decision of the People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this to bring it into harmony with Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the Constitution which requires conviction as a condition precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already stated, despite defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision imposing the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or sentence until and after this Tribunal has reviewed the case and rendered its own decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court based on the new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in which case there would be no automatic review by us. Let the record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for new trial and thereafter, for a new decision. At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the defense, Ambrosio Tuble and Basilio Taborete, were introduced. Appellant also presented documentary evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly granted him. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the decision of the People's Court, and, reproducing said decision, rendered judgment on October 11, 1955, sentencing appellant to capital punishment. The case was again elevated to us for automatic review and judgment and given the present docket number. In the amended information filed before the People's Court, appellant was accused of treason on ten counts, but the prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower court found that Counts 1 and 2 were not proven, and convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The prosecution established that during the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino citizen, and owing allegiance to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid and comfort by rendering service with the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in the performance of such service, he participated actively and directly in the punitive expeditions periodically made by the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson and massmurders, specifically as follows: Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information recites: 6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of Baroc and Atabayan, municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and several Japanese soldiers, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco, Melchor Trieco, Cosme Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto, Napoleon Luceno, Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio Belandrez on the charge that they were guerrilla soldiers and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and torture them; that subsequently the persons above-mentioned were taken away and were not seen or heard of since then; that on the occasion of the aforementioned patrol, the above-named accused and his companions, with intent of gain and without consent of the owners thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously loot the house of Jose T. Belandrez, taking therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the amount of P300; emergency notes in the amount of P1,200; jewelry value at P500; clothing valued at P200; and other personal effects; and from the house of Toribia Taleon, jewelry, watches, clothing and other personal effects with a total value of P160 more or less. Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and Maria Mendoza, corroborating one another, testified that at dawn of June 10, 1943, appellant, accompanied by some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house of Jose T. Belandrez situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and took therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry worth P300, and clothing valued at P200; that they also arrested Dionisio Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno, members of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said three members of the Bolo Battalion never returned. Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this Count, reads as follows: 7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August, 1943, in the municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give, as he did give said enemy, aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and apprehend several persons suspected of guerrilla activities, among whom were Federico Tinamisan, Eustaquio Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador Tedor, Tomas Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta, Andres Tayo, Victorio Tuante, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirante, Rufo Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilarion Toga and several others, who were gathered in the Chapel at barrio Napnapan, where the persons aforesaid were investigated, maltreated and tortured, as a consequence of which Salvador Tedor died of the beating and torture inflicted upon him by the herein accused and his companions; that the following morning about thirty-seven persons were taken to the yard of Valentina Amandoron's house, where Jesus Astrologo, Carlos Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the Japanese killed by beheading Andres Tai, Victorio Tuante, Roque Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania, Pufo Tulato, Agapito Trompeta, Tomas Trompeta, Celedonio Tupino, Simeon Ledesma, Hermenegildo Taleon, Marcelo Turid, Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid, Jose Tamon, Cornelio Taghap, Eustaquio Doga, Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU) Lucio (LNU), Juan (LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo (LNU), and several others whose names are unknown, while Alfredo Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and wounded on their necks but miraculously escaped death. Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa Gua, Natividad Duga, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilario Taghap and Valentina Amandoron who, corroborating one another, stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was a Monday, at about six o'clock in the evening, while Eustaquio Duga and his family were at their home in Tigbauan, Iloilo, he saw Japanese soldiers and some Filipinos approaching their house; that Eustaquio Duga notified his wife and they immediately started to flee; that unfortunately, they were overtaken by the Japanese soldiers, and Eustaquio Duga was arrested by herein appellant who was in company with said Japanese soldiers; that Eustaquio Duga was taken to the nearby barrio of Napnapan; that sometime later, Severa Gua found the dead body of Eustaquio Duga, with his head almost severed, among other corpses in the yard of the house of Valentina Amandoron. On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his companion Roque Teologo were walking in a barrio road in Napnapan, Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that Trompeta and Teologo were taken to the barrio of Ermita, of the same municipality, where they were investigated together with about thirty persons who were suspected as guerrillas; thence they were brought to the house of Valentina Amandoron where appellant and his companions killed in cold blood Trompeta's companions as well as these persons who were brought there earlier. Among the twenty-five persons killed on that occasion, were Andres Tayo, Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato, Roque Teologo, Jose Taucon and Matias Tiranea. Count No. 8. The information equally recites: 8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army; and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme Calacasan, Nazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevega, Jose Canillas, Aurelio Calacasan, Graciano (LNU), Juan (LNU), and three others, names unknown, on the charge that the persons aforesaid were guerrilla soldiers or guerrilla sympathizers; that thereafter these persons were taken to barrio Taal, municipality of San Miguel, where the accused and his companions set fire to and burned several houses in the aforesaid barrio; and later to barrio Baguingin, municipality of Leon, where the above-named accused and his companions investigated, maltreated and tortured them; that the above-named accused further adhering to the enemy did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, and with evident premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to death Cosme Calacasan, while tied to a tree with hands tied behind his back; while Nazario Calimutan was bayonetted and killed in the same manner by Jesus Astrologo, Filipino co-spy of the herein accused; while Graciano (LNU) and Juan (LNU) and two others (names unknown) were bayonetted to death by the Filipino and Japanese companions of the accused; that after the killing of the aforesaid persons, the above-named accused and his companions did gather the corpses of their victims in the house of Juan Caya and thereafter did set fire to and burn that house the dead bodies inside. Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each other, testified that at about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943, while Aurelio Calacasan, Cosme Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevieja and Jose Canillas and several others were in the barrio of Anonang, Leon, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers and taken to the barrio of Taal, of the same municipality, where they saw appellant and his companions. After setting afire the houses in said barrio, appellant and his companions brought the prisoners to barrio Agboy, of the same municipality, where they were investigated regarding their guerilla activities or connections; that during the investigations, appellant stabbed to death Cosme Calacasan who was a member of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that after several prisoners were killed, their corpses were gathered and placed in a house which was set on fire.

Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended information recites: 9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer, spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid against and mass arrest of persons suspected as guerrilla soldiers and sympathizers, as a consequence of which, about eighty persons, male and female, both young and old were arrested and gathered in a schoolhouse and chapel in the barrio of Buenavista, and thereat investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused and his companions; that subsequently about thirty persons including women and children were taken to the house of Aquilino Sales, where about fourteen persons were bayonetted and killed by Japanese soldiers, namely, Julia Cabilitasan, Mercedes Calopez, Andrea Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel Canag, Rosalia Calopez, Luz Caldito, Estelita Camorahan, Roman Cabilinga, Tomas Canag, Luis Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin, Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio Caldito; while Paulina Cantara, Alejandro Calsona and Bienvenido Cabankalan received and sustained bayonet wounds but survived and were able to escape after the house of aforesaid Aquilino Sales was set on fire and burned by said patrol of Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers. Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro Calsena and Perpetua Canag, who testified for the prosecution, corroborating one another, stated that at about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943, several residents of barrio, Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were arrested by the appellant, who was armed with revolver and bayonet, and his companions consisting of Filipinos and Japanese soldiers; that said barrio residents were brought to the barrio schoolhouse where they were investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan was singled out by the appellant who tied her hands behind her back and brought her under a "doldol" (kapok) tree, near a chapel, where she was stripped of all her clothings until she was naked. Appellant investigated her regarding the whereabouts of her husband who was a USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after severely beating Julia Cabilitasan, brought her to the house of Aquilino Sales where there were other Filipino prisoners. Shortly thereafter, appellant and his companions started the massacre of the prisoners. Appellant stabbed Julia Cabilitasan three times with a bayonet. In that massacre, fourteen persons including women and children were killed. Among those killed were Julia Cabilitasan, Macario Cabilitasan, Roman Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia Calpit. Later, said house was set on fire. Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding this Count, recites: 10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the municipalities of Guimbal and Tubuñgan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies, Bureau of Constabulary and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Edgardo Escorido, Editha Escorido, Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor Tabanda, Elena Gierza, Natividad Gersalino, Jovita Gersalino, Ernesto Tambirao, Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio Tortugalete, Paz Tabora, Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with unknown names on the charge that the persons aforesaid were either guerrilla soldiers, sympathizers and supporters; that the aforesaid persons were then taken to the house of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein accused, did then and their investigate, maltreat, or otherwise torture Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido and Eustaquia Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess as to their connection with the guerrilla movement and the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that subsequently the herein accused further adhering to the enemy did deliver to a Japanese executioner Juan Gelario, Felipe Tanato, David Garnica, Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana, who were all executed and kill one after another; that the killing of Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana took place shortly after they were abused and raped by the Japanese and BC soldiers in the house of Jacinto Taborete; that while this was going on, Jovita Gersalino and Lourdes Tabanda were taken to another house by the herein accused, Filemon Palacios, Jr., Vicente Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they were abused and raped; that subsequently the persons gathered were asked who of them were relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga for they would be released and when an old woman answered that they were all relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga, the Japanese soldiers at once started to inflict and deliver bayonet thrusts on the persons gathered and as a consequence of which about thirty of them were killed and several were wounded: that subsequently, the herein accused and his companions proceeded to barrio Buluañgan, where one Saturnino (LNU) was arrested, investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused and later killed by the Japanese. Gloria Escorido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza, testifying in support of this Count, and corroborating one another, stated that at about seven o'clock in the morning of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and several Japanese soldiers were on a punitive expedition in the barrio of Miadan, Guimbal, Iloilo, they arrested the barrio residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in Tubongan, Iloilo; that the barrio residents, who were about fifty persons, were brought to the barrio of Laguna, Tubongan, Iloilo, were they were investigated and maltreated; that during the investigation, appellant tied the feet of Gloria Escorido, hanged her with her head downward and beat her with the branch of an "aguho" tree; that appellant likewise brought to the house of Jacinto Batorete three females, namely, Luz Tabiana, Jesusa Jimenez and Juana Tabiana where the said girls were abused by the appellant and his companions; that appellant also bayoneted to death Sofia Tambirao for the simple reason that she was the cousin of Tranquilino Geonanga, an officer of the guerrillas; that appellant and his companions massacred on that occasion around thirty persons, among whom were Jovita Gersalino, Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Sofia Tambirao, and Edgardo Escorido. We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated actively in the punitive raids made by the Japanese soldiers and in arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas, but personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely 16 years of age at the time (Count 10), and killed in cold blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three times (Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her three times, with the added ignominy of stripping her stark naked moments before killing her (Count 9), and Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of appellant as testified to by eyewitnesses who have survived the harrowing massacres, speak eloquently that his adherence to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort, was accompanied by cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton disregard of the feelings and decency of his fellow citizens. The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence for appellant, his defense in the lower court merely consisting of (1) his denial of the overt acts imputed upon him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective force of the Japanese Army since January 1st, 1944, it was because he was made to accept the position under duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for the good of the people, he having saved many Filipino lives from Japanese atrocities. We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record because of the seriousness of the charges against appellant, and we find that the evidence for the prosecution is overwhelming, such that appellant's counsel de officio instead of filing a brief, made a manifestation dated November 29, 1955, stating that "after a thorough study of the records of the case, he finds nothing therein sufficient to disturb the decisions of the People's Court and of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo imposing capital punishment on the accused." Said counsel further stated that "The accused's only evidence which directly attacked the government's proofs was his denial of what several witnesses testified to." This manifestation was considered by this Tribunal as appellant's brief, in its resolution of December 6, 1955. Certainly mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon the positive assertion of the witnesses for the government establishing incriminating facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence that as between positive and negative testimony, the former deserves more weight and credit. Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with the Solicitor General that "except the lone and self-serving testimony of the appellant that he was coerced to cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there is not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any evidence showing that the alleged compulsion or coercion was grave and imminent." Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. (16 C. J., 91). To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person. (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384). Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by the law. No man, from fear or circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief upon mankind (Lord Denman in Reg. vs. Tyler, 8 Car. and P. (Eng.) 616, vs. Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 273). When the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of lost testimonies, appellant attempted to give the case a new twist by filing a motion to quash on the ground that the pardon extended him has already extinguished his criminal liability and that his conviction by the People's Court had placed him in jeopardy. This motion was denied, but during the trial appellant was allowed to present documentary evidence relative to the clemency extended him, consisting of Exhibit 1 which is a certified copy of his conditional pardon; Exhibit 2, a certified copy of the letter of the Legal

Assistant of the President dated June 30, 1953, addressed to the Director of Prisons; Exhibit 3 the motion to withdraw appeal filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo; and Exhibit 4, the Tribunal's resolution of September 21, 1953, granting said withdrawal. In addition, appellant presented an Exhibit 5 the decision of the People's Court in the case of People vs. Jesus Astrologo, dated December 11, 1947, sentencing him to death; Exhibit 6 the conditional pardon extended to said accused dated June 27, 1953; and Exhibit 7 the letter of the Legal Assistant of the Office of the President to the Director of Prisons, to show that said Jesus Astrologo who is now enjoying his freedom by reason of the pardon extended, has been allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw his appeal pending review of his death sentence. Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we reiterate our ruling in our resolution of October 19, 1953, hereinbefore quoted. As to appellant's contention respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find it untenable, for the Astrologo case (88 Phil., 423) was elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he filed his brief on October 21, 1949, and we rendered judgment on March 30, 1951, commuting the sentence to life imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon granted him on June 27, 1953, or more than two years after the final judgment, was therefore in order, and cannot be invoked by herein appellant as a precedent. As to the payment of indemnity in the amount of P2,000 to the respective heirs of each of the victims of appellant, the Solicitor-General recommends that this amount imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000. We find this recommendation to be correct, as it is in consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal on the matter; hence the decision of the lower court should be amended accordingly. Furthermore, although the facts of the case verily justify the imposition of death penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty should be, as it is hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua, in accordance with law. Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-895 December 31, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE LUIS GODINEZ, defendant-appellant. BENGZON, J.: Prosecuted and tried for treason, the accused-appellant Jose Luis Godinez was found guilty by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, Judge F.V. Borromeo dissenting. He was a shipmaster in the Philippines coastwise trade before the Pacific War. After the Japanese invasion, from May, 1942 to June, 1943, he rendered services to the Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of Cebu, bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise performing work connected with navigation. He was paid monthly salaries. After a period of rest due to ill health, he was again engaged by the Japanese Army to do the same chores from May, 1943 to October, 1944, at varying rates of compensation. The prosecution's case rests on such acts of cooperation interpreted in the light of incidents, hereafter mentioned which, it is argued, demonstrate treasonable adherence to the enemy, making defendant guilty as charged. In his defense the accused swore that he had to serve the Japanese because he was required by them to do so, that he could not give any valid excuses, that if he made any false statements he would be caught, and killed; and that even if he could escape, the many members of his immediate family would be left to their ruthless ill-will. The majority of the trial judges discounted this explanation saying, in effect, that the danger to the accused was not imminent, because other merchant marine officers, like Captain Obosa and Joaquin Alex succeeded in evading service to the Japanese and were not molested. It was not demonstrated, however, that these seamen were surrounded by the same circumstances of herein indictee, as to family members, means of evasion, personal relations or conditions, etc., all of which necessarily affected any decision to serve or not to serve. To clinch its case the prosecution should have attested that appellant had a valid excuse or that he could eluded the wrath of the masters. Furthermore, the mere fact that some Filipinos were brave enough to refuse and were lucky enough to be let alone is no conclusive reason to hold that in truth there was no danger in denying the conqueror's demands. There were persons put to death or maltreated for so refusing, and that was known at the time, as admitted on the stand by the people's witness Francisco Garcia. Again, it may be that such marine officers were not pressed by the Japanese precisely because the herein accused and others (Eduardo Gonzales, Marcelo Ayesa) had consented to render pilotage service. Those who refused to cooperate, in the fact of danger, were patriotic citizens; but it does not follow that the faintheart, who gave in, were traitors. On this subject the statement of President Osmeña in November 1944, may be quoted: . . . Not all public officials could take to the hills to carry on the heroic struggle. Some had to remain in their posts to maintain a semblance of government, to protect the population from the oppressor to the extent possible by human ingenuity and to comfort the people in their misery. Had their services not been available, the Japanese would either have themselves governed directly and completely or utilized unscrupulous Filipino followers capable of any treason to their people. The result would have been calamitous and the injuries inflicted to our body politic beyond cure. The problem under consideration must be solved with justice and dignity. Every case should examined impartially and decided on it own merits. Persons holding public office during enemy occupation, for the most part, fall within three categories; those prompted by a desire to protect the people, those actuated by fear of enemy reprisals, and those motivated by disloyalty to our government and cause. The motives which caused the retention of the office and conduct while in office, rather than the sole fact of its occupation, will be the criteria upon which such persons will be judged. (Official Gazette, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 102.) It is now undisputed that the mere governmental work under the Japanese regime — and pilotage service may be considered in the same light 1 — does not constitute per se indictable disloyalty. It is contended, however, that appellant's help to the Japanese together with criminal intention to betray render him guilty of treason. Proof of this traitorous intent is made to consist of five circumstances described in the brief of the Solicitor General as follows: (1) During the year 1943, accused often went to the coffee shop of S. P. Banis and during the discussion between Banis and appellant, the latter always showed his pro-Japanese sentiments. On one occasion, during November, 1943, Banis told him about the expected arrival of the Americans, and the appellant exclaimed that Banis was crazy in believing that the Americans were coming back to the Philippines, because according to the appellant, the American forces would never back to these Islands (testimony of S. P. Banis, p. 10, t.s.n., Lopez). (2) Sometime in July, 1942, Capt. Canuto Obosa was in Cebu City for a few days. He saw the appellant inside his own automobile which carried a Japanese flag and on his left arm, appellant was wearing a band with Japanese characters (testimony of Capt. Canuto Obosa, pp. 1-2, t.s.n., Lopez). (3) When the Japanese landed in Cebu City on April 11, 1942, the accused with two other persons went up a Japanese ship anchored alongside the Pier, presented his respects to the Japanese officer in charge of the boat, handed to him a revolver which was examined by said Japanese officer. The appellant showed how the firearm worked by firing the pistol (testimony of Antonio Yee, pp. 14-15, t.s.n., Lopez). (4) From April 1942 to October, 1944, the appellant had a Japanese flag placed on the door of his house situated at D. Jakosalem Street, Cebu City about a foot wide and about two feet long and on the left side of the door was a piece of board with Japanese Characters written on it (testimony of Antonio Yee, p. 15, t.s.n., Lopez.) (5) During the middle of September, 1944, when American planes were dropping bombs in Cebu City, the appellant who was in the lawn of his house said, more or less, the following: "Those sons of the bitches of Americans (referring to the American aviators) are the gangsters of the United States; they are drunk, they will go down". (Testimony of William del Villar, p. 7, t.s.n., Dizon.) I. On the first point, the accused denied having stated the Americans could never come back, admitting, however, having expressed the belief that it was not easy for them to return, in view of the successive victories of the Imperial hordes at that time. Even if appellant had uttered the words attributed to him, it is doubtful whether they exhibited adherence to the foe, unless it is shown that he wanted, or rejoiced in the inability to return of the American forces. But it is hard to believe appellant wished the defeat of our allies, because he had two sons in the guerrilla forces. And if he ever made the remark, it was probably as one of those arm-chair strategists dishing out war opinions on the basis of doctored news fed by the propaganda machine to the local newspapers and broadcasting stations. The man was sadly in error; he underestimated the publicity corps of the Japanese Army; but should he be jailed for it? II. The second point has no merit. Although there was proof about a Nippon flag fluttering on the automobile the appellant rode, no evidence was adduced that the car belonged to him. III. On the third point the appellant swore that when the Japanese arrived in Cebu, they arrested him, and when they found, after investigation, that he was a marine officer they ordered him to report the next day to the Port Surveyor, bringing any firearms he had in his possession; that he did as directed and surrendered his pistol. His version is entirely credible. Those who were in Manila during the first days of January, 1942, remember identical directives of the Military Commander. And if surrender of the firearm meant treasonable collaboration, thousands of Manila residents would be traitors too. IV. About the display of the Rising Sun. The witness of the prosecution had to admit that after the fall of Cebu City the Japanese issued orders requiring every resident to hoist a Japanese flag in their houses and that refusal to obey meant death. Naturally, compliance with this decree should not be chalked against appellant, a resident therein. V. The accused denied having made the insulting statements imputed to him by William de Villar against American aviators that raided Cebu, and proved that said witness bore a grudge against him that probably colored the testimony. Anyway, his counsel, pleading in extenuation, submitted some endorsable comments upholding the proposition of one undergoing the nerve-racking experience of aerial bombardments, for caustic remarks spoken in private motivated by his apprehension for the safety of his family and his own.lawphil.net After considering all matters, the Court reaches the conclusion that defendant's disloyal heart or treacherous mind has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is absolved, with costs de oficio. Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-547. June 28, 1949.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE DE CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION MORAN, C.J. : Appellant has been convicted of treason by the Fifth Division of the People’s Court and sentenced to life imprisonment, to a fine of P10,000, and to pay the costs. The facts proven by the prosecution are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Appellant was a USAFFE soldier and upon the occupation of the Province of Cebu by the Japanese Army he joined the Bureau of Constabulary and became a regular constabulary soldier under the government of occupation. On January 13, 1945, at 2 o’clock A. M. a group of four Japanese soldiers accompanied by some constabulary soldiers, one of them the herein appellant, went to the house of the Bacani family of Bulacao, in the suburb of El Pardo, Cebu City. The four Japanese soldiers, headed by Sergeant Yoshida, investigated the two girls, Anita and Rosario Bacani, living in that house and suspected of having some connection with the Cebu guerrillas. The two girls were hanged by their arms, which were tied behind their backs, by the Japanese soldiers and they were later arrested and imprisoned together with their younger brother Ricardo m a house near the Redemptory Monastery. For lack of evidence, the Japanese soldiers released Ricardo, and also Anita and Rosario subsequently, after fourteen and twenty days confinement respectively. Yoshida reminded Rosario before releasing her that she was very lucky for not having been killed. On or about February 22, 1945, Rosario Bacani was taken from her house by appellant and others and was brought to the house of Yoshida in Cebu City. Yoshida made some amorous advances to Rosario and threatened to kill her and all the members of her family should she not consent to live with him. Rosario had to yield, according to her, because she was afraid of his brutality. Yoshida told her to go home and to return the next day with her mother which she did. Yoshida told Rosario’s mother of his desire to have Rosario as servant, cook and laundrywoman, and from then on Rosario became a mistress of Yoshida. Rosario testified that while she was living in the house of Yoshida, appellant was also living there and was giving reports to Tanamaya, Yoshida’s interpreter. There IS no evidence, however, of what those reports were, and their felonious character is not to be presumed. The facts above stated do not constitute treason. Appellant’s membership in the Bureau of Constabulary under the government of occupation is not treason. That institution was intended for the promotion and preservation of law and order which were essential during war to the life of the civilian population. Appellant personally did nothing serious except his having taken Rosario Bacani from her house to bring her to the house of Yoshida, but again this is not treason. It may be an aid to satisfy the lust of a japanese officer, an aid which is not treasonous, as held in People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-856. Neither is appellant guilty as co-author of rape, for no rape is alleged in the information and no rape had been committed by Yoshida against Rosario, she having yielded her body to him not because an actual force was being exerted upon her, but because she was afraid that otherwise she might be the victim of his brutality. It is well settled that when "some hesitation was shown by the woman or that she had contributed in some way to the realization of the act" there is no rape. (Viada as quoted in U.S. v. De Dios, 8 Phil., 279, 282.) Judgment is reversed, appellant is acquitted with costs de oficio. Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-565. June 27, 1949.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROQUE BADILI, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION OZAETA, J.: The appellant was accused of treason on eight counts, was found guilty of counts Nos. 1, 2, 7, and 8, and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000. In this appeal the Solicitor General agrees with counsel for the appellant that counts Nos. 1 and 7 have not been established by the testimony of two witnesses. He insists only on counts Nos. 2 and 8. In support of count No. 2, Macario Castañares testified that on or about August 16, 1944, while he was sitting inside a truck parked in T. Padilla street, Cebu City, the accused Roque Badili arrested him and brought him the Japanese Kempeitai headquarters, where he was maltreated and released only after nine days of confinement. Another witness named Pedro Baton testified that he saw the actual arrest of Macario Castañares by the accused. No other witness, however, was presented to corroborate the testimony of Castañares as to his maltreatment and confinement by the Japanese military police. We agree with counsel for the appellant that neither has count No. 2 been fully established by the testimony of at least two witnesses. It remains for us to pass upon the evidence on count No. 8. It appears that in 1944 the accused was a policeman of the City of Cebu and at the same time served as a secret agent of the Japanese military police and aided the latter in apprehending guerrilla suspects. This fact was established by the testimony of several witnesses who had seen the accused accompanying Japanese soldiers and forming part of their patrols in Cebu in their search for guerrillas and guerrilla suspects. On those occasions the accused was always armed with a revolver. In count No. 8 it is alleged that on or about July 16, 1944, in Pasil, San Nicolas, Cebu City, the accused in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipino secret agents, with intent and purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, and treasonably capture Lt. Pacifico Rosales of the guerrillas, tie and torture him, and did drag him to a sailboat and kill him while at sea. To prove that allegation three witnesses were called by the prosecution, namely, Francisca Garcia, Basilio Argoso, and Pastor Abellana. Francisca Garcia testified that she was forty years of age, married, and a resident of Pasil, Cebu City; that on the morning of July 16, 1944, Lt. Pacifico Rosales came to her house to exchange Philippine currency with Japanese military notes; that since she did not have enough cash at that time, Rosales left to go to church, saying that he would come back later; that soon after Rosales came back, the accused and two other undercover agents named Bautista and Failing, who were then near her house on the seashore rigging up a sailboat, saw Rosales and immediately surrounded her house; that Rosales went out thru the back door in an attempt to escape but was apprehended by Bautista and the accused. By order of the accused Lieutenant Rosales’ hands were tied at his back, after which he was dragged to one of the sailboats on the shore. Bautista and Failing boarded the sailboat where Rosales was and the accused boarded another sailboat. The two boats then put to sea, and after that she had not seen nor heard of Lieutenant Rosales any more. Basilio Argoso, a twenty-three-year-old fisherman and neighbor of Francisca Garcia, testified that he had known the accused since before the war; that he also knew Lt. Pacifico Rosales; that on the morning of July 16, 1944, after hearing mass he saw the accused and his companions Alberto Bautista and Joe Gabora arrest Lieutenant Rosales in the premises of Francisca Garcia; that after capturing Rosales they tied him and brought him to a sailboat; that the companions of the accused boarded the boat where they had placed Lieutenant Rosales while the accused boarded another boat, and then the two boats sailed towards the island of Bohol; that he knew that Lieutenant Rosales belonged to the Philippine Army; and that at that time the accused and his companions were armed with revolvers. Pastor Abellana, a twenty-seven-year-old merchant of Cebu City, testified that in July, 1944, he was technical sergeant and member of the G-2 of the Philippine Army assigned to the Bohol Area Command; that Lt. Pacifico Rosales was his officer; that on the morning of July 16, 1944, he went to meet Lieutenant Rosales in the house of Mrs. Francisca Garcia in Pasil because he had an agreement with him to meet him there; that before he reached the house of Mrs. Garcia he saw Lieutenant Rosales captured by the accused Roque Badili and his companions; that instead of going to Mrs. Garcia’s house he went to the house of a friend of his named Godofredo Borres; that from the latter’s house he saw Lieutenant Rosales "being dragged by these people with his hands tied behind him and he was brought to the sailboat" ; that he (the witness) was about thirty yards from the place where they brought Lieutenant Rosales; that the accused Roque Badili was the one holding the rope tied to Lieutenant Rosales; that as soon as Lieutenant Rosales was placed in the boat "they headed for the sea." When asked who "they" were, he replied: "Roque Badili, Bautista, Jose Moro, and there were others I did not recognize." He further testified that as a member of the military organization of Lt. Pacifico Rosales, he made an investigation to ascertain his whereabouts; that according to the members of the crew of the sailboat Rosales was killed and thrown into the sea; that the members of the crew had gone to Mindanao and could not be located at the time of the trial. The defense impugns the testimony of Mrs. Francisca Garcia on the ground that it is prejudiced and biased because on one occasion, according to the testimony of the accused, she asked him to intervene with the Japanese on behalf of her husband who had been arrested by a member of the Japanese navy but that the accused told her that the navy was a different organization from that to which he belonged, and so he could not do anything for her husband. Assuming that to be true, we do not believe it sufficient to destroy the credibility of Francisca Garcia. The accused had not done any harm to her or her husband; and the fact that he was not able to secure the release of her husband by the Japanese navy for the reason explained by him was not sufficient motive for her to testify falsely against him. We cannot believe her testimony to be a pure invention because it was corroborated by that of two other witnesses, Basilio Argoso and Pastor Abellana. Basilio Argoso’s testimony is also impugned by the defense, alleging that on one occasion the accused arrested Basilio Argoso on a charge of theft. But according to the accused he subsequently released Argoso upon the request of the offended party himself. In any event, even if we should doubt the veracity of Basilio Argoso, there is still the testimony of Pastor Abellana, which has not in any way been impeached by the defense. The accused testified that he did not know Lieutenant Rosales and that on July 16, 1944, he was in Bohol. His alibi is not corroborated by the testimony of any other witness. The only other witness he called was Sergio Gaboya, an eighteen-year-old laborer, who testified that in 1943 (he must have been only fifteen years of age then) he was a soldier belonging to the 85th Regiment; that he and the accused Roque Badili were guerrillas; that he knew Lieutenant Rosales, who he said belonged to the Bohol Unit; and that he saw Rosales in the mountains of Carmen, Bohol, in December, 1944. We are convinced from the evidence that the accused served the enemy as a secret agent to apprehend members of the resistance movement, and that with the aid of two fellow agents he captured Lt. Pacifico Rosales, who was a member of the Philippine Army and engaged in the resistance movement; and that as a result of the treasonous acts of the accused and his companions, Lieutenant Rosales was prevented from pursuing his patriotic activities. We make no pronouncement as to whether Lieutenant Rosales was killed or whether he is still alive, although the members of his organization could find no trace of his whereabouts. The evidence on this point is not sufficient upon which to make a definite pronouncement. But whether Lieutenant Rosales was killed or not, the act of the accused in apprehending him and preventing him from pursuing his activities as a member of the guerrilla forces constituted an aid to the enemy. Considering all the circumstances of the case, the Court is of the opinion that the appellant deserves reclusion temporal.

The sentenced appealed from is modified in the sense that the accused shall suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal. As thus modified, the sentence appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-743, October 11, 1949 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. POLICARPIO DUMAPIT, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION PARAS, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Policarpio Dumapit, guilty of treason and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, a fine of ten thousand pesos, and the costs. The information charged six counts, but the People's Court based appellant's conviction only on counts IV and VI. Under count IV, the appellant is alleged to have caused, with the aid of a group of Constabulary soldiers, the arrest in barrio Balingahili, municipality of Botolan, province of Zambales, in March, 1943, of eight guerrillas who were thereafter investigated and tortured by the Constabulary and the Japanese and finally confined in the provincial jail for about three months. Under count VI, the appellant is accused of having issued on April 14, 1943, an order to Andres Atanasio, then Chief of the Non-Christian Tribes Of the East Zambales Mountains in Macasan, Botolan, Zambales, enjoining Andres Atanasio and his men to capture, dead or alive, all Americans roaming in the forests of Zambales, and to report the result of his mission to Onofre Dienzo, Superintendent of the Non-Christian Tribes of Zambales. Upon a careful review of the evidence, we are convinced that a reversal of the appealed judgment is in order. As to count IV, we note that only three of the alleged victims testified for the prosecution. They were Federico Decag, Emilio Trapse and Catalino Dumangas. These, however, especially the last two, admitted that they were investigated for, and suspected of, having burned the heuse of Pedro Daco. (pp. 115, 131, 132 & 133, t. s. n.) Aside from the fact that the appellant denied having had any hand in the arrest in question, the circumstance remains that said arrest was effected as a result of the common crime of arson. That the matter had no treasonous significance is shown by the further fact that those arrested were donfined for almost the whole period of their detention in the provincial jail, and not in the Japanese garrison. If the Japanese in some way intervened, it was undoubtedly because they had their own eyes and ears even in civil offices and they merely wanted to be sure that any disorder was not directed against their authority and safety. But said intervention, without more, cannot be attributed to the voluntary invitation or denunciation on the part of the appellant or the Constabulary. Appellant's alleged authorship of the arrest is inconsistent, moreover, with the affidavit of Federico Decag (Exhibit I) to the effect that the appellant helped in having him and his companions released. Neither is the charge in count VI tenable. The lone witness for the prosecution on this score is Andres Atanasio who had conspicuously supplied what is sufficient to exculpate the appellant; for it is noteworthy thgt this witness categorically testified that, as the appellant was handing over the written order for the capture of all Americans, the appellant told him to disregard the same. (p. 36, t. s. n.) The appellant admits having written the order, but corroborates witness Andres Atanasio in the latter's exculpatory testimony. The immediate background of the appellant is further refutation of the likelihood that he had any treasonable intent. The appellant was before the outbreak of the last war a corporal of the Manila Harbor Police and, upon order of his chief Alejo Valdes, was even the one who was entrusted with the task of taking the personal properties of the family of President Quezon to the motorship EDIL. If the appellant had undergone police training and becon6 a member of the Constabulary during the Japanese occupation, it was at the behest of the then mayor of Botolan (Juan M. Corom) and provincial governor (Dantes), and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the guerrilla unit to which the appellant belonged. Indeed, the appellant was known to the underground men as "Ave Maria." The appelaed judgment is therefore reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, and Torres, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-2256, July 06, 1950 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LUIS NAVEA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION PARAS, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay a fine of P10,000, plus the costs, the appellant being entitled, however, to the benefit of one-half of his preventive imprisonment . The appellant was charged with six counts but was found guilty only of three, 1, 2 and 4. Under count No. 1, the appellant is alleged to have been a member of a party of Filipinos who captured in the latter part of November,. 1944, Lieutenant Leslie of the American Air Force who bailed out from his plane between Binañgonan and Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The capturing party delivered the flier to the Japanese soldiers who liquidated him. The skull of Lieutenant Leslie was, found only after the liberation of Sta. Rosa. The witnesses for the prosecution presented in support of this count were unanimous in testifying that the only part taken by the appellant was to pilot the banca in which the capturing party of Lieutenant Leslie rode. The evidence for the defense tends to show that the appellant was compelled to pilot the banca by the Japanese soldiers. In our opinion, the appellant at least is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, as he merely piloted the banca used by the rescuing party and did not even go with the Japanese soldiers when the latter took over the American flier. No active part is therefore attributable to the appellant in the delivery or liquidation of Lieutenant Leslie. Under count No. 2, it is alleged that on or about two o'clock in the morning of November 16, 1944, the appellant and David Cose, both armed and clad in Japanese uniforms and army caps,'want to the house of the spouses Wenceslao Cappena and Maxima Bato in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival, they took hold of Reynaldo Carpena, son of . Wenceslao, and after he was tied, Reynaldo was brought down to the place where appellant's' companions were waiting with Capt. Maykawa of the Japanese Army, thereafter, the appellant and David Cose went tip the house, tied the hands of Wenceslao, and dragged him down. The appellant and his companions then left, bringing with them Wenceslao Carpena. Nothing was heard from Wenceslao since then, and it was known that he was killed only after the liberation when his remains were discovered. Wenceslao Carpena, according to the evidence for the prosecution, was apprehended for being a guerrilla suspect. This count is supported by the testimony of Maxima Bato and Reynaldo Carpena, wife and son respectively of Wenceslao Carpena. Under count No. 4, it is alleged that on February 14, 195, the appellant, together with Martin Laurel, Filemon Alitaptap, Tiburcio Alitaptap and Higino Sigue, found Agustin Ramires riding on a bicycle. Thereupon they arrested him. After Agustin's hands had been tied, the group took him to a yard in front of the house of Buenaventura Dichoso where he was fenced to kneel down on the edge of a prepared grave and bayoneted to death by Tiburcio Alitaptap and Martin Laurel. Agustin Ramirez was suspected of being a guerrilla. This count is supported by the testimony of Buenaventura Dichoso and Canuto Velandres. We are convinced that the appellant is guilty under counts 2 and 4. At least two witnesses testified in support thereof. It is true that, as pointed out in the lengthy brief of appellant's counsel de oficio, there are some discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, but as they refer to minor details, said discrepancies rather lead to the conclusion that the witnesses were not fabricated. In view of the lapse of time and different capacities for observation, the witnesses cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity minor matters connected to the main overt acts. The trial court saw and observed the witnesses during the trial, and we have found no good reason for overruling said court when it gave weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and refused to believe the testimony of the witnesses for the defense. At any rate, the witnesses for the prosecution have not been shown to have had any motive for falsely testifying against the appellant. The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason, it "becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides." Being in conformity with the facts and the law, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered. Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant. REYES, J.: We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape." The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains the following counts: 1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend every aid and cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other elements and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines. 2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida, performing the function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did in company with other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines. 3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance against said enemy and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed. 4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November 1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the expected landing of America forces. 5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to the said enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities. 6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla. 7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation. 8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer of the guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips. 9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police, did then and there apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez. 10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort said enemy in company with five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the KempeiTai and his capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since then. 11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his

capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy. 12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla. 13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since. 14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla whereabouts. 15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas. 16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy. 17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation conducted by the Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy. 18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco: 2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes 3 pairs white pants 2 out shirts 2 pairs shoes 1 buntal hat 1 wedding ring on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla. 19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was captured. 20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession of the latter's connection with guerrillas. 21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter. 22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them. 23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to the said enemy. By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred: 1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of the Japanese;

2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him; 3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty; 4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery; 5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000. Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only. Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.) The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would not be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying appellant' motions for reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same." There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra. But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs. For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims. The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since five member of this court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000. Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-2162, September 30, 1949 ] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. BENITO TUASON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION PADILLA, J.: Benito Tuason was charged with treason in the People's Court, and after trial was found guilty and sentenced to suffer 20 years of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P7,000 and costs. He appeals from said judgment. In the morning of 21 November 1944, about 7 o'clock, in the barrio of Ugong, municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, the appellant and several companions, seme of them carrying rifles, arrested Miguel Castillo, Candido Cruz, one Daniel, and another unidentified individual. After their arrest, Miguel Castillo, Candido Cruz and the other two have not been seen again. In the morning of 24 November 1944 in the same barrio, the appellant and several Japanese and Filipino companions, who were known to be Makapilis, all armed with rifles and pistols, arrested Bibiano Azores, Eustaquio Santos, Elpidio Cruz, Valentin Cruz, Pedro Cruz, Rafael Bernardo, one Victoriano, Rafael Raymundo, Daniel Santos, Cirilo Jose and Salvador San Pedro, who were suspected of being guerrillas. After their arrest they were exposed to the sun, tortured, tied and loaded in a banca. Since their arrest they have not been seen again, except Valentin Cruz and Rafael Raymundo who were released. On 10 December 1944, about 8 o'clock in the evening, the appellant and several other persons, known to be Makapilis, all carrying firearms, arrested Pedro Natividad because they suspected him to be a guerrilla. The appellant and his companions demanded the surrender of the key to the wardrobe for the avowed purpose of searching for firearms. Instead, they found jewelry, clothing and money which they took away. The value of the jewelry was P500. Pedro Natividad was brought to the house of the mayor used as garrison and there maltreated. That was the last time he was seen by his wife. The following morning Teodora Silverio saw Pedro Natividad and several companions with swollen faces being dragged away. He could hardly walk. That was the last time Teodora Silverio saw her brother-in-law Pedro Natividad. The appellant is a Filipino citizen. Several witnesses testified that they had known the appellant to be a native of the Philippines, born of Filipino parents. The appellant admits that he was a "Ganap." The arrest of Miguel Castillo and Candido Cruz was witnessed by Leona Natividad and Rita Pascual. The house of the former is adjoining that of the latter and the arrest was made in front of the house of Rita Pascual. The arrest of Bibiano Azores, Eustaquio Santos and Elpidio Cruz is established by the testimony of eyewitnesses Pedro Santos and Eleuteria Bautista, parents of Eustaquio Santos, and Fidela Bonifacio, a neighbor of Eustaquio Santos and Bibiano Azores. The arrest of Daniel Santos, Cirilo Jose and Salvador San Pedro is proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses Leona Natividad and Fidela Bonifacio. The latter saw the arrested persons at the ferry already tied. And finally, the arrest of Pedro Natividad is proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses, his widow, Ceferina Raymundo, and his son, Deogracias Natividad. Counsel for the appellant contends that his client is not guilty of treason but at most of illegal detention as that crime is defined in article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no merit in the contention, because the arrest of the victims constitutes not only adherence to the enemy but also it gave him aid and, therefore, is treason as defined in article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. It is clear that the crime committed by the appellant does not come under the amnesty, because it was not in furtherance of the resistance movement. It was just the reverse. The claim or theory that sovereignty of the legitimate government was suspended during the occupation of the country by the enemy has been rejected in this jurisdiction as unsound principle of unwholesome consequences (Laurel vs. Misa, L-409, 44 Off. Gaz., 1176[1]). Appellant denies having taken part in the arrest of the victims. He claims that from the 1st to the 20th day of December he was in Manila. If that were true, the only arrest in which he could not have taken part was that of Pedro Natividad in the morning of 10 December 1944. But the testimony of Ceferina Raymundo, widow of Pedro Natividad, and that of his son, Deogracias Natividad, prove beyond doubt that the appellant was with the arresting party on that occasion. In another part of his testimony the appellant also claims that he was in Manila on 21 November; but again the testimony of Leona Natividad and Rita Pascual, in front of whose houses Miguel Castillo and Candido Cruz were arrested, proves that the appellant was in Ugong on 21 November 1944. Appellant admits that Rita Pascual entertained no ill-feeling towards him but believes that Leona Natividad wae resentful, because when she requested him to find means by which her husband could be released, the appellant told her that he knew no Japanese at that time. If that were a fact, Leona Natividad could not feel resentful as there was no reason for such resentment. It was not sufficient motive for her to testify against the appellant. The imputation to Fidela Bonifacio being the same as that attributed to Leona Natividad should also be disregarded. It was not sufficient motive for her to incriminate the appellant. Counts 12, 13 and 15 of the information filed against the appellant have not been proved in accordance with the two-witness rule. The testimony of Leona Natividad and that of Fidela Bonifacio refer to two different stages of the arrest. Counts 8, 9, 10, 14, 16 and 22 of the information filed against the appellant having been established by competent evidence and in accordance with the two-witness rule, the judgment rendered by the People's Court should be, and the same is, affirmed. The principal penalty, however, is modified and that of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, is imposed upon the appellant, with costs against him. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant. TUASON, J.: The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000. Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos. These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together. This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.) The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide." Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows: 1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days; 2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known; 3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death; 7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities. The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make treason. In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately under their general denomination. However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective. This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned. In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant. Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant. PERFECTO, J.: Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs, Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court. He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows: The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows: That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder stated, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following manner, to wit: 1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed several men in the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the same party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house; that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed. 2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned. 3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him. 4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas. 5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944. 6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla. 7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers. That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof. Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest, effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of. Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous morning raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough weight to prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count. With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation having been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts relate to the second count. With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in Gagalañgin, Manila. In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution. Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the lower court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest because appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the kempei office. Counts five and seven were not proven. Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one, two, three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's brief compromises one hundred

thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes against the victimized persons. Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as decreed by the lower court. Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only after he had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were declared proven by the People's Court. The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10). We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty. Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law. The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows: That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof. The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not changing the nature of the offense committed. For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs. Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-2997. June 29, 1951.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMBERTO SAN JUAN, Defendant-Appellant. DECISION PARAS, C.J. : This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, finding the appellant, Lamberto San Juan, guilty of treason and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and its legal accessories, and to pay a fine of fifteen thousand pesos, plus the costs. The information charged eleven counts, but appellant’s conviction is predicated only on counts 1, 2, 8 and 10. That the appellant is a Filipino citizen is beyond question. The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that one day in December, 1943, during the socalled amnesty period, Vivencio Panganiban, Rustico Cabasco, Lt. Tuso, Lt. Ovena, and Gerundio Villanisa, coming to the town of Lopez, Quezon, met in the house of Potenciano Desembrana for the purpose of talking about guerrilla matters. In the midst of their conference, somebody appeared and gave the news that the Japanese were coming, whereupon the group began to leave. Meeting Gerundio Villanisa who, upon being asked, disclosed that he was talking with guerrillas, the appellant proceeded to the Japanese garrison and returned with four Japanese soldiers, armed like the appellant. The latter and his Japanese companions went in the direction taken by the guerrillas, and when the latter approached the hospital, the appellant fired at them, with the result that the intended victims had to flee. These facts constitute the basis of count No. 1 and were testified to by Gerundio Villanisa and Rustico Cabasco. Counsel for appellant insists that there is a discrepancy in the testimony of these two witnesses, because Villanisa stated that the appellant rushed to the Japanese garrison and returned with Japanese soldiers, while Cabasco alleged that he saw the appellant with Japanese soldiers, without mentioning appellant’s trip to the garrison. The discrepancy is more apparent than real. Cabasco merely omitted a detail which Villanisa was able to recite, but the former’s testimony is nonetheless complete in specifying that the appellant and his Japanese companions pursued the abovenamed guerrillas and that the appellant fired at them near the hospital. We are inclined to agree with counsel for appellant that the other counts, Nos. 2, 8 and 10, (that the appellant arrested Melecio Villate, that he delivered a speech in Lopez in which he claimed that the Americans would not return and General Vera was a bandit, and that the appellant sent a patrol of Makapilis to barrio Villahermosa with orders to arrest all), have not been proven in accordance with the two-witness rule; but count No. 1 is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, his adherence to the enemy being implied from the overt acts charged and established thereunder, and confirmed by his admission that he evacuated with the Japanese from Lopez to Atimonan. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty imposed by the trial court is conformable to law. The appealed judgment will therefore be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.