Crim 2 Title Iii.docx

Criminal Law II Title III: Crimes Against Public Order

Rebellion, Coup d’etat, sedition, and disloyalty

Rebellion and Insurrection (Art 134) (Roque) Elements: 1. Public uprising AND taking up arms against the gov’t. 2. Purpose of ^ a. Remove from allegiance to said gov’t or its laws: i. Any part of PH territory ii. Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or b. Deprive the Chief Executive OR Congress, wholly or partially, ANY of their powers or prerogatives. Penalty: RP – person who promotes, maintains or heads rebellion or insurrection RT – person merely participating or executing commands of others Rebellion – used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government Insurrection – used in reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters or subject Rebellion distinguished from Treason: 1. 2.

Rebellion – levying of war during peace time for any of the purposes mentioned; Treason – performed in aid of enemy during wartime Rebellion always involves taking up arms against government; Treason may be committed by mere adherence to the enemy, giving aid or comfort

Notes: 1. 2.

Rebellion or of inciting it is a crime of masses, of a multitude Actual clash of arms with the forces of the government, not necessary to convict the accused who is in conspiracy with others actually taking arms against the government 3. Purpose of the uprising must be shown 4. It is not necessary that the purpose be accomplished 5. Giving aid or comfort not criminal in rebellion 6. Rebellion distinguished from Subversion –rebellion is a crime against public order; Subversion – like treason, against national security 7. Mere silence or omission is not punishable in rebellion 8. It is not a defense in rebellion that the accuse never took the oath of allegiance to, or that they never recognized the government 9. Those who killed persons in pursuance of movement to overthrow government are liable for rebellion only 10. There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder and other common crimes (Hernandez ruling) 11. Killing, robbing, etc for a private purpose or profit, without any political motivation, would be separately punished and would not be absorbed in the rebellion

R.A. 6968

People v (Nepomuceno)

Lovedioro

FACTS : That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Albay, Elias Lovedioro together with Gilberto Longasa, and three(3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring,confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to killand with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.The trial court found the accused guilty. The accused appealed contesting the ruling of himguilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion. He further claims that in the testimony of the witness,he is a member of the NPA. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means toor in furtherance of subversive ends,"said killing should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of Prison mayor by the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and not rebellion. HELD: YES. The accused of guilty of murder. RATIO: The RTC was correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder because overt act and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, which either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. No political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, andmere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA

People v (Hernandez)

Dasig

SUMMARY: Appellant and several others who were part of a sparrow unit killed a police officer performing traffic duties. Appellant was convicted of murder with direct assault. He appealed that it was merely rebellion. Court ruled in his favor. DOCTRINE: Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion through crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. FACTS: 1. Pfc. Redempto Manatad and two other police officers, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora, were tasked to man traffic. Pfc. Catamora noticed eight persons, including Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously, one of whom gave instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. 2. Pfc. Catamora followed the, but they sensed it and proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged him in a gunfight. He then heard a series of shots from the other group and saw Pfc. Manatad on the ground. Pfc. Catamora sought refuge

at the BIR Office, from where he saw two persons take Pfc. Manatad’s gun and again fired on him to assure he was dead before the group fled. 3. Nuñez and appellant Rodrigo Dasig were located in a safehouse, where they were apprehended and disarmed. In the process, Dasig was shot in the arm. He confessed that he and Nuñez’s group had killed Pfc. Manatad, and that he and Nuñez, alias ‘Armand’ and ‘Mabi’ respectively, were members of a sparrow unit. He was found guilty of murder with direct assault. Nuñez died while the trial was still ongoing. 4. Dasig contended, among others, that assuming arguendo he conspired in the killing, he should have been convicted at most of simple rebellion, not murder with direct assault. ISSUE: WoN the proper crime charged is rebellion, not murder with direct assault - YES RULING: Accused found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt. Penalty of 8 years prision mayor, and to pay deceased’s heirs P50,000 as civil indemnity. RATIO: 1. Art 135, RPC: Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. Appellant voluntarily confessed his membership in the sparrow unit and his participation and that of the group in Pfc.Manatad’s killing. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the NPA’s liquidation squad, with the objective of overthrowing the government. 2. Rebellion consists of many acts. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion through crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion, or an act done in its furtherance. It cannot be the basis of a separate charge. 3. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion. The Art 135 penalty for any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P200,000. But since there is no evidence that appellant headed the crime committed, and in fact Pfc. Catamora pinpointed him as not the person giving instructions to the group that attacked Pfc. Manatad, the imposed penalty is eight years of prision mayor and civil indemnity of P50,000 to Manatad’s heirs.

Umil v Ramos* (Gaverza)

FACTS: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOUCAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside. ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful. RULING: YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it

can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crime. Petitions are DISMISSED. People v (Ambray)

Hernandez**

FACTS: · Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by the lower courts of rebellion, w/ multiple murder, arsons and robberies · Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and took part in ‘rebellious’ activities w/): Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) w/c is an instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP); Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB, a.k.a. Hukbalahaps/Huks) · Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to make armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and, as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, they also committed then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property · The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment · The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. ISSUE: W/N Rebellion is considered a complex crime with arson, murder or robbery HELD: NO Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.” i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein”: (1) “engaging in war against the forces of the government”, (2) “destroying property”, or (3) “committing serious violence”, (4) “exacting contributions or” (5) “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated” -Elements of Penalty: Rebellion may be committed by engaging in war against the forces government and committing serious violence in the prosecution of said war -The war connotes resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damages to property, etc -The said act of resorting to arms, with resulting impairment or destruction of life and property constitutes nether two or more offences or complex crimes but one crime - rebellion only and punishable with only one single penalty -Whether performed singly or collectively, these 5 classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute only ONE offense, Art 48 cannot be applied

People v Geronimo (Alejo)

Facts: In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of

First Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed. In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants committed the crime of rebellion? Held: Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion. However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs

of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.

Enrile v Salazar (Roque)

Facts: Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Dir Alfredo Lim,on the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Salazar of RTC QC. The warrant was issued on an information signed earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors, charging Enrile and the Panlilio spouses with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, allegedly committed during the period of failed coup attempt. Enrile was held overnight at the NBI HQ, then brought to Camp Karingal the following morning. On the same day, Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights, having been: 1. Held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in statute books 2. Charged with a criminal offense inan information for which no complaint was initially filed or prelim investigation was conducted, hence, due process.

Enrile filed for a petition of habeas corpus alleging he was deprived of constitutional rights for (1) being held to answer a criminal offence w/c does not exist in statute books, (2) having no prelim. investigation conducted denying him of due process, (3) being denied right to bail, and (4) having no judge to personally determine probable cause. ●

Applicability and validity of Hernandez ruling was also being questioned on the case. ○ Hernandez was repealed by a PD issued by Pres. Marcos. ○ Enrile contends that Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion whereas in the present case, he was charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion but not in furtherance of rebellion.

3. Denied his right to bail 4. Arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge having personally determined existence of probable cause Solicitor General: the case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the information in the Hernandez ruling charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion. Issue: Is the Hernandez ruling applicable in this case? Held: Although Hernandez is still a binding doctrine, Enrile is correct. There is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed by rebellion. Thus, he can only be charged with rebellion which is bailable.

Ponce Enrile (Nepomuceno)

v

Amin

FACTS: An information was filed against Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion "complexed" with murder and charging him of violation of PD No. 1829. It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort in his house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure of the petitioner that prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction was allegedly a violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829. On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then, Sen. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information but then again was denied. In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court on the following grounds: a. the facts do not constitute an offense; b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in complexed rebellion; c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion; d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No. 1829. ISSUE:Whether or not Sen. Enrile be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 not withstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him. HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition of Sen. Enrile and quashed the information. The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions. It is Hernandez case that remains binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Petitioner's act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in the furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes. It is the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by application of Art. 48 of the RPC.

Sanlakas et. al. v Angelo Reyes (Read only Separate Opinion of J.Ynares-Santiago) (Hernandez)

SEPARATE OPINION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The fundamental issue in the petitions is the legality of Proclamation No. 427 issued by the President on July 27, 2003 declaring a state of rebellion. The majority affirmed the declaration is legal because the President was only exercising a wedding of the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. U.S. jurisprudence and commentators are cited discussing the awesome powers

exercised by the U.S. President during moments of crisis[1] and that these powers are also available to the Philippine President.[2] Although the limits cannot be precisely defined, the majority concluded that there are enough residual powers to serve as the basis to support the Presidential declaration of a state of rebellion.[3] The majority, however, emphasized that the declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.[4] They affirmed the legality of warrantless arrests of persons who participated in the rebellion, if circumstances so warrant[5] with this clarification: [i]n other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.[6] If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still be present for an arrest to be made, then the declaration is a superfluity. I therefore shudder when a blanket affirmation is given to the President to issue declarations of a state of rebellion which in fact may not be the truth or which may be in affect even after the rebellion has ended. Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 27, 2003, at the height of the occupation of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City, by 323 junior officers and enlisted men (Oakwood Incident),[7] which began in the early morning of July 27, 2003.[8] Shortly after, the President issued General Order No. 4, ordering the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to use reasonable force, and pay due regard to constitutional rights, in putting down the rebellion.[9] The Oakwood incident ended peacefully that same evening when the militant soldiers surrendered after negotiations. From July 27 to August 1, 2003, search and recovery operations were conducted. Throughout the Oakwood Incident, searches were conducted in the non-occupied areas,[10] and, with the recovery of evidence, staging points for the Oakwood Incident were found in Cavite, Makati and Mandaluyong.[11] After the soldiers left at around 11:00 in the evening of July 27, a search was conducted around the Oakwood premises.[12] These searches expanded in scope on the basis of recovered evidence.[13] Ramon Cardenas, Assistant Executive Secretary in the previous administration, was arrested, presented to the media in handcuffs and brought for inquest proceedings before the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the morning of July 28.[14] He was initially detained at the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), and brought to the DOJ in the afternoon of July 28.[15] Cardenas was later charged with the crime of rebellion,[16] but as of this writing has been allowed bail. On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group had surrendered peacefully, an official spokesperson from the DOJ declared that the Presidents indefinite imposition of the state of rebellion would make warrantless arrests a valid exercise of executive power. The Court can take judicial notice that the police authorities were releasing to media evidence found purporting to link personalities in the political opposition, the most prominent of whom was Senator Gringo Honasan. Even Senator Loi Ejercito and Mayor JV Ejercitos names were being linked to the attempted uprising. On August 1, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police had effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion, and, accordingly, that the state of rebellion had ceased on that date. The majority discussed only the abstract nature of the powers exercised by the

Chief Executive, without considering if there was sufficient factual basis for the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion and when it ended. In taking this position, the majority is returning, if not expanding, the doctrine enunciated in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,[17] which overturned the landmark doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia.[18] In Lansang, the Supreme Court upheld its authority to inquire into the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and held that this inquiry raises a judicial rather than a political question. In Garcia-Padilla, on the other hand, the ponencia held that Lansang was no longer authoritative, and that the Presidents decision to suspend the privilege is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons. These two cases were decided prior to the 1987 Constitution, which requires this Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[19] This provision in the 1987 Constitution was precisely meant to check abuses of executive power. Martial Law was still fresh in the minds of the delegates in 1987! The majority ignored the fact that the state of rebellion declared by the President was in effect five days after the peaceful surrender of the militant group. The Presidents proclamation cites Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution as the basis for the declaration of the state of rebellion.. Section 18 authorizes the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to call out the Armed Forces, in order to suppress one of three conditions: (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion or (3) invasion.[20] In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (1) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (2) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. The majority made it clear that exercise of the Presidents Commander-in-Chief powers does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion or a declaration of a state of lawless violence or a state of invasion. When any of these conditions exist, the President may call out the armed forces to suppress the danger. Thus, the declaration of a state of rebellion does not have any legal meaning or consequence. This declaration does not give the President any extra powers. It does not have any good purpose. If the declaration is used to justify warrantless arrests even after the rebellion has ended, as in the case of Cardenas, such declaration or, at the least, the warrantless arrests, must be struck down. Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is the crime of rebellion or insurrection, to wit: ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How committed. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. On the other hand, a coup d etat is defined as follows: ART. 134-A. Coup d etat. How committed. The crime of coup d etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities or other

facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office employment, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose seizing or diminishing state power.

or or or of

Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed only by rising publicly or taking up arms against the Government. A coup d etat, on the other hand, takes place only when there is a swift attack accompanied by violence. Once the act of rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government ceases, the commission of the crime of rebellion ceases. Similarly, when the swift attack ceases, the crime of coup d etat is no longer being committed. Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,[21] and the authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.[22] However, this doctrine should be applied to its proper context i.e., relating to subversive armed organizations, such as the New Peoples Army, the avowed purpose of which is the armed overthrow of the organized and established government. Only in such instance should rebellion be considered a continuing crime. When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the evening of July 27, the rebellion or the coup d etat ended. The President, however, did not lift the declaration of the state of rebellion until 5 days later, on August 1, 2003. After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of having conspired with the soldiers or participated in the Oakwood incident could be arrested without a warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs arrest without warrant, provides as follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and xxxxxxxxx In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court are exceptions to the due process clause in the Constitution. Section 5, par. (a) relates to a situation where a crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer. Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the requirement of personal knowledge, on the part of the arresting officer, of facts indicating that an offense had just been committed, and that the person to be arrested had committed that offense. After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July 27, 2003, there was no crime that was being attempted, being committed, or had just been committed. There should, therefore, be no occasion to effect a valid warrantless arrest in connection with the Oakwood Incident.

The purpose of the declaration and its duration as far as the overeager authorities were concerned was only to give legal cover to effect warrantless arrests even if the state of rebellion or the instances stated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules are absent or no longer exist. Our history had shown the dangers when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one person. Unless specifically defined, it is risky to concede and acknowledge the residual powers to justify the validity of the presidential issuances. This can serve as a blank check for other issuances and open the door to abuses. The majority cite the exercise of strong executive powers by U.S. President Andrew Jackson. Was it not President Jackson who is said to have cynically defied the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling (under Chief Justice Marshall) against the forcible removal of the American Indians from the tribal lands by saying: The Chief Justice has issued his Decision, now let him try to enforce it? Others quote Madison as having gone further with: With what army will the Chief Justice enforce his Decision? WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, issued on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All other orders issued and action taken based on those issuances, especially after the Oakwood incident ended in the evening of July 27, 2003, e.g., warrantless arrests, should also be declared null and void. Coup d’etat (Art 134-A) (Gaverza) Art. 134-A. Coup d’etat -- how committed The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 6968) The crime of coup d'etat may be committed with or without civilian participation. Elements: 1. That the offender is a person or persons belonging to the - military or - police or holding - any public office or employment; 2. That it is committed by means of a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; 3. That the attack is directed against - duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or - any military camp or installation, - communication networks, - public utilities or -other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power; 4. That the purpose of the attack is to seize or diminish state power. Penalty under Art. 135 Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in

undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period. Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as performed similar acts, on behalf or the rebels shall be deemed a leader of such a rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat. (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990). Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art 136) (Ambray) Article 136: Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit coup d’etat, Rebellion or Insurrection - The conspiracy and proposal commit coup d’erat shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000). The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished respectively, by prision correcional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000) and by prision correcional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos (P2000) 2 Crimes are defined and penalised in this article: Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion are two different crimes namely 1) Conspiracy to commit rebellion and 2) Proposal to commit rebellion Notes: -No conspiracy when there is no agreement and no decision to commit rebellion -Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and soliciting funds from the people for, the organisation, show conspiracy to overthrow the Government -Merely agreeing and deciding to rise publicly and take arms against the government for the purposes of rebellion or merely proposing the commission of said acts is already subject to punishment Inciting to Rebellion or Insurrection (Art 138) (Alejo) ART. 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection. - The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end. Elements: 1. 2. 3.

That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government; That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion; That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners, or other representations tending to the same end.

Penalty: PM in minimum Notes: Inciting to Rebellion Distinguished from Proposal a. in both, the offender induces another to commit rebellion b. in proposal, person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion; in inciting, it is not required that offender has decided to commit rebellion c. in proposal, person who proposes uses secret motive; in inciting, the act is done publicly Rebellion should not actually be committed

Sedition (Art 139) (Roque) ELEMENTS: 1. Offenders rise publicly AND tumultuously. 2. Offenders employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods. 3. Offender employs any of those means to attain any of the following objects: a. Prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election; b. Prevent the National Gov’t, or any provincial or municipal gov’t, or any public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order; c. Inflict any act of hate or revenge upon person or property of any public officer or employee. d. Commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class; and e. Despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National Gov’t of all its property or any part thereof. Penalty: PM in minimum and a fine not exceeding P10,000 – for the leader of sedition PC in maximum and a fine not exceeding P5,000 – for other persons participating therein Notes: 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state Sedition Distinguished from Rebellion 1. In both, there must be public uprising 2. In sedition, it is sufficient that public uprising is tumultuous; in rebellion, there must be taking up of arms against the government 3. In sedition, the purpose of offenders may be political or social; in rebellion, it is always political Sedition distinguished from treason – treason is the violation by a subject of allegiance to sovereign; sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State Public uprising and an object of sedition must concur Common crimes are not absorbed in sedition

People v (Nepomuceno)

Cabrera

DOCTRINE Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state. (SHORT VERSION) Because of certain incidents, the Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a rough relationship with each other. The constabulary force had grudges against the Police force of Manila. One night, the constabulary force went to attack the Police force, killing and wounding several policemen and civilians.

FACTS The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict revenge for the following reasons: (1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman. (2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead.There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered.On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window(the saw out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances:(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American Policeman and his friend.(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer- by, causing a death and wounding most of the passengers.(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman (asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala ISSUES/HELD (1) Is there connivance/conspiracy between the accused- YES (2) Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law-YES RATIO (1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,

and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. (2) Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of outside of legal methods any one of five objects,including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and what really happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this contention is without foundation. The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. What is important is that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government. DECISION Judgment affirmed Conspiracy to commit Sedition (Art 141) (Hernandez) Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period" and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. There must be an agreement and a decision to rise publicly and tumultuously to attain any of the objects of sedition. Thus, an agreement and a decision to attain an object of sedition without any agreement to rise publicly and tumultuously is not conspiracy to commit sedition. Such an agreement and decision may constitute a conspiracy to commit direct assault of the first form (Art. 148), which is not a felony. There is no proposal to commit sedition. Art. 141 punishes only conspiracy to commit sedition. Hence, proposal to commit sedition is not punishable.

Inciting to sedition (Art 142) (Gaverza) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202 Different acts of inciting to sedition

1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means -speeches, -proclamations, - writings, -emblems 2. Uttering seditious words or speeches -which tend to disturb the public peace 3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels -against the Government or -any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, -which tend to disturb the public peace. Inciting to sedition to accomplish any of its objects. Elements: 1. That the offender does not take direct part in the crime of sedition. 2. That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition. 3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end. Uttering seditious words or speeches. -Uttering seditious words - The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head -Uttering seditious speech - It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. Meaning of the word "scurrilous." -"Scurrilous" means low, vulgar, mean or foul Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace Uttering seditious words or speeches and writing, publishing or circulating scurrilous libels are punishable, when — -They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing - tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together - suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies -lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities A theatrical play or drama where the words uttered or speeches delivered are seditious may be punished under Art. 142. Proposal to throw hand grenades in a public place, intended to cause commotion and disturbance, as an act of hate and revenge against the police force, is inciting to sedition. Knowingly concealing such evil practices - ordinarily an act of the accessory after the fact, - but under this provision, the act is treated and punished as that of the principal. The use of words, emblems, etc., not performance of act, is punished in inciting to sedition Disturbance or disorder, not necessary in inciting to sedition - its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order. There are two rules relative to seditious words: (a) The clear and present danger rule. -must be of such a nature that by uttering them there is a danger of a public uprising and that such danger should be both clear and imminent - must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent (b) The dangerous tendency rule. -tend to create a danger of public uprising -could easily produce disaffection among the people Reasons why seditious utterances are prohibited. -No need to wait Unlawful rumor-mongering and spreading false information.

-penalty is prision correccional or 6 months and 1 day to 6 years imprisonment - If public officer, absolute perpetual disqualification from holding any public office - spread rumors, false news and information and gossip, or cause to -endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State US v Tolentino (Ambray)

FACTS: · On 14 May 1903, Aurelio Tolentino and others presented a theatrical work written by the former entitled, “Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas” in Tagalog language at the Teatro Libertad in Manila · The piece contained seditious words and speeches, and scurrilous libels against the Government of the US and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands which were uttered during the presentation as if tending to obstruct the lawful officers in the execution of their offices, instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and disturb the peace, safety and order of the community. ISSUE: Whether or not the theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition. HELD: YES. · The theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition. · The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines · The Court was satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.

Espuelas v People (Alejo)

Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Issue: Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines? Held: Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be

affirmed with costs. Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written by the accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationale of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty. If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration. The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. Umil v Ramos* (Roque)

Usual Facts of this case: (disregard if not needed) arrest w/o warrant thing Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration. In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reason to believe that an NPA member(Rolando Dural, although using a fictitious name) was indeed being treated at St. Agnes Hospital,QC for gunshot wounds. The information was from the attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore came from reliable sources. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA courier. In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live ammunition were found at the timeof her arrest, and she admitted to owning such documents. As regards Domingo Anonuevo &Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and found subversive documents & loaded guns without permits. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were found in her car. In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the latter’s companion in killing Romulo Bunye II Fact that relates to sedition: Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. During this time, police authorities were present during the press conderence held at the National Press Club (NPC) where Espiritu called for a nationwide jeepny and bus driver strike. Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition. Held: Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Crimes Against Popular Representation

Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies (Art 143) (Nepomuceno) 1. There be a projected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board 2. The offender who may be any person prevents such meeting by force or fraud Penalty: PC or a fine ranging from P200 to P2,000 or both Other Notes: Chief of police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the municipal council are liable under Article 143, when the defect of the meeting is not manifest and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined Disturbance of proceedings of Congress or similar bodies (Art 144) (Hernandez) 1. There be a meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board 2. The offender does any of the following acts: 1. He disturbs any of such meetings 2. He behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. Penalty: A. Mayor or a fine of P200 to P1,000 Notes: 1. The complaint for disturbance of proceedings may be filed by a member of a legislative body 2. One who disturbs the proceedings of the congress may also be punished for contempt Violation of parliamentary Immunity (Art 145) (Ambray) Violation of parliamentary immunity - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who

shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor. What are the acts punishable under Art. 145? 1) By using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of the National Assembly from (1) Attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or (2) From expressing his opinions or (3) Casting his vote Elements: (1) That the offender uses force, intimidation, threats, or fraud (2) That the purpose of the offender is to prevent any member of the National Assembly from: (a) Attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its committees or constitutional commissions, etc (b) Expressing his opinions or (c) Casting his vote 2) By arresting or searching any member thereof while the National Assembly is in regular or special session, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor Elements: (1) That the offender is a public officer or employee (2) That he arrests or searches any member of the National Assembly (3) That the Assembly, at the time of arrest or search, is in regular or special session (4) That the member arrested or searched has not committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor Notes: -Parliamentary immunity does not protect members of the National Assembly from responsibility before the legislative body itself

Martinez v Morfe (Alejo)

FACTS: The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges. HELD: No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. Illegal Assemblies and Associations

Illegal Assemblies (Art 146) (Roque) What are illegal assemblies? 1.

Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code. Requisites: a. There is a meeting, a gathering of a group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving; b. Meeting is attended by armed persons. c. Purpose is to commit any of the crimes punishable under the Code.

2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of Treason, Rebellion OR Insurrection, Sedition, or Assault (TRISA) upon a person in authority or his agents. Requisites: a. There is a meeting, a gathering of a group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving; b. The audience whether armed or not, is incited to te commission of the crime of TRISA..

Penalty: Prision correcciona l in its maximum period to

For: a.

or ga ni ze rs

prision mayor in its medium period

b.

or le ad er s of an y m ee tin g att en de d by ar m ed pe rs on s for th e pu rp os e of co m mi tti ng an y of th e cri m es pu ni sh ab le un de r thi s C od e an y

m ee tin g in w hi ch th e au di en ce is in cit ed to th e co m mi ss io n of th e cri m e of T RI S A Arresto mayor

Persons merely present at such meeting

Prision correcciona l

^ if armed.

BP 880: The Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Nepomuceno) "Public assembly" means "any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or

concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances." PERMIT NEEDED: A public assembly is either with or without a permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the assembly may be peacefully dispersed. Duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly: 1. To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit. 2. To police the ranks of the demonstrators to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the assembly. 3. To confer with local officials and law enforcers so the assembly may be held peacefully. 4. To see to it that the assembly does not go beyond the time stated in the permit. 5. To take steps so demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the assembly. Duty and responsibility of police: 1. Be in complete uniform with their nameplates and their units displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe "maximum tolerance." 2. Not carry any firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle-high shoes with shin guards. 3. Not use tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property. Generally, no public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. Except: 1. At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcers shall call the attention of the leaders of the assembly and ask them to prevent any possible disturbance. 2. If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at non-participants, or at any property causing damage to it, the ranking police officer shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the assembly will be dispersed. 3. If the violence or disturbances does not stop or abate, the ranking officer shall audibly warn the participants, and after allowing reasonable of time to lapse, shall order it to disperse immediately. 4. No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall be made during the assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of the Public Assembly Act. While the holding of a public assembly without a permit where one is required is a violation by the leader(s) or organizer(s), no other person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly. If committed within 100 meters of the public assembly, these acts are violations of law: 1. The carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, a bladed weapon and the like. 2. The malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares. 3. The carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit. But even beyond 100 meters, the unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly is a crime. Illegal Associations (Art 147) (Hernandez) Illegal Associations: 1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code 2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals Persons Liable for Illegal Association: 1. Founders, directors and president of the association 2. Mere members of the association Penalty:

PC in minimum and medium and a fine not exceeding P1,000 – founders, directors, and presidents A Mayor – mere members of said association Illegal Association distinguished from Illegal Assembly 1. In Illegal Association, it is not necessary that there be an actual meeting; In illegal Assembly, it is necessary there is an actual meeting 2. In illegal associations, it is the act of forming or organizing and membership in association that are punished; in Illegal Assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that are punished 3. In illegal associations, the persons liable are the founders, directors and president and the members; In illegal assembly the person liable are the organizers or leaders of the meeting, and persons present at such meeting Illegal Possession of Firearms PD 1866 (1983) Section 1 Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms Penalty= reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua If homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Penalty = Death If violation of this is in connection with Rebellion, insurrection subversion. Penalty = Death Owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm company, corporation or entity used by any person or persons found guilty violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. Penalty = reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua Any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor = prison mayor Section 2. Presumption of illegal manufacture of firearms or ammunition The possession of any machinery, tool, or instrument used directly in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition by any person whose business or employment does not lawfully deal with the manufacture of firearms or ammunition, shall be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful/illegal manufacture of firearms or ammunition RA 8294: Act Amending PD 1866 (1997) Section 1. (Amended Sec 1) Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. “The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. “If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat. “The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of

any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. “The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.” Sec.2 (Amended Sec 3) SEC. 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives. – The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to ‘pillbox,’ ‘molotov cocktail bombs,’ ‘fire bombs,’ or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person. “When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. “If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat. “The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. SEC. 3. Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: “Sec. 5. Tampering of Firearm’s Serial Number. – The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm.” Sec. 4 (amended sec 6) “Sec. 6. Repacking or Altering the Composition of Lawfully Manufactured Explosives. – The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured explosives. Sec.5 Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm 1. Firearms with expired license OR 2. Unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime People v Quijada

Facts: ·

·

·

· · ·

On Dec 25 1992, a benefit dance was helf in Bohol. A fight broke out between accused-appelant Daniel Quijada and the victim (Diosdado Iroy) due to the constant pestering by the former of the latte’rs sister In the evening of Dec 30 1992, a benefit dance was once again held. It was attended by Rosita Iroy and her brother Disodado Iroy among other The victim (Iroy) was sitting at a plaza hall approximately 4 meters from the dance hall when he was approached from behind and shot in the head by Quijada. The incident was witnessed by the victim’s sister Iroy was rushed to the hospital by his companions bu the injury proved to be fatal The firearm used by Quijada was found to be unlicensed as verified froma list of licensed firearm holders in the province The appellant was charged in two informations

o o

· ·

Murder under Art.248 of the RPC Illegal Possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 The Trial Court found him GBRD for both crimes Hence, this appeal

Issue: W/N Quijada should only be convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearm in its aggravated form Ruling: Appeal is dismissed Ratio: YES. Sec. 1 of PD 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. It does not use the clause “as a result” or :on the occasion of” to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”

People v Ringor Jr (Alejo)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years. ISSUE (1): 1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable HELD (1): No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law. 2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years. HELD (2): Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence. According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favourable to the accused. ISSUE (2):

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case, defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no basis. 4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven and that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance. Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described by art 248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed in according to article 63(2) of RPC Assault upon, and resistance and disobedience to persons in authority and their agents

Direct Assaults (Art 148) (Roque) Ways to commit direct assaults: 1. W/o public uprising, employing force or intimidation for the attainment of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition. Elements: a. Offender employs force OR intimidation; b. Aim is to attain any or the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects in the crime of sedition; c. There is NO public uprising. 2.

W/o public uprising, by attacking, by employing force, OR seriously intimidating OR seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion of such performance. Elements: a. Offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes serious intimidation, or (d) makes serious resistance. b. Person assaulted = person in authority / his agent. c. During assault, ^ (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, OR (b) assaulted by reason of past performance of official duties.

People v (Nepomuceno)

Beltran

FACTS: Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it. When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault. H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. People v (Hernandez)

Dollantes

FACTS Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. The Barangay Captain delivered a speech to start a dance for an approaching fiesta in the evening of April 21, 1983. While the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and reprimanded him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body. The Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds. ISSUE WON, the accused is guilty assault upon a person in authority resulting to murder? HELD When a Barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the Barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

Indirect Assaults (Art 149) 1. A person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault defined in Article 148 2. A person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent 3. The offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person coming to the aid of the authority or his agent Penalty: PC in minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding P500 Notes: 1. Indirect assault can be committed only when a direct assault is also committed 2. The offended party in indirect assault may be a private person

Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees, etc., by the constitutional commissions, its committees, etc. (Art. 150) (Ambray) Acts punished as disobedience to the National Assembly or its committee or Constitutional Commission 1. By refusing, without legal excuse, to obey summons of the National Assembly 2. By refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation while being before such legislative or constitutional body or official 3. By refusing to answer any legal inquiry or to produce books, papers, documents, or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions 4. By restraining another from attending as a witness in such legislative or constitutional body 5. By inducing obedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official Penalty: A Mayor or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 – any person who having been summoned... Same penalty – any person who shall induce disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any such body Notes: -The court may take action not amounting to a release of a prisoner of the National Assembly What is the reason for this provision? -The power of inquiry - with process to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative functions Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person (Art. 151) Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties; When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender. Resistance and Serious Disobedience (par 1) 1. A person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender 2. The offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent 3. The act of the offender is not included in the provisions of Articles 148, 149, and 150 Penalty: A Mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 – any person shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority Notes: ● ● ● ● ●

The juridical conception of the crime of resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or his agents consists in a failure to comply with orders directly issued by the authorities in the exercise of their official duties The person in authority must be in the actual performance of his official duties The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct order from the authority or his agent The accused must have knowledge that the person arresting him is a peace officer There is justified resistance when the accused had no right to make the search

Simple Disobedience (par 2) 1. An agent of a person in authority is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender 2. The offender disobeys such agent of a person in authority 3. Such disobedience is not of a serious nature Penalty: A Menor or a fine ranging from P10 to P100 – disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature

Notes: ● ● ●

The order must be lawful If the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is of a serious nature, the offender should be punished under par. 1 of Article 151 When the attack or employment of force is not deliberate, the crime is only resistance or disobedience

Direct Assault

1.

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1.

2.

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2.

3.

4.

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3.

4.

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Public Disorders

Tumults and other disturbances of public order (Art 153) (Roque) What are tumults and other disturbances of public order? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment; Interrupting or disturbing performances, functions or gatherings, or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Arts. 131 and 132; Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting or association or public place; Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place; Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.

Outcry - to shout subversive or provocative words tendency to stir up people to obtain by means of force or violence any of the objects of rebellion or sedition Qualifying if tumultuous in character: the disturbance or interruption shall be deemed as such if caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence

Penallties:

How Committed:

Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos

Cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings

Penalty next higher in degree

Any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character

Arresto mayor

Who in any meeting, association, or public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order

Arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos

In violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed

Notes: 1. 2. 3.

4.

Serious disturbance must be planned or intended If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious ceremony is not committed by public officers, or if committed by public officers they are participants therein, Article 153 should be applied Inciting to Sedition or Rebellion distinguished from Public Disorder – It is necessary that offender should have done the act with the idea aforethought of inducing his hearers or readers to commit the crime of rebellion or sedition; if the outcry is more or less unconscious outburst, which, although rebellious or seditious in nature, is not intentionally calculated to induce others to commit rebellion or sedition, it is only public disorder One who fired a submachine gun to cause disturbance, but inflicted serious physical injuries on another, may be prosecuted for 2 crimes

Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances (Art 154) (Nepomuceno) Acts Punished: 1. Publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of publication, as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State 2. By encouraging disobedience to the law r to the constituted authorities or by praising, justifying or extolling any act punished by law, by the same means or by words, utterances or speeches 3. By maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have been published officially 4. By printing, publishing or distributing (or causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printer’s name, or which are classified as anonymous Penalty: A. Mayor and fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 Other Notes: 1. It is not necessary that the publication of the false news actually cased public disorder or caused damage to the interest or credit of the State; the mere possibility of causing such danger or damage is sufficient 2. The offender must know that the news is false 3. If there is no possibility of danger to the public order or of causing damage to the interest or credit of the state by the publication of the false news Alarms and Scandals (Art 155) (Hernandez) Acts punished as alarms and scandals. 1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within any town or public place, calculated to cause (which produces) alarm or danger.

2. 3. 4.

Instigating or taking an active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility. Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal amusements Causing any disturbance or scandal in public places while intoxicated or otherwise, provided Art. 153 is not applicable.

Delivering prisoners from jails (Art 156) 1. There is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment 2. The offender removes therefrom such person, or helps the escape of such person Qualifying: What constitutes the qualifying circumstance is the offender’s act of employing bribery as a “means” of removing or delivering the prisoner from jail, and not the offender’s act of receiving or agreeing to receive a bribe as a consideration fro committing the offense Penalty: A Mayor in maximum to PC in minimum – any person who shall remove from any jail any person confined therein or shall help escape of such person by means of violence, intimidation or bribery Same Penalties in Minimum – if escape should take place outside of said establishment by taking guards by surprise Notes: 1. Person may be under detention only or by final judgment 2. Hospital or asylum considered as an extension of jail or prison 3. Offender is usually an outsider 4. The guard of the jail, who is off duty, may be held liable for delivering prisoner from jail 5. Violence, intimidation or bribery is not necessary Employment of deceit is not an element of the offense 7. If the crime committed by the prisoner for which he is confined or serving sentence is treason, murder or parricide, the act of taking the place of the prisoner in the prison is that of an accessory and he may be held liable as such, because he assists in the escape of the principal 8. Prisoner is criminally liable for leaving the penal institution only when there is evasion of a sentence Alberto v (Ambray)

De

la

Cruz

FACTS: · Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera (Provincial Jailer) on September 12, 1968 · The Governor’s residence at that time is being rented by the province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur v The detainee worked at the Governor’s residence by virtue of an order of the Governor which was implemented by Lt. Esmeralda (Assistant Provincial Warden). · It was the accused, Eligio Orbita (Provincial Guard), himself who handpicked the group of prisoners to work at the Governor’s residence on September 12, 1968 · Neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and guarding the detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor · In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Orbita, was prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code · In the course of the trial of Esmeralda, the defense brought forth and confronted the witness with a note purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house. · Esmeralda, declared that he could not remember who handed the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and signed by Gov. Cledera.

· Believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which that accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense counsel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda as defendants. · The respondent Judge, Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz, directed the office of Edmundo Alberto (Fiscal), within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of Denaque's escape from judicial custody · Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged.” · On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is warranted. · Respondent Judge ruled to let the charges be so amended by including in the information the author or writer of the said note containing orders and the person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. · The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion was denied on February 18, 1970 Issue: W/N Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code Ruling: NO. · Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. · To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. · To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. · The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. · If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. Evasion of Service of Sentence

Evasion of Service of Sentence (Art 157) Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:

(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Qualifying Circumstances: 1. by means of unlawful entry (by scaling); 2. by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors; 3. by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence, or intimidation; or 4. thru connivance with other convicts or employees of penal institution Penalty: PC in medium and maximum – escape during term of imprisonment PC in maximum – if it shall take with any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated NOTES: 1. The sentence must be “by reason of final judgment” 2. This article is not applicable to sentence executed by deportation 3. Escape – flee from, to avoid, to get out of the way, as to flee to avoid arrest 4. Article 157 is applicable to sentence of destierro, since it consists in a deprivation of liberty 5. Unlawful entry – scaling or climbing the wall Tanega (Roque)

v

Masakayan

Facts: Petitioner was convicted of slander then later on appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance,she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed. SC declined to review on certiorari so the case went back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition. Issue: W/n petitioner has evaded sentence. (NO) Held: Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking". Prescription will only run when he escapes confinement We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Averting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor. People v (Nepomuceno)

Abilong

Doctrine: Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of Destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Thus,if a person sentenced to destierro by virtue of final judgment and prohibited from entering the City of Manila enters said city within the period of his sentence, he is guilty of evasion of sentence under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code

FACTS: Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence. The said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered toserve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should notenter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) monthsand one (1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error: Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentenceof destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only topersons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. Hebases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said articlewhich in part reads as follows: Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of “destierro” - NO RATIO: It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly

admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorder, conflagrations, earthquakes or other calamities (art 158) (Hernandez) Elements: 1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution. 2. That there is disorder, resulting from — a. Conflagration b. Earthquake c. Explosion d. Similar Catastrophe e. Mutiny in which he has not participated 3. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny. 4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief announcing the passing away of such calamity. Penalty: Increase of 1/5 of time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall exceed six months Deduction provided in Article 98 – if convict shall give himself up within 48 hours

Other notes: 1. Offender must be a convict by final judgment 2. The convict must leave the penal institution 3. What is punished is not the leaving of the penal institution, but the failure of the convict to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours after the proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity 4. If offender fails to give himself up, he gets an increased penalty 5. If offender gives himself up he is entitled to a deduction of 1/5th of his sentence Other cases of evasion of service of sentence [violation of conditional pardon](Art 159) 1. Offender was a convict 2. He was granted a conditional pardon by the Chief Executive 3. He violated any of the conditions of such pardon Conditional Pardon - a contract between the Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it Penalty: PC in minimum period – if penalty remitted does not exceed 6 years Unexpired Portion of Original Sentence – if penalty remitted is higher than 6 years Notes: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The court cannot require the convict to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence if it does not exceed 6 years Violation of conditional pardon is not a substantive offense, because the penalty for such violation is the unexpired portion of the punishment in the original sentence Condition extends to special laws Offender must be found guilty of subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under Article 159

5. 6. 7.

Offender can be arrested and re-incarcerated without trial The period when convict was at liberty, not deducted in case he is recommitted Duration of the conditions subsequent is limited to the remaining period of the

Torres (Ambray)

v

Gonzales

FACTS: · 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. · In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. · Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. · In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. · Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. · Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence RULING: · In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: o (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or o (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon. · Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. · Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed. · In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, which is a choice and exercise of the President’s executive prerogative, not subject to judicial scrutiny. *Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted.

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense (Art 160) (Alejo) Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency. Elements: 1. 2.

That the offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same

Penalty: Besides the provisions of Rule 5 Article 62, Maximum of penalty prescribed by law for the new felony Notes: 1. 2. 3.

Second crime must be a felony; but the first crime for which the offender is serving sentence need not be a felony (could be under a special law) Quasi-Recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances A quasi-recidivist, who is not a habitual criminal, may be pardoned at the age of 70 years if he has already served out his original sentence or when he shall complete it after reaching said age

People v Dioso (Roque)

Facts:

Doctrine:

Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed by the Circuit Court of Rizal upon Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca for the crime of murder.

When a crime is committed while serving another sentence, maximum penalty will apply regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may or may not be present.

The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal where both accused were serving sentence, Abarca having been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery. At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were members of the "Batang Mindanao" gang, while the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, also prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, belonged to a group known as the "Happy Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had been involved in intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the latest of which resulted in the death of one Balerio a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their gangmate, the two accused set their Minds to avenge his death. They found the occasion to execute their nefarious design when they learned that Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital. At 6:15 in the 'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca, feigning illness, went to the hospital to seek admission as a patient. He was accompanied by his coaccused Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their intended victims: Reyno was taking breakfast with Gomez was lying down on a "tarima" [wooden bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno and spoke briefly to him, while Abarca headed towards the "tarima". Then, both accused suddenly drew out their improvised knives matalas Abarca raised the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed Gomez, as Dioso, almost simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And after the latter had fallen, Dioso strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez. When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they were met at the corridor by Prison

Guard Enriquito Aguilar Both gave themselves up and handed their weapons to him. Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the NBI, who performed the autopsy, found that both accused died of massive bleeding due to multiple stab wounds on the chest and abdomen. They voluntarily entered plea of guilty during arraignment. Issue or question in this case: What is the degree of their punishment? Held: They seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court by invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. We find no necessity to discuss at length the effects of such mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the new felony [murder] is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the complete absence thereof.