Contraction And Convergence

Conservation Focus

Economic Growth, Climate Change, Biodiversity Loss: Distributive Justice for the Global North and South JON ROSALES Department of Environmental Studies, St. Lawrence University, 23 Romoda Drive, Canton, NY 13617, U.S.A., email [email protected]

Abstract: Economic growth-the increase in production and consumption of goods and services-must be considered within its biophysical context. Economic growth is fueled by biophysical inputs and its outputs degrade ecological processes, such as the global climate system. Economic growth is currently the principal cause of increased climate change, and climate change is a primary mechanism of biodiversity loss. Therefore, economic growth is a prime catalyst of biodiversity loss. Because people desire economic growth for dissimilar reasons-some for the increased accumulation of wealth, others for basic needs-how we limit economic growth becomes an ethical problem. Principles of distributive justice can help construct an international climatechange regime based on principles of equity. An equity-based framework that caps economic growth in the most polluting economies will lessen human impact on biodiversity. When coupled with a cap-and-trade mechanism, the framework can also provide a powerful tool for redistribution of wealth. Such an equity-based framework promises to be more inclusive and therefore more effective because it accounts for the disparate developmental conditions of the global north and south.

Keywords: biodiversity, climate change, distributive justice, economic growth, equity, per capita emissions Crecimiento Econ´ omico, Cambio Clim´atico, P´erdida de Biodiversidad: Justicia Distributiva para el Norte y el Sur

Resumen: El crecimiento econ´omico – incremento en la producci´on y consumo de bienes y servicios – debe ser considerado dentro de su contexto biof´ısico. El crecimiento econ´ omico esta alimentado por los insumos biof´ısicos y sus productos degradan los procesos ecol´ ogicos, como el sistema clim´ atico global. El crecimiento econ´ omico es la principal causa actual del incremento de cambio clim´ atico, y el cambio clim´ atico es un mecanismo primario de la p´erdida de biodiversidad. Por lo tanto, el crecimiento econ´ omico es un catalizador primario de la p´erdida de biodiversidad. Debido a que la gente desea el crecimiento econ´ omico por razones disimilares – algunos por el incremento de la acumulaci´ on de capital, otros por necesidades b´ asicas – la forma en que se limita el crecimiento econ´ omico se vuelve un problema ´etico. Los principios de la justicia distributiva pueden ayudar a construir un r´egimen internacional de cambio clim´ atico basado en los principios de equidad. Un marco de referencia basado en la equidad que encapsula el crecimiento econ´ omico en las econom´ıas m´ as contaminantes reducir´ a el impacto humano sobre la biodiversidad. En combinaci´ on con un mecanismo de l´ımites y canje, el marco tambi´en puede proporcionar una herramienta poderosa para la redistribuci´ on de la riqueza. Tal marco basado en la equidad promete ser m´ as incluyente y, por lo tanto, m´ as efectivo porque considera la disparidad en las condiciones de desarrollo del norte y del sur.

Palabras Clave: biodiversidad, cambio clim´atico, crecimiento econ´omico, emisiones per c´apita, equidad, justicia distributiva

Introduction People around the world desire economic growth for different reasons, some to attain basic needs and some

to attain higher levels of affluence. These disparate desires must be considered when confronting the issue of economic growth and biodiversity conservation. Because economic growth is the increase in production and

Paper submitted March 26, 2008; revised manuscript accepted June 10, 2008.

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consumption of goods and services, and goods and services are directly or indirectly made of biophysical matter that flows through the economic system, the impact of economic growth on the natural world increases with size of the economy. Curbing economic growth in any culture will not be easy; capping it will be very difficult. Powerful social actors that benefit from economic growth assume these ambitions are universal. Economic growth as a public policy has powerful constituencies, including corporate coalitions, politicians who serve their interests, highranking economists, and institutions of international finance. Perpetual economic growth is the purported remedy for poverty alleviation, technological advancement, and the very idea of social progress. But when economic growth is placed in its biophysical context, a conundrum emerges—perpetual economic growth is an impossibility (Daly & Townsend 1993). Long before it is limited by its biophysical environment, it causes numerous social problems that eventually outweigh its social merits. This reality must be confronted. The question I consider here is how to limit economic growth in an ethical manner. As Lawn (2008 [this issue]) explains, macroeconomic policy instruments are not currently designed to cap economic growth; in fact, their purposes are quite the contrary. Macroeconomic policy will not necessarily achieve ethical outcomes either. Although macroeconomic policy may be reformed as economic growth becomes more problematic, one must also look elsewhere for policy tools to limit growth. Codifying limits to economic growth into law can be effective if it is guided by science and ethics with a sensitivity to ecological thresholds and distributional equity. The conflict between economic growth and biodiversity conservation is often described by those working in the conservation field as a trade-off between humans and nonhumans in a competition for natural resources for survival (Czech et al. 2000). This conflict can also be seen between groups of humans when competing economies scour the globe for resources and prevent their competitors from acquiring more favorable positions, what Ophuls (1977) calls the politics of scarcity. Claims on open-access natural resources in the atmosphere, high seas, and even outer space, and human-contrived openaccess resources, such as information, are staked out and gradually privatized into the market by privileged and powerful interests. These interests are supported by current institutions of global economic activity and policy. The politics of scarcity seem insurmountable, and it is difficult to envision an alternative. Other traditions, however, can become more prominent for allocating resources. For example, parallel to the politics of scarcity are the politics of reason and the politics of equity. Applying reason through science-based decision making requires one to acknowledge the impacts of economic growth on biodiversity and to acknowledge

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limits to economic growth. Scientific efforts help determine the causal mechanisms of biodiversity loss and environmental deterioration, and these determinations eventually comprise a powerful mode of persuasion in the policy process. Science itself, however, cannot ensure action. Science can help reveal the causal factors of climate change and the likely impacts and vulnerabilities, but it does not provide a basis for making choices among policy options. Other impulses, such as ethics, are needed to guide responsible action and to resolve conflicts between values and principles. Furthermore, science and ethics often work synergistically. Issues of equity, particularly the just distribution of wealth, often arise from studying limited and deteriorating biophysical factors. Although dominant economic theory includes the assumption that economic growth provides the resources necessary for environmental protection and a vehicle for social equality, this assumption falls apart when biophysical limits are acknowledged. Science is needed to determine environmental limits and thresholds, and ethics is needed to ensure human actions move society toward social equity. The need to identify environmental limits and develop equitable policy is becoming especially evident with regard to climate change. Climate change is an umbrella crisis in that it has social, economic, political, and ecological impacts, including biodiversity loss. It is also a crisis that exposes the need to integrate the politics of reason and equity. The negotiating body that developed the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has a core commitment to strive to reconcile north–south equity concerns with scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. I used the scientific work of the IPCC and the ethical foundations of the UNFCCC to frame my argument. Taken together, they offer a chance for biodiversity conservation by limiting economic activity in the diverse and prolific sectors that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) and, given the integration of economic sectors, by limiting growth of the economy at large while acknowledging the relative contribution of economies that pollute less. Economic Growth, Climate Change, and Biodiversity Loss In their Fourth Assessment Report the IPCC compiles and assesses climate-change literature from 1970 to 2005. Regarding biodiversity, they affirm, “recent warming is already strongly affecting natural biological systems” (IPCC 2007a). Observed changes in terrestrial systems include shifting species ranges, in particular poleward and elevational range shifts; increased wildfire risk; and phenological changes in species, such as timing of growth and migration, length of growing season, and changes in abundance (IPCC 2007a). Changes have also been observed in aquatic systems, including phenological

Rosales

changes in species; poleward shifts in the range of species (plankton have moved 10◦ north in the last 40 years); coral bleaching; and, perhaps most disturbingly, ocean acidification that has affected corals, plankton, and benthic marine organisms (IPCC 2007a). Ocean pH has declined by an average of 0.1 units since 1750 (IPCC 2007a). The full ramifications of ocean acidification are unknown. Similar effects have been observed in lakes and rivers (IPCC 2007a). Of the 28,671 observed biological changes reviewed by the IPCC, 90% are consistent with what one would expect to see with global warming (IPCC 2007a). The projected impacts on biodiversity are even more troubling. The most vulnerable terrestrial ecosystems— tundra, boreal forest, mountain, and Mediterranean-type ecosystems; mangroves and salt marshes; coral reefs and sea ice biomes—are virtually certain (>99% probability) to experience “severe” impacts (IPCC 2007a). Endemic species are the most vulnerable. Some species and communities will benefit from increasing net primary productivity in systems (e.g., savannas, species-poor deserts in some regions), but ecosystems are unlikely to be able to adapt by 2100 to atmospheric CO 2 levels higher than any time in the last 650,000 years and to temperatures higher than in the last 740,000 years (IPCC 2007a). These conditions will be “characterized by threshold-type responses, many irreversible on time-scales relevant to human society, such as biodiversity loss through extinction, disruption of species’ ecological interactions, and major changes in ecosystem structure and disturbance regimes” (IPCC 2007a). Overall, the IPCC states with high confidence (80% chance) that there will be up to a 30% increase in risk of extinction with 1 ◦ C warming and more than 40% extinction with 4 ◦ C warming (IPCC 2007a). Economic growth drives climate change, and attendant biodiversity loss, and the rate at which it does so increases with size of the economy. Producing a dollar’s worth of goods or services in the United States yields, on average, 0.36 kg of CO 2 e (all GHGs weighted for their global warming potential compared with CO 2 ) at the site of production and 0.83 kg when supply-chain emissions are included (Suh 2006). According to Canadell et al. (2007), economic growth accounts for approximately 65% of the increase in GHGs in the atmosphere (17% of which comes from an increase in carbon intensity and ∼18% of which comes from decreased environmental sink efficiency). Growth rates in CO 2 emissions increased from 1.3%/year in the 1990s to 3.3%/year between 2000 and 2006. Carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere are growing at 1.93 ppm/year, the highest rate of increase on record. These new findings exceed IPCC’s highest emissions scenarios. Additionally, midrange emissions scenarios predict global emissions will grow by 60% between 2000 and 2025 (Baumert & Pershing 2004). Although technological efficiency improvements that allow economies to grow without any additional burden on the environment have a powerful grip on our imag-

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inations, evidence shows technological improvements have been overtaken by economic growth. Whereas the energy intensity embodied in goods and services decreased by 33% between 1970 and 2004, increased use of carbon-based energy from economic and population growth vastly outstripped gains in efficiency, with GHGs emissions growing by 70% over the same period (IPCC 2007b). The main driver of increased GHGs from 1970 to 2004 was global economic growth, which grew by 77% over the period (IPCC 2007b). Even if technological improvements can lessen GHG production, the activities required to research and produce these technologies require surplus production in other sectors that will have an additional impact on ecosystems and biodiversity (Czech 2008 [this issue]). Although much uncertainty remains about individual species and ecosystems, it is well established that the overall impact of climate change on biodiversity has been and will be negative. It is also well established that economic growth is the main driver in increased GHG emissions. Therefore, by inference, economic growth is the main driver of climate-change-related biodiversity loss. The issue at hand, then, is how to limit economic growth in an ethical manner to minimize biodiversity loss. Traditional economic instruments are insufficient for the task. To address this enormous challenge, one must turn to ethics.

Ethical Principles A convergence of ethical principles can point to a resolution. Ethical principles from the field of distributive justice are particularly useful. Inspiration in this field is drawn from political philosopher John Rawls, and in particular his seminal work on justice (Rawls 1971). Rawls develops a theory of distributive justice from the basic rights of life, liberty, and personal security that can be used to address economic growth and biodiversity loss. His theory, called “justice as fairness,” is instructive because it offers a solution to the problem of economic growth that is amenable to developing countries. Rawls suggests social structures should be developed that acknowledge each person has equal rights that are comparable to the rights of others; social and economic conditions should be arranged so there is equal opportunity for all; and the greatest benefit of social action should be granted to those who are the least advantaged (Rawls 1971). Although Rawls’ principles are intended for national ethical obligations, not international relations, there are parallels that can be drawn to international climate policy. Four principles of international policy that are pertinent to the discussion here are: polluter pays; provision of basic needs; ability to pay; and common but differentiated

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responsibilities. These principles can help guide specific policy approaches and help construct just and equitable legal structures and policy outcomes (Brown et al. 2006). In a bellwether article, Shue (1999) applies ethical principles to how the costs of global environmental issues should be distributed. He develops three ethical postulates that can be directly applied to the principles mentioned above. 1. If climate change costs are imposed on the south without their consent by industrialized countries in the north, then the south has the right to demand the north “shoulder the burdens” of mitigation and adaptation. This is consistent with the polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities principles. 2. The north should contribute more to mitigate climate change because it has the most resources. Shue (1999) suggests this position is logically irreducible. It is consistent with the ability to pay principle. 3. With unequal capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change, the south should at least be guaranteed an “adequate minimum” to meet basic needs. An adequate minimum guarantee requires a right to development if such a minimum has not been achieved. This is consistent with the provision of basic needs principle. When there are disproportionate benefits to the north and harm to the south derived from GHG emissions and economic growth and where the capacity to respond to climate change is disproportionately limited, extra burdens on the “producer of the inequality” are ethically justified (Shue 1999). Furthermore, progressive burdening rates (i.e., a higher imposition of burdens on the more affluent) are justified. Acknowledging and incorporating these principles into law can help maintain equity as a core commitment of climate-change policy. The principle of equity is more than rhetorical argument, it is a founding principle of international law and policy. Equity is codified, for example, in the charter of the United Nations, the Stockholm Declaration, the Brundtland Commission’s report “Our Common Future,” the UN Rio Declaration, and the UNFCCC (Rosales 2008). For example, the Charter of the United Nations states, “We the peoples of the United Nations Determined. . . to reaffirm faith in. . . the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” (UN 1949). The Rio Declaration adds, “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations” (UN 1992). And the UNFCCC maintains, “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities” (UNFCCC 2002). Although the definition and intent of equity in these documents are necessarily ambiguous, equity is laid out

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as a principle to work with. Equity, therefore, is codified in the institutions that develop international environmental policy, including climate-change policy. These institutions are designed to facilitate equity in their operations. There are three fundamental ethical positions to draw from this body of literature that have direct relevance to economic growth and biodiversity loss: each country has an equal right to develop; each country has equal rights to the atmospheric commons; and in the context of existing international inequality, the global south should be granted “atmospheric space” to pursue economic growth. Principles of equity, from theory to practice, provide a powerful position from which to negotiate policy on the disastrous effects of economic growth and climate change on biodiversity loss.

Ethical Framework to Cap Harmful Economic Growth Frameworks used to address climate change that are based on ethical foundations, especially those based on equity, are receiving much attention in the climatechange community. They particularly resonate with those representing the global south. An ethical framework can be developed into a model that shows how economic growth can be capped, and even reduced, at least in some sectors. Per capita schemes are in a class of climate-change mitigation proposals that are based on equity. The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) was an early proponent of a per capita approach to climate-change mitigation (Agarwal & Narain 1991). The CSE finds that GHG emissions have been and continue to be emitted unequally from different countries (Table 1), and they point out that although the chemical composition of the GHG emissions from different sources is the same and the molecules themselves mix evenly in the atmosphere, the type of activities from which they derive vary significantly according to their necessity to meet basic needs. Emissions from luxury activities, such as recreational boating, cannot be equated with growing rice for a family. Because GHG emissions are associated with varying degrees of luxury and survival, CSE envisions a global per capita emissions quota. These quotas could be tradable, but only after equal entitlements to the atmospheric commons were allotted. Other scholars have since adopted this ethical foundation and further developed proposals for per capita GHG trading (e.g., Byrne et al. 1998; Gupta & Bhandari 1999). Elaborating on a concept developed by Carley and Spapens (1998) and Athanasiou and Baer (2002), for example, initially framed global inequity in terms of space.

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Table 1. Contribution of CO 2 from fossil fuels and cement from the top 20 emitters of greenhouse gases (Baumert & Pershing 2004).

Country United States Russia Germany China United Kingdom Japan France Ukraine Canada Poland India Italy South Africa Australia Mexico Spain Brazil South Korea Iran Argentina Developed Developing

Cumulative emissions 1850–2000

Cumulative emissions 1990–2000

Percent change

29.8 8.3 7.5 7.3 6.5 4.1 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 77 22

23.5 7.8 4.0 13.8 2.5 5.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.5 3.7 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.5 62 38

−21 −5 −46 89 −61 28 −45 −8 −3 −27 80 18 27 24 60 30 60 138 93 14 −20 73

They suggest that the remaining atmospheric space for the south to develop is scarce. Because the provision of basic needs in the south involves increased GHG emissions, southern countries will not accept a global treaty that will limit their atmospheric space, especially when the space has been filled by way of economic growth in the affluent north. Athanasiou and Baer (2002) base their proposed scheme on equal rights to the atmospheric commons. They argue that an equal-rights approach is effective for two reasons: it accounts for the tremendous ecological debt northern countries owe for using up the space, and it is more politically acceptable for southern governments because their right to develop is retained. Their rights-based approach centers on principles of equity and fairness; “atmospheric overusers have to pay for their overuse of the atmospheric space” (Athanasiou & Baer 2002). The lack of available space, however, occasioned these scholars to rethink their support of a per capita approach (Baer et al. 2007). The most developed per capita scheme has been proposed by Meyer (2007) at the Global Commons Institute. His model, called contraction and convergence, shows how to negotiate a long-term target for overall GHG reductions (contraction) and establish a GHG budget on a per capita basis. Greenhouse gasses then converge on a negotiated per capita level of emissions for all countries. Much like emissions trading, unused entitlements are tradable (i.e., if a country emits GHGs below its negotiated cap, it can sell the remaining entitlements on a global market).

After examining climate-change mitigation options for the post-Kyoto Protocol era, a group of scholars concludes, “An equal per capita allocation would be consistent with principles of justice because: (a) it treats all individuals as equals and therefore is consistent with most theories of distributive justice, (b) it would implement the ethical maxim that all people should have equal rights to use the global commons, (c) it would implement the widely accepted ‘polluter pays’ principle, and (d) it would recognize the need of developing countries to increase their emissions to meet the basic needs of their citizens” (Brown et al. 2006). Due to the widely disproportionate nature of global GHG emissions, the principles of polluter pays, ability to pay, and shared but differentiated responsibilities compel one to acknowledge the disparate responsibility for climate change and to use it as a foundation for action. In this disparity one can read the histories of economic growth and the development of the global north and south (Table 1). This history of unequal growth and inequity is often overlooked, disregarded, or dismissed by northern scholars. After an extensive review of the equity literature on climate change and the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report of 2001, M¨ uller (2002) concludes that the majority of the literature completely misses the equity concerns of the south. Most of the discussion is on emission targets, as opposed to unequal impacts and responsibility and the gaping divide in per capita emissions (Fig. 1). Because GHGs mix evenly in the atmosphere, it is possible to reduce emissions in one location and have a global impact. This fact has been taken advantage of by the north in developing offset projects in the south as a way to avoid structural change and the tempering of economic growth. The south can use this fact and that their share of GHG emissions is minimal to get compensation for their often enormous carbon sinks and environmentally benign development choices to rectify their unequal share of atmospheric space (Fig. 1). To set up a global per capita scheme, it makes sense to take advantage of the political and economic infrastructure already developed under the Kyoto Protocol and to build on its tradable allowances framework, in this case tradable emissions credits. To set up such a scheme, three steps are required: set a cap, allocate credits, and institute trading rules. First, any tradable-permits scheme is only as effective as the associated cap. Assuming the scheme is robust enough for parties to comply, the cap determines its overall environmental effectiveness. As in the contraction and convergence model mentioned above, caps can be set high initially, so that parties will accept the framework, and then decreased over time to match ecological thresholds. Although a flexible cap does not immediately satisfy the ethical principles (such as polluter pays) outlined above, it does consider that countries will not

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40.0 30.0

CO2 per capita (tonnes)

20.0 10.0 0.0 -10.0 -20.0 -30.0 -40.0 -50.0 -60.0

UNFCCC member countries

Figure 1. Per capita CO 2 emissions for 149 UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) member countries. Roughly 30% of the countries reported their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2000, and the rest reported them in the 1990s, with the vast majority of those reporting in 1994 (UNFCCC 2007). Population figures for the year GHGs were reported are used to calculate per capita amounts (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). Data points for Guinea-Bissau (−10,110 t per capita) and Gabon (−477 t per capita) are not included because they exceed the range shown on the y-axis. These two countries are large net carbon sinks due to their removal of CO 2 from land uses and forestry. accept a treaty in which caps are seen as too onerous or unachievable. Adjustable caps can be included for political expediency as a means to arrive at ethical responsibility. In general, lower caps will result in less climate change and more biodiversity conservation. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report concludes that the most serious effects of climate change can be avoided if warming stays below 2 ◦ C (IPCC 2001). The European Union has adopted this threshold as a target (Council of the European Union 2005). Hansen et al. (2007), however, argue that 1 ◦ C is the threshold. Identifying this threshold is important because the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (Article 2) is to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 2002). Article 2 also states that greenhouse gas concentrations should be “achieved within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC 2002). Of key importance is ensuring that ecosystems are able to adapt to climate change. Although admittedly conservative and “underestimated due to missing carbon cycle feedbacks” (footnote IPCC 2007c), the IPCC estimates that at least 85% cuts in CO 2 emissions from 2000 levels by 2050 are required to keep warming below 2◦ C (IPCC 2007c).

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Global CO 2 emissions in 2000 were roughly 33 Gt (IPCC 2007c). An 85% decrease in CO 2 emissions from 2000 levels would be approximately 5 Gt. To avoid dangerous climate change, as defined by the IPCC and given 2000 population totals (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b), humanity would have to reduce its emissions to 0.8 t of CO 2 per capita per year by 2050 (Fig. 2, dashed). Countries currently emitting at this level are Pakistan, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, and Niger. Of the 149 countries in this data set, 68 with altogether nearly 800 million people, fall at or below this threshold. Staying at or below this threshold emissions level will not prevent climate change. Rather, the threshold is an estimate of GHG emissions levels needed to avoid dangerous climate change as defined by the IPCC and UNFCCC. If we are to avoid dangerous climate change, we need to be aware there is not much atmospheric space left for GHG emissions. After a cap is determined (in this case 0.8 t CO 2 /year), the ethical principles laid out above to allocate credits can be adopted. Consistent with the principles of polluter pays and shared but differentiated responsibilities principles, countries that emit above 0.8 t CO 2 /year would be responsible for either reducing their per capita emissions to the ecological threshold or buying credits from those countries that are already below the threshold. Either

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Figure 2. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions for selected countries. Dashed line is the resulting 0.8 t CO 2 per capita threshold needed to achieve Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment figures of 85% CO 2 emissions cuts by 2050 to keep global temperature increase below 2 ◦ C. Countries below the dashed line would be able to sell GHG credits equal to the amount below the line to those countries above line. Countries with emissions above the line would be required to reduce their emissions or buy credits equal to the amount they are above the line. way, those above the threshold bear the costs. In addition, this approach is consistent with the ability-to-pay principle, whereby those that have benefited from using more than their fair share of atmospheric space for economic growth will have accumulated the wealth to pay for the credits or to invest in mitigation. The resulting redistribution of wealth from those countries above the threshold to those below would be significant. The principle of basic needs is more difficult to apply. Because Pakistan, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, and Niger represent levels of development equal to 0.8 t CO 2 /year, it could be argued that the threshold is not high enough. This fact is not lost on once-ardent advocates for per capita schemes. Baer et al. (2007), for example, step back from their previous support of per capita schemes and refocus on the conditions necessary for a human life beyond basic needs, yet well below affluence. They now focus on “greenhouse development rights” that establish a development threshold of $9000/year (calculated with purchasing power parity, which equalizes the value of global currencies according to the amount of money it would cost to buy a similar basket of goods in each country) (Baer et al. 2007). They justify this $9000 threshold on the basis of who has the capacity to develop. Those who do not have the capacity to develop should not bear the extra burden of climate-change mitigation. Their position is consistent with the ethical principle of ability to pay.

However, for purposes of biodiversity conservation, maintaining the capacity of ecosystems, communities, and species to adapt to climate change is also a concern. Therefore, it is incumbent on conservation biologists to identify ecological thresholds to augment the development thresholds in the political discourse pertaining to caps and tradable permits. The importance of biodiversity in maintaining the development capacity of all economies should also be emphasized. Developing trading rules appropriate for all peoples also has ethical implications. The rules developed for the Kyoto Protocol-the Marrakech Accords-are so complex they effectively exclude most people on the planet from participation. Specialized technical knowledge is required to calculate GHG emissions according to the standards necessary and to proceed through the verification process of the UNFCCC. A southern farmer, for example, who intentionally preserves forest along a river bank probably will not have the capacity to participate in a global credit-trading market. As developed thus far, the carbon market established by the Kyoto Protocol benefits those already benefiting from economic globalization (Lohman 2006). This violates ethical principles of distributive and participatory justice. Trading rules that start with ethical principles need to acknowledge these difficulties. Therefore, governments must ensure the opportunity to participate is open to everyone and the benefits of participation are equally shared and

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not just going to those who already have the capacity to benefit.

Conclusion The atmospheric space for safe levels of GHG emissions and the ecological space for socially beneficial economic growth have been outstripped. Long-term ecological and economic carrying capacities have been overshot, development options are cut off, and economic growth is no longer an option for all people on the planet. If the north does not abide by its ethical obligations to accept responsibility and to act first, as expressed in principles such as the polluter pays, ability to pay, and common but differentiated responsibilities, the south’s participation in global environmental protection is less likely. Similarly, if countries act according to national interests alone, the economic growth impasse cannot be resolved. The most effective resolution is to provide room for development for the south while capping economic growth. With increased knowledge of ecological thresholds, and in the context of an ethical framework, per capita GHG emissions can be used to determine levels of responsibility and, by association, to identify under- and overgrown economies. In other words, per capita emissions can be adjusted as a scientifically sound metric and used to determine whether economic growth is an appropriate goal for particular countries. Climate-change negotiations that developed the Kyoto Protocol were fantastic efforts to guard economic growth, especially for the high-polluting economies of the north. Many government delegations recognized the threat an unstable climate poses to economic growth, particularly for agriculture and coastal human settlements. They rallied to develop a treaty that addresses climate change, albeit insufficiently, yet develops new sectors for economic growth such as GHG credits, technology exchange, and financial trade. In addition, those countries that resisted the protocol most fervently—the United States and until recently Australia—did so on grounds that it would dampen economic growth even with the development of these new sectors. Ironically, guarding economic growth is often the key consideration in climate-change negotiations even though economic growth is the main driver of climate change. This imperative may be changing. Negotiations by the UNFCCC are increasingly focusing on science-based decision making (IISD 2007), and scientists are increasingly exposing the impact of economic growth on the environment (Canadell et al. 2007; IPCC 2007b). In addition the Working Group III of the IPCC is building on the ethical foundations of the UN and the UNFCCC and increasingly working on the ethical dimensions of climate change (see Fisher et al. 2007). Efforts to mitigate climate change that

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