Consti-cases-under-privacy-of-communication-and-correspondence (1).docx

V.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE •

R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) (1965)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings. Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest. All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded. The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed. Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. •

Arts, 290, 291, 292 and 299. Revised Penal Code.

Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof. If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or study, nor to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them. Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets. Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in

charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter. Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if: (a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following means: 1. Through a opening not intended for entrance or egress. 2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window. 3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools. 4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority. Or if (b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances: 1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle; 2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery. When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos. When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period. If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed. 1) Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986) Facts: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault the filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE: WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. HELD: NO An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. 2) Katz vs. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) Facts: Katz was charged with transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of a federal statute. At the trial, the Government was permitted, over Katz' objection, to introduce evidence of his phone calls that were overheard by FBI agents who attached electronic listening and recording devices outside the public telephone booth where Katz had placed the calls. Contention of Katz: Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and siezure can be said to be violative of the 4th amendment (right to privacy). Defense of Govt: The 4th amendment is limited only to searches and seizures that are tangible. Also, the govt was so careful with their investigation that they only began investigation when they had strong probability of his offense. They also limited their 'listening' only to the specific violation he had committed, and only for a certain duration-- not the entire phone conversation/ Held: We have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest. Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. The omission of authorization by the court bypasses the safeguards that are provided by an objective predetermination of probably cause. It is too likely to be subtly influenced by hindsight judgement.

These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment, a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. 3) Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 TOPIC: Recording of conversation through a tape recorder. The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. Facts of the Case: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES. Ratio: The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an offense. 4) Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994) FACTS: Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity. Rafael presented evidences with 3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. Teresita objected to Rafael's evidence but the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by Rafael, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of Teresita with unidentified persons. (These tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone). Teresita then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the admission in evidence of the cassette tapes, but the CA likewise dismissed the petition. RULING: The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence by the SC. RA 4200, sec 1 and 4 expressly make such tape recordings inadmissible. It was not shown that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. 5) Alejano vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005 Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings. Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights. Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters

violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness. •

Privileged Communications 6) In Re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

FACTS: Eva Maravilla Ilustre personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano a letter claiming that the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled ‘Eva Maravilla Ilustre v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., ‘ is an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court and threatening to file a case as well as call for national attention for what they deemed to be injustice on the part of the Supreme Court. Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who were charged. The court then held Ilustre in contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice and held Atty. Laureta in contempt for the same as well as for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client’s name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. CONTENTION OF ILUSTRE: Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications.” ISSUE: WON the letters are considered to be private in character and that Ilustre is protected by the privacy of communication mandate

RULING: Respondents’ reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. 7) People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987) FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.” Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were convicted of murder. ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy? HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability. 8) Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996) Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the Properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress. ”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the same documents were admissible as evidence. Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible as evidence.

Held: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding. 9) Deano vs. Godinez, 12 SCRA 483 (1964) FACTS: It is alleged that, on or about March 20, 1956, defendant, as a responsible public school official, wrote a letter to the Division Superintendent of Schools. Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño, plaintiff herein, as the school dentist of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating therein a contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the dental-medical drive, when she knew well that the drive included the Boy Scout Rally of the district. "In view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping critic, a fault finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds. . . . The lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school year. . . . She did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated." The utterances or statements above referred to, if untrue, are indeed derogatory to the personal dignity and professional standing of the plaintiff as a high official in the government service as they in fact disturbed her peace of mind to the extent that they caused her mental anguish, wounded her feelings and made her suffer moral shock and social humiliation for which she now asks for damages in retribution. But defendant claims that he made those statements in pursuance of a legal duty or in the exercise of his functions as a public official and as such they are justifiable under the doctrine of privileged communication. In this sense, defendant contends, they cannot be the basis of an action for damages. ISSUE: Does the letter in which the alleged defamatory statements appear partake of the nature of a privileged communication? HELD: Indeed, the communication now denounced by plaintiff as defamatory is one sent by defendant to his immediate superior in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so defendant employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable in the interest of public policy. As it has been aptly said, "The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, ‘which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer." ‘ (Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, 175 U.S., 409, 411). The letter sent by defendant being a privileged communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice. 1 It being a communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable for damages. "It will be noted that all of the defendant’s communications were of a public nature and addressed to his superior officers, and that his investigation was made in the line of his duty. There is no evidence that defendant was actuated by any malicious motive . . . "In the instant case, the alleged libel is based upon the official letter of the defendant to his superior officers, which were written in the discharge of his official duties, and for which he is not liable in an action for damages." (Gilmer v. Hilliard, 43 Phil., 180.) WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

10) Waterhouse Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997 Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation on. On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP) wherein 10 bottles of Voren tablets were sold at P384 per bottle when it is only P320 there was an over price of a total of P640, YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the Pharmacy Clerk, opened the envelope and confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Catolico. Catolico contends that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. And on 8 March 1990, Catolico was terminated. Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to prove what they alleged as complainant’s dishonesty, and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. The petitioners then filed for a motion for reconsideration at NLRC but they just affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico’s dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioners evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope but, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article III of the Constitution. CONTENTION OF CATOLICO: The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication. CONTENTION OF WATEROUS: in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. ISSUE: WON the check is admissible in evidence HELD: Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment, Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment. Therefore, the petition was dismissed and the decision of the NLRC was affirmed. • Exclusionary Rule • Art. III, Sec. 3(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 11) Silverthorne Lumber vs. US, 251 US 385 (1920) FACTS: Frederick Silverthorne refused to obey the subpoenas and the Court order to produce documents and books of the company before the grand jury. The order was made because of the violation of the statutes of the United States committed by Silverthorne and his father.

When they were arrested and detained, representatives of the Department of Justice and the U.S. marshal with an invalid warrant conducted a warrantless search and seizure in their company. A new warrant then was drafted based on the information gained from the documents seized. RULING: By allowing the government to use the knowledge obtained through unlawful means, it violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court decided that the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure renders the evidence as inadmissible. Had the knowledge been gained from an independent source, the Court may permit to keep the evidence. 12) People vs. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998 FACTS: Rosa Aruta was arrested in Baguio City for transporting 8 kilos and 500 grams of dried marijuana leaves packed in her travelling bag. The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items violating the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. RULING: The SC set aside the case and acquitted Aruta. Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution says that any evidence produced as a product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence. These factors were present to constitute a violation of Aruta’s constitutional right: • In searches and seizures without a warrant, probable cause must be present. No probable cause was established in the instant case. • The police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. • Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Nor was she actually committing or attempting to commit a crime. She was apprehended while crossing a street. • There were no exigent and emergency circumstance as to allow warrantless search and seizure. 13) People vs. Rondero, G.R. No.125687, December 9, 1999 FACTS: Rondero was found guilty for killing a 9 yr old girl after the father of the victim saw him with an ice pick while washing hmhis bloodied hands in an artesian well. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him?

HELD: Yes. What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him. The blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence. •

Liability for damages 14) Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)

ISSUE: Whether the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus prevents a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel. FACTS: General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses. The plaintiffs alleged that: 1) The TFM raided several places, where they employed defectively issued judicial search warrants; 2) Some members of the TFM confiscated some purely personal items belonging to the plaintiffs; 3) The plaintiffs were illegally arrested and that they were denied visits of relatives and counsel; and 4) The plaintiffs were interrogated, without the presence of counsel, by military men who employed threats and other forms of violence to elicit information from them. The defendants contend that: 1) The plaintiffs may not cause judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because their privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; 2) The defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and 3) The complaint does not have a state of action against the defendants. RULING: Whether the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Article 32 of the Civil Code indicates that a public officer or a private individual who violates the following rights of a person is liable for damages: 1) Freedom of religion; 2) Freedom of speech; 3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; 4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; 5) Freedom of suffrage; 6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; 7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; 8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; 9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; 11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; 12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; 13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; 14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; 15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; 16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; 17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; 18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and 19) Freedom of access to the courts. The civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages, and exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The purpose of the codal provision is to provide a sanction for any person who violates the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. VI.

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY •

Art. III, Sec. 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

•

BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880 AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985." Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law. Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act: (a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. (c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twentyfour hours. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory. (g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade. Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly; (c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully; (d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and (e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly. Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined; (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards; (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property. Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows: (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance; (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse; (d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal. Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act: (a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly; (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf. (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf; (d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly; (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly; (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof; (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof; 1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like; 2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like; 3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares; 4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems. Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows: (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months; (b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years; (c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866; (d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act. 15) IBP vs. Mayor Lito Atienza (G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010) FACTS: The IBP filed an application with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but with modification. The permit indicated Plaza Miranda as the venue instead of the Mendiola Bridge. Petitioners filed a certiorari before the CA but to no avail. Petitioners again, filed before the SC assailing the appellate court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Petition was denied. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge and the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A few days later, the MPD instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. (Again, the venue indicated was Plaza Miranda.) ISSUE: Whether or not the modification of the venue in the permit issued constitute the violation of the right to freedom of expression and public assembly. HELD: Yes. The Court finds for the petitioners. In modifying the permit, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent also failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. He did not indicate the basis or his explanation for his action. Also, nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. It smacks of

whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. DOCTRINE: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 16) Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948) Facts: The City of Manila enacted Secs. 844 and 1119 of Revised Ordinances of 1927 which prohibits "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties instituted a mandamus against Manila City Mayor Fugoso for refusing to grant the former a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting” in Plaza Miranda for redress of their grievances. His reason for such is “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech and assembly was violated. Held: In keeping with the presumption of validity the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that the Mayor is not given absolute power to grant permits for lawful meetings or assembly but the discretion to determine the places available for such. This is why the ordinance remains to be valid but the freedom of speech and assembly was still violated by the mayor’s refusal to issue the permit in this case. The Supreme Court held that the power to regulate cannot be conferred upon the mayor or other legal officer and must be given by the local legislature. The Supreme Court notes that the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. It is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. Hence it can be limited by police power. However in the case at bar the mayor’s fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Manila mayor is ordered to issue assailed permit. 17) Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970) Facts: The petitioner has applied for a permit to conduct a rally in Plaza Miranda during a weekday. Mayor denied the request but he expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for the use of the Plaza Miranda during weekends and holidays when they would not cause unnecessary great disruption of the normal activities of the community. He has offered the Sunken Garden as an alternative, due to the events that happened from the past week. The petitioner filed a suit contesting Mayor’s action as their right to peaceable assembly is violated Issue: WON, the Mayor’s act on denying the request of the petitioner violates their right to peaceable assembly. Held: The right of peaceable assemble is not absolute and can be subject to regulation under the police power of the state if it is injurious to the equal enjoyment of the others

The mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine the public places to be used for assembly to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety. 18) Ignacio vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) 19) J.B.I. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983) Facts: Petitioner retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally, requesting for the removal of the foreign military bases in Manila, on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. Respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing denied the issuance of permit, says he will issue a permit if the march and rally be done in another suggested place, and prohibited rallying around the US Embassy: He denied the request due to police intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number is expected to attend. He added that he will issue the permit if it will be held at Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the general public is ensured. He relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Issue: Whether or not denial of a public rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a violation of constitutional guarantee to free (speech and) assembly Ruling: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent of clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta and US Embassy as the place for the peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Moreover, denial of permit for a rally in front of the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of a clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy. There can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public dark that is the Luneta. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

Note: Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 20) Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233 (1983) FACTS OF THE CASE: Hector Ruiz, coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen’s Alliance for National Reconciliation sent a letter to Olongapo City Mayor Richard Gordon, asking for a permit to hold a prayer-rally and a parade at Rizal Triangle starting at 1pm on December 4, 1983. Ruiz filed a mandamus against Gordon on November 25 since he has not replied to their letter dated November 21. After being required by the court to answer, Gordon claims that even before the request, he has openly stated during flag ceremonies that he would grant permits for those who want to exercise their freedom to assemble. He has given interviews in a

newspaper on November 22, stating that he has granted Ruiz’s request. On November 23, Gordon has granted the permit. ISSUE WON the petition for mandamus (compel Gordon to act on the request) be granted? SC RULING: The petition for mandamus is dismissed since Gordon has granted the permit. The action for mandamus would have been avoided if only Ruiz verified on November 23 whether or not the permit has been issued. A party seeking to exercise the right to peaceable assembly should be the most interested in ascertaining if the permit has been granted. They should send a representative to the office of the issuing authority or indicate the address where the reply could be sent. If after a reasonable time, there is still no reply, the parties can seek action before the courts. Without prejudice to filing a petition for mandamus before the SC, it would be better if petitions for mandamus concerning right to peaceable assembly are sent to the RTC to serve the interest of justice and public convenience. 21) Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents 2 and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. Court Ruling: The petitioners were given due course to upheld their assembly in accordance with the requirements for the approval of permit to hold an assembly. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required." Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed right of students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive

evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. 22) Arreza vs. GAUF, 137 SCRA 94 (1985) Facts: Carmelo A. Arreza, Lonesto G. Oidem, Jacob F. Meimban, and Edgardo S. Fernando were either leaders or participants in what the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation referred to as a rally/demonstration held on 28 September 1982, in front of the Life Science Building of the University, and are officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of said university. The demonstration's purpose was to register the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal Science, as those taking courses therein would not be able to graduate. Other rallies were held on September 8, 27 and 29,1982, for the purpose of sympathizing with the suspension of 5 student leaders who conducted an illegal assembly on 27 August 1982, causing additional disturbance on the campus, not only by the disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes. Such exercise of the right to peaceable assembly was visited by the University with a refusal to let Arreza, et. al. enroll after an investigation of their allegedviolation of school rules and regulations. Arreza, et. al. filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for apreliminary mandatory injunction to allow them to enroll. Issue: Whether the students may be denied re-enrollment due to the improper conduct attributed to them inthe exercise of their free speech and peaceable assembly. Held: If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances,extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective ifduring a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the schoolpremises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Herein, the infractions of University rules or regulations by the students justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.