Consti 2.docx

PEOPLE’S JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN (FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, LIBEL AND NATIONAL SECURITY) Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the People’s Journal claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages. The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in good faith and without malice. Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech. Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a public figure. Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer. There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality… The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection” Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE) Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties. Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items and a probable clause exists.

Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items. PEOPLE V OMAWENG (VALID WAIVER) FACTS: The accused was caught in the act of transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond moral certainty by the following circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a spare tire, (d)he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which he loaded the bag was under his absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court (on circumstantial evidence), the combination of all these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such circumstances, unrebutted by strong and convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to the presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug. ISSUE: Whether respondent waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. RULING: Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of Prosecution witness Joseph Laying was not dented on crossexamination or rebutted by the accused for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures as this Court stated in People v. Malasugui. TERRY VS. OHIO (STOP AND FRISK) Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry, was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons (stop and frisk) without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? Held. The Supreme Court of the United States held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous. PEOPLE vs. CONDE (VALIDITY OF CONVICTION) FACTS: The RTC ruled that Conde, Atis and Perez, Jr. were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Oscar Conde claims that he was illegally arrested by the authorities. He adds that the Indian Embassy was pressuring the police to solve the murder. He also wants the Court to disregard as evidence the stolen items and weapons illegally seized by the police. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the appellants were illegally arrested. 2. Whether or not the items seized were admissible as evidence for valid conviction. RULING: 1. YES The arrests of the appellants came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant, namely: (a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed. It cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance is patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, appellants rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution were violated. Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. It is much too late for appellants to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all

other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability. 2. NO The warrantless search in the house of a certain Jimmy, based on the confession of accused Perez, Jr., is definitely questionable. PO3 Sevillano categorically stated that they were able to recover the stolen items, i.e., the beach towel and the umbrella, because of the confession of Perez, Jr. who was not assisted by counsel when he confessed and eventually led the police to the whereabouts of the said items. The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution. Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Moreover, the Court find in order the search of the bag of Felicidad Macabare, at the time she was visiting her husband who was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of police standard operating procedure and is recognized as part of precautionary measures by the police to safeguard the safety of the detainees as well as the over-all security of the jail premises. However, the weapons confiscated from Felicidad Macabare, were not formally offered as evidence by the prosecution, hence probatively valueless. With regards to the crime committed, appellants are guilty of two counts of homicide and not robbery with homicide because only the facts and causes of deaths were established with moral certainty.