Consti 1 Case Digests.docx

G.R. No. L-26379

December 27, 1969

WILLIAM C. REAGAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FACTS: Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. Disputed the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly expressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. ISSUE: -

Whether the Clark Field Air Base, a United States Air Force in the Philippines, is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.

RULING: The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying the refund of P2, 979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner. 

Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern there- in, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.



It is to be admitted that any state may by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal selfdetermination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.

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A state is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.



The Clark Air Force Base is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such assertion, it has not become foreign soil or territory. The Philippine's jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not

excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for. 

The exemption clause in the Military Bases Agreement by virtue of which a "national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his income "unless derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources," does not apply to income derived in the bases which are clearly derived in the Philippines. For income tax purposes, the Clark Air Force Base is not outside Philippine territory.

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The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.

G.R. No. 144570 September 21, 2005 VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL v. JOSE J. CAFE, et al. FACTS: Petitioner Vivencio V. Jumamil seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 20001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35082, the dispositive portion of which read: With the foregoing, the assailed Decision of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court of Panabo Davao dated 26 November 1990 in Sp. Civil Action No. 89-1 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court dismissed petitioner’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered the petitioner to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱1,000 to each of the 57 private respondents. In 1989, petitioner Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution No. 7). Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111, provided for an initial appropriation of ₱765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49, series of 1989 (Resolution No. 49), denominated as Ordinance No. 10, appropriating a further amount of ₱1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of ₱40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of the public respondents. The construction of the stalls which petitioner sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited ₱40,000 each. Thus, the petition was amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. ISSUES: -

Whether the parties were bound by the outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424;

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Whether petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;

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Whether Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional; and

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Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages.

RULING: The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35082 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees to private respondents is deleted. 

The petition for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the subject resolutions. There is an unbending rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

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Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.



Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA does not apply because it involved contracts between two private parties. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction.



We note that the foregoing was a disputed fact which the courts below did not resolve because the case was dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal standing. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking this Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary. And this is not to mention that: The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and

unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. 

Adverting to the first issue, we observe that petitioner was the one who wanted the parties to await the decision of the Supreme Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since the facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner, having expressly agreed to be bound by our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the dismissal order we issued, now final and executory. In addition to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object. As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras: A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court.

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We do not agree that petitioner should be held liable for damages. It is not sound public policy to put a premium on the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, albeit erroneously. The alleged bad faith of petitioner was never established. The special circumstances in Article 2208 of the Civil Code justifying the award of attorney’s fees are not present in this case.

G.R. No. 83820

May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. FACTS: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1"). The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition. Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. ISSUES: -

Whether petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent out of time Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed

RULING: The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED. 

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January

22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time. 

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.



Petitioner’s contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

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In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

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By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

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In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express”, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either “express” or “implied”.



Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, et al. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys. Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 14671015, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15." ISSUES: -

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

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Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

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Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

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Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

RULING: The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. 

The legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.



We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio”



We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.

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Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

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In Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.

January 22, 1973 ROE ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DALLAS COUNTY FACTS: Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and [410 U.S. 113, 121] that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present "a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated." The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, [410 U.S. 113, 122] and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that the "fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad

infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex. 1970). The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253, have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971). [410 U.S. 113, 123] ISSUE: -

Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right to abort her child

RULING: 

The Constitutional right to personal privacy, the roots of which are found in the 4th, 5th, 9th and 14th Amendments, is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The right to abortion, however, is not absolute. At some point, a "compelling state interest" in protecting the health of the woman and the potentiality of human life develops which permits the state to protect fetal life even to the point of proscribing all nontherapudic abortions. To balance the competing interests of the woman and the state, the Court set up the following timetable:

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First Trimester: The state has no "compelling interest" in protecting the health of the woman because "abortion in early pregnancy, although not without its risks, is relatively safe." The state also has no "compelling interest" in protecting the potentiality of human life because "the compelling point is at viability." Therefore, the state may not regulate abortion at all except to require that the procedure be preformed by a physician.



Second Trimester: Since "the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues," the state, in promoting its interest in protecting the health of the woman "may regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health." Examples of permissible state regulation are requirements as to the qualifications of the person performing the abortion or the licensure of the abortion facility.

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Third Trimester: Since the fetus has the capability of "meaningful life" outside the pregnant woman's womb at "about 28 weeks, but as early as 24 weeks," the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes "compelling" at this point of "viability." Therefore, the state, if it chooses, may regulate and even proscribe abortion except where it is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the woman.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS PROFESSOR: JUSTICE ECONG

SUBMITTED BY: RUTH RAÑA T. MANINGAS