Conflicts-case Digests.docx

Carlos vs Sandoval Facts: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Teofilo died intestate and was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon his death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the RTC of Muntinlupa. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad, on 1962, was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. Issue: WON a person who is not a spouse may bring action for nullity of marriage. Held: No. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. However, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. However, a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, petitioner must assail first the filiation of Teofilo II with Teofilo because the presence of descendants excludes ascendants and collateral relatives for inheritance. Garcia-Recio vs Recio Facts: The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce dissolving their marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in 1997. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the divorce decree submitted by Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry.

Held: No. Article 26 of the Family Code allows the Filipino citizen to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Thus, the nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the RTC of Cabanatuan City to receive, on trial, evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Republic vs Orbecido III Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which was granted. The Republic, through OSG, moved for reconsideration. Issue: WON Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. Held: Requisites for filing petition for declaratory relief: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (Applicability of Article 26) (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (vs State to protect marriage) (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination Yes. They took into consideration the record of the deliberations of the FC and rules that Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry. However,

for his plea to prosper, OrbecioIII must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Republic vs Crasus Iyoy Facts: Crasus married Fely on 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely went to US, leaving all of their five children to Crasus. A year after, 1985, Fely left, Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers which he disregarded. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely got married to an American with whom she eventually had a child. He filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage since it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. He also allege that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC asserted that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of her present nationality shall govern her status. RTC declared the marriage between the two void ab initio. The Republic, through OSG moved for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC. Issue: WON the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid. Held: Yes. Art 26 of the Family Code is not applicable in this case because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Art 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. The psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.

Quita vs CA and Padlan Facts: Quita and Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. Ruperto, brother of Arturo intervened in the case. Quita moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. CA, on the other hand, remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the citizenship of Quita. Issue: Who may validly claim as the spouse of decedent. Held: The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse must still be determined by the trial court. The trial court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Thus, it is but just proper to remanded the case to the trial court. Pilapil vs Somera Facts: Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, at Germany. They had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated and private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany in 1983. The petitioner also filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on the same year. The decree of divorce was promulgated on 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses and the custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. Issue: WON private respondent can file a case for adultery even after the issuance of divorce decree. Held:

No. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Van Dorn vs Romillo Facts: Alice Reyes-Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. Issue: WON the foreign divorce obtained in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Yes. Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served. Republic vs Labrador Corpuz vs Sto. Thomas Facts: Petitioner, a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization, was married to the respondent but was shocked of her infidelity. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court. Issues: WON Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Held:

No. The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse only . However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law. Thus, the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling. The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void. Fujiki vs Marinay Facts: In 2004, Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen, Maekara, here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan. In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines together. In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done: (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only. Issues: 1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. 2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. 3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Held: 1. No. What’s applicable here is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. It is the procedure to record “acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons” in the civil registry as required by

Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, “the law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status . The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean to litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. However, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment as a fact. The petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. 2. Yes. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 3. Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Republic vs Albios Facts: On 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of

their essential marital obligations. Fringer did not file his answer. On 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio on the ground that the parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship. The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. Issue: WON a marriage contracted was in jest and thus void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Held: No. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose. The respondent’s marriage, however, is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. There is also no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. Vda. De Perez vs Tolete Facts: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

HELD: Art. 816 provides that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them. This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party . The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . " Suntay vs Suntay Facts: In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner Silvino Suntay. Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931 and probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China on November, 1931. Issue: WON the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines.

Held: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. In re: Christensen Facts: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed. Issue: WON the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen Held: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth. The Supreme Court grants more successional rights to Helen. It said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which applies to California’s domiciled in California, and the conflict rule for Californian’s domiciled out of California. Christensen, being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. For the determination of the successional rights under Philippine Law, the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.