5. BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999 RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs. VICENTE D. CHING, applicant. FACTS: Vicente D. Ching is a legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino and was born in Francia West, Tubao La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination and was allowed to take the exam on the condition that he must submit to the court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance, Ching submitted the following documents.
Certification that he is a Certified Public Accountant (issued by the Board of Accountancy) Voter certification issued by COMELEC in Tubao La Union Certification showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao during the May 12, 1992 Synchronized elections
When the result of the Bar Examination was released, Ching was one of the successful examinees; however, because of the questionable citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that since petitioner was born under the 1935 Constitution, he was technically a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship. This is in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen.” On July 15, 1999, Ching elected Philippine Citizenship and filed a manifestation thereafter attaching his affidavit of election. ISSUE: Whether or not, Ching’s election of Philippine citizenship was done within a reasonable time. RULING: The court held that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. He was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on June 15, 1999. Aside from the fact that petitioner has offered no reason in delaying his election of Philippine citizenship, the span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority," which the Secretary of Justice interpreted to mean three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
6. G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991 ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents. FACTS: On May 11 1987, Jose Ong Jr. won in the congressional election bid as the representative of the second district of Northern Samar. However, his opponents Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co filed before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), an election protest premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET ruled in favor of Ong and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. Hence, petitions for certiorari were brought before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Ong was a naturalborn Filipino citizen RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that under the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII, Section 1), the Court is bound to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. On the issue of citizenship, the court held that it is unnatural and unnecessary to have Ong to formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age. He was already a citizen since his mother was a natural born citizen and his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. Under the curative provisions of the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing and considered both as natural-born citizens. On the issue of residence, the court held that the petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. Even after their misfortunes, the domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile and it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
7. G.R. No. L-35947 October 20, 1992 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellee, vs.WILLIAM LI YAO, petitioner-appellant.
FACTS: William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 8225). Since he appeared to possess all the qualifications of a naturalized Filipino and none of the disqualifications provided for by the law, the court declared him a naturalized Filipino citizen. On November 20, 1952, he finally took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines after satisfying the provisions of Republic Act No. 530. Fifteen years later (January 5, 1968), the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained. The following reasons were cited.
He was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous relationship (sic) with several women other than his lawfully wedded wife, by whom he fathered illegitimate children. Nor had he conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in his dealings with the duly constituted authorities (i.e tax liability, anti-dummy laws violation, etc.)
On July 22, 1971, the motion to cancel William Li Yao’s naturalization was granted. When he brought the appeal to the Supreme Court, Li Yao died. The case however was not considered to become moot and academic since its disposition will have grave implications for the late petitioner-appellant's wife and children. ISSUE: Whether or not, the cancellation of William Li Yao’s naturalization made by the Government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid RULING: Yes. Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act, provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled "if it is shown that the naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently and illegally,” And while he had already settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization. Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.