Conflict Resolution Paper

Al Akhawayn University

Conflict Resolution approaches implemented in Yugoslavia conflict

INS 5313 Conflict Management and Resolution Dr. Bouzidi

Prepared by: Ismail khejjou

Monday, March 16, 2009

1

The emergence of Conflict Resolution is traced back to the era after the Second World War. As an academic discipline, conflict resolution has contributed to the management and settlement of post Cold War conflicts through a range of processes and approaches. Among these processes are mediation, facilitation, negotiation and conciliation. The objective of this paper is to explore the conflict resolution approaches that have been implemented/ adopted during the war in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) or simply Yugoslavia as it is called today. the paper`s emphasis is on countries in which peacekeeping missions took place and how the peace operations were carried out. Before going directly into the topic, it is important to go briefly over some of the sources of the conflict that plunged Yugoslavia into one of the most inhuman and vicious wars in history. As a starting point, it is important to note that the death of Josip Broz Tito marked, to some extent, the beginning of a new era characterized by ethnic tension, massive economic disruption, and political turmoil. All these factors led to the second disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of its most troubled history.

Politically

speaking, relations among the republics started to decline and the inability of the political reforms to resolve the national problem of different interests and ideologies. Civil Wars and the severe economic crisis worsened the social situation and left the country at strong turmoil. The ethnic dimension of the Yugoslavia crisis should not be 2

ignored at this point in that it sparked fierce conflict among different group divisions which, in turn, challenged the stability of the country at large. As it became clear that the situation was getting worse in Yugoslavia, the call for the international community to intervene was critical since Slovenia and then Croatia declared their independence. The conflict in these countries was mainly triggered by the rise of nationalism which, to some degree, contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. According to Mihailo Crnobrnja, “The essence of their [Slovenia and Coratia] nationalism was not towards Yugoslavia but away from it.” (107) As a note, the withdrawal of Slovenia from the federal republic was not as destructive as that of Croatia which was prolonged and devastating. This intention of reducing the federal authority brought Croatia to a serious confrontation with the Yugoslav National Army, and it was this first conflict that strongly called for a serious involvement of the international community. According to Nambiar, the first initiative that the international community took was “to set up the Badinter Commission, whose task was to establish whether or not the newly emerging states fulfilled the primary requirement for recognition by the community.” (170) Initially, the war was between the Socialist Republic of Croatia and Serbian minority who opposed its independence. The ethnic 3

tension between these groups escalated the conflict to the point that the Yugoslav People's Army supported Serbia for fighting Croatia. It is true to say that nationalism was the driving force that motivated the Serbs to revolt against Croatia`s declaration of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the midst of increasing diplomatic negotiations to contain the conflict, a mediation approach was primarily carried out by “Mr. Cyrus Vance who was sent to Yugoslavia on 8 October 1991 as the personal envoy of United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.”(Bercovitch, 177) On the basis of “Security Council Resolution 740 of 7 February and 743 0f 21 February 1992” (Baletic et al), UNPROFOR was the first peacekeeping operation to be set up in Croatia to maintain conditions for conflict settlements and the demilitarization of armed forces. The efforts of the mediation process put emphasis on securing the cease-fire agreement that the two parties agreed to sign as well as the implementation of the United Nations plan for peacekeeping mission. James Gow makes this point crystal clear when he says:

UNPROFOR came into being on 21 Februray 1992 for an initial period of twelve months (six months longer than the customary initial period for UN peacekeeping forces), having been created to underpin the ceasefire between Serbian and Croatian forces in Croatia. Although its primary aim was to strengthen the 2 January ceasefire agreement negotiated by the UN Secretary-General`s special Envoy, Cyrus Vance (the Vance Plane), it also had 4

the secondary aim of providing a symbolic presence in neighboring Bosnia and Hercegovina which it was hoped would be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of armed hostility there. (102)

In the context of conflict resolution approaches, the UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia had a significant role in the sense that it helped alleviate the conflict and gradually forced the Yugoslav army forces to withdraw from the country as it was stated in the Vance plan which will be addressed later. In analyzing the situation in Croatia, it is clear that the deployment of UNPROFOR created a space for security and negotiations that would bring an end to Yugoslavia crisis in general. Interestingly enough, another important aspect of the UN forces was, among other things, to ensure that that the United Nations Protected Areas “remained demilitarized, to protect the indigenous population from ‘fear of armed attack’ and to help return displaced persons to their homes.” (Gow, 103). In addition to this, UN peacekeeping forces performed other mandates, such us keeping the conflicting parties separated, protecting of civilians and, most importantly, facilitating communication. The involvement of the European Community Monitoring Mission was an approach of resolution in the Serbo-Croatia war. It is certainly important to bear in mind that the EC response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was, to some extent, instrumental in the sense that it was relatively able to limit the conflict. Gow, asserts that

5

While the 300-strong ECMM no doubt helped to limit the scope of the conflict in some parts of Croatia, as well as ensuring some local cease-fire agreements which resulted in implementation, and successfully accomplished their mission resulted in Slovenia, perhaps its most significant achievement was to negotiation the withdrawal of the JNA from the Prevlaka in September 1992. (106)

The EC was among the leading regional organizations that enhanced the role and position of the United Nations regarding its conflict management in Yugoslavia. In addition to the peace mission, the EC had a significant role in consolidating peacekeeping in order to encourage negotiations and dialogue in Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the EC involvement in Yugoslavia crisis came after war broke out in Slovenia with the objective of securing a cease-fire. The Slovenia conflict, although it lasted only for ten days, received a serious response from the European Community which sent “troikas” to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Negotiation was an

effective policy approach that the European Community used in the crisis which compelled Yugoslavia to agree on the “Brioni Accord on 08th July 1929.” (Terrett, 74) Achieving a cease-fire in Slovenia was, as seen by many, a real action and timely international response to the Crisis. But, it became clear that the EC`s increased effort to resolve the conflict in Croatia was far from being realistic in terms of attainable goals and was thus unsuccessful. It remains to be said whether the failure of the EC was because of the the hold out against Serbia or if it 6

was due to other significant reasons. Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor assert that

This followed the failure of the EC`s efforts to end the crisis in Croatia, in part because it was now seen, not as an unbiased mediator, but an opponent of Serbia. The EC also made mistakes in concluding and administering ceasefires: it did not have the mechanisms or experience of the UN in such matters. (70)

The underlying idea that Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor assert is that the European Community effort to mediate a peaceful solution of the break-up of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia, lacked the important mediatory techniques among which are impartiality and neutrality. On a more serious note, the inability or the weaknesses of the European Community to completely carry out its mediation mission sprang from the fact that it did not give serious attention to the root of conflict. The dissolution of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came as an outcome of the Cold War and the emerging concept of “the new world order” (Michael Clarke, 11). The mounting of conflict in the three states, Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia called for a strong and urgent international response. As a result, the focus here is on the international response and policy approaches of the United Nations 7

towards Bosnia, as it was the third country to break up. As the conflict escalated and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation started to deteriorate which inevitably led to the outbreak of a bloody Civil war among the country`s Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The deployment of UNPROFOR troops, which was reserved for Croatia, had to move to Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate the possibility for a ceasefire which relatively seemed unachievable at the outset. The international efforts were unable to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict until later when the Security Council decided to impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia as an attempt “to encourage a settlement of the conflict.” ( Terrett, 75) Another prominent UN policy was the embargo on supplies of weapons to Yugoslavia to reinforce the view that the use of force to resolve internal political conflicts is illegitimate. In Bosnia, and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the U.N.-led Protection Force was mainly designed to assist humanitarian aid missions and, most importantly, support and reinforce the effort of the international community to establish peace and security essential for negotiations. These concerns to bring an end to the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict proved difficult especially because the situations became hostile which then called for the International Community to consider peace enforcement measures. This muscular approach was encouraged by the Security Council

8

resolution 816 which called for using “all necessary measures” under the mandate of UNPROFOR. A further active involvement in Yugoslavia crisis was undertaken by the Western European Union (WEU). In essence, the WEU played a major role in supporting the activities that significantly called for respect for humanitarian missions and other peacekeeping and enforcement missions which were initiated by Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for example. Furthermore, the WEU contributed to the unity of Bosnian and Croat parties and it was “The only mission coming close to the functions of a peace-keeping force … to Mostar in 1994, incorporating 150 military and civilian personnel.” (Terrett, 102) In addition to the peace support objectives of UNPROFOR, a peace plan was initiated by the European Community and the United Nations in 1992. This plan was carried out in a form of a mediation and negotiation approach by “David Owen, on behalf of the EC, and Cyrus Vance, on the behalf of the UN, [and they] attempted to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the worsening Bosnian crisis.”(Terrett, 95) This Vance-Owen peace plan was reached through the International Commission on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which essentially called for and ensured respect for human rights as well as national communities and group minorities.

9

In relation to this, the involvement of the international community in Bosnia was also seen through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as an intervention approach to provide humanitarian aid to civilians in the areas torn by humanitarian atrocities in the country. As an effective approach, UNHCR played a significant role in the sense that it “attempted to coordinate an inter-agency programme of action on humanitarian issues in Yugoslavia and played an active role on the Humanitarian Issues Working Group within the ICFY.” (Terrett, 98) Closely connected to this is the Dayton peace agreement which came up as a result of the three-year civil war and the acts of violence in Bosnia. Signed on November 21, 1995, this agreement was mainly enforced by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the arrangement of the United States which, at the last stage, became involved in the Bosnia Crisis. The Dayton agreement was signed in order to strengthen the implementation of peace that Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, Serbian president Milošević, Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, agreed upon. Specifically, this accord called for the reintegration of Bosnia`s ethnic groups as well as the importance of promoting human rights standards and the rebuilding of the economic sector. Interestingly enough, the involvement of the NATO in Bosnia had a positive role in the performance and enforcement of the peace accord particularly under UN-SC Resolution 10

770 which called for monitoring the cease-fire and the “delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.” (Terrett, 100) It should be noted here that the conclusion reached through the Dayton peace agreement brought a relatively peaceful resolution to Bosnia crisis. Equally, it is clear that the American intervention initiative participated in fostering not only peace and security in Bosnia but it also its development in the long-run. Clarke says “It [U.S] facilitated the creation of a partially coherent policy to resolving the conflict by creating a broader consensus within the international community as to what ought to be done.” (15) Attempts to address Yugoslavia conflict were significantly taken by other international institutions and organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which “created a Commission to trace missing persons and mortal remains as well as assisting in the evacuation of refugees in areas which had been ‘ethnically-cleansed’.” (Terrett. 102) While the international community was trying to maintain peace in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, new ethnic tensions erupted in Kosovo. The growing nationalism and separatism, as said mentioned before, ultimately paved the way to conflict between Serbs and Albanians. With the escalation of violence, the international community was urged to intervene in order to take substantial action 11

to quell hostilities which resulted in a great number of refugees in the county. At the outset, the United Nations Security Council passed a “Resolution 1160 which placed an arms embargo on the region.” (Scorgie, 28) As the conflict continued to escalate, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for a cease-fire by the conflicting parties which partly resulted in an agreement of limiting the Serbian forces in Kosovo as apparently agreed on by Milosevic Slobodan. However, the agreement did not last in the sense that Milosevic did not stick with the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that led to the resuming of conflict again. As a result, ‘Renewed international efforts were made to give new political impetus to find a peaceful solution to the conflict… It was agreed to convene urgent negotiations between the parties to the conflict, under international mediation.’

1

The

mediation approach at this point was taken by the Contact Group (The United State, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) at Rambouillet in order to bring the Serbs and Kosovo representatives to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Another international response was that of US ambassador to UN Richard Holbrooke who started negotiations with Milosevic threatening him with NATO air strikes, but the effort was not effective. In essence, this situation left NATO with one choice and that was to start its bombing mission. After 1

NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm 12

that, the involvement of NATO brought the conflict to an end and, interestingly, “Peace was formally instigated on June 10 by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.” (Scorgie, 29) Up to this point, it is interesting to see that the international responses to Kosovo War took a primarily non-violent approach to the settlement of the conflict. But, it appeared that while negotiations and diplomatic measures were used as instrumental means to arrive at a peaceful resolution, nothing impressive had been achieved. Although the Kosovo case was, to some degree, characterized by neglect from the international community, initiatives that called for a peaceful settlement were undertaken by a NGOs and Track initiatives, “for example, a significant dialogue developed among student groups in Belgrade and Pristina.” (Maill, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 126). On a more serious note, this leaves us with the view that, although it was aggressive, NATO`s military approach was effective because its mission, after all, was to quell a humanitarian crisis in the country. Although the international community tried to stop the spread of war to all the Yugoslavia republics, violent conflict flared-up in Macedonia; however the conflict was not as fierce as that of Croatia and Bosnia. Of particular interest is that Macedonia`s ethnic unrest, economic difficulties, and the rise of nationalism were the same factors that significantly led to the outbreak of the war in the other Yugoslavia republics, namely, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia. However, the 13

international response to the conflict in Macedonia showed the active involvement and the serious concern of the international community to suppress the violence in fear of its extending to neighboring countries and cause further threat to security and stability of the region at large. In their book, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall assert that “While the international community failed to prevent the spread of violent conflict from Croatia to Bosnia, it made great efforts in Macedonia to significant effect.” (127) Interestingly enough, this worry about the situation compelled the international community to take timely, effective preventive measures to contain conflict between ethnic Albanians and the majority Macedonian Slavs. Initially, the UN Security council took a leading role in establishing UNPROFOR as a “preventive deployment mission to provide security along Macedonia’s borders.” (Julie Kim) This preventive peacekeeping mission played a prominent role in the sense that it preserved the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia. Moreover, the involvement of the United States and EU mediation approach helped the disputants arrive at a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall make this point crystal clear when they say

With the help US and EU mediators, the Albanians and Macedonian parties signed the Ohrid agreement, which provided for new elections, arms to be collected by NATO 14

troops, a revision of the constitution to give more rights to Albanians, and civilian monitors to assist the return of refugees. (128)

Through their international diplomatic efforts, it should be noted that the United States and the European Union both had a significant role in bringing conclusion to Macedonia conflict. In broader terms, the US and EU mediatory activity paved the way to NATO forces for disarmament mission of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA). Furthermore, the US military response to the conflict was a strategic approach which significantly reinforced the UNPROFO mandate. In addition to the symbolic presence and support of the United State for a peaceful resolution, the EU envoy Javier Solana mediatory activity maintained a cease-fire and fostered peace implementation in the country. The voice of mediation was strong in the conflict hand and it turned out to be a real success. According to Bruce W. Hamilton The common explanation is that, in contrast to the international response to Croatia and Bosnia, timely initiatives by the United Nations and other third parties towards Macedonia prevented the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict. These efforts are held up as a model of effective international preventive diplomacy. (173)

It is noteworthy to add that the United Nations and other international actors including Non-Governmental Organizations have 15

taken preventive measures to aid conflict resolution. More importantly, the economic development of Macedonia was essentially an approach that the international community took to help bring the quick settlement of the country and to foster the co-existence of the ethnic groups. Linked to this is the leading role that NGOs undertook to help bring an end to the ethnic conflict between the Albanians and Serbs. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse say that “The Catholic Relief Services, the Center for Inter Ethnic Relations and Search for Common Ground” were examples of NGOs which had a major role in reducing tension between the conflicting ethnic groups (122). Related to conflict resolution, it should be understood that such international organization are effective in terms of the measures they use to promote and foster meaningful communication among the parties concerned. The case of Serbia and Montenegro is another scene to be considered although the involvement of the international community was less than that of other republics discussed before. Montenegro got its independence in June 3, 2006 and its history was inextricably linked to that of Serbia. Although there was not sever violent conflict in Montenegro, peacemaking efforts were undertaken to assist and maintain the stability of the country. These peace operations were sat in Montenegro to support the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) whose aim was to monitor and reinforce the “effective implementation of international human rights standards” 16

This paper has examined major conflict resolution approaches applied to the conflict in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Whether under the umbrella of the United Nations, regional organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations, it should be acknowledged that international peace operations were, to some extent, effective in bringing a peaceful end to the war in Yugoslavia. It is noticeable that negotiation and mediation were among the most non-violent approaches adopted by the international community to accomplish a peaceful settlement of the war. However, it must be emphasized that, in addition to enhanced peacekeeping mission, peace enforcement measures were significantly used as an alternative and appropriate policy approach to maintain security and impose settlement in Yugoslavia. With regard to all this, it should be said that the United Nations and NATO played a critical role in that they reinforced the legitimacy of the international intervention in violent conflict especially in Bosnia which represented the center of the Yugoslavia war.

17

Bibliography

Baletic, Zvonimir and Josip Esterajher, Milan Jajcinovic, Mladen Klemencic, Andjelko Milardovic, Gorazd Nikic, and Fran Visnar. 1994. Croatia between Aggression and Peace. Paper published by AGM, Zagreb available at http://www.hic.hr/books/croatiabetween/part-06.htm. Crnobrnja, Mihail.1994. The Yugoslavia Drama.UK: McGill-Quenn`s University Press. Scorgie, Lindsay. 2004. Kosovo and the International Community: The Prolonging and Exacerbation of a Crisis. A worldwide journal of politics. . 18

Clarke, Michael. “Constructing International Crises.” Paper presented at the World International Studies Conference. 23rd-26th July, Ljubljana, Slovenia. European Studies and Modern Languages. < www.wiscnetwork.org/getpaper.php?id=244 ->. Economides, Spyros and Paul Taylor.1996. Former Yugoslavia. In The New Interventionism: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Ed. James Mayall, 59-93.Cambridge: Cambridge University press. Gow, James. 1997. Triumph of the lack of will. United Kingdom: C. Hurst. Lund, Michael S. 2000. Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia: 19921999: from containment to Nation building. In Opportunities missed, opportunities seized: preventive diplomacy in the post-Cold War world, Ed. Bruce W. Hamilton, 173-208. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Nambiar, Satish. 2001. UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia-from UNPROFOR to Kosovo. In United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Ed, Ramish Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, 167-181. New York: United Nations University. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Wood House, and Hugh Miall. 2005. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 1st ed. USA: Polity Press. ------------------------. 2005. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 2nd ed. USA: Polity Press. Terrett, Steve. 2000. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A contextual study of peace-making efforts in the post-Cold War world. England. Dartmouth. Webb, Keith, Vassiliki Koutrakou, and Mike Walters. 1996. The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model: A Critical Perspective, Ed. Jacob Bercovitch, 171-189.USA: Lynne Rienner.

19

Works Consulted Akashi, Yasushi. 2001. The politics of UN peacekeeping from Cambodia toYugoslavia. In United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Ed. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, 149-145. New York: The United Nations University.

International Crisis Group. 1 March 2002b. “A Kosovo Roadmap (II): Internal Benchmarks.” . Karns, Margaret P. 2001. Peacekeeping and the changing role of the United Nations: Four dilemmas. In United Nations Peacekeeping 20

Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Ed. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, 215-235. New York: UN University.

Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2000. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd.

21