China And Africa-(vc Oparah, 2007)

1 Introduction After defeats in several wars in the past, China learnt to make peaceful economic progress by attracting as many friends as it could. With a population of roughly 1, 3 billion, this largest developing country has acquired deepening economic integration into the various facets of the global economy. The positive result to this wise move is its emergence as an economic and political power with major influence in Africa it sees as the largest developing continent1. Similarly, the post-colonial conundrum of multiple motives and meager means has left African countries a slim chance to strive to become active participants and claimants in the international arena2. African governments realised the severe constraints on the freedom of actors (governments) in developing countries during the cold-war periods. African decision makers were constrained by the need to consolidate power and meet socio-economic demands at home setting the stage for the reshaping of economic and political relationships with China3. With the perceived sympathy shown by China to Africa because of its some sort of colonial experience in 1800s by Western governments of France, Britain, France, US , Germany and, Portugal, Beijing has portrayed itself as the leader of the Third World countries. It is against this background that this essay discusses the extent to which “informed observers” see China’s engagement in Africa as predatory on one hand and as a friend in the other hand. Numerous examples will be drawn from so many African countries to support both sides of the argument. To understand these opposing opinions, this writer shall first and foremost give some brief overviews of China’s foreign policy to understand why China behaves the way it does and relate it to the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) and the Africa policy of China announced on 12 January 2006. Of note is the fact that this writer believes that the so called informed observers only report what they want to report to suit who they represent and this writer shall give some first hand information based on personal interaction and experience with some of those concerned on this issue. 1

Thompson, D., “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United

States” in African Renaissance Journal, University of Lisbon Press, Lisbon, July/August, 2005, p. 20. 2

Clapham, C., “Sub-Saharan Africa”, in Clapham, C. (ed.) Foreign Policy in Developing States: A Comparative

Approach, Praeger, New York, I997, P. 79. 3

Loc cit.

2 Brief overview of China’s foreign policy, FOCAC and China’s New African policy A traditional view of China’s foreign policy shows its predictability in shaping of policies put up by the different successive governments under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from Mao Tse Tung to the current leader Hu Jintao. The policies of this East Asia country are usually normative and give foes and friends alike an easy assessment and inkling of what it does and likely to do. Just like every other country, especially the rich North, China’s foreign policy is driven by national interest (mercantilist as it may appear in this context) to protect her strategic interest so as to sustain her physical survival. More so, it has strived to establish itself in the international affairs though with a totally different ideology from those offered by the West. Thus, holds to a strict interpretation of sovereignty and professed adherence to peaceful coexistence with other countries. Meaning, “the five principles of peaceful co-existence so as to continue to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world”.4 China’s position in world affairs has always been guided by these five principles and has been translated and captured into the holistic vision of FOCAC which was launched in Beijing 2000. There is a firm commitment on part of China to use this forum to advance its Declaration of the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa CooperationAddis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006). China and Africa meet every three years under the above mentioned umbrella to discuss multilateral co-operations and support each other in global diplomatic arena.5

Hu’s visit to Africa recently afforded him the opportunity to reassure African governments Beijing’s commitment to this course. Though there is contrasting interest and views from both parties on issues of democracy and human rights but have managed to work together for the common good of all the parties concerned.6 Discussions have focused on development assistance, trade, economic integration and featuring long term stability, equality and mutual benefits. These discussions formed the aims of the China’s African Policy: 4

Thompson, D., Op. Cit. p. 26.

5

Registration System for Overseas Chinese Invested Enterprises (Organizations): “China’s African Policy” in

BEIJING REVIEW, No. 10. Beijing, March 9, 2006, p. 14. 6Ibid. p. 20 and Hale, D., “China’s Economic Takeoff Implications for Africa”, in Brenthurst Discussion Papers, Chicago, 1/2006, p. 10.

3 First on the list are sincerity, friendship and equality, which proposes that China respects African counties independence and offer supports in unifying the continent of Africa. Secondly, China will offer support to African countries in their efforts to attain economic development through mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. Mutual support and close coordination with Africa in United Nations (UN) and other multilateral gatherings is being advocated through this proposal, is the last but not the list. The two parties are being encouraged to learn from each other in development efforts to find areas for improvement.7 So, China arguably believes in one good turn deserving another. Nonetheless, the above guiding principles of China-Africa relations have been possible and being carried out in different styles by China to suit its interest well. This strategy of “bread and butter” is discussed in the next following two sub-headings based on the FOCAC and the new Africa policy principles of China already enumerated.

China as a partner in progress China’s interest in Africa grew stronger especially after the events of 9/11. America’s adoption of “pre-emptive strike” and “regime change” where possible as evident in Iraq and Afghanistan kept PRC worried as to the intensions and long-term objectives of Washington. Beijing embarked in search for strategic partners.8 The country is often accused of working “against US global interest in general”9 but she is just trying to solidify her global interest as well. Part of this ploy is to recognise the need to court votes from Africa in multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and UN. Africa has the largest single bloc of votes in these multilateral settings and this is more possible to form partners because the political and economic interest of China and Africa do not necessarily clash deeply. Also, China is working very hard to derail if not eliminate Taiwan’s little diplomatic recognition in Africa by forming a lot of bilateral co-operations with various African governments. 7

Ibid. p. 20.

8

Alden, C., “China-Africa Relations: The end of the Beginning” in Draper, P and le Pere, G. (eds.) Enter the Dragon,

SAIIA, Johannesburg, 2005, p. 142. 9

Shelton, G., “US Foreign Policy in East Asia: China, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula” in South African Yearbook

of International Affairs, 2002/03, SAIIA, Johannesburg, p.348.

4 For instance, it invited the eight African countries that recognises Taiwan to the Addis Ababa Summit in 2003 to find a way of convincing them otherwise in the diplomatic recognition battle between her and Taipei.10 So, this co-operation has been made possible by willingness of Africa to learn and do business with a country widely perceived to be the next superpower. Her rise in power clearly appeals to many looking for models of success that do not threaten established governments. It has cultivated relationships with all the African countries through provision of aid, technical expertise and diplomatic support in a more multi-polar post-cold war environment.11 In drawing the attentions of African government, China has been offering unalloyed support to African countries especially in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU). It has also helped in the implementation of the programme of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and promoting the process of regional and sub-regional co-operation. Despite the different political ideologies of good governance and human rights being upheld by NEPAD initiative as against the totalitarian practices of the Chinese authority, both have worked impressively in conflict resolution and peace keeping in Africa through a UN supported mission. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) stipulate direct intervention in the internal affairs of a member state and China has supported this efforts in 2005 even though it does not usually do so by sending 600 peacekeepers in Liberia and worked with African peacekeepers in UN-sanctioned operation in that country to promote peace and stability.12 Also, China has vetoed most decisions in the UN Security Council with its veto powers and turned down economic sanctions against some African counties in the past such as Nigeria in 1995, Sudan in 2005 and Zimbabwe in 2005.13 10

Alden, C. Op. Cit. p. 143.

11

Loc cit.

10

Alden, C. Op. Cit. p. 148

12

Alden, C. Op. Cit. p. 137. and “The New Playing Field: China’s Rising Role” in Report by the Independent Task

Force, More than Humanitarianism: A strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 6, p. 50.

5 In another broader development, Beijing has encouraged pragmatic co-operation with Africa by offering aid, build infrastructure and encourage economic and human development in Africa by investing where other Western countries fear or dread.14 It has built foreign ministries in Uganda and Djibouti for those governments and constructed sports stadiums in Mali, Djibouti and Central African Republic for sports development in those countries. Apart from constructing Tanzam railway linking Tanzania and Zambia, it has also built houses of parliament for Mozambique and Gabon in Maputo and Libraville respectively putting projects China is involved with in Africa to 800. China trains about 10,000 Africans yearly free of charge with the support of African Human Resources Development Fund contributing to the continent’s human development. Since 1963, 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47 African counties and treated nearly 180 million cases. 940 Chinese doctors were still working in Africa in 2003.15

In 1999, People Republic of China (PRC) donated $200,000 to combat drought in the Horn of Africa, and also $610,000 was donated to fight drought in Darfur. On more economic dispensation, 31 African counties debts owed to China to the tune of $1, 27 billion was cancelled in 2003 during one of its trianual gatherings with African governments. Debt cancellation has reached $10 billion to date from China. Interestingly, China does not mix business with politics and do not attach political and economic conditionality criteria when offering aid or loan to African government as in Angola and Zimbabwe cases. Both countries were given $2 billion and $6 million respectively with the president of the later even making a trip to Beijing in 2005 to seek for more loans.16 This similar gesture has offered African counties alternatives to scrutinise the stringent conditionalities of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Western donors when in need of economic aids and loans.17 14

Log.Cit. and Ibid. p.45.

15

Ibid. p. 42 and Wilson111, E.J., “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy” Testimony before the

Sub-committee an Africa, Human Rights and International Operations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C., Council for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, 28 July, 2005, p. 11. 16

Peta, B., “Mugabe returns from China without securing a $1-billion loan” in The Sunday Independent Business

Report, Johannesburg, 31 July, 2005, p. 1. 17

Council on Foreign Relations, Op. Cit. p. 51 and Aiden, C., Op. Cit. p.144.

6 China has created avenue for trade relations with the continent to improve greatly. Chinese tourists visiting Africa has increased to 1110,000 in 2005 according to statistic from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. Trade between China and Africa in 2005 stood at $39, 7 billion, investment of about $1, 25 billion and has over 800 Chinese-funded companies in Africa. It imports 28% of Africa’s oil and reversed a long decline of prices of resources from Africa such as copper, gold, aluminum, nickel and timber thereby given African exporters economic boost.18 Since 2000, it has signed 40 trade agreements to encourage market motives. PRC is also the major investor in copper production in war-turn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and has also invested $170 million in Zambia’s copper and other minerals.19

Following the withdrawal of some Western oil companies in Sudan (accused of genocide and habouring terrorist groups) in 1995, China became the major investor in oil in that country through the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation by buying 40% of the countries oil stake. This move sustained the economy of Sudan and it exported oil for the very first time in 1999 with production output of 310,000 barrels of oil per day.20

Again, in Nigeria, China is taking risk where others dare to do business especially in the volatile Niger-Delta region not devoid of kidnapping of oil workers, bunkering and interruptions of productions of oil by some indigenes of the host areas. It has been granted exploration rights in Nigeria last week as a mark of recognition of its efforts.21 Aforesaid, it becomes more interesting to see in the next sub-heading the real reasons behind China’s good investments and aid to Africa besides US’s threat, Africa’s support and its flexing of muscles with Taiwan in Africa. 18

Council on Foreign Relations, Op. Cit. p. 42.

19

Aiden, C., Op. Cit. p.141.

20

Thompson, D., Op.Cit. p. 25.

21

Council on Foreign Relations, Op. Cit. p. 45. and Nigeria to Offer China Exploration Licenses,

http://www.rigzone.com/newws/article_pf.asp?a_id=31620, 10 May, 2006, p.1.

7 China as an unfriendly friend (predator) There is a conventional wisdom of “all that glitters is not gold” in Africa which often advises people in the continent to become suspicious or get uncomfortable if someone is trying to be too good or too friendly to you which has been neglected in this context of China’s involvements in Africa. Through her pragmatic and yet amoral foreign policy, it has based its policy on seeking for natural resources, in particular oil just like any other Western country and lock up it up by becoming some sort of uncle for many of the same African rogue regimes loathed by the West. Also, her strong economic and military power and is increasingly using “soft power” for its own geostrategic goals.22 This communist country masquerades and covers up with a reminder to the rest of the world about the famous 1972 historic Shanghai communiqué the then US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed which acknowledged the “essential difference… in the both social systems and foreign policies”23 of both countries. These differences it claims did not lead to major disagreements and they agreed to “conduct their relations on the principles of non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”.24

Beijing usually manipulates the above comment to carry out its activities in different parts of the world and often gets involved in destabilising activities and arms proliferations in the continent. For example, it armed both Ethiopia and Eritrea during their 1998 war just to sell arms. Also, it did use its UN veto power to block pressure on Omar Hassan al-Bashir to halt violence in Darfur and rather armed the government to carry out the on going horrendous genocide in that country which has now spilled over to neighbouring Chad. Chinese made weapons were recently seen used by rebels to attack Chad capital in middle of April 2006. Now, war has continued in Darfur after failures of the rebel factions to reach agreements in Abuja with one of the factions reported to have the backing of the Chinese authority not to reach any compromise with the other factions.25 22

Aiden, C., Op. Cit. p.142.

23

Sariolgham, M., “Cutting a Deal with Tehran” in Newsweek, 24 April, 2005, p. 29.and Council on Foreign

Relations, Op. Cit. p. 45. 24

Log. Cit. 25Sparks, J., “China’s New Best Friends” in Newsweek, 24 April, 2006, p. 16.

8 It is easy to dictate that Beijing’s support for NEPAD is just a charade because of the divergent views of China’s policy from that of NEPAD. There is little or no element of surprise with regards to lack of financial support by China for this African initiative. Besides, PRC see democracy campaigners as revolutionaries who want to overthrow the CCP which means she is not the right support for upholding what NEPAD stands for. Again, a country that usually have 87,000 public-order disturbances yearly and grappling with domestic issues by putting its health care, social security and education responsibilities in the hands of local government does not look convincing to offer much aid to Africa.26 In another development, Beijing usually feels reluctant to send peacekeepers to Africa even when their help were sought. The only time it did so was when Liberia renounced its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. It had even before that time supported rebel factions to fight the ruling government of that country. Talk about wolf in sheep clothing.27

Many countries in Africa have become more comfortable with China’s neutral approach especially those seen as Pariah States. Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe president is coveted by China for coal and platinum control which are mined with tax breaks. In return, he gets cash and arms to prop up the government in power. Similarly, China gave $2 billion credit line to Jose dos Santos of Angola to build schools, house and infrastructural facilities shattered by civil war. This was done to get cheap oil and ease pressure on the government to improve on economic transparency being canvassed by IMF and Western donors.28 China’s interest in dealing with Africa can also be said to be “motivated by parochial concerns to seek energy and take it where it can”.29 Some informed observers describe this as energy-hungry mercantilist foreign policy. It is important to mention that apart from oil quest, it is engaged in massive extraction of other raw materials as pointed out in the preceding sub-heading of this essay. 26

Danlang, H.B., “Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion” in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 11, 13 March, 2006, p. 25.

27

Log.Cit

28

Log.Cit.

29

Sparks, J., Op.Cit. p. 17.

9 China has exacerbated and become some sort of mechanisms of underdevelopment in the region through lack of investment proper. Investments/developments where possible are done in isolated enclaves, just to expand their operations and export raw materials to China such as the construction of TanZam railway line.30 Furthermore, this East Asia country has encouraged corruption, autocratic rule and abuse of human right in African countries such as in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Arguably, a country that procures organs from its prisoners and claim falsely that the prisoners gave consent to it should not be blamed if they do not understand the meaning of corruption. It rather calls it “Christmas gift”. Chinese officials have been accused of colluding with the ruling governments in some African countries to loot state funds and send to bank accounts in Asia. Ironically, these funds are in turn loaned to developing African countries with high interest repayment rates to China. So, that is why it is easy for China to cancel some Africa’s debts buoyed initially by Africa’s money.31

Still

on

corruption,

wealth

generated

from these natural resources

is

distributed

disproportionately where possible among few elites in Africa and to section of the population that supports the government while security and military tools are built and supplied by China to quash people seen as oppositions. Patronage politics is the order of the day in some of these countries with political posts depending on the clique one belongs to rather than power of ballots. Nigeria and Zimbabwe fall under this category. Similarly, getting a job in public service in these counties depends mainly on connections/contacts rather than qualifications and skills. As a result, they have also become “rentier states” whereby it is earning income without paying taxes according to the level of people in government one knows or how connected and not how qualified/ hardworking.32 30

Graaff, J.: Introduction to Sociology: Poverty and Development, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2003, p. 38

31

Gerlin, A., “China’s Grim Harvest’ in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 18, 1 May 2006, p. 12 and Ibid. p. 38

32

Skocpol, T.: Social Revolution in the Third World, Cambridge University Press, UK. 1994, p. 242.

10 More importantly, China has neither environmental law of its own nor a signatory to Kyoto protocol and therefore it does not care about environmental degradation in the host communities its companies extract raw materials and oil. China often uses cheap products to construct factories and assembly lines which sometimes collapses and leads to loss of lives across the continent. Just last week, 200 people were killed in Lagos, Nigeria as a result of oil blast from pipe lines imported from China and their bodies were even charred. In early 1990s, some Chinese businessmen collaborated with some corrupt Nigeria customs officials to dump toxic waste materials in Nigeria which later led to the outbreak of laser fever and meningitis. Reports of oil bunkering or illegal exploration and exportation of oil by Chinese and some corrupt Nigeria nationals are common practice.33

Lastly, Chinese businessmen use intimidating tactics in doing business all over the world. Always attending meetings in large group to out number their counter parts and often bid lower than usual cost in projects than their competitors with the support of its government. African businessmen are not spared from falling victims to this underhand tactics. It is generally believed that these Chinese businessmen even operate at a loss but do have ways of making up the loss through methods best known to them. For example, textiles exports to United States from some African countries have been grounded as a result of Chinese exports to US at lower prices. China’s export to Africa is $39, 7 billion in 2005 compared to $21 billion import from Africa in the same year thereby leaving trade deficits in the continent.34 Besides, there are emergences of “Chinatowns” where large numbers of Chinese immigrants and temporary workers settle and do business. Again, some imports by China from Africa on woods come from unsound logging practices encouraged by China. This has led to deforestation of many forests in Africa and also deprives governments of revenues.35 33

Ofoegbu, C., Champion Newspaper, Telephone discussions, Johannesburg, 12 May, 2006 and Moyela, M., “Fires

in the Delta” in Africa Today, London, August 2000, p. 10. 34

China-Africa Economic…to be Win-Win, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/HujintaoUS/167307.htm, 5

May, 2006, p. 1. 35

Council on Foreign Relations, Op. Cit. p. 46 & 49.

11 This blossoming Sino and Africa trade relationship is very much in favour of China and they are not doing anything to bridge the asymmetric in this partnership. Local/infant industries in Africa and merchant traders have been put out of business as a result of flood of cheap imports from China. Is China really a friend of Africa? The comment below of a flabbergasted African diplomat from Benin on treatment melted out to his native country gives a very good clue. We‘re a socialist-Marxist state, we‘ve had 30 years of or relations with the Peoples Republic of China and yet they bypassed us to go to Gabon. This tells me that China has no friends-only interest (International Herald Tribune, 8 September 2004).36

Conclusion In this essay, the manners in which China has been a friend on one hand and a predator in the other hand in Africa has been discussed with the predatory features of China more active in this Sino-Africa relation. There should be more avenues for dialogue and improvements of the relations for parties involved rather than forming another master-servant relationship or new form of neo-imperialism. China should endavour to become a responsible player in the global system and go beyond passive commitment and actively work with established powers on resolving international economic and political problems. Pan-Africanism, regionalism and continentalism are terms usually used in Africa out of an urgency to deal with political, economic and social issues facing the region. However, Africa should be more careful, unified and encourage themselves first of all before looking up externally and be shrewd in negotiations with other external bodies/countries and not to be goaded or manipulated into the so called south-south and G-77 co-operations. Also, with the world’s pre-occupation with the events in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Africa must learn to be their own saviour militarily, economically and politically by looking inwardly rather than waiting for external helps. 36

Aiden, C., Op. Cit. p.151.

12 Bibliography Alden, C., “China-Africa Relations: The end of the Beginning” in Draper, P and le Pere, G. (eds.) Enter the Dragon, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 2005. China-Africa Economic…to be Win-Win, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/HujintaoUS/167307.htm, 5 May, 2006. Clapham, C., “Sub-Saharan Africa”, in Clapham, C. (ed.) Foreign Policy in Developing States: A Comparative Approach, Praeger, New York, I997.

Danlang, H.B., “Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion” in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 11, 13 March, 2006. Gerlin, A., “China’s Grim Harvest’ in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 18, 1 May 2006. Graaff, J.: Introduction to Sociology: Poverty and Development, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2003. Skocpol, T.: Social Revolution in the Third World, Cambridge University Press, UK. 1994.

Moyela, M., “Fires in the Delta” in Africa Today, London, August 2000. Nigeria to Offer China Exploration Licenses, http://www.rigzone.com/newws/article_pf.asp?a_id=31620, 10 May, 2006.

Ofoegbu, C., Champion Newspaper, Telephone discussions, Johannesburg, 12 May, 2006. Peta, B., “Mugabe returns from China without securing a $1-billion loan” in The Sunday Independent Business Report, Johannesburg, 31 July, 2005. Sariolgham, M., “Cutting a Deal with Tehran” in Newsweek, 24 April, 2005. Shelton, G., “US Foreign Policy in East Asia: China, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula” in South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2002/03, SAIIA, Johannesburg.

Registration System for Overseas Chinese Invested Enterprises (Organizations): “China’s African Policy” in BEIJING REVIEW, No. 10. Beijing, March 9, 2006, p. 14. 6Ibid. p. 20 and Hale, D., “China’s Economic Takeoff Implications for Africa”, in Brenthurst Discussion Papers, Chicago, 1/2006.

13 Sparks, J., “China’s New Best Friends” in Newsweek, 24 April, 2006. The New Playing Field: China’s Rising Role” in Report by the Independent Task Force, More than Humanitarianism: A strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 6. Thompson, D., “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States” in African Renaissance Journal, University of Lisbon Press, Lisbon, July/August, 2005. Wilson111, E.J., “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy” Testimony before the Sub-committee an Africa, Human Rights and International Operations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C., Council for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, 28 July, 2005.