Castro V. Gre.docx

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual 5 tendencies. She insisted, however, that they “remained friends for fifteen 6 (15) years despite their separation(.)” 7 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his 8 illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom 9 Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. 11 According to the Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any 13 children. It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname

At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina 16 temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth’s death in July 1995. 18 RTC: trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that “[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person 20 A certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006. 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint 21 for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne for 36 years. She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne’s knowledge and consent. She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He 25 alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined. He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because 26 several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. He then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with “justice and equity.” 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the 30 adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of 31 32 consent, marked by the trial court as “Exh. K,” was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistics Office certificates shows the 33 father to be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the hearing.” The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment. They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never secured from Joanne. Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was “amply protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public prosecutor. Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to

46 the world of the adoption proceedings. They argue that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of 47 judgment. They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.—It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. Same; Same; As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption; The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.—As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the word “shall” in the above quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

Same; Civil Procedure; Adoption; Service of Summons; Personal Service of Summons; Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.—For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights. Cang v. CA GR 105308 Sept. 25, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Clavano married and begot 3 children. Upon learning that petitioner had an alleged extramarital affair with another woman, Anna filed a petition for legal separation. The court approved the joint manifestation of the spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They further agreed: That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000 effective from the date of the filing of the complaint That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any persons without the written consent of the husband. Petitioner left for the US where she sought a divorce from Anna. A divorce decree was issued which also granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna. While in the US, petitioner remitted to the Philippines a portion of his monthly salary to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and deposited another portion of his monthly salary in a bank in the name of his children. Private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna, filed a special proceeding for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children.

The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging facts of abandonment by petitioner. Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children. The RTC issued a decree of adoption and concluded that petitioner has abandoned his children. ISSUES: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of the natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary RULING: Yes. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that there shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known living parents who is not insane, or hopelessly intemperate, or has not abandoned the child x x x. In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors by the natural father. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.

No. Records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. REPUBLIC V. CA
 spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: . a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; 
 . b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and 
 . c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL.” 
 The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from “Midael” to “Michael.” He argued

that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child. RTC:
RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was “Michael,” instead of “Midael,” which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth. Petitioner’s contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child. The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter “d,” so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read “Michael.” Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from “Midael C. Mazon” to “Michael C. Mazon” cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names “can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,

himig).” The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents’ prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Eugenio Reyes, et al. Vs. Librada Mauricio (deceased) Leonida Mauricio

The RTC – ruled in favor of Mauricio. On review to CA – it issued a resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute her mother – librada, who died during the pendency of the case.

This case involves the filing of complaint of the Librada and her alleged Leonida Mauricio to the dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). They want the annulment of the contract “KASUNDUAN” between Librada and Eugenio. And they prayed for the maintenance of the peaceful possession of the land, with damages.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.

They averred that they are the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-ininterest. Petitioner in this case Eugenio alleged that he was the owner of the subject property (parcel of land) and the title was formerly registered in the name of Eugenio’s siblings; that the property was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents. ***He now, among others questions the legal personality of Leonida to file the case. As Leonida is only a ward(AMPON) of Godofredo Mauricio and Librada Mauricio, therefore not a legal heir.

ISSUE: Can petitioner (Eugenio) contest the legal standing - whether heir or not, of the respondent (Leonida) in a case here involving tenancy relationship and agricultural land HELD: The Court ruled that Eugenio cannot COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE STATUS OF LEONIDA IN THE INSTANT PETITION. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.

****Nota bene: The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. ASTORGA: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his 1 minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname. ***Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. 5 petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. 6 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them “Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of 25 adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary 26 and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

NERY V. SAMPANA Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana. 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded. Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP- CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position papers.

5 in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self- serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving “one package fee” from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that “if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible.” Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification. Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses. Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law. Court: Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client 8 relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and 9 competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received “one package fee” for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use. This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana, we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest. BARTOLOME V. SSS DOCTRINE: In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

beneficiary,

filed

a

claim

for

death

benefits

with

the

SSS.

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three years since the decree of John’s adoption became final. ISSUE: Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s dependent parent and, thus, entitled to the death benefits? HELD: YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’Compensation Program (ECP).

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules: xxx

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the

entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters; xxx (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.