Cases From Lex Libris

EN BANC [G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.] KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents. Erlinda S. Carolino for petitioners. Del Rosario Lim Devera Vigilia & Panganiban for China Banking Corporation. SYNOPSIS Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg detained Karen for four days and raped her several times. After policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. A case for Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of rape charges were filed against Greg Bartelli. A Civil Case for damages with preliminary attachment was also filed against him. On the scheduled day of hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail, thereby causing all criminal cases filed against him to be archived pending his arrest. Meanwhile, the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was granted for the petitioners and the writ was issued. However, China Banking Corporation failed to honor Notice of Garnishment served by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Meanwhile, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the civil case. Summons was published. Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default. After hearing ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960. Thus, petitioner seek relief from the Supreme Court.

According to the Supreme Court, petitioner deserved the damages awarded to her by the court. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief; however, exceptions to the rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has farreaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if the Court rule that the questioned Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempt from attachment, garnishment, or an order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 were held to be inapplicable to the case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents were required to comply with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 and to release to the petitioners the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. caDTSE SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INSTANT PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF TREATED AS A PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; THE SUPREME COURT HAS NO ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. — Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. 2. COMMERCIAL LAW; SECTION 113 OF CENTRAL BANK CIRCULAR NO. 960, PROVIDING THAT FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ATTACHMENT, GARNISHMENT OR ANY OTHER ORDER OF ANY COURT OR ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR BODY; HELD INAPPLICABLE TO THIS

CASE BECAUSE OF ITS PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES. — The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377). It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. DCHaTc DECISION TORRES, JR., J p: In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; prcd b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered: 1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents; 2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever" i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank. The antecedent facts: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 0210006781166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant. On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804 and 805 for four (4)

counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail. On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989. Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of 100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989. On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando De Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever, This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows: "May 26, 1989 "Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue South Admiral Village Parañaque, Metro Manila Dear Ms. Carolino: "This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983). "The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended. "The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined. "Very truly yours, (SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO Director" 1 Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 893214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter: "1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages; "2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them; "3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and "4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded; llcd "5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus "6. Costs of the Suit. "SO ORDERED." The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:

"The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte. "In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following testimony: "Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year. "In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema, Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5) "The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5) "The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6) "They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6) "When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told

her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7) "Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7) "Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdraw his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8) "He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to inset his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9) "After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen has no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to giver her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10) "The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.

During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly. "Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 1214) "On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15) "That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried: 'Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was 'istorbo'. Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16) "She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 - 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After

shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16) cdll "Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19) "When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policemen asked her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to them. 'Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,' Karen added. "The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20) They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21) "At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.

"She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46) xxx xxx xxx "After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11)The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience." (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11) Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court. The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two: May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive

due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiff's substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff's substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so. On the other hand, respondent Central bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class. Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. cdta For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the breastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioners has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular NO. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same. This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petitioner for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. 3 Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good, and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and that she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the

child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision. "Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case. xxx xxx xxx The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, . . ." 4 If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important that his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being

unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. It has thus been said that — "But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times . . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: "The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long. "The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through. xxx xxx xxx ". . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960: 'Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.' "Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426: 'Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. — The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette

and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.' "The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus: 'Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order a process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,' prll "The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz: 'WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency; 'WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases; 'WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines; 'WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing

such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country;' "Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is 'to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines' (3rd Whereas). "The Offshore Banking System was established by PD. No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows: 'WHEREAS, conditions conductive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines; 'WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development; 'WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing to the national development effort. 'WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;' "On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows: 'WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree; 'WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms; 'WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;' "It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide

second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them. "Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositors stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. "Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines. "For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and P.D. No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes." 6 In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377). It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. cdll SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ ., concur. Padilla, J ., took no part. Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., are on leave. Footnotes 1. Annex "R", Petition. 2. Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1. 3. Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275; and Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra. 4. Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 & 12; Rollo, pp. 66-69. 5. Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York, Penguin, 1946) p. 171. 6. Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128-129; 135-136.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996.] CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner The Solicitor General for respondents SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. — Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. — The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. — An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS

NAME IN ADDITION TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. — The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. 6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY

AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. — As C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J p: This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases." 1 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2 On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3 When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida

Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4 Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. llcd The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00. Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of

Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5 Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7 For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register. . . . The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil

registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow — Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement, business transaction, or business . . . . For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost

bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9 In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled — There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias 'Kheng Chiau Young' in addition to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau' would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau.' The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, 'he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name 'Yu Kheng Chian,' he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name 'Kheng Chiau Young.' All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name. Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a

competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain the copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and is related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the

proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur. Footnotes 1. Rollo, pp. 24-37. 2. Id., p. 26. 3. Records, p. 7. 4. Rollo, p. 26. 5. Id., p. 12. 6. People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 524. 7. Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-14129, 31 July 1962, 5 SCRA 684. 8. Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009. 9. Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo B., Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., P. 359. 10. 106 Phil 762 (1959). 11. Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139. 12. See Note 6. 13. People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil 679 (1957). 14. See Note 6. C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000.] PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

Ralph Lou I. Willkom for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondent. SYNOPSIS Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation (VGHC) was engaged in rice milling and trading. In the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to VGHC's warehouse in Valencia, Bukidnon. On the strength of a warrant, the DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. Thereafter, an information for illegal possession of lumber in violation of Sec. 68 of Revised Forestry Code (P.D. 705, as amended) was filed against petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager, Noel Sy as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko as president of VGHC. During the trial, the defense presented several documents to establish that the possession of the seized lumber was legal. However, the trial court did not give credence to those documents and instead it convicted the petitioner and Francisco Tankiko of the offense charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, but acquitted Tankiko. EHcaAI In this appeal, the Court ruled that even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. The decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED. SYLLABUS 1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BFD CIRCULAR NO. 10-83; REQUIRES DIFFERENT CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN FOR TIMBER, LUMBER AND NON-TIMBER FOREST PRODUCTS. — The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether

separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof." cSCTID 2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN; NOT CREDIBLE WHERE NUMEROUS IRREGULARITIES AND DEFECTS WERE FOUND THEREIN. — Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company. These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. 3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CORPORATE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF PURCHASE OF LUMBER SHOULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO CORRECT PATENT IRREGULARITIES FOUND ON DOCUMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete. 4. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; NEGATED BY PRESENCE OF GLARING IRREGULARITIES. — The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the

DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished. 5. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF SECTION 68 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705; PENALTY. — Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides: "ART. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . "As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. CADSHI DECISION MENDOZA, J p: This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §68 2 of the Revised Forestry Code 3 (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The facts are as follows: Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading. prcd DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering

that R.L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chainsaw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order 4 was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it. On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied. 5 Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G). On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged: 6 That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299.25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45. Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as follows: 7

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government. Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence against them. prLL Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber. 8 Hence this petition which raises the following issues: 9 I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER PALLADA. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE. First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal: 10 1. Exh. 6 — Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and H.D. Pangcoga Exh. 6-A — Auxiliary Invoice Exh. 6-B — Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)

Exh. 6-C — Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463 pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet Exh. 6-D — Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C" Exh. 6-F — Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP Enterprises, dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of lumber Exh. 6-D-1 — [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above 2. Exh. 7 — CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to 25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM Exh. 7-A — Auxiliary Invoice Exh. 7-B — CTA Exh. 7-C — Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet Exh. 7-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992 Exh. 7-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to Somira M. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991 LLphil Exh. 7-F — Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for 10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992 3. Exh. 8 — CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992 Exh. 8-A — Auxiliary Invoice Exh. 8-B — CTA Exh. 8-C — Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber Exh. 8-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by WHP Enterprises, Exh. 8-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee Exh. 8-F — Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for 8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation payable to WHP Enterprises 4. Exh. 9 — CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of Lama, Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92" Exh. 9-A — Auxiliary Invoice Exh. 9-B — CTA, dated March 20, 1992

Exh. 9-C — Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992 Exh. 9-D — Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992 Exh. 9-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee Exh. 9-F — Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189 board feet of lumber Exh. 9-D-1 — Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D" The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. 11 For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 12 states in pertinent parts: In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . . 5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines. Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. 13 In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 14 The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. 15 As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof." LLphil

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court: 16 Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. .. In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest product[s] as lumber. The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and enclosed in parenthesis. The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:] The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488. In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon." In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon." The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]". 17 Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank. dctai Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were

still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company. 18 These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. 19 It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution. 20 This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete. 21 The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished. 22 Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides: ARTICLE 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . . As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 23 the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. LLphil

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Per Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now Associate Justice of this Court), concurred in by Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Demetrio G. Demetria. 2. Renumbered §78 by Republic Act No. 7161. 3. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (As amended by PD No. 1559, and by EO No. 277, prom. July 25, 1987, italics added). 4. Records, p. 28. 5. Id., p. 136-C. 6. Id., p. 1. 7. Id., p. 255. 8. CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 28. 9. Petition, p. 2; Id., p. 4. 10. RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; Records, pp. 249-251. 11. Id., p. 5; Id., p. 251. 12. Issued on February 28, 1983, now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No. 07, issued on February 17, 1994. 13. Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 7-8.

14. 257 SCRA 430 (1996). 15. DENR Administrative Circular No. 07, §§ 2&17 (series of 1994). 16. RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 251-252 (emphasis in the original). 17. The original consignee's name, still legible, reads: "NORTHWEST FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, ____________, TAGOLCAN, MIS. OR." 18. TSN, pp. 10, 13 & 22, March 12, 1994. 19. Compare DENR Administrative Order No. 59-93, series of 1993, §6 in relation to §2.8, which provides that certificates of origin with erased or tampered vital entries, such as the name and address of consignee, are void (now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No. 07, series of 1994.) 20. Petition, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 8-12. 21. Id., pp. 8-10; Id., pp. 10-12. 22. See Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 (1990). 23. People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 91014. March 31, 1993.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER MAPA Y DE GULA, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Jose T. Maghari for accused-appellant. SYLLABUS REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; IRRECONCILABLE AND UNEXPLAINED CONTRADICTION THEREIN; MAY CAST DOUBT ON THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED AND HIS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED; CASE AT BAR. — The contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses on who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination is significant. Is it police aid Carreon or Pat. Lucero? Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted to the NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken from the accused. Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously, one of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On such kind of shaky testimony conviction cannot be had. The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution. Irreconcilable and unexplained

contractions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the appellant and his guilt for the crime charged. DECISION NOCON, J p: Accused-appellant Elmer Maps y de Gula and Serapin de Gula y Tongco were both charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an information 1 which reads: "That on or about the 16th day of July 1986, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of the law, conspiring with each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possessed and sell and gave away twelve (12) sticks of marijuana treated cigarettes, thereby violating Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended." Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After a trial on the merits, Serapio de Gula was acquitted on reasonable doubt while accused Elmer Mapa was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced accordingly to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision 2 reads: "WHEREFORE, finding the accused Elmer Mapa y de Gula Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling and delivering prohibited drug, consisting of twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes (Indian Hemp) as defined and penalized under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and the costs of suit. On ground of reasonable doubt, the Court hereby ACQUITS the accused Serapio de Gula y Tongco of the crime charged. Costs de officio. The twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes are hereby confiscated in favor of the Government to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition. 3 The People's version of the facts is as follows: Acting upon a confidential information that a certain "Elmer" was engaged in drug pushing at T. de Gula St., Marulas Valenzuela, Major Elias Casimiro, Chief of the Valenzuela Police Anti-Narcotics Unit dispatched a team composed of Valenzuela policemen, namely: Cpt.

Romeo Martin, Pfc. Pedro Protestante, Patrolmen Eduardo Pabalan, Wilfredo Lucero and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct a surveillance operation in the area. On July 16, 1986, at around 8 o'clock in the evening, the team launched a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant at T. de Gula St., Marulas Valenzuela using two (2) P10.00 marked bills. 4 Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, who then acted as a poseur-buyer together with the confidential informant proceeded to appellant's address at T. de Gula Street. Upon reaching the place, the confidential informant introduced Pat. Capangyarihan to accused-appellant as a "score" of "damo." Pat. Capangyarihan asked for P20.00 worth of marijuana and then handed to appellant the two (2) marked P10.00 bills. After receipt of the money, appellant left for a while to get the "marijuana." Later, appellant entered the yard of the house with a wooden fence and talked briefly to a certain person (later identified as accused Serapio de Gula) who was seen by Pat. Capangyarihan handing over something to appellant. Thereafter, accused-appellant returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer a plastic bag containing twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Pat. Capangyarihan identified himself as a policeman and grabbed appellant by the arms. Pat. Capangyarihan then signaled his companions to come and help him subdue the suspect. At this juncture, Serapio de Gula approached the police team and told them that appellant is his nephew. The policemen told Serapio that appellant was placed under arrest for selling "marijuana". Since Pat. Capangyarihan recognized Serapio as the person with whom appellant talked after receiving the marked bills, Serapio was also arrested. The two (2) marked bills were retrieved from the accused-appellant. Appellant and Serapio were brought to the Valenzuela Police headquarters for further investigation. The plastic bag containing the twelve (12) sticks of suspected marijuana were forwarded to the NBI for examination. Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests was conducted on the seized articles and all yielded "positive results" for "marijuana". Accused-appellant Elmer Mapa however, disputes the foregoing facts. Instead, the defense maintains that the facts are as follows: At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1986, while accused Elmer Mapa was inside their house with his co-accused/uncle Serapio de Gula and their chess club members playing chess, two men with drawn guns entered the premises of the accused's house without permission, calling for accused Elmer Mapa, prompting accused Serapio de Gula to tell them, "pare, anong problema, trespassing kayo." 5 In answer, the men identified themselves as policemen and told

Serapio not to interfere. However, Serapio de Gula insisted that even if they were police officers they should nevertheless ask permission from the owner of the house before entering. In reply the police officers allegedly manhandled him while one of them entered the house where accused Elmer Mapa was, pulled him out and brought him to a waiting jeep. Serapio further testified that the four police officers who manhandled him were Patrolman Puchero, Patrolman Inciong, Patrolman Capangyarihan and Patrolman Protestante. 6 Serapio threatened to file charges against these police officers for mauling him so much so that said officers likewise arrested him. Serapio's testimony is as follows: "Q Now, after Elmer was pulled outside, how about you, what was done to you? A The policemen left, I was left behind, then afterwards, the person who manhandled me, when he was leaving, I was able to remember him and I told him that I was going to file a case against him with the Napolcom, then that said policeman returned and he told me, "Kami pala ang isasabit mo, sama ka na rin'. That was what he told me."' 7 This was corroborated by a defense witness, Antonio Trinidad. In his testimony, Antonio revealed that one unidentified man entered the house and when questioned by Serapio de Gula, the man hit the latter with gun. He could not do anything, much less the other chess players present because guns were poked at them. 8 Both the accused were brought to the sub-station where they were mauled and forced to admit the charges against them. Serapio remembered Patrolman Inciong going to his cell and showing (14) tea bags and jestingly said, "Never will you be able to get out of this jail because we will charge you with drug pushing and we will use these as evidence against you." 9 Tarried in jail during the early months of their apprehension, Elmer Mapa learned that a policeman talked to a certain Dueñas who was earlier detained for illegal possession of marijuana, that if he wanted to be released, he must give a substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo. That upon his apprehension, he learned that Eduardo Dueñas was later released by the police. From the foregoing facts, We hold the accused-appellant innocent. The conflicting and contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the weakness of its case thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

We find several glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to engender doubt on the moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt. LLpr The prosecution presented only two of the members of the buy-bust operation, whose testimonies unfortunately did not impress this Court. On the contrary, it weakens the prosecution's case. Take for instance the testimony of Pat. Capangyarihan who testified that Serapio was arrested some 9 to 10 meters away from where Elmer Mapa was standing and that he was not present during the arrest of Serapio de Gula. Contrary to his testimony however, Pat. Lucero testified that when Serapio was apprehended by him Pat. Capangyarihan was present and saw him effect the arrest. Thus — Pat. Capangyarihan: "Q Do you know who was that person? A Later on, I came to know the name of that person and it appears that his name is Serapio de Gula. Q And how far were you from them when they talked with each other? A From the witness stand up to that wall, sir (Which was estimated to be 9 to 10 meters). 10 xxx xxx xxx Q Mr. Witness, when you accosted Elmer Mapa, you actually were not aware what happened to Serapio de Gula since you were not present when he was accosted by Pat. Lucero? A It was Elmer Mapa who was first accosted and alter he was arrested, my other police companions ran. Q And they ran towards what direction? A Towards the place where Serapio de Gula was standing. Q And when you said the place where he was standing, it is the place where he was talking with Elmer Mapa? A Yes, Ma'am. Q And when Pat. Lucero effected the arrest, you were not actually present? A I was not there, but I saw that it was, Pat. Lucero who first took hold of Serapio do Gula. Q Now, since you were not with the team who accosted de Gula, you were not sure that the alleged marked money was recovered from de Gula? A I am sure about that, Ma'am. 11 Patrolman Lucero on the other hand, testified differently on this matter? "Q After you approached Pat. Capangyarihan, what happen next?

A Subsequently a person pulled Elmer Mapa. Q Who was this person who arrived and pulled Elmer Mapa? A Serapio de Gula, Sir. Q Did Serapio de Gula succeed in pulling out Elmer Mapa from the hands of Pat. Capangyarihan? A No, sir. Q What happened alter that? A We got hold of Serapio de Gula and asked him why be is interfering." Q Was, there any answer from him? A He told us that Elmer Maps is his nephew. xxx xxx xxx Q What did you do after you were informed about that? A We also got hold of Serapio de Gula and frisked him." 12 Another glaring inconsistency lies in the seized articles. Pat. Capangyarihan testifies: "Q And after Elmer had approached you, what did he do? A He handed me a plastic container containing twelve (12) handrolled suspected marijuana cigarettes. Q And what did you do? A After Elmer handed to me that suspected handrolled marijuana cigarettes, I introduced myself to him and then I arrested him." 13 On the other hand, Pat. Lucero testified that what Elmer was holding is a tea bag of marijuana and not a plastic container containing twelve (12) handrolled marijuana cigarettes. "Q When you saw Elmer Mapa being held by Pat. Capangyarihan, did you see him holding the money, referring to accused Elmer Mapa? A Yes, sir. Q What was that? Q One tea beg of marijuana. xxx xxx xxx Q What happened to the tea bag being held by Elmer Mapa and two peso bills found in possession of Serapio de Gula? A The tea bag of marijuana was brought to the NBI for laboratory examination. 14 Realizing probably his mistake, Pat. Capangyarihan later on changed his testimony by stating that he could not remember whether it was a plastic container that was given to him or not. Thus — "Q Mr. Witness, it appears that this alleged marijuana handrolled cigarettes is contained in an envelope with the marking DDM, etc. Is this

also the same container when you received the marijuana from the accused? A I cannot recall if this was the same thing wherein these 12 sticks of marijuana were placed. xxx xxx xxx Q But you don't recall, Mr. witness, at the time you apprehended the accused where was this marijuana cigarettes? A After having taken these marijuana cigarettes from Mapa, I took hold of them. A Meaning this was not contained in any container? A I cannot remember anymore if it was contained in any container or not. 15 The trial court observed the strange testimony of Pat. Lucero on a material point on cross examination wherein he admitted that a tea bag cannot be cigarette sticks. This shows that the prosecution cannot even determine what was really taken from accused-appellant, a tea bag or cigarette sticks. Thus, the Court inquired: Q Now, Mr. Witness, who was in custody of the alleged tea bag which was recovered by the team from Elmer Mapa, who was in possession from the time Elmer Mapa was already arrested up to the time he was brought to the police station? A It was Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, sir. Q But you admitted that you have occasion to look at the tea bag? A Yes, sir. Q What is the difference between the tea bag and the suspected marijuana? What is the difference? A Tea bag is like a tea bag, it is square contained like cigarette. Q You will agree with me that as far as I know a roach is like what we call "upos", a cigarette wrapped in a paper. I am referring to the paper wrapper, rolling paper? A Yes, Ma'am. Q And also you will agree with me that a tea bag cannot be a cigarette stick. A Yes, Ma'am. 16 Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered but also on who requested for the seized articles to be examined by the NBI. Pat. Capangyarihan testified that it was police aide Carreon who brought the seized articles to the NBI for examination, whereas Pat. Lucero testified that it was he who forwarded the marijuana to the NBI. Thus — Pat. Capangyarihan:

"Q By the way who submitted this alleged marijuana handrolled cigarettes to the NBI? A As far as I could remember, it was police aide Carreon who brought it to the NBI. 17 Pat. Lucero however testified: "Q You said you forwarded this to the NBI for laboratory examination. Did you come to know the result of the examination? A Yes, sir. Q How did you come to know the result? A There was a request to bring to the NBI and I waited for the result and upon reaching the headquarters, we submit them to the investigating Fiscal. 18 The foregoing contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses on who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination is significant. Is it police aide Carreon or Pat. Lucero? Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted to the NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken from the accused. Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously, one of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On such kind of shaky testimony conviction cannot be had. The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution. Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the appellant and his guilt for the crime charged. 19 As it is, the bungled testimonies of the police officers cannot be given credence. We are more inclined to believe the testimony of accusedappellant that he was a "target" to be arrested not for selling marijuana but as a replacement for Eduardo Dueñas who was at the time detained in the Municipal Jail, with accused-appellant as the substitute or "palitulo" in jail lingo, so that the detainee could be released. LibLex It would be noteworthy to mention though, that accused-appellant was subjected to a drug test to find out whether he was likewise a drug user. It is often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all the time is also a drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support his being a drug dependent. For whatever its worth, accused-appellant was found to be drug free. In the NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646 20 blood and urine specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this report was not presented during trial, such is made part of the records.

The evident falsehood spread on the records before Us creates a nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant. It is sad to state that many innocent people become victims of physical violence and/or harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to continue in a civilized society. While this Court commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of apprehending and prosecuting drug-traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes nor ignore the many reports of false arrests of innocent persons for extortion purposes and blackmail, or to satisfy some hidden personal resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer against the accused. Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped up drug charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 21 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed herefrom is hereby REVERSED, and the accused-appellant, Elmer Mapa y de Gula, is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Costs de officio. SO ORDERED.. Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Rollo, p. 1. 2. Rollo, pp. 149-163. 3. Id., at. p. 163. 4. Exhibits "A", "A-1". 5. T.S.N., February 17, 1988, p. 8. 6. Id., at. p. 15. 7. Id., at p. 13. 8. T.S.N., July 8, 1988, pp. 7-11. 9. Id., at p. 17. 10. T.S.N., January 23, 1987, pp. 9-10. 11. Id., at pp. 19-10. 12. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, pp. 5-6. 13. T.S.N., January 23, 1987, pp. 10-11. 14. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 7. 15. T.SN., June 5, 1987, pp. 5-9. 16. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 13. 17. T.S.N., June 5, 1987, p. 7. 18. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 8. 19. People vs. Canela, G.R. No. 97086, 208 SCRA 842 (1992).

20. 21.

Records, p. 19. People vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 64867-68, 172 SCRA 262 (1989).

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953.] PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendantappellant. Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant. Manuel O. Chan for appellees. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. "Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am. Jur., 714- 715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. 2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; TAXING SALARIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS, A DIMINUTION OF THEIR COMPENSATION AS FIXED BY LAW. — The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85 Phil., 552) to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of

a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J p: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs. Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and con involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine ourselves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he

considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution: "SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos." As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590: "SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law." So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To

determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. "Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N. W., 2nd 341, 342.) "When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." 11 Am. Jur., 714715.) "Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions intrusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions." (11 Am. Jur., 905.) By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This

act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. "The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied). "The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition." (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied). We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers. So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the income tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in full, and when he later pays his income tax, especially when the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully

realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of paydays during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at P12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted from and collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefore clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45? Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compared to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as

interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245): "The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to persons and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds." Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving, as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." When a judicial officer assumes office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this exemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and

comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the average, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous. Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption. And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 815). New and necessary industries are also exempted from taxation for a certain number of years. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by

constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Labrador, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring: Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G«R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers. PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting: I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution. EN BANC [G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947.] ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Pedro M. Recto and Que Tube C. Makalintal, for petitioner. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent. SYLLABUS 1. INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO SOVEREIGN; NATURE OF. — A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. — The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. — The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times." 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO GOVERNMENT OF HIS RESIDENCE. — The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION. — Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 114 OF REVISED PENAL CODE, APPLICABILITY OF. — Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES. — Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF TREASON. — Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason. 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF THEORY OF, ADOPTED. — Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty —such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and

independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide. 10. ID., SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE. — Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines. 11. ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. — The Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution. 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL. — The question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country." 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING JAPANESE OCCUPATION. — Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." RESOLUTION "In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;

and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic: "(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which of foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 42g; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526); "Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing

as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests; "Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United States was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty, or on the old theory that such occupation transfers the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word 'sovereignty' used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case; "Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the

citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions, the laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own; "Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation; "Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military

service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants; "Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor; "Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such

theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party i n the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide; "(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 , a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution;' Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them' (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, 'As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is 'a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any

government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.' "Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States 'All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States', was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not do away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that 'The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines'; "This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion." Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J ., concurring: Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started. As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an

emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if the law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension. Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended. Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives. "'Allegiance,' as the term is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208. "'Allegiance' was said by Mr. Justice Story to be 'nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is.' United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 456, 461; 169 U. S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890. "Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501. "By 'allegiance' is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U. S.(16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"'Allegiance,' as defined by Blackstone, 'is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being per actual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within the King's allegiance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehavior; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences.' Indians w ithin the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911." (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., pp. 226-227.) "Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen. "Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denotation or naturalization; (3) local allegiance — the arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or reed, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might

be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years." (3 C. J. S., 'p. 885.) "Allegiance. — The obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R. C. L., 140." (Ballantine Law Dictionary, p. 68.) "'Allegiance,' as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistency. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty." (W. W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.) "The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States: "Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other." (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p. 6.) "Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received. "It is a comparatively modern corruption of allegiance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and unqualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47. xxx xxx xxx "Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U. S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 42G." (1 Rouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.)

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.' (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies function on the assumption that sovereignty resides in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people. To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are. The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution. There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties, and the wife is thereby deprived of the

benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity? Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevetl, as spokeman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people. The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation f independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forunner of the future democratic constitution of the would government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war. Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be

included among the laws of ther Commonwealth which, by, his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation. Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory. "The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for a moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress. Petitioner advances the theory that protection is the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaining the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection. After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes lad during and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the

Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's theory. If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws governing, it, necessarily we have to conclude that the laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens. Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some foe feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political social and ethical ideologies, between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens. Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules, and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human psychology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred? The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law, could not have established in

our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people. One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller will readily throw away their arms to rally behind palladium of the invaders. Two foot he three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had reminded in full effect an should be enforced. That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said and that no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the useless of creating a People's Court to try crimes which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may the take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost. Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based n generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms

part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent. Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment? There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy determining agency of government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in fore laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2 ), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give more emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines small otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectively the enemy invasion. Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to re vindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which

appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminately classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test. HILADO, J ., concurring: I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed, to set them forth: I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE (a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or in civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history. But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones,

no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous BriandKellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945: "International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations. xxx xxx xxx "After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal. "The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. "Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry I,. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, 'war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing . . .. By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.'

"This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that justifiable war is a crime. "Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that 'a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.' "The Eighth Assembly of the league of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that 'war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species.' xxx xxx xxx "We therefore propose to charge that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of Peace." (U. S. A. — An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.) When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report. In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the BriandKellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression

constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American Conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue. It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack; against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof. Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war. Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 to the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With that modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the outlawing, proscription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saying that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact. If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or possess any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the

Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only in this sense should we speak here with respect this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation of territories they have so barbarously and feloniously invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy ( Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government? (b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The

continuance of the allegiance owed to a nation by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with. " . . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory. "The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . ." (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp 1898-1899.) ". . .Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . ." (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344) The occupant's lack of authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance. (c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when one's country is unable to afford him its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from that loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worthy offspring. The outward

manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and prompting of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and prompting of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their Love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence, was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime. II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.' Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be changed. Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoke of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution, which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the

Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people — they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in this respect. If one committed treason against the people of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Articles XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence — that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same — only his status has changed. PARAS, J ., dissenting: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is in full harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law adopted by our Constitution (Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 876,881.) The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally suspend all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command,

such action to be made known to the inhabitants. (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases. Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanations to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines have been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not proper to act under the present situation the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes." The suspension of political laws during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It is tuns consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interests of humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from the usage's established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before

the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.) The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power, whose interests and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52); and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant 'is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 29a), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 432.) He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage: "To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible

condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan." The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempts interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.) As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant,

against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant. In Peralta is. Director of Prisons. 75 Phil., 286, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298): "No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because 'a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect,' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely." In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code ni the aforesaid case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if , as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant? The decision in United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States — the court of highest human authority on

that subject — and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place was by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done the Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States. . . . We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . . .. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods

were in no correct sense imported into the United States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerent occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States." But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitant who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States,

allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to the occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. ( Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 364.) The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that those States should provide system of la-v and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.) When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a

territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered." The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulation (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organization. It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left militarily unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction. If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this

line of thought is that the Japanese are assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause it to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Clam vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon) 75 Phil., 371, 373. ) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.) Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhered to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people, as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of the treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been proJapanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations,

likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group, even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors. It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when the r mere physical presence implied force and pressure — and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute bolls of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said

Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (76 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907." The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of this authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government. "Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of the judicial process for non judicial ends, and attached cynics who 'see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the world yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict.' Mussolini may have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws

on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection. If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country. Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute reason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subservient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its manly provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to mail said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent county under the Commonwealth Government. The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status

nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty delegated by the United States whose sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete. "The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be casually appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming quad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created. "By this delegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any

considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 15.) The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. "It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal Constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 250.) "This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.) Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth

Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic. Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law. In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U. S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case can only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States. No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in act all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of the

Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmena who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice President of the Philippines. The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. Footnotes HILADO, J., concurring: 1. English case of De Jager vs. Attorney General of Naval; Belgian case of Auditeur Militaires vs. Van Dieren; cases of Petain, Laval and Quisling. 2.