Case Study Kumira Land

PÆMÖv‡gi †`Iqvb evRvi¯’ †gmvm© gwZb dvg© Gi ¯^Z¡vwaKvix Rbve nvRx Avãyj Mbx Rvgvj, Z`cyÎØq Rbve Avãyjøvn †gv‡Zb I nviæb †gv‡Zb wZbwU c„_K c„_K †iwRóªvixK…Z `vbcÎ `wjj Z_v 11.6.1981 Bs‡iwR m‡bi †iwRtK…Z 2572 bs I 2573 bs `vbcÎ g~‡j Ges 28.8.1982 Bs‡iwR m‡bi †iwRtK…Z 3661 bs `vbcÎg~‡j h_vµ‡g 35.11 GKi, 35.11 GKi Ges 70.00 GKi GKz‡b 140.22 GKi m¤úwË nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi, cxs-giûg †gŠjfx AwQqyi ingvb, mvwKb-eonvwZqv, _vbv-mvZKvwbqv, wRjv- PÆMvg , nvj mvwKb-evqZzk kid gmwR`, awbqvjvcvov, XvKv UªvsK †ivW, _vbvWejgywis, wRjv PÆMÖvg †K * `vb KiZt ¯^Z¡ I `LjP¨yZ nb| †mg‡Z nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. Gi bv‡g weGm Rwic P~ovšÍ cÖPvwiZ Av‡Q| 1388 evsjv nB‡Z 1393 evsjv ch©šÍ nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. wbR bv‡g LvRbv Av`vq K‡ib| m¤úwËi ZckxjPÆMÖvg †Rjvi AšÍM©Z mxZvKzÛ wRjvw¯’Z †gŠRv-DËi RsMj †mvbvBQwo Avi Gm 2 bs `v‡Mi I we Gm 2 bs `v‡Mi Av›`i 140.22 GKi cvnvox Rwg| PyovšÍiƒ‡c cÖPvwiZ we Gm LwZqvb bs-75 `vbcÎ `jx‡ji cÖ‡qvRbxq D‡jøL‡hvM¨ Ask

Avcwb `wjj MÖwnZv PÆMÖv‡gi cÖwm× a¤§©xq RbwnZKi I `vZe¨ cÖwZôvb ÒAvb&Ryg‡b B‡Ënv†`iÓ mfvcwZ nb| Avcwb ¯^qs* Ges Avcbvi cwiPvjbvaxb D³ Ò AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` Ó †`‡ki wewfbœ ¯’v‡b evqZyk kid bv‡g A‡bK gmwR` Ges wewfbœ gv`ªvmv , GwZgLvbv, †ndRLvbv Bmjvgx M‡elYv cÖwZôvb I `vZe¨ wPwKrmvjq cÖwZôv Kwiqv‡Qb Ges Zvnvi myô cwiPvjbv I a¤§©xq cy¯ÍK I cwÎKv cÖKvkbvi gva¨‡g Bmjvg a‡¤§©i I †`k I RvwZi †mevq wb‡qvwRZ iwnqv‡Qb Ges wewfbœ Dcv‡q Bmjvgx cyYtRvMi‡b GK wewkó f~wgKv cvjb Kwiqv Avwm‡Z‡Qb| Avcbvi ag©xq RbwnZKi Kvh©µ‡g hvici bvB mš‘ó nBqv Ges Avgv‡`i cÖ¯ÍvweZ g‡Z ag©xq I Rb‡mevg~jK Kv‡R e¨env‡ii Rb¨ Avcwb MÖwnZv * I Avcbvi cwiPvjbvaxb a¤§©xq cÖwZôvb mg~n‡K Dchy³ cvÎ we‡ePbvq BwZc~‡eŸ© ewY©Z Avgv‡`i me©m¤§wZµ‡g MÖwnZ wm×všÍ †gvZv‡eK Avgvi GKv ¯^Z¡xq I wPwýZ `Lwj Zckx‡ji

Rwgqvw` Avcbv‡K `vb Kivi cÖ¯Íve Kwi‡j Avcwb Zvnv‡Z m¤§Z nIqvq wbgœ Zckx‡ji Rwg wbR c‡ÿ I D³ dv‡g©i c‡ÿ nvwRiv mvÿxM‡bi mvÿvr Avcbv‡K wd Qwewjjøvn `vb Kwiqv w`jvg Ges `vbK…Z Zckx‡ji m¤úwË Avcbvi Lvm `L‡j Ac©Y Kwiqv Zvnv‡Z me© cÖKvi ¯^Z¡ `LjP¨yZ nBjvg| Avcwb MÖwnZv D³ `vb MÖnb KiZt Zckx‡ji m¤úwËi Avgvi Awc©Z `Lj eywSqv wbqv‡Qb| A`¨ ZvwiL nB‡Z Avcwb MÖwnZv Zckx‡ji m¤úwˇZ AÎ `vbcÎ g~‡j Avgvi hveZxq ¯^‡Z¡ ¯^Z¡evb nBqv Avcbvi cÖwZwôZ gv`ªvmv, GwZgLvbv BZ¨vw` a¤§©xq cÖwZôv‡bi e¨q wbe©vnv‡_© I Ab¨vb¨ a¤§©xq Kv‡Ri DcKviv‡_© h‡_”Q iKg †fvM `Lj I e¨envi Kwi‡Z _v‡Kb| cÖKvk _v‡K †h, Avcbvi * cwPvjbvaxb gv`ªvmv, GwZgLvbv, I Ab¨vb¨ a¤§©xq cÖwZôv‡bi e¨q wbe©vn I DbœwZ weav‡bi Rb¨ cÖ‡qvRb †ev‡a Avcwb Zckx‡ji m¤úwË mgy`q ev AvswkK e¨q wewµ ev n¯ÍvšÍi* Kwi‡Z mÿg _vwK‡eb| ‡NvlYv I wb‡lavÁvi gvgjv bs Aci 17/1990 AZtci wc I 98/1972 ((a) no family

[ or body] shall be entitled to retain any land held by it in

9

excess of one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate and all lands held by it in excess of that quantity shall be surrendered to the Government; and (b) no family 10[ or body] shall be entitled to acquire any land by purchase, inheritance, gift, heba or otherwise which, added to the land already held by it exceeds one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate:)

g~‡j weMZ 1991 Bs‡iwR m‡b D³ m¤úwËi gvwjKvbv m¤ú‡K© wecwË m„wó Z_v Dc‡iv³ m¤úwË wmwjs ewnf~©Z g‡g© miKv‡ii eive‡i Lvm Kivi Rb¨ AwZwi³ †Rjv cÖkvmK (ivR¯^) Zvnvi `߇ii ¯§viK bs- 631 (2) Gm G ZvwiL- 01/3/1990 Bs g~‡j mxZvKzÛ Dc‡Rjvi wbev©nx Kg©KZ©vi wbKU 28/02/1990 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡L GKwU Av‡`k †cÖiY K‡ib| Dnvi avivevwnKZvq mnKvix Kwgkbvi (f~wg) mxZvKzÛ D‡”Q` gvgjvi (hvnvi bs 22/1989/90) cÖ‡qvRbxq Kvh©µg Avi¤¢ Kwi‡j cÖK… Z/†iKW©xq gvwjK I †fvM `LjKvi nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. c‡ÿ Zvnvi GUwb© byi Avng` miKv‡ii D³ ¯§viK P¨v‡jÄ Kwiqv PÆMÖv‡gi weÁ mnKvix RR Av`vj‡Z Aci gvgjv bs 77/91 `v‡qi K‡ib| D³ gvgjvq weÁ Av`vjZ †`vZidv ïbvbx m~‡Î/mv‡c‡ÿ miKvi evnv`y‡ii m~‡Îv³ ¯§vi‡Ki cÎ AvBbMZfv‡e AKvh©Ki †NvlYv KiZt Zckx‡jv³ m¤úwˇZ †Kvbiƒc cÖwZeÜKZv m„wó bv Kwievi Ges †iKW©xq gvwj‡Ki †fvM `L‡j †Kvbiƒc e¨NvZ m„wó bv Kwievi Rb¨ ¯’vqx wb‡lavÁvi Av‡`k Øviv evwiZ K‡ib|

Av`vjZ g~jZt wZbwU wel‡q `„wócvZ K‡ib (30/6/1991 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡Li Av‡`k | 1. 7 bs wePvh©¨ Gi Ackb bv †`qv I 6bs wePvh© Z_v wcI 98/1972 Gi

GKwU Aby‡”Q` (Provided

that the limitation imposed by clause (a) shall not apply to

any land held under waqf, debuttor or any other religious or charitable trust, if the income from such land is exclusively dedicated to religious or charitable purposes without reservation of any pecuniary benefit for any individual: Provided further that if the income from any such land is partly dedicated to religious or charitable purposes and partly reserved for the pecuniary benefit of any individual, only such portion of the land, to be selected in the prescribed manner, shall be exempted from such limitation, as would yield the income exclusively dedicated to religious or charitable purposes. )

Ges 2. 3Rb wc WweøD Gi g‡a¨ wc WweøD-3 Rbve Rbve byi Avng‡`i mvÿ¨- hv Zvui mvÿ¨ As‡ki 7, 15, I 16 bs cvZvq wee„Z Av‡Q| 3. mnKvix RR Av`vj‡Zi Aci gvgjv bs 77/91 Gi 8 bs wePvh© welq| Ges 28 bs cvZvq wee„Z Ask| AZtci GKB gvgjvi 7/7/1991 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡Li wWwµ| AZtci wWwµ Rvwii 357 w`b ci miKvi cÿ †Rjv RR Av`vj‡Z Avcxj Ki‡j D³ Avccxj †`vZidvm~‡Î LvwiR nq (Zvgvw` AvBb Øviv evwiZ nIqvq) weMZ 13/9/1992 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡L| weMZ 2005 Bs‡iwRi 15B gvP© ch©šÍ miKvi cÿ LvwiR Av‡`‡ki weiæ‡× †Kvbiƒc wiwfkbvj †gvKÏgv `v‡qi K‡i bvB| 1388 evsjv nB‡Z 1393 evsjv ch©šÍ nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. wbR bv‡g LvRbv Av`vq K‡ib| Gici nB‡Z wewfbœ mgq Zvnvi Iqvwik Mb LvRbv Av`v‡qi `iLv¯Í Kwi‡jI bvbvKvi‡b Zvnv cÖ`vb Kiv nq bvB| D‡jøL¨ 1998Bs‡iwR m‡bi 25†k gvP© Zvwi‡L nhiZ AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. B‡šÍKvj K‡ib Zvunvi B‡šÍKv‡ji ci KzZzeywÏ †gŠjfx evqZzk ki‡di gmb‡` Av‡ivnb K‡i| ‡m Kvnv‡KI bv Rvbv&Bqv AwZ †Mvc‡b gnvgvb¨ nvB‡Kv‡U© Zvnvi †hvM¨ wkl¨ †di‡`Šmyj Kex‡ii gva¨‡g GKLvbv ixU wcwUkb `v‡qi K‡i| ix‡Ui gyL¨ welq wQj Zvnvi AbyK~‡j bvgRvix c~e©K LvRbv Av`v‡qi Av‡`k nvwmj Kiv|

| D³ wiU wcwUkb Awb¯úbœ Ae¯’vq wePvivaxb _vKvKv‡j 22/10/2006 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡L ‡gŠjfx KzZzeywÏi Avg-†gv³vi cwiPq `vbKvix R‰bK bxiÄb `vm KzZzeywÏi c‡ÿ f~wg gš¿Yvj‡q GKLvbv Av‡e`b K‡i| †m Zvnvi Av‡e`‡bi Dci f’wg gš¿Yvj‡qi mnKvix mwPe Avãyj nvwj‡gi †hvMmvR‡k Z`vbxšÍb f’wg Dc gš¿x GW‡fv‡KU iæûj KzÏym ZvjyK`vi `yjyi ¯^vÿi Rvj Kwiqv Zvnvi Av‡e`‡bi AbyK~‡j Dcš¿xi Kw_Z mycvwik †jLvBqv jBqv‡Q g‡g© †`LvBqv GKwU mywbÏ©ó ¯§viK bs mnKv‡i ( f~t gt / kv-9 / (bvgRvix)/130/06/1490/1(2) ZvwiL- 09/11/2006) gš¿Yvjq nB‡Z GKwU cÎ nvwmj K‡i| hvnv †Rjv cÖkvmK PÆMÖv‡gi eive‡i †cÖwiZ nq| BwZg‡a¨ (D³ wiU wcwUkb Awb¯úbœ Ae¯’vq wePvivaxb _vKvKv‡j) †gŠjfx KzZzeywÏ Zckx‡jv³ m¤úwË R‰bK gvngy` Avjxi wbKU mvZ †KvwU cuwPk jÿ UvKv `i mve¨¯Í Kwiqv Z¤§a¨ nB‡Z GK †KvwU UvKv evqbv eve` MÖnb Kwiqv weMZ 19/12/2006 Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡L 5010 bs ‡iwRt evqbvbvgv m¤úv`b K‡ib| D³ c‡Îi ¯§viK bs I Dnvi Av‡`k‡K P¨v‡jÄ Kwiqv AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. Gi ˆRôcyÎ gnvgvb¨ nvB‡Kv‡U© GKLvbv ixU wcwUkb `v‡qi K‡i| hvnv weMZ 30/6/2009Bs‡iwR Zvwi‡L bU †cÖmW& Kwiqv †diZ jIqv nq| BZ¨em‡i PÆMÖv‡gi 1g hyM¥ †Rjv RR Av`vj‡Z AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. Gi IqvwikMb ˆRôcyÎ †gvnv¤§` Avãyj nvB Gi gva¨‡g †gŠjfx KzZzeywÏ mn Ab¨vb¨‡`i weev`x Kwiqv GKLvbv ¯^Z¡ †NvlYvi gvgjv `v‡qi K‡i| Aci †gvKÏgv bs 97/2007| †gŠjfx KzZzeywÏi c‡ÿ AviRxi Reve cÖ`vb bv Kwiqv †`Iqvbx Kvh© wewai AW©vi 7 iæj 11 Gi Av‡jv‡K GKLvbv AviRx Lvwi‡Ri Av‡e`b Kiv nq | weÁ Av`vjZ †`vZidv ïbvbx m~‡Î AW©vi 7 iæj 11 Gi Av‡jv‡K †ckK…Z AviRx bv gÄyi KiZt (evi cvZv) ivq †NvlYv K‡ib| Zvnv‡Z `Lj wel‡q w¯’Zve¯’v Ges weµ‡qi Dci wb‡lavÁv cÖ`vb Kiv nq| GB Av‡`‡ki weiæ‡× gnvgvb¨ nvB‡Kv‡U© Avcxj Kiv nq (Gd Gg G 121/2009 )Av`vj‡Zi †bvwUk h_vh_fv‡e Rvix nq| cÖwZccÿ †Kvbiƒc

Reve A`¨vewa Av`vj‡Z †ck bv Kivq gvgjvwU ïbvbxi Rb¨ GL‡bv cÖ¯‘Z b‡n|

17/1991 gvgjvi AviRxi 5g I 7g cvZvq D‡jøL Av‡Q †h, .. .. Av‡iv eû UvKv e¨v‡q gw`bv †cvjwUª .. .. .. ... AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv‡`i c‡ÿ ev`xi cwiPvwjZ .. .. .. .. ..| AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv‡`i c‡ÿ ev`xi cwiPvwjZ K‡ZK cÖwZôv‡bi bv‡g †gŠwLK `vb Kwiqv w`‡j ev`xi c‡ÿ .. .. .. .. .. .. c„_K `iLv¯Í K‡ib| 1394 evsjv nB‡Z LvRbv Av`v‡q wecwË m„wó nq ; hvnv ‡NvlYv I wb‡lavÁvi gvgjv bs Aci 17/1990 Gi ev`xi AviRxi 7, 8 I 9 bs cvZvq wecwËi we¯ÍvwiZ wjwce× Av‡Q| * `vbcÎ `wj‡j Ò Avcwb ¯^qs Ó - ewjqv AZtci AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv‡`i K_v ejv nBqv‡Q| *

wbRbv‡g `vbcÎ cÖ`vb I MÖnb Kiv nq, `wj‡ji wk‡ivfv‡M AvjnvR¡ †gŠjvbv †gvnv¤§` Avãyj ReŸvi ivn. Gi ms¯’vMZ cwiPq bvB|

*

LyeB ¸iæZ¡c~Y© cÖkœ GB †h BwZg‡a¨ A_©vr ûRy‡ii RxeÏkvq †Kvbiƒc ev cÖKv†ii n¯ÍvšÍi nBhv‡Q wKbv ? nBqv _vwK‡j wKfv‡e Ges Zvnvi AvBbMZ MÖnb‡hvM¨Zv KZLvwb ?

*

AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` evsjv‡`k Ges evqZzk kid AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` evsjv‡`k GK Ges Awfbœ wKbv?

*

AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` wejyß nBqv‡Q wKbv ; bv nBqv _vwK‡j Zvnvi eZ©gvb mfcwZ †K ?

*

AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` evsjv‡`k Ges evqZzk kid AvbRyg‡b B‡Ënv` evsjv‡`k hw` GK I Awfbœ nq ; Z‡e MVbZ‡š¿i 17 bs Aby‡”Q` Abyhvqx †gŠjfx KzZzeywÏi mfvcwZZ¡ ˆea I MVbZvwš¿K wKbv|

*

bv nBqv _vwK‡j Zvnv KL‡bv P¨v‡jÄW& nBqvwQj wKbv ? ev eZ©gv‡b P¨v‡jÄ Kwievi my‡hvM Av‡Q wKbv

THE BANGLADESH LAND HOLDING (LIMITATION) ORDER, 1972 (PRESIDENT'S ORDER NO. 98 OF 1972). [15th August, 1972]

WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the reduction of the maximum quantity of land that may be held by a family [or a body] in Bangladesh and for matters ancillary thereto; NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh, read with the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is pleased to make the following Order:-

1

1. (1) This Order may be called the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) Order, 1972. (2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh. (3) It shall come into force at once.

2

2. In this Order, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,[ (a) “body” means body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and includes any company, firm, society, association, organisation or authority, by whatever name called;] 1

[ (aa)] “Deputy Commissioner” includes an Additional Deputy Commissioner or a Joint Deputy Commissioner; 2

(b) “family” in relation to a person includes such person and his wife, son, unmarried daughter, son's wife, son's son and son's unmarried daughter 3[ : Provided that an adult and married son who has been living in a separate mess independently of his parents continuously since 4 [ before the 20th day of February, 1972], and his wife, son and unmarried daughter shall be deemed to constitute a separate family: Provided further that in the cases of lands held under waqf, waqf-alal-aulad debutter or any other trust where the beneficiaries have no right to alienate such lands as their personal property, all such beneficiaries together shall be deemed to constitute a separate family in relation to such lands;] (c) “Government” means the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh; [ (cc) “head of a body” means a chairman, managing director, director, partner, manager, secretary or any other officer or agent of the body actively concerned in the conduct of the business or affairs thereof;] 5

[ (d) “head of a family” means-

6

(i) in case other than those mentioned in the second proviso to clause (b), 7[ * * *] the person, male or female, in relation to whom a family is determined by the Revenue-officer in the prescribed manner, and (ii) in the cases mentioned in the second proviso to clause (b), 8[ * * *], the Mutawalli, Sebait or trustee, as the case may be;] (e) “land” includes land covered with water at any time of the year, benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth; (f) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Order; and (g) “Revenue-officer” includes any officer whom the Government may appoint to discharge all or any of the functions of a Revenueofficer under this Order or any rules made thereunder.

3

3. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force,(a) no family 9[ or body] shall be entitled to retain any land held by

it in excess of one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate and all lands held by it in excess of that quantity shall be surrendered to the Government; and (b) no family 10[ or body] shall be entitled to acquire any land by purchase, inheritance, gift, heba or otherwise which, added to the land already held by it exceeds one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate: Provided that the limitation imposed by clause (a) shall not apply to any land held under waqf, debuttor or any other religious or charitable trust, if the income from such land is exclusively dedicated to religious or charitable purposes without reservation of any pecuniary benefit for any individual: Provided further that if the income from any such land is partly dedicated to religious or charitable purposes and partly reserved for the pecuniary benefit of any individual, only such portion of the land, to be selected in the prescribed manner, shall be exempted from such limitation, as would yield the income exclusively dedicated to religious or charitable purposes.

4

4. The Government may relax the limitations imposed by Article 3, to such extent and subject to such conditions as it thinks fit, in the following cases, namely:(a) a co-operative society of farmers where the members thereof surrender their ownership in the lands unconditionally to the society and cultivate the lands themselves; (b) land used for cultivation of tea, rubber or coffee by orchards];

[ or covered

11

(c) an industrial concern holding land for the production of raw materials for manufacture of commodities in its own factories; (d) any other case where such relaxation is considered necessary in the public interest.

5

5. For the purpose of clause (a) of Article 3, a family shall be deemed to be holding land in excess of one hundred standard bighas, if the aggregate of the total quantity of land held by all the members of the family on the date of submission of the statement under Article 7, together with the total quantity of land, if any, transferred by them after the 12[ 20th day of February, 1972], and before the date of submission of such statement exceeds one hundred standard bighas and the limitation imposed by that clause shall be applied to such family on the basis of such aggregate.

5A

[ 5A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or agreement, all transfers of land made by any member of a family, holding land in excess of one hundred standard bighas within the meaning of Article 5, after the 14 [ 15th day of August, 1972], and before the date of submission of the statement under Article 7, and also all transfers of land made by any member of any such family on or before the 15[ 15th day of August, 1972], otherwise than by written instruments duly registered before the said date shall be void. 13

Explanation - For the purposes of Article 5 and this Article, “transfer” includes a transfer effected in consequence of a decree of a Civil Court in a suit for the specific performance of a contract or for declaration of title or for enforcement of a mortgage security except where the mortgagee is the Government, a local authority, a scheduled bank or a co-operative society, but does not include a transfer in favour of the Government.]

5B

16

6

6. A family holding a total quantity of land in excess of one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate within the meaning of Article 5 17 [ or a body holding a total quantity of land in excess of one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate] shall have the option to select 18[ , out of the lands held by it,] 19[ * * * ] the lands to be surrendered to the Government being in excess of one hundred standard bighas:

[ 5B. Notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 5 and 5A, if, in the opinion of the Government, any member of a family, holding land in excess of one hundred standard bighas within the meaning of Article 5, transfer any land after the 20th day of February, 1972, and before the 16th day of August, 1972, by a written instrument duly registered, with a view to avoiding the surrender of excess lands to the Government, the Government may pass an order declaring such transfer void.]

Provided that all lands mortgaged to the Government, the Agricultural Development Corporation, the Agricultural Development Bank, the House Building Finance Corporation or a Co-operative Society shall be included within the quantity of land which the family 20[ or body] is entitled to retain under this Order, to the extent they can be covered by such quantity, and shall not be so surrendered.

7

7. 21[ (1)] 22[ By the 31st day of January, 1973], the head of every family holding land in excess of one hundred standard bighas within the meaning of Article 5, shall submit to the Revenue-officer, within whose jurisdiction he resides, a statement, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, showing the particulars of all lands(i) held by all the members of the family on the date of submission of the statement, (ii) transferred by them after the and

[ 20th day of February, 1972],

23

(iii) the family chooses to surrender to the Government as provided in Article 6 24[ : [ * * *]]

25

[ (2) By the 31st day of January, 1973, the head of a body holding land in excess of one hundred standard bighas shall submit to the Revenue-officer, within whose jurisdiction he resides or the body has its principal office or ordinarily carries on its business, a statement, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, showing the particulars of all lands26

(i) held by the body on the date of submission of the statement, and (ii) the body chooses to surrender to the Government as provided in Article 6. (3) The Government may extend the time for submission of statements under this Article in all cases or in any particular case or class of cases or in respect of any area up to such date as it thinks fit.]

8

8. If any head of a family 27[ or body] fails, without any reasonable cause, to submit the statement required under Article 7, within the time mentioned therein or wilfully makes any omission from, or incorrect declaration in, the statement submitted by him under that Article, he shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand taka, or with both and the land for which no statement has been submitted or which has been omitted from the statement or in respect of which the incorrect declaration has been made 28[ may be], forfeited to the Government 29[ . [* * *]]

9

9. Any person may furnish to the Revenue-officer the name and address of any head of a family 30[ or body] which, according to his information and belief, holds land in excess of one hundred standard bighas.

10

10. (1) On receipt of a statement under Article 7 or of information under Article 9, the Revenue-officer shall have such statement or information verified by necessary enquiries and shall, after giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, pass an order accepting the excess lands surrendered by a family 31[ or body] 32[ * * *]: Provided that where a family 33[ or body] does not exercise its option to select the lands to be surrendered to the Government or the option so exercised does not conform to the provisions of Article 6, the Revenue-officer shall make such selection himself in the prescribed manner. (2) An order of the Revenue-officer under clause (1) 34[ accepting any excess land] shall contain the full particulars of such land and upon the passing of such order, such land shall, subject to the provision of Article 11, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.

11

[ 11. (1) An appeal against an order passed by the Revenueofficer under clause (1) of Article 10, if preferred within thirty days of the date of such order, shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner. 35

(2) An appeal against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on an appeal under clause (1), if preferred within thirty days of the date of such order, shall lie to the 36[ Divisional Commissioner]. [ (3) A revision petition against the order of the Divisional Commissioner may be presented before the Board of Land Administration within one month from the date of passing of the order and the decision of the Board of Land Administration in this behalf shall be final.] 37

12

12. All lands acquired by any family 38[ or body] in excess of one hundred standard bighas after the date of commencement of this Order, or where a family 39[ or body] has submitted the statement under Article 7, after the date of submission of such statement, otherwise than by inheritance, shall stand forfeited to the Government, and where any such excess land is acquired by inheritance, it shall vest in the Government free from all

encumbrances.

13

13. The Government shall pay compensation for all excess lands 40 [ vested in the Government under clause (2) of Article 10], and also for all excess lands acquired by a family by inheritance which have vested in the Government under Article 12, at the following rates, namely:(a) where the total quantity of land 41[ so vested] does not exceed fifty standard bighas, twenty per centum of the market value of such land; and (b) where the total quantity of land standard bighas,-

[ so vested] exceeds fifty

42

(i) for fifty standard bighas, twenty per centum of the market value of such land, and (ii) for the balance, ten per centum of the market value of such land: Provided that the family 43[ or body] shall be given the choice to select the lands for the purpose of assessment of compensation under sub-clause (i) of clause (b): Provided further that no compensation shall be payable for any excess land acquired by a family by inheritance which has vested in the Government under Article 12, unless the head of the family submits the full particulars of such land to the Revenue-officer within thirty days of such acquisition.

14

14. The amount of compensation assessed as payable to a family 44[ or body] under Article 13 shall be paid in cash up to ten thousand taka and the balance, if any, shall be paid in savings certificates.

15

15. The assessment and payment of compensation under Articles 13 and 14 shall be made by the Revenue-officer in such manner as may be prescribed.

16

16. (1) An appeal against an order of the Revenue-officer assessing compensation under Article 15, if preferred within thirty days of the date of such order, shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner.

(2) An appeal against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under clause (1), if preferred within thirty days of the date of such order, shall lie to the District Judge and the order of the District Judge on such appeal shall be final.

17

17. Except as provided in clause (2) of Article 16, any order passed, any action taken or anything done under the provisions of this Order shall not be called in question in any Court.

18

18. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Article 8, except upon a complaint in writing made by the Revenueofficer 45[ * * *].

19

19. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Order or any rules made thereunder.

20

20. A Revenue-officer may, at any time between the hours of sunrise and sunset, enter upon any land, with such officers or servants as he considers necessary, and make a survey or take measurement thereof or do any other acts which he considers to be necessary for carrying out any of his duties under this Order.

21

21. (1) A Revenue-officer may, for the purposes of this Order, by notice require any person to make or deliver to him a statement or to produce records or documents in his possession or control relating to any land at a time and place specified in the notice.

(2) Every person required to make or deliver a statement or to produce any record or document under clause (1) shall be deemed legally bound to do so within the meaning of sections 175 and 176 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).

22

22. For the purposes of any enquiry under this Order, a Revenueofficer shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses or of any person having an interest in any land and to compel the production of documents by the same means and, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908).

23

23. The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that any power conferred or duty imposed by this Order upon it shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, be exercised or performed by any officer or authority subordinate to it.

24

24. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order or in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, at any time, further reduce the maximum quantity of land that may be held by a family in Bangladesh under this Order, and when such further reduction is made, compensation shall be paid for all excess lands that may be surrendered to, or may vest in, the Government in consequence of such reduction at the rates specified in Article 13 and all the other provisions of this Order shall, as far as may be, apply to all matters relating to such reduction.

25

25. The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Order.

Clause (a) was inserted by section 3 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 1

The existing clause (a) was renumbered as clause (aa) by section 3 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 2

The colon (:) was substituted for the semi-colon (;) and thereafter the provisos were added by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 3

The words, figures and comma “before the 20th day of February, 1972 ” were substituted for the words, figure and comma “five years before the 16th day of December, 1971” by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 4

Clause (cc) was inserted by section 3 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 5

Clause (d) was substituted by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 6

The words and comma “amended as aforesaid,” were omitted by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 7

The words and comma “amended as aforesaid,” were omitted by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 8

The words “or body” were inserted by section 4 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 9

The words “or body” were inserted by section 4 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 10

The words “or covered by orchards” were inserted by Article 3 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 11

The words, figures and comma “20th day of February, 1972” were substituted for the words, comma and figures “16th day of December, 1971” by Article 3 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 12

Article 5A was inserted by Article 4 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 13

The words, figures and comma “15th day of August, 1972 ” were substituted for the words, figures and comma “20th day of February, 1972” by Article 4 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 14

The words, figures and comma “15th day of August, 1972 ” were substituted for the words, figures and comma “20th day of February, 1972” by Article 4 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 15

Article 5B was inserted by Article 5 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 16

The words “or a body holding a total quantity of land in excess of one hundred standard bighas in the aggregate” were inserted by section 5 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 17

The commas and words “, out of the lands held by it,” were inserted by Article 6 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 18

The commas and words “, out of the lands actually held be it,” were omitted by Article 5 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 19

The words “or body” were inserted by section 5 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 20

Article 7 was renumbered as clause (1) by section 6 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 21

The words, figures, letters and comma “By the 31st day of January, 1973 ” were substituted for the words “Within sixty days from the date of commencement of this Order” by Article 6 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 22

The words, figures and comma “20th day of February, 1972” were substituted for the words, comma and figure “16th day of December, 1971” by Article 7 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 23

The colon (:) was substituted for the full-stop (.) and thereafter the proviso was added by Article 2 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1973 (President's Order No. 6 of 1973) 24

The proviso was omitted by section 6 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 25

Clauses (2) and (3) were added by section 6 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 26

The words “or body” were inserted by section 7 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 27

28

The words “may be” were substituted for the words “shall stand” by Article 8 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation)

(Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) The full-stop (.) was substituted for the colon (:) and the proviso was omitted by Article 7 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 29

The words “or body” were inserted by section 7 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 30

The words “or body” were inserted by section 8 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 31

The words , figure and comma “or forfeiting any land under Article 8, as the case may be” were omitted by Article 9 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 32

The words “or body” were inserted by section 8 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 33

The words “accepting any excess land” were substituted for the words “accepting any excess land or forfeiting any land” by Article 9 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 34

Article 11 was substituted by Article 8 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 138 of 1972) 35

The words “Divisional Commissioner” were substituted for the word “Government” by section 4 and the Schedule of the Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. XLI of 1982) 36

Clause (3) was substituted by section 4 and the Schedule of the Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. XLI of 1982) 37

The words “or body” were inserted by section 9 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 38

The words “or body” were inserted by section 9 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 39

The words, figures and brackets “vested in the Government under clause (2) of Article 10” were substituted for the words and figures “surrendered by a family and accepted under Article 10” by Article 10 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 40

The words “so vested” were substituted for the words “so accepted or vested” by Article 10 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 41

The words “so vested” were substituted for the words “so accepted or vested” by Article 10 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 42

The words “or body” were inserted by section 10 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 43

The words “or body” were inserted by section 11 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. III of 1982) 44

The words “or by any other officer authorised by him in writing in this behalf” were omitted by Article 10 of the Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) (Second Amendment) Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 154 of 1972) 45

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Introduction

The judgment forms the concluding part of the civil suit and it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties. Basically judgment is followed by a decree which is its operating part. Historically,

there was the distinction between judgment and decree. Common Law adheres to the judgment while the Equity Court of Law deals with the decree. But later on Judicature Act was passed in U.K. which merged the distinction between judgment and decree. In U.S. also, distinction between judgment and decree has lost its relevance but in India, the distinction between judgment and decree has still maintain its position from the initiation of the old Code of Civil Procedure, 1859. The present Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 also recognizes this distinction. In this legal world, judgment given by any court followed by its decree play an important role to define the scope and limitations of any individual. Apart from the statutory rules and regulations, one also has to adhere to the decision given by the court to keep oneself away from the clutches of the court room drama. Daily various judgments are pronounced and decree following it took place in the courts of our country. Various civil cases are also being disposed off each working day. These judgments are important as they act as precedents for future declarations, so it is very necessary that they stick to the judicial reasoning without bringing their own discretionary power blindly. After so many judgments and backing it up with the decree also, certain issues do arises which tends to confuse us. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 has been drafted very nicely but then also certain loopholes are there providing leeway for the creeping of unnecessary elements. As no law seems to perfect for us but then also effort should be made to take them somewhere close to the shell of perfectness. Decree is the operating part of the judgment and it has to be in harmony with the judgment. Section 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 says decree is followed by the judgment. Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred as C.P.C.) judgment and decree has been defined in the section 2 of the C.P.C. and provisions related to it are given in the Order 20 of this Act. Certain specific issues arise while dealing with this Order such as the time frame for the pronouncement of the judgment; power to amend the decree; reasons for each decision etc. Pronouncement of Judgment- The D’ Day Crystallizing judge’s intention into a formal shape in an open court leads the judgment to its final destination. Rule 1 of Order 20 deals with the pronouncement of judgment. It talks of specific time frame for the declaration of the judgment in the open court. But there was no time limit prescribed for the pronouncement of judgment prior to the amendment in 1976 which led to a persistent demand all over India for the imposition of a reasonable time frame for the declaration of judgment after the hearing of the case gets over . In this regard, observation of the Supreme Court in R.C. Sharma v. Union of India is worth noting; The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and the delivery of a judgment. Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is the litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done. Accordingly amendment was introduced providing a time limit for the declaration of the judgment. If it is not possible to pronounce the judgment at once, it should be declared within thirty days from the day of conclusion of the hearing and in case some extreme situation arises then the provision is also there to extend this declaration of pronouncement till the sixtieth day from the conclusion of hearing. Thus judge have a discretionary power for the pronouncement of judgment for these sixty days but after that declaration becomes mandatory on the part of the judge.

But what happens if the judgment is not pronounced within sixty days also. Supreme Court has strongly deprecated the action of the High Court in the case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar , where the judgment was pronounced after two years. Remarks of the honourable court in this case are just next to the truth and are worth noting down: # The Constitution did not provide anything when High Court judges do not pronounce judgments after lapse of several months presumably because the architects of the Constitution believed that no High Court judge would cause long and distressing delays. Such expectation of the makers of the Constitution remained faultless during the early period of the post Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later years have shown slackness on the part of a few judges of the superior Courts in India with the result that the records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves normally forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced. Sometimes the interval is so long that the judges forget even the fact that such a case is pending with them expecting judicial verdict. # This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. A long delay in delivering the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to a case. # Excessive delay is not only against the provisions of law but in fact infringes the right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Any procedure or course of action which does not ensure a reasonable quick adjudication has been termed to be unjust. # Justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been done. Similarly whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is even worst than that. # In a country like ours where people consider the judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eye-brows, some time genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. Thus declaration of judgment within reasonable time is highly inevitable. In order to raise the standard of the court in this regard certain guidelines has also been given in the Anil Rai’s case. These guidelines are given below: # The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court officer concerned. # The Chief Justices of the High Courts should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month. # On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. # Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays. # If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said list shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances. Alteration in Judgment Before the pronouncement of judgment, every right is with the judge to change his mind but the

dilemma arises in the situation when judgment has been declared in the open court and after that something strikes to the judge which prompts him to alter the judgment; so the question arises will the changed mind frame should be given prevalence over the old decision or old should be preserved from the new one? Rule 3 of Order 20 of C.P.C. provides that a judgment once signed cannot be amended or altered afterwards except to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors due to accidental slips or omissions as mentioned in section 152 of the C.P.C. or on review. According to Allahabad High Court in Sangam Lal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer , a judgment dictated in an open court can be changed, even completely, before it is signed provided notice is given to all parties concerned and they are heard before the change is made. Reasoning given for this judgment was that they do not want to construe the rules too technically as they are indeed rules to further the ends of justice; so they should not be viewed too narrowly. This view of the Allahabad High Court was also accepted by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ram Ralaya v. The Official Receiver . But the Gujarat High Court disagreed with this view and was of the opinion that once a judgment has been pronounced or delivered in an open court, though formal corrections may be made before the judge signs it, the core of it cannot be altered or changed so as to modify the order or amend or even set it at naught . Basically judgment is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at the large in an open court. This declaration is the intention of the mindset of the court after going through the tedious process of the wholesome hearing. This intention of the court is the final operative decision of the court which constitutes the decision. Regarding this, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ishwarbhai mentions some worthwhile remarks. It says that, as soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court. The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is any irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus, if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently consequent on acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of this subsequent authentication. The court can do some formal corrections but the core of it cannot be altered or changed so as to modify the order or amend or even set at naught the same. That can be done only by the Court in appeal or in revision. Even with the consent or agreement of the parties also, a judgment cannot be altered or amended. The researcher is also in line with the decision of the Gujarat High Court. Allowing alteration before signing of judgment but after declaration in the open court raises doubt regarding the sanctity of the judgment. Reasoning for Decision Before starting anything, it is very necessary to lay down the ground; before judging also something, it is quite crucial to have full facts before it and then take out the relevant portions to make a concise statement of the case. Thus, a judgment should inaugurate with the facts of the case in brief. Rule 4(2) of Order 20 of C.P.C. states that apart from the judgment of Small Cause Courts, judgments of all other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case; the points for determination; the decision thereon; and the reasons for such decision. Thus after laying down the facts, facts in issue should be settled by bringing out the claims which are disputed between both the parties; thus issues should be framed. Framing of issues should be done via Rule 1 of Order 14 of C.P.C. Now after issues are framed, points for determination come into picture and for determining those points, need for extra force is required. It is not possible to cruise through the disputed

facts in the absence of any peaceful land. In order to satisfactorily reach on a judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise, it has to be supported by the most cogent reasons; a mere order deciding the matter in dispute without any reasoning is no judgment at all Power of reasoning is needed to back up the decision on each issue given by the court under Rule 5 of Order 20 of this Code. Rule 2 of Order 14 of C.P.C. provides judgment to be given on all the issues that has arisen in the given case. Rule 1 of the same Order provides for framing of issues with the object of keeping the various points arising for decision separate and distinct and to avoid the confusion later on. As per Rule 5 of Order 20 of C.P.C. court has to state its decision with reasons on each issue separately unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit. But Rule 2 of Order 14 of C.P.C. requires that a court should decide on all issues even if the case can be decided by settling few issues only except where a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction or bar to suit is involved. Further with the addition of an explanation to Rule 22 of Order 41 of C.P.C. which empowers a respondent in appeal to file cross objection in respect of findings against him in a decree notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit the decree is wholly or in part in favour of the respondent, the intention of the legislature is clear that the court will now have to decide and state its findings on all the issues even if it considers that finding for one or only few issues is sufficient for the disposal of the case. Thus in order to have a harmonious construction of all these rules, it would be judicial to amend the Rule 5 of Order 20 of C.P.C. by omission of the words unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit at the end . Moreover, principle of res-judicata operates after the determination of the case; so in case if judgment is not given by deciding all the issues then problem can erupt in future whether the rule of res-judicata will operate or not for that particular issue. There is ambiguity whether recording of reasons for each issue is one of the principle of natural justice or not but it is inevitable for providing safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness and provides protection to the person adversely affected The court must decide all the issues of fact, which arise between the parties as if the appellate Court takes a different view; the parties are saved from further harassment . Court has to refer in its judgment all the submissions made before it and have to deal with it even if the court is of the opinion that there is no substance in any of the submission; in those extreme situations the Court may just refer to the same and say that there is no substance. In the absence of discussion in detail of the evidence by the parties, it cannot be said that its judgment is no judgment in the eyes of law. All the court has to do is to frame proper issues and to keep in mind all the points involved in the case and has discussed all those points, though in brief; thus giving full respect to the judgment. Problem arises where there is absolutely no evidence on the record and the plaintiff is wholly unable to proceed with the case; in that situation an order simply dismissing the suit without a finding on every issue is not bad. It would be a sheer formality to write a judgment on each issue in these scenarios. Comparison Between Judgment & Decree Judgment is defined in section 2(9) of the C.P.C. which says judgment is the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Judgment refers to what the judge writes regarding all the issues in the matter and the decision on each of the issues. Hence every judgment consists of facts, evidence, findings etc. and the conclusion of the court. The term decree is defined in section 2(2) of the C.P.C. which reads as follows: decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court

expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not includea) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or b) any order of dismissal for default. Decree is the conclusion reached by the judge after hearing both parties on merits and expressing the same in writing. Basically decree is the subset in the set of judgment. The decree forms the last part of the judgment and is extracted from the entire judgment by the decree clerk who contains the basic details and the result of the case. The date of the decree is the date of judgment for the purpose of execution though it can be signed anytime later even by a successor judge though it should be given within 15 days. Even a set-off/ counter claim is in the same decree. Judgments by way of an amendment in 1976 must contain the exact decree and words like “decree what is prayed for” cannot be used. Thus every judgment contains the decree, amongst other things and the decree is usually the last portion of the judgment and the decree independently is without reasoning. There is no need of a statement in a decree though it is necessary in a judgment. Likewise, it is not necessary that there should be a formal expression of the order in the judgment, though it is desirable to do so. A judgment is a stage prior to the passing of a decree or an order, and after the pronouncement of the judgment, way for the decree has to be left wide open. Decree has to be in line with the judgment and it should present the correct interpretation of the judgment. But in case, scenario arises where there appears to be a conflict between the judgment and the decree, then the decree must be reasonably construed and if on such construction both of them able to remain together, then adhere to that decree. But if it gets difficult for the decree to stay together with the judgment, then it must be amended under section 151 of the C.P.C. and if there is any clerical mistakes in the decree, then section 152 of the C.P.C. will take out the decree safe from the clutch of being declared nullity. ********* EndnotesJustice C.K. Thakker, Civil Procedure (5th edn., Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2005) at 273. AIR 1976 SC 2037. AIR 2001 SC 3173. AIR 1966 All 221. AIR 1976 Del. 172. Ishwarbhai v. Vadilal, AIR 1968 Guj. 289. Subramania v. Corera, AIR 1925 Madras 457. Swaranlata v. Harendra, AIR 1969 SC 1167. Sudipto Sarkar & VR Manohar, Sarkar’s The Law of Civil Procedure Vol. 1 (10th edn., New Delhi: Wadhwa & Company Nagpur, 2002) at 1319. Supra note 1 at 275. Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh v. Sukar Ahir, AIR 1947 Pat. 334.

Balkrishna Chatrabhuj Thacker v. Devabai, AIR 1985 Guj. 133. Jokhan v. The Joint Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, AIR 1980 All 215. Pitamber Prasad v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1957 All 107. Supra note 1 at 21.