Case Digest - Medico Legal Aspect Of Drugs.docx

Case Digests: Medico-legal Aspect of Drugs

9.

People v. Farhad Hatani G.R. No. 78813-14, November 8, 1993 Facts: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

In the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her camadre, Maura Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter Precila, who had high fever and LBM Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat Precila and Agustina agreed Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her tablets to take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the second at noon. After each injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep. It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina agreed in the belief that her daughter was a drug addict. In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to sleep. When she awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep. When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched her private parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her another injection rendering her unconscious. The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence, she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and appellant both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed that morning. She also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister, Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a second shot of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence. The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave their statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on Precila's arms and buttocks. A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L"). Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary AntiNarcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979. Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap and other medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a "hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized. The Handwriting Identification Report on the prescription slips showed that these were written by the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the seized tablets and capsules confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium. After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for (1) rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes. The RTC convicted the appellant of both crimes Hence, this appeal.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Issue: WON appellant is guilty of both crimes 11. Held: 1. 2.

3.

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days.

12.

13. 14.

Precila did not give any statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her two sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she would gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind even four years after. Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as a consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of the injuries does not negate the commission of rape, for rape may be committed after rendering a woman unconscious Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding was actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential element of rape. To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative. Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas were antedated and were prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also cites some inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such objections and to refute them. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor details, which cannot destroy their credibility. This is also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with the affidavit, which are generally incomplete With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his innocence. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours from the commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had

15.

16.

17.

18.

"deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and Precila was "in non-virgin state physically". Furthermore, the report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her several times. On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on the bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both attempts from accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections. This is corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together naked on bed. This unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila. As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where the rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator. It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to justice. Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's decision holding that it. —

24.

25.

26.

27.

28. . . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the defense to show the contrary 19. Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement of the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide evidence to the contrary. 20. With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant. 21. If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? 22. A perusal of the photographs showing accused during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony that his room was made into a mess during the raid. 23. The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to present its return and

29.

we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was obtained. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard both criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a search warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously, the items seized are admissible in evidence. The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal reports which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting Identification Report showing assorted drugs and medical equipment in appellant's room; and the chemistry reports prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee. Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her crossexamination that she was in school the whole day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony was in response to a question regarding her school schedule for that day. Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

People v. Juan Mendoza G.R. No. 186387, August 31, 2011 J. Mendoza Facts: Prosecution Version 1.

SPO4 Edelfonso Sison received information from an informant of the Baguio City Police Office-Drug Enforcement Section (BCPO-DES) that the accused contacted him and offered to sell shabu worth P1,000 to any interested buyer. The accused then suggested that they meet at the stairs of the Cresencia Brgy. Hall along Bokawkan Road.

9.

After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector Myles Pascual (PSI Pascual) decided to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap the accused. PSI Pascual made arrangements for the informant, the accused, and the poseur buyer officer to meet on April 14, 2005 around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon at the stairs below the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road. He planned for an entrapment operation and put together a team, with SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky Calamiong (PO3 Calamiong) and PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3 Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police Officer 2 Edgar Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the poseur buyer. In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the entrapment team proceeded to the area at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, half an hour before the scheduled time. The team parked their vehicle 20 to 30 meters away from the designated transaction area. PO2 Antolin and the informant alighted and proceeded to the stairway to wait for the accused. Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached the informant. The latter introduced PO2 Antolin as the buyer. After the accused asked if the buyer had the money, PO2 Antolin handed over P1,000.00. The accused then gave him two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Antolin raised his right hand, the pre-arranged signal, signifying to the other team members that the transaction had been consummated. The team rushed to assist PO2 Antolin, who arrested the accused and recovered the buybust-money. PO2 Antolin frisked the accused and recovered five (5) more small transparent sachets with white crystalline substance from the pants pocket of the accused. He turned over the same to the team leader, SPO4 Sison. SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why he was being arrested and apprised him of his constitutional rights. The accused merely nodded but otherwise kept silent. The buy-bust team then took the accused to the BCPO, where PO2 Antolin identified him as Juan Mendoza, alias "Ampi." In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance recovered from the accused tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The case records state that after the conduct of such preliminary test, the items confiscated from the accused were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further analysis and disposition. A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan Bullong yielded the same result.

Version of the Accused 10. According the accused, he was questioned by a SPO4 Sison on the identity of a certain Gary Chua which he had no knowledge.

11. He was then invited to the BCPO and was subjected to a drug test. 12. Again, unable to refuse, he was subjected to a drug test at the BCPO Station 7 laboratory, in front of the DES. He was then brought to the Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for a medical examination, and later back to the police station. 13. During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have a counsel present.7 SPO4 Sison did not inform him that he was being arrested for the possession of the 5 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu. 14. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt 15. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Issue: (1)

(2)

WON the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 were not complied with WON the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt

9.

a.

b. c.

d. e.

investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. Regarding the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination, the parties admitted the following facts during pre-trial: The fact that the forensic chemist examined the drugs and prepared the report thereon but qualified that it did not come from the accused; Medico-legal Report; The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory taking, signed the inventory but they have no knowledge that the drugs came from the accused. Order of detention, booking sheet and preliminary test; Existence of the pre-operation report and the request for drug test.

16. From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is no break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time that it came to the possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such items were presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is no doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug were properly preserved, in compliance with what the law requires. 17. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED People v. John Brian Amarillo (Jao Mapa) G.R. No. 194721, August 15, 2012 J. Perez Facts: 1.

Held: 1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of merit. In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied: (1) identities of the buyer, the seller, the object, and the consideration (BSOC); and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it must be shown that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In this case, all these elements were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented during the trial. PO2 Antolin, the designated poseur-buyer, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the accused, and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered from the accused. Then, SPO4 Sison corroborated PO2 Antolin’s testimony and confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the accused were turned over to him as team leader. The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody and disposition of the dangerous drugs was not observed. The Court finds, however, that the compliance with the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established in this case. In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the

10. The prosecution also presented several documents that traced how the evidence changed hands. 11. The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses listed six small transparent heat-sealed plastic sachets, each weighing approximately 0.3g and containing white crystalline substance suspected to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, previously marked as "ECA" 04/14/0521, and showed the corresponding photos taken during the inventory. 12. The Certificate of Preliminary Test prepared under the signature of Marites Vizcara Tamio of the BCPO DES and addressed to the Baguio City Prosecutor, certified that on April 14, 2005, at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she conducted a preliminary test on the same marked items by using Simons reagent on the white crystalline substance contained in the individually heat-sealed plastic sachets. 13. All the items yielded a "dark blue color," indicating the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The same certificate stated that the alleged confiscated pieces of evidence were turned over the to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry analysis and disposition. 14. Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-200525 issued by the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet stated that following a qualitative examination conducted on the same marked items, it was found that the specimens produced a positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 15. The illegal drugs subject of the buy-bust transaction and those recovered from the person of the accused were positively identified by PO2 Antolin, marked and presented as evidence during trial

2.

3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

Accused-appellant identified himself as "John Brian Amarillo”, 25 years old, a resident of Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, single, a washing boy." The records do not indicate when, how and upon whose liking the a.k.a. "Jao Mapa" came to be associated with the accused (LOL). "Jao Mapa," the "washing boy" who was acquitted for violation of Sec. 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case in 2004, and whose name appeared in the drugs Watchlist of Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, was again charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu this time allegedly committed in 2006. On 8 May 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the forensic chemist and PO2 Rafael Castillo, the police investigator assigned to the case, appeared in court. The parties stipulated on the following: "qualification of the forensic chemist as an expert witness; existence of the documents relative to the examination conducted by the forensic chemist; substance, subject matter of [the] case; existence of the Final Investigation [R]eport; and Acknowledgement Receipt," after which, the court ordered that the testimony of the forensic chemist and the police investigator be dispensed with. After the trial, the RTC found Jao Mapa guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Hence, this automatic review of the accused decision

Issue: WON the chain of custody was followed Held: 1.

To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.

2.

And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. 3. In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, not being authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza in a buy-bust operation. 4. PO1 Mendoza testified that, during the buy-bust operation, the informant introduced him to accused-appellant; that informant asked accused-appellant if he could help PO1 Mendoza buy shabu; that accused-appellant agreed to sell him Three Hundred Peso-worth of shabu; that PO1 Mendoza, counted the pre-marked bills in front of accusedappellant and gave them to him; and that accusedappellant, in turn, handed him a small transparent plastic sachet, which he took from the pocket of his short pants, and which tested for shabu based on the result of the laboratory examination. 5. PO1 Lique corroborated the testimony of PO1 Mendoza by stating that he saw accused-appellant hand something to the poseur-buyer. 6. Further, the seized items, together with the result of the laboratory examination and the marked money were all presented in court. 7. As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, the prosecution clearly proved the presence of the following essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." 8. After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen (17) heat-sealed sachets of white substance were found in his possession. 9. The chemistry report showed that the white substance in the plastic sachets tested for shabu. And, there was no showing that such possession was authorized by law. 10. We find no merit in the arguments of the defense that the arresting officers did not testify that the marking of the seized items were done in the presence of the persons mentioned by the law and its implementing rules; and that testimonies on how the confiscated items were turned over to the investigator for examination were lacking. 11. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Randy C. Santos, the allegations of which PO1 Mendoza affirmed and confirmed during his direct testimony, is clear on two points: (1) that the seized items were marked and inventoried at the place where accused-appellant was arrested; and (2) that the integrity of the seized items was preserved. Thus: 4. That immediately thereafter, together with the confiscated pieces of evidence marked and inventoried at the place of suspect’s apprehension, the confiscated pieces of evidence, together with suspect AMARILLO, were immediately brought at

SAID SOTF office, for formal dispositions and proper investigations. 5. That, before the SAID SOTF office, the investigator on case acknowledge the complaint, and in preparation for the formal filing of formal charges against herein suspects, same was subjected to the procedural Drug Test at SOCO/SPD and mandatory MEDICO LEGAL examinations at OSMAK Malugay as assisted by the same arresting officers, xxx. The confiscated pieces of evidence, only in so far with the suspected illegal drugs and the small white plastic Mercury Drug were referred at SOCO SPD for laboratory examinations and safe keeping.

12. The testimony, in turn, is well-supported by a copy of the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit "A") showing that it was PO1 Mendoza himself who brought the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 13. As to the required "presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official," Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 specifically provides: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – x x x: 1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; 14. This has been substantially complied with after the prosecution was able to show that the accused, the arresting officers and a public official were all present during the inventory of the seized items as evidenced by the

testimonies of the witnesses, the photographs, and the Acknowledgement Receipt of the items seized. 15. Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of these were defective for one reason or another, the defense failed to consider the following well-settled principle: The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 16. The Court has long settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. 17. As to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, we hold, as we have done time and again, that "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect" and that "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings." 18. Also, after a thorough examination of the records, we find the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution credible. For instance, after the cross examination of Barangay Captain Gatchalian, the presiding judge asked him a number of clarificatory questions, which he readily answered in a straightforward manner. 19. PO3 Lique corroborated material facts in the testimony of PO1 Mendoza, to the effect that the sale of shabu between accused-appellant and PO1 Mendoza was consummated, and that Barangay Captain Gatchalian was present during the inventory of the seized items. 20. The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is likewise applicable in the instant case there being no showing of any ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse accusedappellant of the crimes charged. In fact, he himself testified that "he did not know any of the persons who arrested him and that he did not also have any misunderstanding with any one of them." The Court elucidated: And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed. 21. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

People v. Domingo Sabardan G.R. No. 132135, May 21, 2004 Facts: 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

An information was filed against accused for serious illegal detention committed against Richelle Banluta and had carnal knowledge with the latter. Accused detained Richelle for 15 days and made her drink either beer or juice which made her dizzy. On Sept. 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed the door outside with three padlocks. At about 5:00 a.m. on that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife who lived about thirty meters away from the appellant, heard someone hysterically shouting, "Mang Domeng!" Elizabeth sensed that the voice was that of Richelle’s. She looked out of the window of her house and saw the appellant in the upper floor of his apartment, walking to and from This eventually led to the rescue of Richelle Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for investigation. There, she executed a written sworn statement dated October 2, 1991. She also signed a criminal complaint charging the appellant of serious illegal detention with rape. Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, conducted a physical and medical examination on the private complainant on October 3, 1991 For his defense, appellant raised that he did not know Richelle and the latter was only trying to exact money from him. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty Hence, this appeal

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

Issue: WON the appellant is guilty of the crime charged 12.

Held: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant contends that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because he was charged of detaining and raping the private complainant in his apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. However, the prosecution’s evidence shows that she was detained and raped at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that under the allegations of the Information, the private complainant was raped when she was "deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug" which the appellant supposedly administered to her. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he administered any drug to the private complainant before she was raped.

13.

14.

If this were true, Richelle could not have known that she was raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy and lost consciousness after drinking beer and juice. The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that Richelle was illegally detained by the appellant in his apartment, and that he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The evidence on record, the appellant insists, shows that Richelle agreed to stay with him in his apartment after leaving their house and consented to having sexual intercourse with him. From the time Richelle arrived at his apartment in the evening of September 15, 1991 up to September 30, 1991, she never tried to escape, nor shouted for help, despite the proximity of the appellant’s apartment to their house and that of Elizabeth de Luna. The contention of the appellant does not persuade. The verisimilitude and probative weight of the testimony of Richelle, that the appellant detained her against her will and raped her in his apartment, were not debilitated by her mistake in declaring that the apartment of the appellant was at No. 5-C Linaluz Street, when, in fact, it was at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential element in rape. The gravamen of the felony is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Richelle’s mistake was only minor and collateral to the gravamen of the crime charged. She consistently testified that the appellant detained and raped her in his apartment, only about thirty meters away from their house in San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. The appellant admitted that he resided in the said apartment, and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors. In People vs. Monieva, we stressed that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony, referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the substance or drug which the appellant forced Richelle to drink and which made her dizzy and unconscious, or its failure to present an expert witness to testify on the presence of any sedative in the beer and juice which Richelle was made to drink. First. The drug or substance in question is only corroborative to Richelle’s testimony that she became dizzy and unconscious when the appellant forced her to drink beer and juice. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant mixed a sedative in the beverage which he forced Richelle to drink. It must be stressed that Richelle was then barely twelve years old. The alcoholic content of

the beer must have caused her to feel dizzy and lose consciousness. She was rendered to such stupor, weakness of body and mind as to prevent effectual resistance and preclude the possibility of consent. 15. Second. In People vs. Del Rosario, we held that a test to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to a victim is not an indispensable element in the prosecution for rape: True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentary control of their faculties. But this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in the prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found to have been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her. 16. Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her captivity, before she was rescued on September 30, 1991, the appellant forced her to drink beer or juice, threatening to kill her if she refused. 17. Despite her resistance, the appellant succeeded in forcing her to drink the beverage. Richelle felt dizzy and unconscious as a consequence, and when she came to, found herself completely naked with the appellant beside her who was also completely nude. 18. Understandably, Richelle could not have seen the appellant insert his penis into her vagina since she lost consciousness after drinking the beer and juice. 19. However, in rape cases, carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proven not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence, provided that there is more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 20. In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that, on the fourth and fifth day of Richelle’s captivity, and while seated on the sofa in the sala of the ground floor of the appellant’s apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness, and when she came to, found herself in the room on the second floor of the apartment, completely naked, with the appellant beside her. Richelle felt severe pains in her vagina and was petrified when she saw plenty of blood on it. She washed her bloodied vagina with water. 21. The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in raping her, is corroborated by Dr. Jesusa Nieves’ medical findings that Richelle was no longer in a virgin state physically and that her hymen had a deep laceration at seven o’clock when she was examined on October 3, 1991. 22. We reject the appellant’s submission that he could not have raped Richelle during the period of September 17, 1991 to September 30, 1991 because when she was examined by Dr.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

Nieves on October 3, 1991, the lacerations in her hymen had already healed. The appellant’s reliance on the testimony of Dr. Nieves, that the healing period of the lacerations on the hymen was seven (7) days from the infliction of such lacerations, is misplaced. The doctor did not testify that the laceration in the hymen of Richelle could not have been healed in less than seven days. Indeed, the healing of wounds is dependent on several factors: (a) vascularity; (b) age of the person; (c) degree of rest or immobilization; and (d) nature of injury. In fine, although the lacerations were already healed by the time Richelle was examined by Dr. Nieves on October 3, 1991, it is not impossible that Richelle was raped by the appellant for the first time on the fourth day of her captivity. It is well settled that healed lacerations do not necessarily negate rape. The appellant asserted that Richelle consented to having sex with him, because she shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na!," when he kissed and embraced her, and mashed her breasts. The appellant asserts that, in saying, "ayaw ko na," twelve-year-old Richelle was consenting to his prior sexual assaults The appellant’s contention deserves scant consideration. As gleaned from Richelle’s testimony, she had been shouting and pleading to the appellant everyday to stop the lascivious acts and the sexual advances on her. She resolutely fought back and even pulled the appellant’s hair. In fine, when the appellant subjected Richelle to his bestial desires, Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as claimed by the appellant, Richelle had consented to having sexual intercourse with him from September 16, 1991 to September 30, 1991, there would no longer have been a need for him to force her to drink beer and juice to render her dizzy and unconscious. The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its truncated parts but in its entirety. The meaning of the words in a portion of the testimony of a witness should be considered, taking into account the entirety of the latter’s testimony. Besides, bearing in mind the chastity and bashfulness of a typical Filipina, especially one in her tender years, it is highly inconceivable for Richelle, a young girl, to consent to sexual acts with the appellant. Richelle was barely in her teens when the harrowing experience took place. We find it deviant for a twelve-year-old naïve and unsophisticated grade school student to be consenting to sexual intercourse with the appellant. Richelle’s unwaivering sincerity and candor while testifying in court convinces us that she was constrained by her desire to seek justice for the bestial act committed upon her person. In fact, Richelle cried while recalling the sexual assaults on her. The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral character to escape conviction. This hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed,

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

religiosity is not always a badge of good conduct and faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion. In the case of People vs. Diopita, this Court pronounced that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because he is of good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of the appellant’s good moral character cannot prevail. The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of serious illegal detention. We agree with the appellant’s assertion that he is not guilty of serious illegal detention, but we do not agree that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment from September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on September 30, 1991. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellant’s apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant, who was their neighbor and her brother’s friend. However, when the appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her that her mother, Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her mother’s anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellant’s apartment. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult would. She could not have foreseen the appellant’s evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellant’s apartment, she could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the fourth day of Richelle’s stay in the appellant’s apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith raped her. In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code. Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua.

37. Richelle could not have escaped from the appellant’s apartment during her stay therein from September 17, 1991 until September 30, 1991, because the appellant locked the door from the outside whenever he would go out. Richelle could move around the house, but the windows on the ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass. Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not. 38. We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story of rape which would expose herself to a lifetime of shame, allow an examination of her private parts and face public trial. 39. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Richelle. Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. 40. In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of the victim to be trustworthy and convincing. It has been held in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are afforded great respect, since it is the trial judge who observes and monitors the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses. 41. Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against him was motivated by Richelle’s desire to extort money from him is preposterous. The appellant’s testimony to prove his claim is hearsay because he was merely told by his counsel of Richelle’s desire for money. The appellant failed to present his counsel to prove his claim. Besides, the appellant was merely a catechist and had no apparent sustainable means of livelihood, and only survived through the support given to him by his siblings. We agree with the findings of the trial court, viz: The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on the part of the complainant by alleging that complainant Richelle charge[d] him with this offense because they are asking money as told [to] him by Atty. Mendoza. 42. This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be given any value by the court, as it was hearsay, and Atty. Mendoza was not presented to pursue or give light on this allegation. At any rate, the mother of the offended party, Nimfa Banluta, testified that she got the insinuation that the sister of the accused was willing to settle the case through her friend living near the street of the accused. 43. It is rudimentary that where there is no showing that the private complainant was impelled by any improper motive in making the accusation against the appellant, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credit. Hence, when the appellant could not present any sensible justification as to why the private complainant had accused him, such fact logically proves that no improper motive propelled the latter to charge the former of such a serious offense as rape.

44. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision is AFFIRMED

4.

People v. Marco Alejandro G.R. No. 205227, April 7, 2014 J. Villarama Facts: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

Appellant, along with Imelda Solema and Jenny del Rosario were charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 for selling shabu When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime charged considering that her mere presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in the sale of illegal drugs In the buy-bust operation conducted by PDEA, The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Cariaso with his initials "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also recovered the marked P500 bills and boodle money from appellant. The three accused and the confiscated items were brought to the PDEA Regional Office in Camp Vicente Lim. For the defense, the appellant alleged that he went to Imelda because he was trying to rent an apartment for his girlfriend who was coming home from Japan The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the requirements in conducting the buy-bust operation. RTC thus convicted Imelda and Marco On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Hence, this petition

5.

6.

Issue: WON the accused-appellant is guilty of violation of R.A. 9165 Held: 1. 2.

3.

The appeal lacks merit. Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

7. 8.

The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were initially unaware of the identity of appellant, as their CI had only informed them about appellant’s co-accused, "Aida" (Imelda Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug deal for 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00, appellant’s presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly identified him as the seller who himself demanded and received the payment from SPO1 Cariaso after giving the shabu to the latter. Appellant’s arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time of the sale transaction arranged the previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they should wait for appellant after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear indications that they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a police officer detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant. After Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the said specimen, the result yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was presented in court as evidence after it was properly identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same substance handed by appellant to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso that they conducted a buy-bust operation as he positioned himself across the street 15 meters from the house of Imelda Solema. From his vantage, SPO1 Platon saw the following transpired: SPOI Cariaso accompanied by the CI in front of the house of Imelda Solema; SPO1 Cariaso conversing with Imelda Solema; the subsequent arrival of appellant on board the Vios; appellant going inside the Revo where SPO1 Cariaso and Imelda Solema waited for him; appellant getting something from the Vios and returning to the Revo carrying the said item. Upon hearing the call from SPO1 Cariaso’s cellphone, SPO1 Platon immediately proceeded to the scene and arrested Jenny del Rosario who was still inside the Vios. At that moment, SPO1 Cariaso had already arrested appellant and Imelda Solema, confiscated the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and recovered the marked money from appellant. Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object evidence presented in court. It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.

9.

10.

11. 12.

13.

Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by appellant, the RTC and CA did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that a buy-bust operation (which is a form of entrapment) is a valid means of arresting violators of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant assails the CA in not correctly interpreting the requirements set forth in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. He harps on the failure to immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the incident and photograph the same, and the inventory of the confiscated items which was not shown to have been done in the presence of the accused. As to the absence of testimony by the investigator and the receiving employee of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, appellant argues this is fatal to the case of the prosecution. He thus contends that the chain of custody was broken in this case. We sustain the CA’s ruling on the chain of custody issue. Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, "chain of custody" is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody (DRAMC) of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs.

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination; (3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours; xxxx On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 14. In this case, while SPO1 Cariaso testified that he immediately marked the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant, there was no statement as to whether such marking was made at the place of arrest. From the records it is clear that such marking was done upon reaching the PDEA office before its turnover to the investigator on duty. What is important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of SPO1 Cariaso as he was present throughout the physical inventory being conducted by the said investigator.

15. This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to the guidelines, is not fatal. It does not automatically render accusedappellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 16. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of the accused. 17. Records reveal that only the marked money was photographed at the PDEA office. The Certificate of Inventory, though not signed by the accused, was duly signed by team leader PCI Ablang, a representative from the media and a barangay councilor. We thus find substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and IRR. 18. Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. 19. In the instant case, although the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, their noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from appellant as the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. 20. In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court enumerated the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 21. The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the transparent plastic sachet containing shabu during the buy-bust operation. Records show that from the time appellant handed to SPO1 Cariaso the said item, only SPO1 Cariaso was in possession of the same until it was brought to the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso himself marked the said sachet of shabu with his initials and date of buy-bust: "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006." While the marking was not immediately made at the crime scene, it does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved. 22. The second link is the turnover of the shabu at the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso testified that he turned over the seized plastic sachet containing shabu with his markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the investigator who proceeded with

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

the inventory thereof, along with the marked money also confiscated from appellant. He was present next to the investigator while the latter was conducting the inventory. The third link constitutes the delivery of the request for laboratory examination and the specimen to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. It was likewise SPO1 Cariaso who brought the said request and the specimen to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory on the same day. He personally turned over the specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the receiving clerk as evidenced by the stamp receipt on the said request bearing the time and date received as "10:25 PM July 12, 2006." The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination is the one presented in court. Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. testified that the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006", was given to him by the receiving clerk. Within twenty-four hours, he conducted the chemical analysis by taking a representative sample from the specimen, even explaining in detail the process of testing the specimen for shabu. He identified the specimen with markings "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" presented as evidence in court (Exhibit "J") as the same specimen he examined and which he found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the receiving clerk of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. Further, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and every one who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand." With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the prosecution evidence, the CA did not err in giving the same full credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who failed to substantiate his allegation of frame-up and extortion. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the

police officers' testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. 32. No such evidence was presented by appellant in this case. The CA even quoted in part the decision of the RTC which highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of defense witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation. 33. WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED People v. Romeo Oniza v. Mercy Oniza G.R. No. 202709, July 3, 2013 J. Abad Facts: 1.

2.

3. 4.

On June 21, 2004, the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal file charges of possession of dangerous drugs before the RTC of Rizal, Br. 2 against the accused spouses Romeo and Mercy. They were further charged with selling drugs. Police officers of Rodriguez Police Station in Rizal received information from a police asset that the accused Mercy was selling dangerous drugs. They formed a team for a buy-bust operation. After 5 years of trial, RTC rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC

Issue: WON the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused Held: 1.

The law prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs like the shabu that the police supposedly confiscated from Romeo and Mercy on June 16, 2004. Section 21 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 reads:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1)The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice

(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; 2.

Compliance with the above, especially the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible government functionaries, would be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation. 3. Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce such evidence, indicating that the police officers did not at all comply with prescribed procedures. Worse, they offered no excuse or explanation at the hearing of the case for their blatant omission of what the law required of them. 4. Apart from the above, the prosecution carried the burden of establishing the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the night of June 16, 2004. 5. It should establish the following links in that chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 6. Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with respect to the first required link—immediate seizure and marking of the seized items in the presence of the accused and others—namely, that (a) there must be justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 7. Here, the prosecution’s own evidence as recited by the CA and the RTC is that the police officers did not make a physical inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a picture of the same in the presence of the accused, someone in the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and any elected public official. 8. All that Officer Albarico could say is that his companion, Officer Jiro, marked the plastic sachets with the initials of the accused already at the police station and then turned over the same to the desk officer who prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination. 9. Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or justification for their failure to make an inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately after their seizure in the presence of the accused and the other persons designated by the law. 10. Both the RTC and the CA misapprehended the significance of such omission. It is imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with the procedural requirements set by law.

11. The procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not merely empty formalities—these are safeguards against abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. 12. And what is the prosecution’s evidence that the substances, which the police chemist examined and found to be shabu, were the same substances that the police officers allegedly seized from Romeo and Mercy? No such evidence exists. 13. As pointed out above, the prosecution stipulated with the accused that the police chemist “could not testify on the source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined.” No police officer testified out of personal knowledge that the substances given to the police chemist and examined by her were the very same substances seized from the accused. 14. In regard to the required presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media and an elective official, the prosecution also did not bother to offer any justification, even a hollow one, for failing to comply with such requirement. What is more, the police officers could have easily coordinated with any elected barangay official in the conduct of the police operation in the locality. 15. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE Decision of the CA, accused is ACQUITTED People v. Jose Clara G.R. No. 195528, July 24, 2013 J. Perez Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Joel was charged with the crime of Sale of illegal drugs punishable under R.A. 9165 The RTC found the accused of the crime charged The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that all the elements of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present Hence, this appeal

Issue: WON Joel is guilty of illegal sale of drugs Held: 1.

2.

After a careful review of the evidence, we resolve to reverse the ruling of conviction and render a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused. In his Brief, the accused-appellant contested his conviction due to the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence. He also argued against the presumption of regularity of performance of duties. Finally, to substantiate his innocence, he pointed out that he was not even the target person in the PDEA Coordination Report and denied any

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

conspiracy and involvement with such target person named "Ningning." Inspite of the imperfect narration of events by the accused Joel, we are constrained to render a judgment of acquittal due to the lapses of the prosecution that led to its failure to discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented inconsistent versions of an illegal sale. PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the seller who sold to him a small plastic sachet containing shabu in exchange of two hundred pesos The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of shabu. Contradictory statements were further made as to who between PO3 Ramos and PO1 Jimenez held the shabu from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the events that transpired in the buy-bust operation can overturn the judgment of conviction. As held in Zaragga v. People, material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu led to the acquittal of the accused in that case. Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. If the cited inconsistency has

14.

15.

16.

17.

nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a conviction. However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are furthered by inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the narration of circumstances of the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the informant who went to their office to report about the illegal activities committed by Ningning. He readily answered that the informant was a female. PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened in the afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to report about a person selling illegal drugs. These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of evidence of the sale of dangerous drug. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the procedure to be observed in preserving the integrity of chain of custody:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. Provided, that the physical inventory and the photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at least the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team/officer, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of

seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. 18. To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. 19. The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. 20. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. 21. In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. 22. As to the first link of marking, the three police officers failed to agree on who among them marked the plastic sachet, which is highly improbable if they really had a clear grasp on what really transpired on the day of operation. 23. PO3 Ramos testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet but recanted his previous statement at the latter part of the examination and pointed out that it was the investigator PO1 Jimenez who put the marking in front of him at the area of arrest.70 SPO2 Nagera in his testimony confirmed that it was PO1 Jimenez who put marking on the plastic sachet.71 However, PO1 Jimenez in his testimony clarified that the item confiscated were already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him in their office. 24. Likewise, they cannot seem to agree on the second link on who among them held the item confiscated from the time of arrest and confiscation until it was turned over to the investigator and the place where it was turned over. 25. PO3 Ramos positively pointed that it was PO1 Jimenez who took possession of the item from the time of the arrest until

26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

34.

arrival at the police station.73 However, when SPO2 Nagera was asked, he pointed out that it was PO3 Ramos who held the item from the time of the arrest until they reached the police where it was turned over to Jimenez for investigation. In Malillin v. People, it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The inconsistent statements of the police officers generated doubt on whether the identity of the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to marking and inventory then given to the Jimenez for investigation and eventually submitted by PO3 Ramos for examination by the forensic chemist The prosecution cannot rely on the saving clause provided under Section 21(a) of the IRR that non-compliance with the legal requirements shall not render void and invalid seizures of and custody over said items. This saving clause is applicable only if prosecution was able to prove the twin conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds and (b) preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items.77 The procedural lapses in this case put to doubt the integrity of the items presented in court. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is adamant in its argument that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by police officers conducting buy-bust operation. We agree but with qualification. In numerous cases, we were inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of public officers. However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. It does not mean that we straight away and without a blink of the eye rule on the regularity of their performance of duties. We at all times harmonize the interest of the accused alongside the interest of the State. Inconsistencies committed by the police officers amounting to procedural lapses in observing the chain of custody of evidence requirement effectively negated this presumption. Their inaccurate recall of events amounted to irregularities that affected the presumption and tilted the evidence in favor of the accused. The absence of improper motive tends to sustain inexistence but does not absolutely rule out false charges. In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the presumption of innocence of the accused, we rule that the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction. Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police officers which directly constitute the recollection of

events of buy-bust together and failure of observance of chain of custody of evidence which effectively broke the links to sustain conviction, we rule for the acquittal of the accused. 35. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED