Case Digest For March 31 2019 Part 2.docx

NICK ANGELO B. CUNANAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 9:00 AM -12:00 PM

THE CASE - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents, G.R. No. 80845. March 14, 1994. FACTS – Three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries. It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag, Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot investigation, the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible thereof. At the arraignment Magalop pleaded “guilty” while Fernandez pleaded “not guilty.” The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was “not mentally well.” Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers, a pair of long-nose pliers, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to have been recovered by the police. The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision. Respondent Judge render its decision acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge. ISSUE - Is Respondent Judge correct in acquitting Fernandez and Magalop? RULING - No. The procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course, as the better procedure would have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, where the court sustained the exoneration of the accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in view of the

exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and, in its place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not done by respondent judge. For even after finding that the plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal hence said acquittal was a nullity.

THE CASE -THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee. FACTS - This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal. Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged that on December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, the accused assaulted and stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat. The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At his counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. The accused testified that he stabbed Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. He further stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police after the incident. The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the basis of his testimony. Hence, the instant appeal. ISSUES: 1. Is the Trial Court Correct in acquitting the accused othe offense charged despite the latter pleads guilty? 2. Is the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy? RULING: - 1. NO. Plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant’s plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 2. NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on

the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as foretasted, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy. DOCTRINE LEARNED - A plea of guilty must be unconditional save to explain mitigating circumstances. Where the accused enters a conditional plea in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, he must be considered as, having entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial, but the trial court failed to do such; rather it acquits the accused at the moment of its arraignment. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court not only erred in procedure but also deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. As assertion that the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy, existence of plea is requisite to double jeopardy. The said testimony of the accused had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty, and the court should have required him to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This not having been done, there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal, and it follows that there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the present appeal.

THE CASE - HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258. FACTS - On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Also, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUE: Is the petitioner correct in claiming that the NBI violates right to due process as the latter violates the right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation?

RULING: The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. The Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding. Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution.

SEC. 10. Bill of particulars.—Accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects and the details desired. (6a, R-116) Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. DOCTRINE LEARNED - Motion for bill of particulars applies after the filing of the complaint or information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. Denial of right to discovery of proceeding is not per se a violation of due process. This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property.