Bsw Supplement #2

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

BSW Supplement #2 – Oil DA Answers and such *Oil DA Answers* BSW Supplement #2 – Oil DA Answers and such........................................................................................................1 2AC Oil DA – general.....................................................................................................................................................2 2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ Russia impacts).................................................................................................................3 Extend the David 99 impact they read............................................................................................................................4 2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ Saudi econ impacts)..........................................................................................................5 2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ renewable impacts)...........................................................................................................7 2AC- Angola Oil DA .....................................................................................................................................................9 AT: Angola Oil DA - XT #3 – No Escalation ..............................................................................................................11 AT Angola DA - Species Loss impacts.........................................................................................................................12 The greatest known loss of Earth life was the Permian extinction that occurred roughly 250 million years ago. At that time as many as 96 percent of the life-forms on Earth fell extinct. If you believe the current ordering of nature gloried and worthy of reverence, then you must believe the Permian extinction was a splendorous event. Without it the species and ecological wonders we now seek to preserve would never have come into being. Some other set of creatures and wonders would exist, to be sure. But there might be, say, no dolphins or whales: the Permian extinction was particularly hard on aquatic life. There might be no bear, no frogs, no otter, no songbirds, no flowering plants, no old-growth forests, no taiga, no Madagascan lemur....................................................................13 2AC – Russia Oil DA...................................................................................................................................................14 2AC - IPI Pipeline........................................................................................................................................................17 AT: High Prices = IPI / XT #4 – alt causes to failure...................................................................................................19 AT: High Prices = IPI - no India/pak conflict..............................................................................................................20 2AC: Trans-Balkan Pipeline DA..................................................................................................................................21 2AC – Gabon Deforestation..........................................................................................................................................23 AT Gabon DA - Species Loss impacts..........................................................................................................................24 2AC – Secessionism DA...............................................................................................................................................25 2AC – Euro Switch DA................................................................................................................................................27 Euro Switch DA / XT #4 – OPEC will never switch....................................................................................................29 2AC – Saudi Relations..................................................................................................................................................30 Saudi Relations XT #2 – Relations low now ...............................................................................................................32 Higher Oil Price = Wars Worldwide.............................................................................................................................34 High Oil Prices = Economic decline XT......................................................................................................................35 High oil prices hurts democracy XT.............................................................................................................................36 A/T Oil Spills: ↓ Prices = ↓ Double Hulls...................................................................................................................37 A/T Oil Spills: Impact Empirically Denied .................................................................................................................38 A/T Oil Spills: Alternative Causality............................................................................................................................39 A/T Oil Spills: Bio-Remediation Solves Impacts.......................................................................................................40 A/T Oil Spills: Bio-Remediation Solves.......................................................................................................................41 AT: Flex Fuels Trade Deficit Add-On...........................................................................................................................43 India Deal Good (Contain China Mod)........................................................................................................................45 India Deal Good (relations impact)...............................................................................................................................46 US-India Relations Good..............................................................................................................................................47 AT: Capitalist epistemology args..................................................................................................................................48

1

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC Oil DA – general 1. High oil prices are inevitable and won’t go down – strong demand from China and India Associated Press, July 6 2008 OPEC chief: Strong demand will keep oil prices up Sun Jul 6, 1:27 PM ET OPEC chief Chakib Khelil says the world's surging oil prices are not likely to fall. He says strong market demand, especially from China and India, is one reason prices will stay as high as they are. But Khelil told a conference on energy in Algiers on Sunday that the steady increases of late "have nothing to do with supply and demand." Khelil, who serves as Algeria's energy minister, blames the rise on the weak U.S. dollar, the currency that oil is sold in.

2. Oil producers will keep prices high regardless—increased supply won’t depress prices Seeking Alpha 12-30-2007, (Jim Kingsdale), http://seekingalpha.com/article/58567-what-the-fundamentals-sayabout-future-oil-prices All this looks right on paper and it may well happen, but I wouldn’t bet on it. I would bet that if prices do fall sometime soon, maybe after the peak winter demand season, exporters will cut back fairly quickly to try tokeep the price above $80 or so. Further, when prices eventually begin to rise again, perhaps in the Spring or Fall of 2008, exporters will then be slow to raise production, having just experienced lower prices. So I think a possible

My thesis is based in part on the hoarding mindset that now dominates the oil market and is hardly ever discussed. Exporters (read OPEC, particularly KSA, UAE, Kuwait, and Venezuela) are now addicted to high and rising oil prices. Their ever increasing cash flows from oil have led to their making huge future capital commitments; they are not willing to see falling oil prices endanger those commitments. They also know that due to tight reduction in the oil price next year would be shallow and would likely be followed by a counter trend leg up that will probably bring the price well above $100.

global supplies relatively minor production cuts are sufficient to raise prices. Finally they now believe that oil in the out years will only get more expensive. Thus near term production cuts will also be rewarded because the oil

, exporters today have their hands on a hair-trigger for raising the oil price and they will not Meanwhile global oil production is now at an historically high level but still does not seem to be able to satisfy demand. The Saudis and the Iraqis have both managed to increase not sold now can be sold later for more money. In summary

hesitate to pull it if the price falls much below $85. I summarize this series of attitudes on the part of oil exporters as the “hoarding mindset.”

production by roughly 500,000 b/d helping to cause the 85 mb/d global production plateau that has existed for nearly two years to be eclipsed during the past few months; production now seems to be running in excess of 87

the price of oil refuses to sink. Each time oil goes into the high $80s it seems to bounce right back in the face of tight inventories. U.S. crude oil inventories keep sinking – they are now the lowest in nearly three years. This is a chart that indicates the tightness of U.S. oil supplies measured in days of inventory: mb/d as shown in this chart: Yet

3. Oil supplies won’t keep pace with demand growth, ensuring oil prices rise towards $200 a barrel—this will break the back of the global economy Sato and Okada 6/25/08 (Shigeru and Yuji, Columnists @ Bloomberg, "Oil at US$200 would trigger global recession, Deutsche Bank warns," Financial Post, http://www.financialpost.com/reports/oilwatch/story.html?id=612878) The global economy would collapse if oil hit US$200 a barrel, said the top energy analyst at Germany's largest bank. "Two-hundred dollar oil would break the back of the global economy," Deutsche Bank AG's chief energy economist Adam Sieminski said in an interview on Wednesday in Tokyo. "Next step after US$200 would be global recession and bad news for everybody." Mr. Sieminski's comments come after Goldman Sachs Group Inc. forecast oil may rise to between US$150 and US$200 within two years as supply growth, especially from producers outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, fails to keep pace with demand. Deutsche Bank is due to release its oil-price forecast on June 27.

4. Global economic decline causes global nuclear war Mead 92 [Walter Russel, fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New perspectives quarterly, summer pp. 28] What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s. But what if it can't?

2

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ Russia impacts) 1. Global spare production capacity is tight AND such capacity is in largely unusable heavy crudes Melbourne Herald Sun 6/7/08 ("Global demand sees oil on fire," http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23823430-664,00.html) THE recent oil price jump is due to rising demand in developing countries and the lack of spare supply capacity. That means that even small disruptions to oil output drive prices higher. Given the slow growth in oil supply, in prospect, only a world recession that cuts demand will bring oil prices down sharply. Unfortunately, a world recession is looking increasingly likely. The oil price is not just being driven by speculators. The underlying demand and supply balance is tight. There is very little spare capacity, with only around two million barrels a day of spare capacity available, while demand is around 86 million barrels a day. Most of this spare capacity is heavy crudes and refiners want lighter crudes to produce diesel where demand is

booming.

2. OPEC can no longer influence prices Sodhi 2008 (The Myth of OPEC, The center for independent studies http://www.cis.org.au/executive_highlights/EH2008/eh63608.html) The massive reserves of Saudi Arabia have also historically been a tool to encourage quota compliance. The Saudis, with their massive oil reserves and high levels of spare production capacity, have in the past threatened to flood the market with oil to engineer a collapse in price. With the world’s cheapest production costs and lots of spare capacity, it was a threat the Saudis could theoretically carry out. Not anymore. Saudi Arabia no longer has the buffer of excess production, and there is a lack of confidence in the sustainability of its largest fields. The long standing threat to flood the market with cheap oil has now become a bluff, and the other members of OPEC know it. OPEC goes to great trouble to pretend that it can influence prices. It holds regular meetings where it ordains a new production target with much ceremony. But honestly, you would have to be a mug to believe that OPEC countries are purposefully limiting production. When oil prices rise, so does the opportunity cost of sticking to the allocated quota. So while its possible to maintain a cartel when prices are low, you can bet your life that each member is pumping out as much crude as it possibly can at $140 a barrel.

3. Oil price drop would have no effect on the Russian economy. Prices could get as low as $55 a barrel and the effect would still be insignificant Russia & CIS Banking & Finance Weekly June 20, 2008 headline: russia does not fear drop in oil prices - kudrin Russia should be prepared for both further growth as well as a rapid drop in oil prices, he said. It is better for Russia when oil prices are high, he said, but these prices must be utilized soundly and oil windfalls should not be wasted. "If oil prices are higher and is spent immediately, the ruble's exchange rate will strengthen," he said, stressing that the appreciation of the ruble would have a negative effect on Russian industry. A decline in the price of oil will not have a significant impact on the Russian budget, Kudrin said. "Russia is not afraid of a price drop," Kudrin said in an interview with Vesti 24 TV while in Osaka following the meeting of the G8 finance chiefs. "Our budget would not have a deficit at a price of $55 per barrel. The tax system for our oil companies is set up so that as the price of oil declines, taxation declines. So no substantial changes will take place. It will have some effect on

our GDP growth, but an insignificant one compared with the earlier period. I repeat, the effect will be insignificant," he said.

3

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. High oil-revenue deters economic liberalization. Christian Science Monitor, Fred Weir, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, "Has Russian oil output peaked?" May 28, 2008 lexis Oil profits, on the other hand, are taxed at nearly 90 percent, which has filled the state's coffers as prices for crude oil have risen from $10 per barrel a decade ago to more than $130 last week. Petrowealth was a key factor enabling Mr. Putin to concentrate political power in the Kremlin, which he used to take over huge slices of the formerly private oil and gas industry. The looming production crunch, therefore, suggests a need for sweeping political reforms as well as economic adjustments, some experts say. "As long as energy prices keep going up and the easy money keeps rolling in, there is no incentive to liberalize," says Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog, a Moscow investment bank. "If the golden goose stops laying eggs, then they'll start to recognize the need for change."

5. Forcing Russian liberalization now key to Russia's economy. Christian Science Monitor, Fred Weir, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, "Has Russian oil output peaked?" May 28, 2008 lexis A sharp debate is breaking out among economists, some of whom argue that the crisis is an opportunity for Russia to develop a long-term strategy to husband its remaining energy resources and diversify its economy. They point to figures showing that gas and oil exports have risen since 2000 from under half to over 60 percent of Russia's gross domestic product and say that to continue trading nonrenewable resources for rapidly devaluing dollars is a big mistake. "Russia should not be a colonial country that provides raw materials to more developed countries," says Nodari Simonia, director of the Center for World Energy Studies, an independent Moscow think tank. "We don't need to export more crude, we have to invest resources in our manufacturing base." Russian oil profits, taxed by the state, have been accumulating in a special 'stabilization fund' that now totals about $130 billion. Earlier this year the government put another $32 billion into a sovereign wealth fund that is expected to begin investing in Russian infrastructure and social welfare schemes. "Russia's economy so far can't absorb the oil

cash that's coming in. That, not increasing oil output, is our biggest worry,"

says Sergei Glaziev, head of the National Institute for Development, a Moscow think tank. "We urgently need to diversify our economy away from this dependence on natural resources." Extend the David 99 impact they read

4

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ Saudi econ impacts) 1. Global spare production capacity is tight AND such capacity is in largely unusable heavy crudes Melbourne Herald Sun 6/7/08 ("Global demand sees oil on fire," http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23823430-664,00.html) THE recent oil price jump is due to rising demand in developing countries and the lack of spare supply capacity. That means that even small disruptions to oil output drive prices higher. Given the slow growth in oil supply, in prospect, only a world recession that cuts demand will bring oil prices down sharply. Unfortunately, a world recession is looking increasingly likely. The oil price is not just being driven by speculators. The underlying demand and supply balance is tight. There is very little spare capacity, with only around two million barrels a day of spare capacity available, while demand is around 86 million barrels a day. Most of this spare capacity is heavy crudes and refiners want lighter crudes to produce diesel where demand is

booming.

2. OPEC can no longer influence prices Sodhi 2008 (The Myth of OPEC, The center for independent studies http://www.cis.org.au/executive_highlights/EH2008/eh63608.html) The massive reserves of Saudi Arabia have also historically been a tool to encourage quota compliance. The Saudis, with their massive oil reserves and high levels of spare production capacity, have in the past threatened to flood the market with oil to engineer a collapse in price. With the world’s cheapest production costs and lots of spare capacity, it was a threat the Saudis could theoretically carry out. Not anymore. Saudi Arabia no longer has the buffer of excess production, and there is a lack of confidence in the sustainability of its largest fields. The long standing threat to flood the market with cheap oil has now become a bluff, and the other members of OPEC know it. OPEC goes to great trouble to pretend that it can influence prices. It holds regular meetings where it ordains a new production target with much ceremony. But honestly, you would have to be a mug to believe that OPEC countries are purposefully limiting production. When oil prices rise, so does the opportunity cost of sticking to the allocated quota. So while its possible to maintain a cartel when prices are low, you can bet your life that each member is pumping out as much crude as it possibly can at $140 a barrel.

3. Saudi Arabia has diversified their economy and can stay on a growth path even if oil prices decline. Arsene Aka Global Insight August 2, 2007 HEADLINE: Fitch Raises Outlook for Saudi Arabia's Sovereign Foreign Currency Significance: A sharp decrease in international oil prices remains the main risk facing the kingdom. However, during the current oil boom,

Saudi Arabia has used part of its oil-revenue windfall to build up assets overseas, which could be drawn upon if global energy prices falter in the future. With global oil demand expected to remain strong over the next two years, the sovereign's creditworthiness seems relatively secure. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has made good progress in promoting the non-oil sector. Despite a fall in oil production in 2006, the economy expanded robustly, on the back of strong growth in the nonoil sector.

5

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. Turn / High oil prices have allowed Saudi Arabia to reform its economy which is key to their stability Erlend Paasche Saudi Arabia's economic liberalization Wednesday, December 12, 2007 http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=12974

According to conventional wisdom, high oil prices would render economic reform in oil-rich countries a poor chance of success with increases in state income lessening the pressure for such change. In a time of sky-high oil prices, Saudi Arabia proves that conventional wisdom sometimes misses the mark. Saudi oil export revenues constituted a meager US$34.3 billion in 1998, but rose to US$46.8 billion in 1999 and US$65.5 billion in 2002. SABB, one of the kingdom's largest banks, projects oil revenues of US$165 billion this year. Even though the Saudi state has thus gradually gained access to a greatly increased volume of external rent, it has somewhat paradoxically loosened its tight grip on the economy, opened up its markets for privatization and foreign investment and actively strengthened its private sector.

6

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – OPEC Flood DA (w/ renewable impacts) 1. Global spare production capacity is tight AND such capacity is in largely unusable heavy crudes Melbourne Herald Sun 6/7/08 ("Global demand sees oil on fire," http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23823430-664,00.html) THE recent oil price jump is due to rising demand in developing countries and the lack of spare supply capacity. That means that even small disruptions to oil output drive prices higher. Given the slow growth in oil supply, in prospect, only a world recession that cuts demand will bring oil prices down sharply. Unfortunately, a world recession is looking increasingly likely. The oil price is not just being driven by speculators. The underlying demand and supply balance is tight. There is very little spare capacity, with only around two million barrels a day of spare capacity available, while demand is around 86 million barrels a day. Most of this spare capacity is heavy crudes and refiners want lighter crudes to produce diesel where demand is

booming.

2. OPEC can no longer influence prices Sodhi 2008 (The Myth of OPEC, The center for independent studies http://www.cis.org.au/executive_highlights/EH2008/eh63608.html) The massive reserves of Saudi Arabia have also historically been a tool to encourage quota compliance. The Saudis, with their massive oil reserves and high levels of spare production capacity, have in the past threatened to flood the market with oil to engineer a collapse in price. With the world’s cheapest production costs and lots of spare capacity, it was a threat the Saudis could theoretically carry out. Not anymore. Saudi Arabia no longer has the buffer of excess production, and there is a lack of confidence in the sustainability of its largest fields. The long standing threat to flood the market with cheap oil has now become a bluff, and the other members of OPEC know it. OPEC goes to great trouble to pretend that it can influence prices. It holds regular meetings where it ordains a new production target with much ceremony. But honestly, you would have to be a mug to believe that OPEC countries are purposefully limiting production. When oil prices rise, so does the opportunity cost of sticking to the allocated quota. So while its possible to maintain a cartel when prices are low, you can bet your life that each member is pumping out as much crude as it possibly can at $140 a barrel.

3. The disad doesn’t turn the case. We don’t argue an increase in renewables is good or even a decrease in emissions is good Our advantage is hegemony and this disad doesn’t turn that advantage. 4. Renewable development is not dependent on high oil prices Environment News Service, 6-21-07, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2007/2007-06-21-04.asp While the report finds that high oil prices have driven investors into the renewable energy market, UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner says many investors are choosing renewables regardless of oil prices. "One of the new and fundamental messages of this report is that renewable energies are no longer subject to the vagaries of rising and falling oil prices - they are becoming generating systems of choice for increasing numbers of power companies, communities and countries irrespective of the costs of fossil fuels, said UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner, introducing the report Wednesday.

.

7

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

5. Renewables won’t catch on – 4 reasons Paul Roberts, energy expert and writer for Harpers,2004, The End of Oil, pg. 201-2 Other problems become more apparent when we look more closely at cost. Although wind and solar are getting cheaper, proponents often overlook the fact that their competitors are also getting cheaper and will continue to do so. Just as fuel cells must compete with a constantly improving internal-combustion engine, wind and solar will have to battle with gas- and coal-fired technologies that will grow more efficient and less expensive and less polluting by the year. Renewables are also extremely vulnerable to energy price swings: if gas prices were to come down, for example, wind and solar power would lose much of their cost advantage. Renewables are politically vulnerable, as well: if wind or solar were to lose their government subsidies, the current boom in new installations would come to a screeching halt: the mere threat of such a loss has many potential investors looking elsewhere.

8

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC- Angola Oil DA 1. No risk of great power conflict over Africa Robert Barrett, PhD student Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, June 1, 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID726162_code327511.pdf?abstractid=726162&mirid=1 Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.

2. Their nuclear escalation claim is empirically denied by dozens of African conflicts Tim Docking, African Affairs Specialist with the United States Institute of Peace, 2007, Taking Sides Clashing Views on African Issues, p. 372 Nowhere was the scope and intensity of violence during the 1990s as great as in Africa. While the general trend of armed conflict in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East fell during the 1989-99 period, the 1990s witnessed an increase in the number of conflicts on the African continent. During this period, 16 UN peacekeeping missions were sent to Africa. (Three countries-Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Angola-were visited by multiple missions during this time.) Furthermore, this period saw internal and interstate violence in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states. In 1999 alone, the continent was plagued by 16 armed conflicts, seven of which were wars with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths (Journal of Peace Research, 37:5, 2000, p. 638). In 2000, the situation continued to deteriorate: renewed heavy fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed tens of thousands of lives in the lead-up to a June ceasefire and ultimately the signing of a peace accord in December; continued violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria as well as the outbreak of new violence between Guinea and Liberia, in Zimbabwe, and in the Ivory Coast have brought new hardship and bloodshed to the continent.

3. No great power intervention Major Yushau A Salisu, April 18, 2002, “NIGERIA’S RISING HEGEMONY IS ESSENTIAL TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN WEST-AFRICA,” http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA420533&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, p. 2 The international community has of late shown lack of interest in intervening in conflicts within sub-Saharan Africa in general and West Africa in particular as the Liberian, Sierra Leone and Burundi and Rwandan civil wars proved. For instance the United Nation’s peacekeeping force in Africa which stood at about 40,000 in 1993 was just about 1600 as of June 19992. And during the Liberian conflicts, the then United Nation (UN) Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar categorically stated that the UN would not intervene. The United States (U.S) which had about 2000 Marines off the Liberian coast also refused to intervene and separate the warring factions.

9

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. foreign oil dependence and resource competition is the root of African instability Klare 8 (Micheal T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. “The New Geopolitics of Energy” The Nation. New York: May 19, 2008. Vol. 286, Iss. 19; pg. 18)

This risk is made all the greater because intensified production of oil, natural gas, uranium and minerals is itself a source of instability, acting as a magnet for arms deliveries and outside intervention. The nations involved are largely poor, so whoever controls the resources controls the one sure source of abundant wealth. This is an invitation for the monopolization of power by greedy elites who use control over military and police to suppress rivals. The result, more often than not, is a wealthy strata of crony capitalists kept in power by brutal security forces and surrounded by disaffected and impoverished masses, often belonging to a different ethnic group--a recipe for unrest and insurgency. This is the situation today in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in Darfur and southern Sudan, in the uranium-producing areas of Niger, in Zimbabwe, in the Cabinda province of Angola (where most of that country's oil lies) and in numerous other areas suffering from what's been called the "resource curse."

5. Turn / Oil revenues will cause civil war in Angola David Blair Diplomatic Editor The Daily Telegraph (London) July 18, 2008 HEADLINE: Analysis; Africa's oil boom shifts balance; of power

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos leads a notionally Marxist government busily engaged in stealing and squandering the oil revenues. Angola's cabinet, steeped in corruption, is filled with Marxist millionaires. Mr dos Santos himself is believed to rank among Africa's richest men. Experience suggests that oil bonanzas inflict nothing but harm on African countries. A tiny elite seizes the chance to enrich itself - and virtually nothing trickles down to the poor. Meanwhile, oil revenues distort the entire economy, discouraging genuine entrepreneurs and undermining every state institution. Civil war becomes more likely because the incentive to take over the country and steal its resources is all the greater. Angola emerged from more than three decades of civil war in 2002.

10

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT: Angola Oil DA - XT #3 – No Escalation Outside powers won’t intervene in African conflicts Tim Docking, African Affairs Specialist with the United States Institute of Peace, 2007, Taking Sides Clashing Views on African Issues, p. 376 Since the tragedy in Somalia, the trend has been for Western nations to refuse to send troops into Africa's hot spots. Jordan recently underscored this point when it expressed frustration with the West's failure to commit soldiers to the UNAMSIL mission as a reason for the withdrawal of its troops from Sierra Leone. America's aversion to peacekeeping in Africa also reflects broader U.S. foreign policy on the continent. Africa occupies a marginal role in American foreign policy in general (a point highlighted by conference participants).

Great powers don’t get involved in African conflicts Richard Bogosian et al, Special Coordinator for USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, 2-21-01, Peacekeeping in Africa,” http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr66.pdf The Brahimi Report does not, however, address the most serious problem facing contemporary peacekeeping missions: lack of international political will. The 1990s witnessed both the changing nature of international conflict and the growing need for peacekeeping operations. Between 1948 and 1988 the UN undertook just 15 peacekeeping operations around the world; between 1989 and 1999, that number jumped to 31. In 1999 the African continent was gripped by 16 armed conflicts, 7 of which were wars with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths. Currently, the United Nations has four peacekeeping missions in Africa: MINURSO in the Western Sahara, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today, a distinct possibility exists that more civil wars, like those that gripped Sierra Leone and Liberia during the ‘90s, will occur on the continent . Despite the growing discussion of African affairs in American foreign policy circles, the United

States is largely disengaged from security issues on the continent. The United States (and the rest of the Western nations) is loath to contribute peacekeepers to African peacekeeping missions. Conference participants agreed on the continued importance of the democratization process in Africa . Conference participants also agreed that the agenda put forth by the Brahimi Report offers numerous points of entry for members of the international community to promote conflict prevention on the continent .

11

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT Angola DA - Species Loss impacts 1.) New Life A.) New species fill the void. Richard Kerr 10/7/1994 Science 28 In the immediate aftermath of an extinction, some taxa – groups of animals such as species or genera – flourish, then gradually fade. Others that had apparently vanished can reappear, Lazarus-like. In the turmoil, new groups may gain ascendancy, filling ecological niches left empty by the extinction and displacing other survivors to create a new ecological order (See box on p.29).

B.) Resiliency- recolonization species will recolonize damagead areas Princeton University Press 2005 http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7130.html Reice argues, in terms refreshingly nontechnical yet scientifically sound, that the traditional, equilibrium paradigm--according to which ''stability'' produces healthier ecosystems than does sudden, sweeping change--is fundamentally flawed. He describes a radically different model of how nature operates, one that many ecologists and population biologists have come to understand in recent years: a concept founded on the premise that disturbances help create and maintain the biodiversity that benefits both

the ecosystem and ourselves. Reice demonstrates that ecosystems need disturbances to accomplish indispensable tasks such as the production of clean air and water. He recommends changes in environmental management to incorporate the essential role of natural disturbances.

2.) No spillover to other species. Thomas Gale Moore 1998 Climate of fear, why we shouldn’t worry about global warming 98-9 Nevertheless,

the loss of a class of living beings does not typically threaten other species. Most animals and plants can derive their nutrients or receive the other benefits provided by a particular species from more than a single source. If it were true that the extinction of a single species would produce a cascade of losses, then the massive extinctions of the past should have wiped out all life. Evolution forces various life forms to adjust to change. A few may not make the adaptation but others will mutate to meet the new conditions. Although a particular chain of DNA may be eliminated through the loss of species, other animals or plants adapting to the same environment often produce similar genetic solutions with like proteins. It is almost impossible to imagine a single species that, if eliminated, would threaten us humans. Perhaps if the E. coli that are necessary for digestion became extinct, we could no longer exist. But those bacteria live in a symbiotic relationship with man and, as long as humans survive, so will they. Thus any animal that hosts a symbiotic species need not fear the loss of its partner. As long as the host remains, so will parasites and symbiotic species.

3.) Their impact is non-falsifiable and politically motivated. John Charles Kunich )Judge Advocate specializing in environmental law, United States Air Force, Colorado Springs, Co) Spring, 1994 SPECIES & HABITAT CONSERVATION: THE FALLACY OF DEATHBED CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 24 Envtl. L. 501 It is undisputed that, as one expert puts it, "Our ignorance of the natural world is enormous," and that, as we struggle with our response to the plight of our fellow organisms on this planet, "if we do not even know who the players are, our understanding of how well they are playing is far more deficient." 43 It has been estimated that the ratio of unknown to known species may be as high as 21 to 1, with 30 million undescribed species versus 1.4 [*517] million that have been identified and taxonomically categorized by man. 44 The skeptics argue that the apocalyptic vision of a gigantic extinction spasm is based more on ideology than on science. In this view, although estimates of total species range as high as 100 million, anything in excess of the 1.4 million actually identified is mere guesswork. If no one knows how many species exist, how can anyone know how many are going extinct? 45 If traces of the alleged extinction victims are never discovered, no one will be able to determine whether they became extinct or never existed at all. According to Patrick Kangas of the University of Maryland, the "whole business is unfalsifiable, and everyone in science knows what a mess unfalsifiable theories are." 46

12

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. Permian extinction disproves their impact. Greg Easterbrook 1995 A Moment on the Earth 101-2 The greatest known loss of Earth life was the Permian extinction

that occurred roughly 250 million years ago. At that

.

time as many as 96 percent of the life-forms on Earth fell extinct If you believe the current ordering of nature gloried and worthy of reverence, then you must believe the Permian extinction was a splendorous event. Without it the species and ecological wonders we now seek to preserve would never have come into being. Some other set of creatures and wonders would exist, to be sure. But

.

there might be, say, no dolphins or whales: the Permian extinction was particularly hard on aquatic life There might be no bear, no frogs, no otter, no songbirds, no flowering plants, no old-growth forests, no taiga, no Madagascan lemur.

13

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – Russia Oil DA 1. Oil price drop would have no effect on the Russian economy. Prices could get as low as $55 a barrel and the effect would still be insignificant Russia & CIS Banking & Finance Weekly June 20, 2008 headline: russia does not fear drop in oil prices - kudrin Russia should be prepared for both further growth as well as a rapid drop in oil prices, he said. It is better for Russia when oil prices are high, he said, but these prices must be utilized soundly and oil windfalls should not be wasted. "If oil prices are higher and is spent immediately, the ruble's exchange rate will strengthen," he said, stressing that the appreciation of the ruble would have a negative effect on Russian industry. A decline in the price of oil will not have a significant impact on the Russian budget, Kudrin said. "Russia is not afraid of a price drop," Kudrin said in an interview with Vesti 24 TV while in Osaka following the meeting of the G8 finance chiefs. "Our budget would not have a deficit at a price of $55 per barrel. The tax system for our oil companies is set up so that as the price of oil declines, taxation declines. So no substantial changes will take place. It will have some effect on

our GDP growth, but an insignificant one compared with the earlier period. I repeat, the effect will be insignificant," he said.

2. High oil-revenue deters economic liberalization. Christian Science Monitor, Fred Weir, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, "Has Russian oil output peaked?" May 28, 2008 lexis Oil profits, on the other hand, are taxed at nearly 90 percent, which has filled the state's coffers as prices for crude oil have risen from $10 per barrel a decade ago to more than $130 last week. Petrowealth was a key factor enabling Mr. Putin to concentrate political power in the Kremlin, which he used to take over huge slices of the formerly private oil and gas industry. The looming production crunch, therefore, suggests a need for sweeping political reforms as well as economic adjustments, some experts say. "As long as energy prices keep going up and the easy money keeps rolling in, there is no incentive to liberalize," says Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog, a Moscow investment bank. "If the golden goose stops laying eggs, then they'll start to recognize the need for change."

3. Forcing Russian liberalization now key to Russia's economy. Christian Science Monitor, Fred Weir, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, "Has Russian oil output peaked?" May 28, 2008 lexis A sharp debate is breaking out among economists, some of whom argue that the crisis is an opportunity for Russia to develop a long-term strategy to husband its remaining energy resources and diversify its economy. They point to figures showing that gas and oil exports have risen since 2000 from under half to over 60 percent of Russia's gross domestic product and say that to continue trading nonrenewable resources for rapidly devaluing dollars is a big mistake. "Russia should not be a colonial country that provides raw materials to more developed countries," says Nodari Simonia, director of the Center for World Energy Studies, an independent Moscow think tank. "We don't need to export more crude, we have to invest resources in our manufacturing base." Russian oil profits, taxed by the state, have been accumulating in a special 'stabilization fund' that now totals about $130 billion. Earlier this year the government put another $32 billion into a sovereign wealth fund that is expected to begin investing in Russian infrastructure and social welfare schemes. "Russia's economy so far can't absorb the oil

cash that's coming in. That, not increasing oil output, is our biggest worry,"

says Sergei Glaziev, head of the National Institute for Development, a Moscow think tank. "We urgently need to diversify our economy away from this dependence on natural resources."

14

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. Russian economy is resilient. Bruce Stokes. "Don't Ignore the Russian Bear." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. http://www.cfr.org/publication/3225/dont_ignore_the_russian_bear.html A little less than a year ago, August 17 to be precise, the post-Cold War Russian economic experiment imploded. The ruble collapsed and debt payments to foreigners were frozen. Wall Street lost billions of dollars. Long Term Capital Management, one of the world's biggest hedge funds, had to be taken over by its bankers. Once burned, international investors yanked their capital out of all emerging markets — from Latin America to East Asia— causing world interest rates to spike. The global economy teetered on the edge of

depression. But, much to the surprise of most economic pundits, international markets quickly righted themselves. The Russian economy proved far more resilient than anticipated. And, in retrospect, the events of August, 1998 were little more than a very large bump in the road. The lessons of this "crisis that wasn't" are now clear: Russia is not too big to fail (the volume of its debts do not dictate special treatment by its creditors); the financial world can cope with such failure; and the Russian economy can bounce back without much overt help from the West. But the impending $4.5 billion loan to Russia by the International Monetary Fund— reflecting Washington's gratitude for Moscow's help in Kosovo, continued fear of Russian nuclear proliferation and concern about Russia's internal political stability— demonstrates that Russia still remains too important for the world to ignore. This contradiction— not too big to fail, but still too big to flounder— highlights the friction inherent when economic policy is used to further geo-political goals. Up until a year ago, the Clinton Administration argued that aid to Russia was needed, in part, to avoid global economic collapse. August, 1998 exposed that rationale as a charade. Now American support for assistance to Russia can only be justified for two reasons: to reinforce Russia's transition to a market economy or as ransom in Moscow's continued strategic blackmail of the West. Evidence to justify the former is dubious. Its time to own up to the latter. Last summer's fleeting economic fright reflected Russia's staggering economic collapse. The ruble fell by more than 70 per cent in a couple of weeks. The economy shrank by 4.3 per cent. Real wages fell 41 per cent. But the crisis was cathartic. "The shock accomplished what reform was intended to achieve," said Anders Aslund, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. The banking system now functions better. Barter is declining. Most important, there has been no reversion to central planning, government-directed lending, industrial subsidies or government reliance on simply printing money.

5. High oil prices are collapsing democracy and creating increased authoritarianism in Russia States News Service June

24,

2008 HEADLINE: AS

OIL WEALTH RISES IN EURASIA, DEMOCRACY DECLINES

SIGNIFICANTLY To coincide with today's release of the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2008 report, three of the study's authors gathered at RFE/RL's Washington, DC headquarters to discuss one of its key findings - that, as oil and natural gas revenues surge in Russia and Central Asia, democratic institutions in these countries are eroding significantly. [Read more about the Nations in Transit 2008 Report] "The resource curse is taking root," Freedom House Director of Studies Christopher Walker told the group. "The growing authoritarianism in oil and natural gas-rich countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is severely restricting the ability of democratic institutions to operate." According to the report, the regression in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia has occurred systematically and across sectors, including in the areas of electoral process, civil society, independent media and judicial independence. "Russia's decline in all of the report's categories over the past eight years is dramatic," said Robert Orttung, the author of the section on Russia and a Senior Fellow at the Jefferson Institute. "For years, Vladimir Putin has been using oil and natural gas revenues to build up his police forces and consolidate power in such a way that there is no space for

democracy to grow."

15

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

6. Failure of democracy in Russia will cause global nuclear war Muravchik 2001 (Joshua- Resident Scholar at the AEI, “Democracy and Nuclear Peace” July 14, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf, Date Accessed 7/29/2006) That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the

overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

16

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC - IPI Pipeline 1. IPI doesn’t solve for India-Pakistan conflict S. Pandian, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, March 2005, “The political economy of trans-Pakistan gas pipeline project: assessing the political and economic risks for India,” Energy Policy It is suggested that the on-shore Indo-Iran gas pipeline would act as a confident building measure between India and Pakistan. However, India does not seem to interpret the Indo-Iran pipeline project as an instrument of confidence building measure in the subcontinent. This is clearly witnessed by India's eagerness to exclude Pakistan from the proposed project. India's economic interests in the Indo-Iran pipeline project are in conflict with Pakistan's geo-strategic interests. As India views that Pakistan's geo-strategic interests are aimed at disrupting Indian economic interests, the Indo-Iran pipeline project could hardly be conducive to sustain confidence between India and Pakistan. In this regard, it is unlikely that India would entertain Pakistan's role in Indo-Iran pipeline project. Only upon mutual co-existence with India, Pakistan could benefit from its geostrategic location.

2. IPI doesn’t solve India-Pakistan military rivalry Neha Kumar, Research Officer Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 9-14-2007, http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2386&subCatID=null&mod=null India-Pakistan relations have been tense due to the conflict over Kashmir since Independence. Today their relations are marked by the efforts of both sides to settle differences and move beyond the Kashmir problem. It is important, however, to analyze whether the various steps taken by their governments are bearing fruit or both countries are still suspicious of each other's military moves. It is noteworthy that both countries are getting into a missile race despite having promoted various Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Both countries have agreed to provide prior notification of missile tests, which includes only ballistic missile tests, and not the tests of cruise missiles. In spite of the pre-notification agreement, missile tests by one country are always followed by the other, almost in reply to each other. On 4 February 2007, India successfully tested a Brahmos cruise missile, which has a range of 200 km and can be launched from ships, submarines and aircrafts. In response, Pakistan tested its Hatf IV missile on 23 February, which has a range of 2,000 km and also the short-range Hatf II ballistic missile with a range of 200 km on 4 March. This was followed by India testing its Dhanush missile on 31 March which has a range of 250 km and the capacity to carry a single warhead of up to 750 kg with the declared purpose of studying the control and guidance system of the missile. On 12 April, India successfully tested its Agni III ballistic missile which has a range of 3,500 km. Pakistan believes that Agni III is more capable than any ballistic missiles with Pakistan and said it would therefore upgrade its Shaheen II missile. Another important point is that testing missiles having greater range and capability than those in the other's arsenal will remain an important goal for both countries. Therefore, despite trade agreements, confidence building measures and efforts to have a common gas pipeline, both countries will continue to build up their weapon systems.

3. No risk of India-Pakistan conflict—deterrence is stable Stratfor, 6-21-07, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=290807&selected=Country%20Profiles&showCoun try=1&countryId=56&showMore=1 Ultimately, India is fairly geographically secure. Oceans and mountains constitute the bulk of New Delhi's border. The Himalayas provide a nearly impenetrable barrier to meaningful military confrontation with China. Pakistan, which along with Afghanistan occupies the Hindu Kush to the northwest, is the only real power within India's immediate geographic zone. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry has been well entrenched since 1948 -- but Indian strategic missiles are well-suited to deal with that threat. Moreover, the nuclear balance between the two has matured to the point that it now injects an element of stability and restraint into the rivalry. An ICBM has almost no relevance to a direct confrontation with Pakistan. The 3,000-kilometer (about 1,800 miles) distance from Bangalore in southern India to the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, in northern Pakistan is probably approaching the minimum range of a true ICBM.

17

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. U.S. sanctions prevent Indian pipeline project with Iran Business Recorder, 10-29-07 The United States has asked India not to proceed with Iran, Pakistan, India gas pipeline project. The leading English Indian daily reported that US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is expected to ask India to keep away from the project during his visit to India starting from Sunday. "We are hoping that India won't move forward on [the pipeline]," a US treasury official said. The daily said US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew into New Delhi two years back to tell Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government not to proceed with the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project. She left, promising to pave the way for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Henry Paulson is expected to do the same job during his visit. The paper also said the US Treasury Under-secretary for international affairs David McCormick told a press conference in Washington that Paulson will urge India not to move forward with the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project. "We are hoping that India won't move forward on this," said McCormick. "We think at a time when the world should be imposing greater discipline on its interactions with [Iranian] companies and financial institutions and the Iranian government more broadly, that this is not the right path forward. We have been very clear on that." McCormick went on to suggest that the US had a "profound understanding" of India's energy needs and it was "one of the underlying pieces of logic" of the nuclear deal. "But," he added, "we do not see a pipeline with Iran providing India with any real energy security given the state of the Iranian regime." The daily said India maintains that it is interested in purchasing the Iranian gas, but the fresh round of sanctions by the US on Iran may have put the "peace pipeline" project in jeopardy.

5. IPI is dead because Iran won’t sell Daily Times, 8-21-07, BBC Monitoring South Asia Earlier this month, the 7.5bn dollar Iran-India-Pakistan (IPI) gas

pipeline was all but abandoned after Tehran fired the oil minister who had reportedly agreed to sell gas to Pakistan and India "at a discount". Although the dismissed minister Mr Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh recently rejected claims that he had agreed to sell the IPI gas at a 30 per cent discount, and insisted that "no agreement on price" had been reached, the hawkish elements opposed to selling the gas to Pakistan seem to have won the day. This has come in the backdrop of Tehran rumours that America was active in Balochistan against Iran as a tit-fortat for what Iran was allegedly doing in Iraq.

6. Pakistani instability derails the IPI pipeline Gal Luft, Executive Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 1-12-2005, http://www.iags.org/n0115042.htm But this win-win proposition seems to be threatened by terrorists. A few days after Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh arrived in New Delhi to discuss the future of the pipeline, terrorists in Pakistan blew up two gas pipelines sending a message to all parties involved that the "pipeline of peace" might be anything but peaceful. The area of the Balochistan-Punjab border where the pipeline is supposed to run is one of Pakistan's poorest areas and its most restive province. In recent years it has been a battleground of private militias belonging to Baloch tribes. Sporadic armed clashes resulted in attacks against water pipelines, power transmission lines and gas installations. Yet, the region strategically important due to its large reserves of oil and gas. But these riches did little for the Baloch tribesmen. Over the years Islamabad has failed to provide a fair share of the oil and gas wealth. Lack of economic progress and a deep sense of disaffection has contributed to the distrust between the federal government and the Baloch people. As a result, the tribes now oppose any energy projects in their area. In January 2003, sabotage of a gas pipeline from Sui cut off supply to the Punjab. Later, in June, a wave of attacks against gas installations caused the government to send troops to protect the installations. For the rest of 2003 and the following year the confrontation was defused but the underlying grievances of the local population were not addressed. To calm the area Islamabad recently added carrots to its policy of sticks by increasing investment in regional development projects. However, it seems that violence has resurfaced and the region is sliding into a near war situation. On the night of January 8 terrorists belonging to the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) fired rockets at the pipeline and exchanged gunfire with the security forces for several hours. During the fire exchange the pipeline caught fire, disrupting supply to a power plant. Six people were killed. In a separate incident the BLF launched an attack on the pipeline close to Sui township, 250 miles north of Karachi. This area alone produces about 45 percent of Pakistan’s total gas production. Some rockets also exploded close to the main pipeline supplying gas to Sindh and Punjab provinces but did not cause any damage. On January 11 Baloch gunmen stormed facilities operated by state-run Pakistan Petroleum Ltd (PPL) in Sui. The gunmen overpowered the guards and damaged pipelines and a purification plant. Gunmen also Kidnapped 10 employees of the Water and Power Development Authority (APDA), Pakistan’s main water and power utility. The attacks disrupted gas and power production as well work in fertilizer and chemical plants. Many in the region believe that the recent attacks in Balochistan province are meant to sabotage the pipeline project as well as other projects connecting Sui gas installations with the Turkmenistan gas fields. If true, these pipeline attacks are unsettling and will

raise to the surface India's concerns about the reliability of the project. The possibility of sabotage of the proposed Iran-India pipeline by militant groups in Pakistan is becoming increasingly feasible as terrorists learn from their allies in Iraq about the strategic gain in conducting a sustained sabotage campaign against oil infrastructure. This is especially true after last month’s exhortation by Osama bin Ladin to his cohorts to target oil pipelines in the Persian Gulf. In the next few weeks India will have to make a final determination if it wants to join the pipeline project. If Pakistan truly wants India to share the burden of the project it should demonstrate to Delhi that it can ensure security and stability along the pipeline route.

18

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT: High Prices = IPI / XT #4 – alt causes to failure IPI will fall through now Abbas Maleki, director of the International Institute for Caspian Studies in Tehran, September 2007, http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/17518/iranpakistanindia_pipeline.html?breadcrumb=%2F The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline (I PI) would run totally 2,670 km (1,660 miles), about 1,115 km (690 miles) in Iran, 705 km (440 miles) in Pakistan and 850 km (530 miles) in India, and the total investment is estimated at $7 billion and may take four to five years to complete. Apart from the fact that the IPI pipeline makes good economic sense, particularly in promoting regional cooperation, it is immensely important to the on-going peace process between India and Pakistan. A number of observers of the IndiaPakistan conflict have termed this project as the mother of all confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan and named it the Peace Pipeline. The project has been dealt a major jolt by the news that New Delhi and Islamabad have rejected the draft final agreement circulated by Iran, which calls for a three-year review cycle on the gas price. Causing yet another delay in the trilateral deal, the pricing dispute will either be resolved by a new round of negotiations or turn into an unbridgeable difference putting the IPI's fate under question marks. Prior to his resignation in early August 2007, Iran's petroleum minister, Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh, had announced that the seventh round of negotiations for the IPI contract would be held in Tehran on July 29, 2007. It did not happen and, what is more, a former Iranian deputy oil minister, Hadi Nejad Hosseinian, has questioned the deal on the ground that it gives a huge discount to India and is some 30 percent below the value of gas sold to Turkey. Another Iranian politician, Akbar Mohtashemipour, from Iran's reformist side, has publicly questioned the wisdom of exporting Iran's gas at a time when the cold regions of Iran face gas shortages. The IPI issue has been moved to Iran's Foreign Ministry, and during the past year and a half, the Iranian negotiation team has changed three times.

19

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT: High Prices = IPI - no India/pak conflict The risk of India Pakistan conflict is low Republican Duncan Hunter, 10-10-07, US Fed News "In addition to its counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan has made progress on its eastern border with India tensions between the two nations have noticeably decreased due to confidence-building measures and Pakistan and India are both committed to taking steps toward resolving the historical animosity that exists over Kashmir. I am interested in your thoughts regarding the United States' role in the Indo-Pakistani dialogue process.

20

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC: Trans-Balkan Pipeline DA 1. There is no risk that major powers will get drawn into Balkan regional wars. Roland Dannreuther. “European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a neighbourhood Strategy.” New York, Routledge. 2004 p. 195-6 The global setting is thus primed for a continuance of the transatlantic partnership, but with ongoing and sometimes fractious policy bargaining that is frequently stoked by status dissonance. What are the implications for policy cooperation in the EU's neighbourhood? It is important to stress that the unipolar structure paradoxically increases the salience of regional international politics across the globe for two reasons. First is the declining pole-to-state ratio. The nineteenth-century international system was composed of six or eight polar states out of a total of roughly 30 significant powers. In the early Cold War there were two poles, but the number of states had doubled to just over 70. Today there is one pole in a system whose population has

trebled to nearly 200 states. As a simple matter of numbers, there is bound to be more going on in regional international relations in today's system. Not only are the numbers of lesser powers growing, so are their aggregate capabilities. By one measure, the conventionally defined Great Powers comprised over 80 per cent of global capabilities in the mid-nineteenth century, 65 per cent in the early Cold War, but only around 55 per cent today.15 Second, many regional dynamics are measurably less constrained by

Great Power politics than they were in the Cold War for purely structural reasons. The current international structure is looser than Cold War bipolarity, even though it is more unequal. The gap between the most powerful state and the rest is much larger now than under bipolarity, but the system is less constraining on many important regions. This comparative looseness does not mean that the system is not unipolar. On the contrary, it is a result of the fact that unipolarity limits the very intense Great Power contradictions that tend to force lesser powers to choose sides. The contemporary international system, in short, is characterized by unprecedented US hegemony within the Great Power club, and a novel proliferation of lesser states outside that club. The likelihood that regional dynamics will fall outside the limits of a polar state's national interest or capability is thus greater than in preceding systems. Because there are now far more, and more capable, states relative to poles than in prior eras, and because the abeyance of intense security rivalries among Great Powers increases the latitude for regional interstate dynamics, there is a heightened demand for inter-state cooperation at the regional level. Notwithstanding US primacy, today's international system puts a premium on the ability of the United States and the EU to coordinate policy in the regions.

2. Instability in the Balkans now—Kosovo Fridl 7/11/08 (Daniella, "The Balkan Saga Continues," recipient of a six-month fellowship from IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19374) With U.S.-Russia relations continuing to deteriorate in the wake of the G8 summit and America’s continuing efforts to build a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe, we now have another nail to add to the coffin. In the United States and the European Union, there is a widely

held belief that Kosovo’s independence was the last missing piece in achieving stability in the Balkans. Having just returned from Kosovo, I would have to disagree. My observations lead me to conclude that there remains serious potential for instability in Kosovo—with broad implications for U.S.-Russia relations and beyond. Serbia paid a high price for the mistakes that were made during Slobodan Milsovic’s regime. Former Finnish President and the key mediator in the Kosovo negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari, explained to me that the Serbs lost Kosovo in 1999. This is not to say that Belgrade did not have a chance to negotiate a more favorable agreement between 2005 and 2007. However, it was almost impossible for any constructive Serbian policy to develop, given the fragile structure of the governing coalition and the intense rivalries between nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and pro-European President Boris Tadic. Hence, it was politically more expedient and safe to exploit the nationalist sentiment in the country and settle on the lowest common denominator: claiming that historically Kosovo was and remains part of Serbia. Instead of sitting back in denial, hoping for a miraculous turn of events, Belgrade could have been more effective in using Russia’s support and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which protects the territorial integrity of Serbia, as leverage in securing some level of sovereignty for the Serbs living in Kosovo. Opportunities were there, but the political will, wisdom and effectiveness that were required to achieve this outcome were lacking. Although Kosovo is making slow progress toward obtaining international recognition, this new European state has many

other far-more-pressing challenges. They include a still-lagging economy, high levels of organized crime and corruption, an unemployment rate close to 50 percent, a population of about two million—half under the age of twenty-five, and most importantly the unresolved question of Kosovo Serbs. Some of these issues will improve, especially considering the resources and funding that the European Union and the United States are putting in Kosovo. At the upcoming donors’ conference, the international community is expected to raise over one billion dollars to help boost Kosovo’s economy. Regrettably, the northern part of the country remains completely isolated and is not likely to reap any benefits from this aid. Mitrovica is an ethnically divided city, with the majority of Serbs living on the northern side of the Ibar River and Albanians on the southern side. Ironically, the white bridge over the river symbolizes the division between the two ethnic groups, which is evident in the UN checkpoints and barbed-wire barricades set up on both sides. Crossing into the opposite side of the bridge at nighttime is not advisable for security reasons.

21

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

3. The pipeline is inevitable – construction has already started, the agreement is signed and operation will begin in 2011 Hydrocarbons technology.com 2008, http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/trans-balkan-pipelin/index.html In March 2007 Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed an intergovernmental agreement to build and operate the BurgasAlexandropoulos oil pipeline between Bulgaria and Greece. The construction will begin in 2008 and operations are due to begin in 2011. Advisors to the governments include Allen & Overy and Paul Hastings with stake holders including: Rosneft (17%) (Russian), Universal Terminal Burgas (12.25%) (Bulgarian), Transneft (17%) (Russian), Hellenic Petroleum (8.1%) (Greek), Gazprom (17%) (Russian), Thraki (8.1%) (Greek), Bulgargaz (12.25%) (Bulgarian), Government of Greece (8.1%). Russia will have overall control of 51% of the line and Greece and Bulgaria will control 49%.

4. Pipeline will lead to an oil spill in the Aegean because of the concentration of oil tankers Hydrocarbons technology.com 2008, http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/trans-balkan-pipelin/index.html The pipeline will have three oil refilling stations along the route; two of these are intended to be in Bulgaria (the first one is planned at Neftochim quite close to the Burgas terminal) and also one at the Alexandroupolis terminus of the line. The cost of the project will include the reconstruction and refurbishment (capacity enhancement) of both the Burgas and Alexandroupolis terminals, which will include oil tanks with a capacity of over 600,000t in Burgas, and 1,200,000t in Alexandroupolis.

There have been environmental concerns raised about the possibility of an oil spill in the Aegean where there will soon be a concentration of crude oil tankers.

5. Oil spills threaten marine life and ecosystems Parent 06 (Jason, associate with the Law Offices of Beauregard, Burke & Franco in New Bedford, Massachusets, Fall, 14 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 117, lexis) Pollution is an on-going and increasing problem in our oceans. 94 Oil spills can have deadly impacts on marine life, as evidenced by the Exxon Valdez incident. 95 That incident was particularly detrimental because on the coast of Alaska and in other colder areas, oil takes longer to breakdown and can get trapped in the ice, making clean up more difficult. 96 Additionally, toxic contaminants, such as mirex and PCBs, often from unknown sources, can impact marine mammals much in the same manner that contaminants in our drinking water can affect us. 97 Impacts on mammals can be severe because "they bioaccumulate many of the toxic chemicals in their bodies, resulting in the release of more concentrated doses further along the food chain when they are preyed or scavenged upon." 98 Finally, ocean dumping continues to [*136] take the lives of many marine animals." 99 According to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, "the most pervasive 'threat to marine mammals is the degradation of the environment upon which they depend.'" 100 A wide variety of materials are intentionally or negligently dumped into the oceans. 101 Much of the debris can have detrimental impacts on marine life, causing asphyxiation, strangulation, entanglement, contamination, and a host of other potential hazards. 102

6. That causes extinction Paul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life Sciences, 1994, p 177 Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.

22

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – Gabon Deforestation 1. Gabon’s economy has diversified. Loss of oil revenue wouldn’t destroy it or forests. Canadian Corporate Newswire February 20, 2008 HEADLINE: SearchGold Defines a 3km by 5km Anomalous Gold Sector on Ekarlong Target in Gabon

Gabon is now starting to diversify its economy and intends on maximizing the overlooked potential of its mining sector which offers upside from various commodities. SearchGold and its partner Managem are developing Gabon is one of the most politically stable countries in Africa and the country's petroleum industry has insured prosperity.

Gabon's most advanced gold project, the Bakoudou-Magnima Project. The Booue-Mimongo Project complements the Bakoudou-Magnima Project by strengthening SearchGold's position in Gabon with access to 10,000 km2 of under-explored greenstone belts.

2. No impact - Congo deforestation being solved now. New Congo Basin Forest fund will solve deforestation Africa News June 23, 2008 HEADLINE: Central Africa;

New Fund Launched for Congo Basin BYLINE: Inter Press Service

The prime ministers of Norway and Britain have launched a 200 million dollar fund to tackle deforestation in the Congo Basin, the world's second largest tropical forest. Launched in London last week, the Congo Basin Forest Fund will support initiatives from governments, civil society and the private sector that aim to reduce logging. The fund will sponsor livelihood projects that seek to make it more profitable for local communities to preserve the forest than to cut it down, as well as the development of new and innovative approaches. This includes a new satellite system that will monitor the forest -- which is twice the size of France and covers an area of more than a million square kilometres.

3. Non-unique. Deforestation of the Congo is rampant now and oil prices are high. Law & Health Weekly December 22, 2007 HEADLINE: BURNESS COMMUNICATIONS; Report finds deforestation offers very little money compared to potential financial benefits Developing new incentives for reducing carbon emissions stemming from deforestation is high on the agenda in Bali. Deforestation is Currently, confusion over how to value and monitor the large amounts of carbon stored in tropical forests has prevented the inclusion of forests in the carbon offset market that is mainly dominated by reductions achieved in the industrial sector, even though deforestation is responsible for some 20 percent of the world 's carbon emissions.

rampant in places like Indonesia, the Amazon and the Congo.

23

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT Gabon DA - Species Loss impacts 1.) New Life A.) New species fill the void. Richard Kerr 10/7/1994 Science 28 In the immediate aftermath of an extinction, some taxa – groups of animals such as species or genera – flourish, then gradually fade. Others that had apparently vanished can reappear, Lazarus-like. In the turmoil, new groups may gain ascendancy, filling ecological niches left empty by the extinction and displacing other survivors to create a new ecological order (See box on p.29).

B.) Resiliency- recolonization species will recolonize damagead areas Princeton University Press 2005 http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7130.html Reice argues, in terms refreshingly nontechnical yet scientifically sound, that the traditional, equilibrium paradigm--according to which ''stability'' produces healthier ecosystems than does sudden, sweeping change--is fundamentally flawed. He describes a radically different model of how nature operates, one that many ecologists and population biologists have come to understand in recent years: a concept founded on the premise that disturbances help create and maintain the biodiversity that benefits both

the ecosystem and ourselves. Reice demonstrates that ecosystems need disturbances to accomplish indispensable tasks such as the production of clean air and water. He recommends changes in environmental management to incorporate the essential role of natural disturbances.

2.) No spillover to other species. Thomas Gale Moore 1998 Climate of fear, why we shouldn’t worry about global warming 98-9 Nevertheless,

the loss of a class of living beings does not typically threaten other species. Most animals and plants can derive their nutrients or receive the other benefits provided by a particular species from more than a single source. If it were true that the extinction of a single species would produce a cascade of losses, then the massive extinctions of the past should have wiped out all life. Evolution forces various life forms to adjust to change. A few may not make the adaptation but others will mutate to meet the new conditions. Although a particular chain of DNA may be eliminated through the loss of species, other animals or plants adapting to the same environment often produce similar genetic solutions with like proteins. It is almost impossible to imagine a single species that, if eliminated, would threaten us humans. Perhaps if the E. coli that are necessary for digestion became extinct, we could no longer exist. But those bacteria live in a symbiotic relationship with man and, as long as humans survive, so will they. Thus any animal that hosts a symbiotic species need not fear the loss of its partner. As long as the host remains, so will parasites and symbiotic species.

3.) Their impact is non-falsifiable and politically motivated. John Charles Kunich )Judge Advocate specializing in environmental law, United States Air Force, Colorado Springs, Co) Spring, 1994 SPECIES & HABITAT CONSERVATION: THE FALLACY OF DEATHBED CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 24 Envtl. L. 501 It is undisputed that, as one expert puts it, "Our ignorance of the natural world is enormous," and that, as we struggle with our response to the plight of our fellow organisms on this planet, "if we do not even know who the players are, our understanding of how well they are playing is far more deficient." 43 It has been estimated that the ratio of unknown to known species may be as high as 21 to 1, with 30 million undescribed species versus 1.4 [*517] million that have been identified and taxonomically categorized by man. 44 The skeptics argue that the apocalyptic vision of a gigantic extinction spasm is based more on ideology than on science. In this view, although estimates of total species range as high as 100 million, anything in excess of the 1.4 million actually identified is mere guesswork. If no one knows how many species exist, how can anyone know how many are going extinct? 45 If traces of the alleged extinction victims are never discovered, no one will be able to determine whether they became extinct or never existed at all. According to Patrick Kangas of the University of Maryland, the "whole business is unfalsifiable, and everyone in science knows what a mess unfalsifiable theories are." 46

24

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – Secessionism DA 1. Impact is not specific and empirically denied. They provide no explanation of which states might all of a sudden engage in secessionist conflicts, which of these states might have access to weapons of mass destruction, and what the time frame would be for the conflicts. No recent secessionist conflict have gone nuclear. Prefer our case advantage. 2. U.S. hegemony holds everything together-solves secessionist wars. Robert Kagan, Commentary, July, 1995 The term "isolationist" has never fairly described any American foreign policy at any time, and it is of no greater value today. A party that demands the immediate expansion of NATO eastward; that stands for international free trade and rigorous efforts to enforce global nuclear nonproliferation; and that speaks constantly of the need for American leadership in the world is not an isolationist party. Nor does history simply repeat itself. But without conjuring up alarmist visions of a new Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, it does not take a great deal of foresight to see the dangers that might arise from an American "return to normalcy" in the 1990's. Today's relatively benign international order was created by the United States in World War II and in the subsequent four-and-a-half decades of the cold war through great effort and at great expense. It is especially the product of the ideologically-charged global activism that characterized the Reagan years, when Americans, guided by Reagan's simple vision, came to understand the close links among the spread of democracy, the expansion of free markets, the deterrence and punishment of aggression, and American security. This benign order is neither the natural state of the world nor the inevitable product of a Hegelian dialectic. It is, on the contrary, a fragile, temporary situation, and dependent for its continuance on high levels of American power, influence, and engagement. If America begins to behave like a more "normal" power, the rest of the world will adjust accordingly--adjust, that is, to the diminution of American influence and involvement.

3. Oil revenues spark secessionist conflicts and civil wars in oil-producing states Ross May/June 08 (Michael, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, "Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict," http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/blood-barrels.html?mode=print) For new oil and gas producers, the gravest danger is the possibility of armed conflict.

Among developing countries, an oil-producing country is twice as likely to suffer internal rebellion as a non-oil-producing one. The conflicts range in magnitude from low-level secessionist struggles, such as those occurring in the Niger Delta and southern Thailand, to full-blown civil wars, such as in Algeria, Colombia, Sudan, and, of course, Iraq. Oil wealth can trigger conflict in three ways. First, it can cause economic instability, which then leads to political instability. When people lose their jobs, they become more frustrated with their government and more vulnerable to being recruited by rebel armies that challenge the cash-starved government. A sudden drop in income can result in internal strife in any country, but because oil prices are unusually volatile, oil-producing countries tend to be battered by cycles of booms and busts. And the more dependent a government is on its oil revenues, the more likely it is to face turmoil when prices go south. Second, oil wealth often helps support insurgencies. Rebellions in many countries fail when their instigators run out of funds. But raising money in petroleum-rich countries is relatively easy: insurgents can steal oil and sell it on the black market (as has happened in Iraq and Nigeria), extort money from oil companies working in remote areas (as in Colombia and Sudan), or find business partners to fund them in exchange for future consideration in the event they seize power (as in Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of the Congo). Third, oil wealth encourages separatism. Oil and gas are usually produced in self-contained economic enclaves that yield a lot of revenue for the central government but provide few jobs for locals -- who also often

bear the costs of petroleum development, such as lost property rights and environmental damage. To reverse the imbalance, some locals seek autonomy from the central government, as have the people in the petroleum-rich regions of Bolivia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Sudan. This is not to say that petroleum is the only source of such conflicts or that it inevitably breeds violence. In fact, almost half of all the states that have produced oil since 1970 have been conflict-free. Oil alone cannot create conflict, but it both exacerbates latent tensions and gives governments and their more militant opponents the means to fight them out. Governments that limit corruption and put their windfalls to good use rarely face unrest. Unfortunately, oil production is now rising precisely in those countries where wise leadership is often in short supply. Most of the new energy-rich states are in Africa (Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Namibia, and São Tomé and Príncipe), the Caspian basin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), or Southeast Asia (Cambodia, East Timor, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Almost all are undemocratic. The majority are very poor and ill equipped to manage a sudden and large influx of revenues. And many also have limited petroleum reserves -- just enough to yield large revenues for a decade or two -- which means that if they succumb to civil war, they will squander whatever chance they had of using their oil windfalls to escape from poverty.

25

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. Oil revenue induced corruption leads to civil unrest and revolution. Michael T. Klare, a Current History contributing editor is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, 2002, “The deadly nexus: Oil, terrorism, and America's national security” accessed July 10, 2008, proquest.

Oil is also linked to conflict and violence through its role in generating immense wealth for those who receive the royalties and other rewards derived from the exploitation of a nation's petroleum reserves. Petroleum production and distribution is one of the world's most lucrative industries, producing vast profits for the giant oil companies and also channeling enormous riches to the elites and ruling dynasties that own the oil fields or control the disbursement of the royalties (or "rents") paid by companies for the right to tap into these fields. These riches, in turn, have inspired efforts by rival elites and clans to gain control over the oil fields-in some cases through the use of force. The concentration of so much affluence in the hands of so few has also produced resentment for those members of society who have received little or no benefit from oil production, thus providing the tinder for revolutionary and extremist movements aimed at the redistribution of wealth.

5. There is no risk that major powers will get drawn into ethnic civil wars Roland Dannreuther. “European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a neighbourhood Strategy.” New York, Routledge. 2004 p. 195-6 The global setting is thus primed for a continuance of the transatlantic partnership, but with ongoing and sometimes fractious policy bargaining that is frequently stoked by status dissonance. What are the implications for policy cooperation in the EU's neighbourhood? It is important to stress that the unipolar structure paradoxically increases the salience of regional international politics across the globe for two reasons. First is the declining pole-to-state ratio. The nineteenth-century international system was composed of six or eight polar states out of a total of roughly 30 significant powers. In the early Cold War there were two poles, but the number of states had doubled to just over 70. Today there is one pole in a system whose population has

trebled to nearly 200 states. As a simple matter of numbers, there is bound to be more going on in regional international relations in today's system. Not only are the numbers of lesser powers growing, so are their aggregate capabilities. By one measure, the conventionally defined Great Powers comprised over 80 per cent of global capabilities in the mid-nineteenth century, 65 per cent in the early Cold War, but only around 55 per cent today.15 Second, many regional dynamics are measurably less constrained by

Great Power politics than they were in the Cold War for purely structural reasons. The current international structure is looser than Cold War bipolarity, even though it is more unequal. The gap between the most powerful state and the rest is much larger now than under bipolarity, but the system is less constraining on many important regions. This comparative looseness does not mean that the system is not unipolar. On the contrary, it is a result of the fact that unipolarity limits the very intense Great Power contradictions that tend to force lesser powers to choose sides. The contemporary international system, in short, is characterized by unprecedented US hegemony within the Great Power club, and a novel proliferation of lesser states outside that club. The likelihood that regional dynamics will fall outside the limits of a polar state's national interest or capability is thus greater than in preceding systems. Because there are now far more, and more capable, states relative to poles than in prior eras, and because the abeyance of intense security rivalries among Great Powers increases the latitude for regional interstate dynamics, there is a heightened demand for inter-state cooperation at the regional level. Notwithstanding US primacy, today's international system puts a premium on the ability of the United States and the EU to coordinate policy in the regions.

26

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – Euro Switch DA 1. Dollar is weak and will continue to decline against other currencies in the next six months; several sectors are collapsing in the economy and that prevents dollar recovery Ye Xie and Stanley White. 7/16/2008. (Bloomberg. “Dollar Optimism Dissipates as Confidence in Fed Ebbs”, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=alSZFf4DnQ7g&refer=home) The U.S. dollar will weaken against the euro, yen, Brazilian real and Swiss franc in the next six months as confidence in Federal Reserve and Treasury efforts to keep the economy out of a recession fades, a survey of Bloomberg users showed. U.S. investors turned bearish on the dollar for the first time in three months, according to respondents in the monthly Bloomberg Professional Global Confidence Index, which questioned 5,450 users from Los Angles to Paris to Tokyo. Participants became bullish on the franc for the first time since March and less pessimistic about the British pound. The results are consistent with expectations of futures traders, who are placing less of a chance that the Fed will raise its benchmark interest rate from 2 percent this year. The Dollar Index, which tracks the currency against six of U.S. major trading partners, fell to a three-month low yesterday on concern that losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest U.S. mortgage firms, will slow economic growth. ``The markets were naïve to think that the Fed's efforts to restore stability would be enough to prompt an immediate recovery,'' said Paresh Upadhyaya, who helps oversee about $50 billion in currency assets as a senior vice president at Putnam Investments in Boston and participated in the survey. ``It takes time to resolve the issues in the housing and financial sectors, and these problems will prevent any sustained recovery of the dollar.'

2. Rising oil prices are causing the dollar to decline against the euro Gulf News July 20, 2008 HEADLINE: CITIGROUP TONIC GIVES STRENGTH TO DOLLAR The dollar commenced the week initially supported by announcements of US Treasury and Federal Reserve of emergency measures to restore investor confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which together directly or indirectly control almost half the US mortgage market. It, however, fell to a record low against interpreted the support as indicating the extreme severity of the credit market problems.

the euro

as the markets later

With rising oil prices hurting US growth, there was little incentive seen to buy dollars. Concerns about the US economy and financial sector overshadowed a series-low reading of the German ZEW investor sentiment.

3. No impact – even if OPEC did switch the market value is too small to change the currency markets. The dollar wouldn’t really take a hit. Steve Hargreaves, CNNMoney.com staff writer November 20 2007: 6:04 AM EST Some OPEC mavericks want to switch to the euro as oil's pricing basis. But analysts say there are several factors keeping the greenback in the game. http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/19/news/international/oil_opec/index.htm?postversion=2007112006

And even if OPEC did switch its oil pricing to another currency, some doubt whether the dollar would really take a hit. The amount of oil OPEC sells on the world market is somewhere around $1.5 billion per day, said Jeffrey Currie, the head of commodity research at Goldman Sachs in London. Compare that, he said, to the more than $3 trillion that change hands in currency markets every day. "You're talking about a value that's just too small to show up on the radar screen," said Currie. "It isn't enough to materially change the currency markets.

4. OPEC would never want to switch. They get too many benefits from the dollar including direct access to large markets, simple commodity trading, flexible export revenue generation and freedom to use export earnings without currency conversion Theodore w. Boll senior economist july 2008 the dollar and oil http://www.house.gov/jec/studies/2008/dollar%20and%20oil.pdf a joint economic committee republican staff study

The large oil exporters derive great benefit from the ability to sell their resource for a currency—the dollar—that gives them direct access to large markets with few limitations. In addition to simplifying commodity trading (no exchange rate arbitrage), it does not constrain export revenue generation (given the dollar’s liquidity compared to other reserve currencies), and it enhances their freedom to use the export earnings in many places around the world without the need for currency conversions (enhancing purchasing power).

27

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

5. No impact - Saudis won’t ever agree to the switch. They have an agreement to support the US and make sure crude stays priced in dollars Steve Hargreaves, CNNMoney.com staff writer November 20 2007: 6:04 AM EST Some OPEC mavericks want to switch to the euro as oil's pricing basis. But analysts say there are several factors keeping the greenback in the game. http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/19/news/international/oil_opec/index.htm?postversion=2007112006

That could be because oil OPEC heavyweight Saudi Arabia is known for keeping the interests of the United States in mind. Talk abounds of the tight relationship between the Saudi royal family and the U.S. government. Some say the United States, in an unwritten agreement dating back to the early days of Saudi oil, promised to guarantee the security of the desert kingdom in exchange for the Saudis making sure crude stays priced in U.S. dollars.

28

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

Euro Switch DA / XT #4 – OPEC will never switch Oil producer nations won’t switch. They want to deploy cash and keep it secure. US treasury bond market is the best place for them to do that. Theodore w. Boll senior economist july 2008 the dollar and oil http://www.house.gov/jec/studies/2008/dollar%20and%20oil.pdf a joint economic committee republican staff study

The oil business started in the United States. For a long time, the U.S. was the largest oil producer in the world and it remains the largest oil consumer today. When oil began to trade in volume internationally after World War II, it would have been highly impractical to quote the market price in anything but dollars. But in addition, oil producers have specific reasons for continuing to price their commodity in dollars and preferring payment in dollars. Outside of North America, governments mostly own oil fields and sell oil through national oil companies. The state may not be able to spend or invest all of the revenue at home without bidding up the domestic price level. Governments of oil exporting countries thus often accumulate cash they want to deploy outside the country. Major oil exporters receive tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue per year (Saudi Arabia collects the most, $194 billion in 2007, according to the EIA). Their first concern is how to keep the cash secure. There is only one place in the world to safely “park” this much money and that is the U.S. Treasury bond market. These bonds have as close to zero default risk as there is in the financial world. They are readily tradable in a secondary market, and the market is so large that even the streams of oil money do not destabilize it. The only other economy that is large enough to support a comparable product in comparable volume is the euro zone—but it does not offer one. Euro-zone member countries issue bonds only individually.

OPEC won’t switch. Exchange risks would threaten the value of their oil revenue Theodore w. Boll senior economist july 2008 the dollar and oil http://www.house.gov/jec/studies/2008/dollar%20and%20oil.pdf a joint economic committee republican staff study

Exchange risk also could threaten the value of the oil revenue. However, the U.S. market for goods and services is vast and the opportunities for investment abundant; moreover, dollars are accepted as a direct form of payment in many places around the world. Hence, there is no pressing need to convert dollars to other currencies for consumption or profitable investment. In the U.S., property rights are well protected, capital movement is easier, and political obstacles are fewer than elsewhere. Receiving oil payments in dollars gives oil exporters the option to exchange or not to exchange them for another currency; they do not need another currency to put their cash to use.

Oil exporters won’t switch they know it would reduce their purchasing power and destroy their assets. Theodore w. Boll senior economist july 2008 the dollar and oil http://www.house.gov/jec/studies/2008/dollar%20and%20oil.pdf a joint economic committee republican staff study

For these reasons, the European Central Bank will not enlarge the money supply unilaterally in an attempt to position the euro as a replacement for the dollar. A group of oil exporters suddenly adopting the euro as “their” currency would not constitute representative global sentiment with respect to the euro’s prospects and would not negate reservations to further openness that various euro-zone members still harbor. It would produce the effect described in the Swiss franc illustration and drive up the euro’s foreign exchange value. The exporters themselves, who have been receiving dollars as payment for their oil all along, would face further, accelerating depreciation of their dollar-denominated assets relative to the surging euro. Any uncoordinated attempt to force a conversion from the dollar to another currency would reduce the purchasing power of their past as well as future earnings.

29

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

2AC – Saudi Relations 1. Oil isn’t key to the US-Saudi relationship Alterman 5/22/08 (Jon, Director of Middle East Program @ CSIS, "Understanding Saudi-US Relations: A Conversation with Jon Alterman," http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/interviews/080521-alterman-interview.html) Alterman: There are two issues. First I don’t think people appreciate how much we do with Saudi Arabia. It’s just not understanding the importance of Saudi Arabia to the U.S. in a myriad of ways. It’s not just energy. It’s not just security. It comes to economic issues, counterterrorism issues, regional diplomacy issues. There’s a centrality and importance to Saudi Arabia that I think most Americans don’t have an appreciation for.

2. us-saudi relations low now – us actions against the gcc Shayji 6/22/08 Abdullah. Professor of IR @ Kuwait University. 6/22/8 http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10223052.html.

We can sense growing suspicion in the asymmetric relationship between the US and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states due to America's divergent view and position on GCC issues, which the member states - collectively and individually - deem as either unfriendly or interfering in their domestic affairs. The GCC states are frustrated at Washington's lack of gratitude and appreciation for their invaluable contribution to stability and security in the region and for pursuing the path of moderation in the Middle East. As part of the axis of moderation, the GCC plays a major role in Iraq, ensures energy security and generates sovereign wealth. But it was all ignored by the US Congress when the US House of Representatives approved a legislation that would allow the United States to sue the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) under its antitrust laws. New York Times columnist, Thomas Evan, too joined the fray and wrote an opinion article titled "Sue OPEC". With the unprecedented increase in oil prices

which is now hovering around $140 per barrel, only the GCC states can calm the world's fears of rising oil prices. Saudi Arabia took the initiative and increased its daily oil output by 200,000 barrels and also held a conference to address the significant relationship between the oil producing and oil consuming countries.

3. Turn—rising oil prices have soured the US-Saudi relationship Global Insight 6/10/08 (lexis) Significance:The volatility and price surges have been blamed by many consumer nations on the unwillingness of the producer nations--in particularly the OPEC states--to provide full third-party witnessed evaluations of their reserves, or on their lack of sufficient investment to end tight supply balance. The producers for their part have blamed financial speculation--in particular caused by capital flight from the weak U.S. dollar into commodities--saying that there is ample supply for the moment and a healthy stock build-up. Saudi Arabia, as OPEC's leading

producer and a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, has taken the brunt of U.S. political criticism over the rising prices, souring previously close personal relations between the U.S. presidential administration and the Saudi royal family in recent years. Launching the conference should be an opportunity for the Kingdom either to deflect some of the criticism onto other producers, or to be able to place some blame on what producers regard as unhelpful tax policies, especially in the developed consumer nations.

30

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. middle east conflict won’t escalate – leaders won’t get involved; self preservation and lack of national interest Maloney, Cook and Takeyh 6-28-2007. International Herald Tribune, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast.” Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq.

unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or

The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

5. ME escalation empirically denied K. Drum, Washington Monthly, 9/9/2007, “the chaos hawks” Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration.

Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and thenleft. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

31

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

Saudi Relations XT #2 – Relations low now relations low – threat of sanctions for human trafficking Shayji 6/22/08 Abdullah. Professor of IR @ Kuwait University. 6/22/8.http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10223052.html.

The US State Department's Eighth Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) or modern day slavery, published in early June was deemed offensive by the GCC states. The US insists that the report is "dedicated to ending human trafficking, a deeply dehumanising form of exploitation. In virtually every country around the world, including the United States, men, women and children are held in domestic servitude, exploited for commercial sex, coerced into work in factories and sweatshops. In some, children are forcibly recruited as soldiers". Mark Lagon, the US State Department's senior adviser on human-trafficking elaborated: "For the last four years, the weak performance of several nations in the Gulf has been the matter of great concern and disappointment." But he added that he was "happy to report that the UAE and Bahrain continued to make significant improvements, notably the UAE. It is a model in the region." The report kept the other four

GCC states in the blacklist with threat of sanctions against Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia because their governments have taken serious steps to deal with "trafficking in people".

US-Saudi relations are fraying now—Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Sept. 11 CBC News 5/16/08 ("Saudi Arabia announces small boost in oil production," http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/05/16/bush-saudi.html) Bush's Saudi stop was intended, in part, to celebrate 75 years of formal U.S.-Saudi relations and strengthen ties that, once strong, have frayed over the perception Washington favours Israel too much in the dispute with the Palestinians, the Iraq war and the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Fifteen of the 19 airline hijackers were Saudis, and Americans blamed Saudis for allowing the religious extremism that gave rise to them.

32

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

relations low now – russian arms deal Daly 7/18/08 John. http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373238. A simple, one-sentence Russian language news item published by Russia's Interfax on July 14 seemingly signals yet another tectonic shift in the Middle East's volatile mixture of oil, religion and weaponry. The item read, "An agreement about military-technical collaboration (VTS) between Russia and Saudi Arabia was signed Monday evening, reports an Interfaks [sic] correspondent; the agreement was signed in the presence of RF Prime Minister Vladimir Putin by Federal agency on VTS head Mikhail Dmitriev and National Security Council of Saudi Arabia Secretary General Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz" (Interfax, July 14). The next day the Saudi Press Agency provided more details, differing from the Interfax bulletin by noting that it was actually Bandar and Putin who signed the agreement, adding that "Bandar reiterated the keenness of the Custodian of the two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz on further cementing Saudi-Russian relations in the political, military, security, cultural and technological domains" (Saudi Press Agency, July 15). While no text of the agreement was published,

the news apparently represents a major potential realignment of the Middle East's geopolitical realities, made all the more extraordinary by the fact that, beginning 29 years ago and continuing through the entire Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia matched, dollar for dollar, the United States' covert assistance to the Mujahideen. Saudi Ambassador to Russia Ali bin Hassan Jaafar commented that the event reflected the two nations' "sincere" desire to develop not only military-technical cooperation, but also broader joint endeavors in other fields, adding, "It will be one more bridge linking our countries" (Vedomosti, July 16). Russian sources remarked that the Saudi military was particularly interested in Mi-17 transport and Mi-35 (NATO designation--"Hind-E") attack/transport helicopters. Ironically, an earlier variant of the Mi-35, the Mi-24, was used extensively during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to strafe Mujahideen, operating with complete air superiority until July 1985, when the United States began to supply the Mujahideen with hundreds of FIM-92A Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Riyadh's shopping list apparently is not limited to transporters and helicopters, as the source also stated that Saudi Arabia also was interested in purchasing Russia's most advanced aircraft and air defense systems, as well as T-90S main battle tanks, and was considering purchasing and integrating Russian-built S-300 and S-400 air defense systems with their U.S. Patriot systems (Vremya Novostei, July 16). Discussions between Riyadh and Moscow have been underway since then President Putin visited Saudi Arabia in February 2007, when he met not only with King Abdullah but also with Sultan, former ambassador to the United States, who was appointed NSC head in October 2005, and Sultan's father, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, half-brother of King Abdallah and currently Saudi Arabia's minister of defense and aviation (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 16, 2007). Obviously impressing his host, Abdullah awarded Putin the Order of King Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia's highest governmental award. Extending his trip to call on other U.S. regional allies, Putin also visited Qatar and Jordan. Following up on Putin's 2007sojourn, Defense Minister Sultan subsequently visited Moscow in November, while last February Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal visited Moscow for discussions with then President Putin (Kommersant, February 15). Putin said of the agreement, "Our relations are developing well; trade turnover is growing, though in absolute terms it still looks modest, but considering our good ties, we have good prospects and a good basis" (Interfax, July 14). Speculation immediately flared in the Russian press that Riyadh was using the agreement and dangling large potential weapons contracts in front of Russia in an effort to woo Moscow away from Iran (Kommersant, July 15). Dmitry Peskov, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's spokesman, was forced to deny the reports, saying, "Any allegations to the effect that Russia's relations with Saudi Arabia with regard to military technological cooperation may in any way be linked to the RussianIranian dialogue are out of place and untrue" (Interfax, July 15). If the allegations are true, they provide yet another hidden aspect to the West's efforts to cajole and pressure Tehran into

The news is unpleasant for the U.S., as from 1999 to 2006, Saudi Arabia received $6.5 billion under arms transfer agreements with the United States, an annual average of $815 million in inflation-adjusted fiscal year 2006 dollars; and in July 2007 Washington announced the sale of $20 billion in advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council. For Russia, to enter such a lucrative arms market, which for years was the exclusive purview of the EU and the U.S., is potentially worth billions of dollars. While Saudi Arabia has yet to express an interest in such top-end (and expensive) items as fighters, Riyadh's potential shopping list reportedly includes not only the items mentioned earlier, but also 150 advanced T-90S tanks, over 100 helicopters including the Mi-35, Mi-17 and Mi-28NE variants, the Buk-M2E medium range air defense systems and several hundred BMP-3 armored personnel carriers; and the wish list could grow, according to a Russian defense industry source (Interfax-AVN, July 15). For Washington, perhaps the most surprising abandoning its uranium enrichment program.

aspect of the agreement is the deep involvement of Bandar, who appears to be the driving agent behind Saudi Arabia's growing military cooperation with Russia. During his time in Washington, Bandar by dint of seniority became the unofficial dean of the diplomatic corps and was so close to the Bush family that he earned the sobriquet, "Bandar Bush." Obviously Bandar's loyalties may be more malleable than Washington previously thought.

33

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

Higher Oil Price = Wars Worldwide High Oil Prices fuel bloody wars between and within countries worldwide Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science, UCLA, ’08 [Michael L., Chairman of the International Development Studies program, and Acting Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Ph.D in Politics from Princeton, “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” May/June, Foreign Affairs, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/bloodbarrels.html

The world is far more peaceful today than it was 15 years ago. There were 17 major civil wars -- with "major" meaning the kind that kill more than a thousand people a year -- going on at the end of the Cold War; by 2006, there were just five. During that period, the number of smaller conflicts also fell, from 33 to 27. Despite this trend, there has been no drop in the number of wars in countries that produce oil. The main reason is that oil wealth often wreaks havoc on a country's economy and politics, makes it easier for insurgents to fund their rebellions, and aggravates ethnic grievances. Today, with violence falling in general, oil-producing states make up a growing fraction of the world's conflict-ridden countries. They now host about a third of the world's civil wars, both large and small, up from one-fifth in 1992. According to some, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq shows that oil breeds conflict between countries, but the

more widespread problem is that it breeds conflict within them. The number of oil-producer-based conflicts is likely to grow in the future as stratospheric prices of crude oil push more countries in the developing world to produce oil and gas. In 2001, the Bush administration's energy task force hailed the emergence of new producers as a chance for the United States to diversify the sources of its energy imports and reduce its reliance on oil from the Persian Gulf. More than a dozen countries in Africa, the Caspian basin, and Southeast Asia have recently become, or will soon become, significant oil and gas exporters. Some of these countries, including Chad, East Timor, and Myanmar, have already suffered internal strife. Most of the rest are poor, undemocratic, and badly governed, which means that they are likely to experience violence as well. On top of that, record oil prices will yield the kind of economic windfalls that typically produce further unrest. Oil is not unique; diamonds and other minerals produce similar problems. But as the world's most sought-after commodity, and with more

countries dependent on it than on gold, copper, or any other resource, oil has an impact more pronounced and more widespread.

Oil wealth triggers conflict – 3 ways. Economic instability, support for insurgency and separatism Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science, UCLA, ’08 [Michael L., Chairman of the International Development Studies program, and Acting Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Ph.D in Politics from Princeton, “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” May/June, Foreign Affairs, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/bloodbarrels.html

For new oil and gas producers, the gravest danger is the possibility of armed conflict. Among developing countries, an oil-producing country is twice as likely to suffer internal rebellion as a non-oil-producing one. The conflicts range in magnitude from low-level secessionist struggles, such as those occurring in the Niger Delta and southern Thailand, to fullblown civil wars, such as in Algeria, Colombia, Sudan, and, of course, Iraq. Oil wealth can trigger conflict in three ways.

First, it can cause economic instability, which then leads to political instability. When people lose their jobs, they become more frustrated with their government and more vulnerable to being recruited by rebel armies that challenge the cash-starved government. A sudden drop in income can result in internal strife in any country, but because oil prices are unusually volatile, oil-producing countries tend to be battered by cycles of booms and busts. And the more dependent a government is on its oil revenues, the more likely it is to face turmoil when prices go south. Second, oil wealth often helps support insurgencies. Rebellions in many countries fail when their instigators run out of funds. But raising money in petroleum-rich countries is relatively easy: insurgents can steal oil and sell it on the black market (as has happened in Iraq and Nigeria), extort money from oil companies working in remote areas (as in Colombia and Sudan), or find business partners to fund them in exchange for future consideration in the event they seize power (as in Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of the Congo). Third, oil wealth encourages separatism. Oil and gas are usually produced in self-contained economic enclaves that yield a lot of revenue for the central government but provide few jobs for locals -- who also often bear the costs of petroleum development, such as lost property rights and environmental damage. To reverse the imbalance, some locals seek autonomy from the central government, as have the people in the petroleum-rich regions of Bolivia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Sudan.

34

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

High Oil Prices = Economic decline XT TURN: Oil profits bring economic decline Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science, UCLA, ’08 [Michael L., Chairman of the International Development Studies program, and Acting Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Ph.D in Politics from Princeton, “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” May/June, Foreign Affairs, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/bloodbarrels.html

The oil booms of the 1970s brought great wealth -- and later great anguish -- to many petroleum-rich countries in the developing world. In the 1970s, oil-producing states enjoyed fast economic growth. But in the following three decades, many suffered crushing debt, high unemployment, and sluggish or declining economies. At least half of the members of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) were poorer in 2005 than they had been 30 years earlier. Oil-rich countries that once held great promise, such as Algeria and Nigeria, have unraveled as a result of decades of internal conflict.

These states were plagued by the so-called oil curse. One aspect of the problem is an economic syndrome known as Dutch disease, named after the troubles that beset the Netherlands in the 1960s after it discovered natural gas in the North Sea. The affliction hits when a country becomes a significant producer and exporter of natural resources. Rising resource exports push up the value of the country's currency, which makes its other exports, such as manufactured and agricultural goods, less competitive abroad. Export figures for those products then decline, depriving the country of the benefits of dynamic manufacturing and agricultural bases and leaving it dependent on its resource sector and so at the mercy of often volatile international markets. In Nigeria, for example, the oil boom of the early 1970s caused agricultural exports to drop from 11.2 percent of GDP in 1968 to 2.8 percent of GDP in 1972; the country has yet to recover.

Another facet of the oil curse is the sudden glut of revenues. Few oil-rich countries have the fiscal discipline to invest the windfalls prudently; most squander them on wasteful projects. The governments of Kazakhstan and Nigeria, for example, have spent their petroleum incomes on building new capital cities while failing to bring running water to the many villages throughout their countries that lack it. Well-governed states with highly educated populations and diverse economies, such as Canada and Norway, have avoided these ill effects. But many more oil-rich countries have low incomes and less effective governments and so are more susceptible to the oil curse. Oil wealth also has political downsides, and those are often worse than the economic ones. Oil revenues tend to increase corruption, strengthen the hands of dictators, and weaken new democracies. The more money the governments of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela have received from oil and gas exports, the less accountable they have become to their own citizens -- and the easier it has been for them to shut up or buy off their opponents. A major boom in oil prices, such as the one that took the price of a barrel from less than $10 in February 1999 to over $100 in March 2008, only heightens the danger. For new oil and gas producers, the gravest danger is the possibility of armed conflict. Among developing

countries, an oil-producing country is twice as likely to suffer internal rebellion as a non-oil-producing one.

35

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

High oil prices hurts democracy XT TURN: Oil profits destroy democracy Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science, UCLA, ’08 [Michael L., Chairman of the International Development Studies program, and Acting Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Ph.D in Politics from Princeton, “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” May/June, Foreign Affairs, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/bloodbarrels.html

Oil wealth also has political downsides, and those are often worse than the economic ones. Oil revenues tend to increase corruption, strengthen the hands of dictators, and weaken new democracies. The more money the governments of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela have received from oil and gas exports, the less accountable they have become to their own citizens -- and the easier it has been for them to shut up or buy off their opponents. A major boom in oil prices, such as the one that took the price of a barrel from less than $10 in February 1999 to over $100 in March 2008, only heightens the danger.

36

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

A/T Oil Spills: ↓ Prices = ↓ Double Hulls TURN: Lower oil prices prevent shift to Double Hull tankers. Those are the best solution to preventing oil spills Kizzia '99 [By TOM KIZZIA, Daily News reporter, "Exxon Valdez - Legacy of a Spill: Double-hull tankers face slow going," Anchorage Daily News, May 13, 1999, http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/T99032456.htm download date: 7-20-08] Ten years after the Exxon Valdez spill, new tankers have yet to be added to the aging fleet sailing through Prince William Sound. Now oil companies are pressing for further delays to a congressional deadline for bringing safer double-hull ships to Alaska. Citing economic reasons, Alaska's oil shippers in January asked the Coast Guard to let them extend the life of existing tankers an additional five years. They say the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which set a schedule for phasing out older single-hull tankers from U.S. ports, intended to allow such extensions if the older tankers are retrofitted with "double sides." Existing tankers could provide the same double-hull-type protection against spills from collisions, oil companies say, if the ships were modified to carry water in wing tanks exposed to the sea. Environmentalists are outraged, saying government officials have repeatedly reneged on promises dating from before the transAlaska pipeline to bring safer, double-hull tankers to Prince William Sound. "The Alaska fleet is now substantially older than the international fleet serving places like Rotterdam and Japan," said Walt Parker, former chairman of the state's Alaska Oil Spill Commission, one of many groups that have recommended tough doublehull standards. But the Knowles administration said it is willing to defer to the Coast Guard and accept reconfigured "double-sided" tankers, as long as the ships have double bottoms to protect against groundings in Prince William Sound. The Coast Guard expects to rule on the oil industry's request in the next few months, said Bob Gauvin, a project manager for the Coast Guard's national office of operating and environmental standards.

While great strides have been made since the Exxon Valdez spill in setting up an oil-spill prevention system in Prince William Sound, the question of double-hull tankers remains a major battleground. "We are still missing the biggest prevention tool that everybody knows about, and that's double hulls," said Cordova biologist Riki Ott, a longtime industry critic. Atlantic Richfield announced in January it had slowed production of its new "Millennium Class" double-hull tankers, while British Petroleum says it has not gone beyond initial design work. Exxon, responsible for the spill that led to the double-hull law, is going further than its Prudhoe Bay partners - it now says

it may never build double-hull ships for the Alaska trade. With oil prices low and North Slope production declining, investment in expensive U.S.-built tankers for Alaska may no longer make sense, said SeaRiver Maritime Inc., Exxon's tanker subsidiary.

Studies have shown that a second steel skin on a tanker would prevent some spills after accidents and reduce others. A Coast Guard study estimated the Exxon Valdez spill would have lost 60 percent less oil with a double hull. Interior Department officials who were promoting construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline during the Nixon administration promised double hulls would be required for the tanker fleet. The state of Alaska adopted strong incentives for double hulls under a 1976 tanker safety law that was thrown out in 1978 in federal court. Oil companies had sued the state, arguing that the tough state law was an infringement on interstate commerce. Several double-hull tankers were built for Alaska while that law was in effect. After it was thrown out, those tankers began carrying oil in the protective outer tanks, wiping out the margin of safety that was designed into them, Parker said. The 1990 law, passed while the Prince William Sound spill was still fresh in the minds of Americans, required double-hulls for all U.S. ports. But the law gave oil companies a long phaseout period, depending on each tanker's age, with the last prespill tankers going out of service in 2015. Environmentalists had fought the long phaseout period, calling it excessive.

37

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

A/T Oil Spills: Impact Empirically Denied Impact is Empirically Denied – dozens of huge spills Green '08 [Hank Green, "10 Largest Oil Spills (The Valdez Doesn't Make the List)," February 28, 2008. http://envirowonk.com/content/view/68/1/ download date: 7-21-08] The Exxon Valdez, the tanker responsible for the worst oil spill in American history, has come back into the news this week, as the Supreme Court finally decides the price that Exxon will pay for ruining the fishing industry in Alaska. But it will likely surprise you to know that the Valdez spill was actually only the 34th largest oil spill in history. These ten oil spills, all massively larger than the Exxon Valdez, were all smaller new stories, either because the ships were offshore, or dropped their toxic loads in less developed parts of the world. The Valdez spilled 10 million gallons off the

coast of Alaska, the smallest spill in the top ten was four times larger. 1. Kuwait - 1991 - 520 million gallons Iraqi forces opened the valves of several oil tankers in order to slow the invasion of American troops. The oil slick was four inches thick and covered 4000 square miles of ocean. 2. Mexico - 1980 - 100 million gallons An accident in an oil well caused an explosion which then caused the well to collapse. The well remained open, spilling 30,000 gallons a day into the ocean for a full year. 3. Trinidad and Tobago - 1979 - 90 million During a tropical storm off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago, a Greek oil tanker collided with another ship, and lost nearly its entire cargo. 4. Russia - 1994 - 84 million gallons A broken pipeline in Russia leaked for eight months before it was noticed and repaired. 5. Persian Gulf - 1983 - 80 million gallons A tanker collided with a drilling platform which, eventually, collapsed into the sea. The well continued to spill oil into the ocean for seven months before it was repaired. 6. South Africa - 1983 - 79 million gallons A tanker cought fire and was abandoned before sinking 25 miles off the coast of Saldanha Bay. 7. France - 1978 - 69 million gallons A tanker's rudder was broken in a severe storm, despite several ships responding to its distress call, the ship ran aground and broke in two. It's entire payload was dumped into the English Channel. 8. Angola - 1991 - more than 51 million gallons The tanker expolded, exact quantity of spill unknown 9. Italy - 1991 - 45 million gallons The tanker exploded and sank off the coast of Italy and continued leaking it's oil into the ocean for 12 years. 10. Odyssey Oil Spill - 1988 - 40 million gallons 700 nautical miles off the cost of Nova Scotia. The Exxon Valdez oil spill was a disaster, but so were the 33 oil spills that were, in fact, worse. Spills have slowed down in recent years, due to advances in logistics and tanker hulls.

38

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

A/T Oil Spills: Alternative Causality Alternative Causality – 92 per cent of oil wastes in ocean come from land drainage, factories, and recreational boating and not tankers & drilling Water Encyclopedia '8 ["Oil Spills: Impact on the Ocean," last modified: 7-21-08, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Oc-Po/Oil-Spills-Impact-on-the-Ocean.html download date: 7-21-08]

Oil wastes that enter the ocean come from many sources, some being accidental spills or leaks, and some being the results of chronic and careless habits in the use of oil and oil products. Most waste oil in the ocean consists of oily stormwater drainage from cities and farms, untreated waste disposal from factories and industrial facilities, and unregulated recreational boating. It is estimated that approximately 706 million gallons of waste oil enter the ocean every year, with over half coming from land drainage and waste disposal; for example, from the improper disposal of used motor oil. Offshore drilling and production operations and spills or leaks from ships or tankers typically contribute less than 8 percent of the total.

39

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

A/T Oil Spills: Bio-Remediation Solves Impacts New discoveries in Bio-remediation solves spills Technology Review '6 [By Duncan Graham-Rowe, "Better Bugs for Oil Spills: Oil-eating bacteria offer new hope for bioremediation," July 31, 2006, http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=17230&ch=biotech&a=f download date: 7-21-08]

Scientists in Europe have sequenced the genome for an oil-eating bacterium, a move that could pave the way for faster and more efficient ways to clean up oil spills. With a complete blueprint for Alcanivorax borkumensis, researchers hope to better understand the specialized physiological mechanisms that enable the bacteria to live almost exclusively on hydrocarbons, says Vitor Martins dos Santos of the Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research (formerly the German Research Centre for Biotechnology) in Braunschweig, Germany, who co-led the international project. The sequencing of the 2,755-gene organism is described in the journal Nature Biotechnology. The findings could reveal how to optimize the conditions for these bugs and thus enable them to help mop up the hundreds of millions of liters of oil that enter the sea each year, says Martins dos Santos.

40

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

A/T Oil Spills: Bio-Remediation Solves Bio-Remediation is safe and effective at cleaning up all types of hydro-carbons Eco Chem '8 [EcoChem is an Alberta Corporation engaged in innovation, product development and manufacturing. Established in 1998, the company offers products and services that contribute to the movement toward self-regulation and voluntary compliance in matters associated with sustainable agriculture, waste management and the environment. With innovations based on science, EcoChem is helping to put the principles of sustainability into practice. "SOIL RECLAMATION, OIL SPILL CLEANUP, OIL SLICK DISPERSANTS, HYDROCARBON BIOREMEDIATION," Page last modified: March 6, 2008, http://www.ecochem.com/t_cbpa2.html download date: 7-21-08]

Bioremediation is an economical and safe method for cleaning up oil spills and bioremediating soils contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbons and dangerous organic compounds. The bioremediation process utilizes beneficial microbes, surfactants, micronutrients and bio-stimulants to decompose contaminants transforming them into harmless byproducts, i.e. water and carbon dioxide. The bioremediation process can be performed insitu or exsitu. The insitu process is adopted where excavation is impractical and involves either bio-stimulation or bio-augmentation. Biostimulation involves aeration and the application of selected micronutrients and bio-stimulants. Bio-stimulation is only effective when indigenous microbial populations, present in the substrate, are high enough to degrade the contaminants and when these microbes can readily adapt to foreign contaminants. Bioaugmentation involves the application of beneficial microbes, that have an affinity towards a specific contaminant. Typically, these microbes are suspended by a stabilizing agent and lie dormant in a spore until activated in solution and applied together with micronutrients and bio stimulants. BIOREMEDIATION can effectively degrade the following contaminants: • Hydrocarbons with carbon chains ranging from C-5 to C-40 • Benzene, xylene and toluene • TCE • PAH • PCB and other chlorinated compounds • Fuel oils • Fossil fuels - gasoline, diesel, aviation gas • Condensate - leakage from pipelines • Glycols BIOREMEDIATION BENEFITS • Thorough degradation in a relatively narrow time window. • Simultaneous multiple activity • Toxin resistant • Reduced risk / higher degree of safety • Reduced labor and equipment costs DATA required to develop a proper bioremediation protocol • Age of the spill • Localization • Soil Type • Spoil porosity • Soil pH • Soil temperature • TPH • Viscosity and volatility of contaminants • Depth of contamination • Soil moisture level • Oxygen availability CASE HISTORY DNF (hazardous waste) Spill High levels of aromatics could not access the affected area without protective equipment. In order to suppress toxic vapours, a microbial formulation, together with surfactants, biostimulants and nutrients was applied to the soil. An analysis, revealed that the benzene level dropped from 60 to 10 ppm in approximately 5 minutes. After a second application the concentration of the aromatic contaminants were below the detection limit within another 5 minutes. MTBE CONTAMINATED SOIL Vapors, resulting from this spill, created an explosion and respiratory hazard. A microbial formulation was applied to the affected area. The vapors were suppressed immediately upon application and, in a relatively short period, the contaminant was digested. Subsequent cleanup was not necessary. PIPE AND SURROUNDING SOIL CONTAMINATED WITH DIESEL

41

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

The free diesel was pumped out of the pipe and a microbial formulation was applied to digest the residual contaminants. The same product, together with bio-stimulants and micronutrients, was applied to the soil. Twenty-eight days after the initial treatment, TPH levels dropped from low thousands to low hundreds. In one case TPH levels dropped to 43 ppm. ↓ Eco Chem ‘8 continued ↓

CRUDE OIL SPILL IN A TANK FIELD The crude oil was pumped out and the soil and grassy area treated with a microbial formulation together with micronutrients and bio-stimulants. Eight weeks after the initial application, TPH levels dropped from low thousands to low hundreds. In one case TPH levels dropped to 39 ppm. DIESEL SPILL IN A PIPE The free diesel was pumped out and a biological formulation together with a bio-stimulant was applied to degrade any remaining contaminant. Within 4 weeks TPH levels dropped from a range of 25,000 - 57,000 ppm to a range of 600 - 9,900 ppm. SOIL, UNDERNEATH A STORAGE TANK, WAS CONTAMINATED WITH GASOLINE DUE TO A LEAK IN THE TANK BOTTOM The remaining alkylate (gasoline blend) was removed from the tank and a biological liquid was introduced into the tank and allowed to travel through the same path as the alkylate. Within three weeks, the TPH levels, in the soil underneath the tank, was reduced from a range of 200 - 600 ppm to a range of 30 -130 ppm. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO ACCIDENTAL GAS RELEASE A suction drum on a compressor began to fill with oil and had to be drained to the contaminated sewer to protect the equipment. Typically, this would not pose a problem, since the contaminated sewer enters an oil/water separator where the oil is captured. However, unknown to the technicians, the oil contained entrained hydrocarbons which broke free of the oil resulting in a gas release, when the oil entered the sewer system. To mitigate this problem and reduce the threat of fire and explosion, a microbial formulation was applied to the sewer. Within two hours of application, the hydrocarbons were reduced to non-detectable levels. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO MTBE SPILL An MTBE tanker was overfilled when the automatic shutoff valve failed. The loading rack was equipped with a secondary containment system that drained to a holding pond. The amount of MTBE collected by the system was estimated to be approximately 2,400 litres. While the MTBE was contained, the vapours from the containment system were both irritating to personnel in the vicinity and explosive. A hand line and eductor were used to apply a microbial formulation to the pond. Within one hour, the vapours were detectable only within a few feet of the pond. An additional amount of product was applied to the pond at that time. One hour later MTBE levels in the pond were non-detectable. FUEL OIL UNDERNEATH BASEMENT FLOOR Analysis revealed a total petroleum hydrocarbon level of 4,500 ppm in the soil underneath the basement floor. Bioremediation was carried out by drilling a series of holes into the affected area and injecting a microbial formulation together with nutrients and bio-stimulants. Immediately after application the contaminant levels in the affected area began to drop and, after five months, with the exception of one small area made up of hard-pan soil, the total petroleum hydrocarbon level was reduced to less than 500 ppm. CLEANING DISTILLATION TOWERS Typically, preparing towers for turnaround, using conventional methods, is labor intensive. Standard procedures call for the towers to be washed with water and drained several times, steamed and wash again. Under certain conditions, towers that have gone thru an intensive cleaning process, will contain elevated levels of contaminants. Treatments were carried out using biological products including, surfactants, micronutrients and bio-stimulants, in the wash portion of the tower. To optimize product efficacy and reduce application rates, eductors and pumps were used in the application process. The end result was complete decontamination and a significant reduction in cleanup time. CLEANING EXCHANGERS, LINES & PUMPS Trials, have shown that oil, trapped in the high points of exchangers, lines, pumps, etc., can be totally removed and the units decontaminated with the use of a biological solution. The decontamination process involves applying the solution and letting it sit for 1 to 3 hours. Circulating the product through the equipment can significantly reduce cleanup time. ELECTRICAL BOX CLEANUP A fuel oil spill contaminated an electrical junction box, cables, the concrete wall to which the box and cables were attached and the surrounding soil. A microbial formulation together with micronutrients and bio-stimulants was applied to the wall, junction box and cables and within 48 hours decontamination was complete. A similar solution was applied to the contaminated soil and within 18 days contaminant levels were undetectable. CONCLUSIONS 1. Based on the results of numerous tests in various substrates and environmental conditions it is fair to

conclude that every hydrocarbon based material can be decomposed.

42

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT: Flex Fuels Trade Deficit Add-On 1. Trade policy doesn’t impact the trade deficit Daniel T. Griswold, associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-20-1998, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-002.html The most important economic truth to grasp about the U.S. trade deficit is that it has virtually nothing to do with trade policy. A nation's trade deficit is determined by the flow of investment funds into or out of the country. And those flows are determined by how much the people of a nation save and invest--two variables that are only marginally affected by trade policy.

2. The trade deficit provides foreign capital that is key to continued US economic growth Daniel T. Griswold, associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-20-1998, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-002.html Without a trade deficit, Americans would need to finance domestic investment exclusively from domestic savings. To bring investment in line with savings, domestic interest rates would need to rise, reducing investment and economic growth. As the Council of Economic Advisers recently concluded, the trade deficit has been a "safety valve" for the expanding U.S. economy. "Imports of goods have kept inflation low, while imports of capital have kept interest rates low, helping to sustain rapid income growth. In the strongly expanding full-employment economy that the United States now enjoys, it should be easier for Americans to see that trade deficits do not necessarily reduce output and employment."(42) The United States ran trade deficits throughout much of the 19th century during a period of dynamic growth and expansion. From independence until the 1880s, America was a net importer of capital from the rest of the world, in particular Great Britain. Foreign investors provided the capital to build the railroads and canals America needed for a continentwide economy. "In the 19th century, especially after the cotton boom of the 1830s, it was the current account that went into the red in order to balance the heavy inflow of funds to finance American enterprise. The United States had more profitable investment opportunities than it had domestic savings to finance them. The British, Germans, Dutch, and French stepped in and made themselves (and our American forebears) richer.”

3. The trade deficit is an indispensable source of liquidity for global economic growth The Economist, 9-14-2002 In the days of the gold standard, the volume of money and credit in circulation was tied to the amount of gold in a country's vaults. Economies laboured under the "tyranny" of the gold regime, booming when gold was abundant, deflating when it was scarce. The dollar standard is a more liberal system. Central banks retain the right to expand the volume of domestic credit to keep pace with the growth of the home economy. Eventually, however, growth in the world's economies translates into a growing demand for dollar assets. The more money central banks print, the more dollars they like to hold in reserve to underpin their currency. The more business is done across borders, the more dollars traders need to cover their transactions. If the greenback is the new gold, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, is the world's alchemist, responsible for concocting enough liquidity to keep world trade bubbling along nicely. But America can play this role only if it is happy to allow foreigners to build up a huge mass of claims on its assets--and if foreigners are happy to go along. Some economists watch with consternation as the rest of the world's claims on America outstrip America's claims on the rest of the world. As they point out, even a dollar bill is an American liability, a promise of ultimate payment by the US Treasury. Can America keep making these promises to foreigners, without eventually emptying them of value? According to Mr Davidson, the world cannot risk America stopping. America's external deficit means an extra $500 billion is going into circulation in the world economy each year. If America reined in its current account, international commerce would suffer a liquidity crunch, as it did periodically under the gold standard. Hence America's deficit is neither a "meaningless concept" nor a lamentable drain on world savings. It is an indispensable fount of liquidity for world trade.

43

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

4. The trade deficit is sustainable: investor confidence is stable and the dollar won’t collapse Daniel T. Griswold, associate director, Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute, May 2001, USA Today Magazine, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2672_129/ai_74572239 The "hard-landing" scenario. A third looming worry about the trade deficit is that it will eventually undermine the confidence of foreign investors. According to this scenario, the rising trade deficit spooks foreign investors into withdrawing funds, starting a downward economic spiral. Most international investors are savvy enough to understand that America's trade deficit is a reflection of underlying strength, not weakness, for all the reasons outlined above. The U.S. trade deficit, by accommodating an inflow of foreign capital, actually encourages lower interest rates and thus promotes economic growth. As for exchange rates, the trade deficit is not the cause of a weaker dollar, but is associated with a stronger dollar. Since 1980, the trade deficit as a percentage of GDP has closely tracked the real value of the dollar on the foreign exchange market. When the dollar rises, so does the trade deficit, and vice versa. The real value of the dollar trended upward in the 1990s along with the size of the trade deficit. A strong dollar and a rising trade deficit are not in conflict. While the trade deficit does increase the supply of dollars abroad, which by itself would put downward pressure on the dollar, the demand by foreign investors for dollars to buy U.S. assets has been even greater, resulting in a net appreciation of the dollar. As long as foreign demand for U.S. assets remains strong, the dollar will remain high, and so will the current account deficit. Foreign investors could reach a point where they believed their portfolios had become overweighted with investments in the U.S., but there is no reason to think that point has arrived, or will anytime soon. The U.S. remains the world's largest economy, and among the freest and most dynamic. The amount of net foreign investment that flows into the U.S. each year is not out of proportion to the American economy's size in the global economy.

5. The trade deficit doesn’t reflect slowed growth and economic activity Daniel T. Griswold, associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-20-1998, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-002.html The balance of payments accounts capture two sides of an equation: the current account and the capital account. The current account side of the ledger covers the flow of goods, services, investment income, and uncompensated transfers such as foreign aid and remittances across borders by private citizens. Within the current account, the trade balance includes goods and services only, and the merchandise trade balance reflects goods only. On the other side, the capital account includes the buying and selling of investment assets such as real estate, stocks, bonds, and government securities. If a country runs a capital account surplus of $100 billion, it will run a current account deficit of $100 billion to balance its payments. As economist Douglas Irwin explains, "If a country is buying more goods and services from the rest of the world than it is selling, the country must also be selling more assets to the rest of the world than it is buying."(17) The necessary balance between the current account and the capital account implies a direct connection between the trade balance on the one hand and the savings and investment balance on the other. That relationship is captured in the simple formula: Savings - Investment = Exports - Imports Thus, a nation that saves more than it invests, such as Japan, will export its excess savings in the form of net foreign investment. In other words, it must run a capital account deficit. The money sent abroad as investment will return to the country to purchase exports in excess of what the country imports, creating a corresponding trade surplus. A nation that invests more than it saves--the United States, for example--must import capital from abroad. In other words, it must run a capital account surplus. The imported capital allows the nation's citizens to consume more goods and services than they produce, importing the difference through a trade deficit.

44

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

India Deal Good (Contain China Mod) The India deal is key to contain China Harvard International Review, 5-6-2006, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1363/1/ One of those aims is to solidify India as a US-friendly counterweight to China in Asia. India’s desire to compete with China is partly geostrategic. Many Westerners are probably unaware that India and China fought a border war in 1962—or perhaps even that India and China share a border. China’s military victory in that confrontation gave it control over a critical artery to Tibet. The border between India and China, while presently stable and tacitly acknowledged by both parties, remains a technically disputed line of military control. Additionally, SinoIndian competition is, of course, economic. India lacks substantial energy resources, and its continuing development will require massive energy use: power for new infrastructure, rural electrification for the poor, and automotive fuel and air conditioning for the burgeoning middle class. The United States sees its transfer of uranium fuel and nuclear technology to India as, in part, an investment in a democratic alternative to Chinese economic hegemony in Asia.

Containing china is key to avoid world war three – the longer the u.s. Waits, the greater the chances that they will gain mass appeal and cause a cold war or build up their military to fuel a hot war. Krauthammer 7/31/1995 “why we must contain china” Time Magazine Does containment mean cold war II, with China playing the part of the old Soviet Union? Not quite. There is no ideological component to this struggle. Until late in life, the Soviet Union had ideological appeal, with sympathizers around the globe. Today's China, unlike Mao's, has no such appeal. China is more an old-style dictatorship, not on a messianic mission, just out for power. It is much more like late 19th century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on. Its neighbors are beginning to feel the pressure. China is extending its reach deep into the South China Sea, claiming islets hundreds of miles from China, near four of its neighbors but within the reach of its rapidly growing military. Indeed, while defense spending in Russia and the West has declined, China's is rising dramatically, doubling in the past 10 years. Those dollars are going to intercontinental rocketry, a modernized army and a blue-water navy. Nor is China deploying its new might just locally. It is sending missile and nuclear technology to such places as Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistan connection represents a flanking maneuver against China's traditional enemy, India; Iran, a leapfrog to make trouble for that old imperial master, the West. Containment of such a bully must begin early in its career. That means building relations with China's neighbors, starting withbVietnam. For all the emotion surrounding our Charles

decision to normalize relations with Vietnam, its significance is coldly geopolitical: Vietnam is China's traditional enemy (they fought a brief war in 1979). We must therefore make it our friend. A map tells you the rest of a containment strategy: 1) a new security relationship with democratic India, now freed from its odd, cold war alliance with the Soviets; 2) renewing the U.S.- Japan alliance, now threatened by a U.S. Administration so hell-bent on selling carburetors in Kyoto that it is blithely jeopardizing the keystone of our Pacific security; and 3) cozying up to the Russians, who, however ornery elsewhere, have a common interest in boxing in China.bContainment is not a cold war invention. It is a

principle of power politics going back centuries. After the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna created a system of alliances designed to contain a too dynamic France. In our time the Atlantic Alliance contained an aggressive Soviet Union. In between, the West failed to contain an emergent Germany. The result was two world wars. We cannot let that happen with the emerging giant of the 21st century.

45

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

India Deal Good (relations impact) Relations Are key to preventing an indo=pak war that will unleash nuclear holocaust New York Times

June 10,

2002

Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy, air force and army joint exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of high-level visits by generals and admirals. The fledgling relationship between American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. "We can hope this translates into some influence and trust, though I don't want to overstate it," a senior American defense official said in an interview on Thursday. "I don't want to predict this guarantees success." The American diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along the border — a situation likely to persist for months — and the process of resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism. India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose

. The United States is hoping its deeper military and political ties with India will give it some measure of leverage to prevent a war between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear holocaust and would play havoc with the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan. growing power was seen as a potential strategic threat. But since Sept. 11, the priority has been terrorism

46

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

US-India Relations Good U.S. India relations are key to Asian stability Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 9/8/05, Congressional Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/m-news+article+storyid-12590.html A strong democratic India is an important partner for the United States. We anticipate that India will play an increasingly important leadership role in 21st century Asia, working with us to promote democracy, economic growth, stability and peace in that vital region. By cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India's rise brings to the region and the world. By fostering ever-closer bilateral ties, we also eliminate any possibility that our two nations might overlook their natural affinities and enter into another period of unproductive estrangement, as was so often the case in the past half century.

Relations are key to the Indian economy Teresita C. Schaffer, Director of the South Asia Program at CSIS, Spring 2002, The Washington Quarterly Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

US-India relations are key to prevent a slew of global problems. Kanti Bajpai, School of International Studies @ Jawaharlal Nehru U., Summer 2001, Washington Quarterly The United States, ideally, should lay the groundwork for an enduring partnership with India, even though India has not been a high priority in U.S. grand strategy. In the decade to come, however, Washington should build bridges to this awakening democratic giant. India's economy has never grown faster; its democracy remains vibrant, if noisy; its population, although growing at a slower rate, will surpass China's number and level off at 1.5 billion in the next half-century. Unlike other countries, India is receptive to a deeper relationship with the sole superpower. A liberalized economy, a more internationalist attitude toward world politics, and an unprecedented appreciation of U.S. purposes and power are propelling India toward the United States. An Indian -- U.S. partnership would be a force for stability in world politics. Global stability will depend on peace and cooperation in Asia and a growing net of constructive interactions among the major powers of this superregion. The United States is the linchpin here. India, on the other hand, is an emerging power with capabilities that extend to the Asia -- Pacific region. Both countries have vital interests in Asia, from the Persian Gulf to East Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean. These common interests relate to oil supplies, proliferation, ethnic disaffection, fundamentalism, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, freedom of the seas, safety of sea lanes, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, and a balance of power. A full-fledged strategic partnership between the United States and India, however, is some time away. In the interim, New Delhi and Washington must build understanding, links, and a foundation of military and nonmilitary cooperation that will move them toward deeper engagement. As the more powerful country, the United States, ideally, would initiate this more thoroughgoing relationship.

47

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.2.0 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008 - 2009

AT: Capitalist epistemology args Their claims that our evidence is flawed by capitalist epistemology is a smokescreen that has no connection to empirical reality – evaluate political action first David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near

total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of

relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no selfrespecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat

policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

Abandoning policy discussion for the purpose of ontological and epistemological questioning paralyzes all action and causes nightmarish levels of violence Darryl Jarvis (Director of the Research Institute for International Risk and Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Sydney) 2000 “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism” p. 128-9 More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorist have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder what we ponder the depth of our theoretical imagination, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only talk on international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emrigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. That is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem solving technical

theory is not necessary – or is in some way bad – is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So What?” To what purpose do they construct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate towards [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

48