Bsw Lab Supplement #1

Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.1 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

BSW Lab Supplement #1 *No Syrian Biowar – (AT: Iran Elections Scenario)* BSW Lab Supplement #1 ...............................................................................................................................................1 AT Syria Bio War-(for Iran elections scenario)...............................................................................................................2 AT Bio War-(for Iran elections scenario)........................................................................................................................3 AT Bio War......................................................................................................................................................................4 ........................................................................................................................................................................................5 AT: Democracy = Peace..................................................................................................................................................5 AT: Democracy solves terrorism.....................................................................................................................................6 Turn / Democracy = War.................................................................................................................................................7 Alt Causes to democracy collapse................................................................................................................................10 AT: Trade Wars Advantage impacts..............................................................................................................................12 Alt causes to trade war..................................................................................................................................................13 Trade wars don’t escalate..............................................................................................................................................15 US-EU relations are resilient........................................................................................................................................18 No US Europe War........................................................................................................................................................20 India Deal Good – US/India Relations........................................................................................................................21 India Deal Good / AT: China ........................................................................................................................................22 India Deal Bad – Proliferation......................................................................................................................................23 India Deal DA / India won’t agree to deal....................................................................................................................24 California Economy Low..............................................................................................................................................25

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Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.1 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

AT Syria Bio War-(for Iran elections scenario) Syria has not integrated biological weapons into its military doctrine – and is unlikely to use them on the battlefield. Zuhair Diab (Syrian Born International Security Analyst Living in Londn. From 1981 to 1985, he was a diplomat with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) "Syria's Chemical and biological weapons: assessing capabilities and motivations. The Non-Proliferation Review. Fall. 1997. Pdf. While the U.S. government may possess secret infor-mation to back up its claim of an offensive Syrian BWcapability, there is no hint of its existence from opensources. Syrian armed forces are equipped with defen-sive equipment but there are no reported exercises in-volving the offensive use of biological weapons, makingit unlikely that they have been integrated into Syrian mili-tary doctrine. If security concerns have encouraged Syriato acquire and retain a CW capability, these motivationsmay not necessarily apply BW. Both Israel and Syria presumably recognize the negative military utility of BWbecause of the geographical proximity of the two states. Moreover, there is no modern precedent of employingBW on the battlefield, and the moral revulsion surround-ing biological warfare is also far stronger than for nuclearor chemical weapons. Since the military utility of BW is uncertain, the functions of denial and punishment in Syria’s deterrent posture could be met more efficiently with CW.Indeed, what advantage could be gained from threaten-ing the use of a completely untested method of warfare?At the same time, it would arguably be foolish for theleadership of a country involved in a serious military con-flict not to research the effects of BW, if only to hedgeagainst possible enemy use. Furthermore, the BWC cur-rently lacks verification provisions, and until this defi-ciency is remedied, states engaged in military conflictsmay wish to maintain at least a basic defensive researchprogram.

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Spartan Debate Institute Supplement – V.1 (Number)

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

AT Bio War-(for Iran elections scenario) International checks solve CBW use. Pugwash International. "Pugwash High Level chemicla and Biological Weapons Workshop Present Trends and Future Policy Change." Pugwash Online. 17 Apr. 2005. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/reportApril2005.htm The existing measures constitute an array of national, bilateral, cooperative, regional, multilateral and global measures that includes: preparedness; technological protection and other means of national defence; intelligence capable of providing early warning of any need for active countermeasures; penal legislation and administrative regulation; export controls; and the international anti-CBW treaty regime. There is mutual reinforcement among different parts of this array. The treaty regime does this by reaffirming the ancient taboo against CBW use, by asserting a norm of abstention from CBW armament, by making it difficult for the international community to disregard transgression, by providing a nucleus for international action in support of regime goals, and, in consequence, by deterring/dissuading potential violators.

Delivery problems and lack of utility make it unlikely that bio weapons will be used on the battlefield. The Washington Note. "Wolfowitz's Xmas Present to Troops: Anthrax vaccine?" 19 Dec. 2004 http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/000241.php Environmental conditions (such as rain and wind) make it an imprecise weapon to deploy on a large scale. A shell can be filled and fired, but because of the incubation period (48-72 hours, as stated above) it has limited tactical battlefield value. I assume that the military has monitoring tools in place to identify whether or not a biological weapons attack is taking place. If one were to happen, area troops could be evacuated for evaluation and treatment before symptoms manifested themselves. I have difficulty thinking of a scenario where anthrax could be effectively deployed on such a scale where a sizeable portion of target troops would require medical aid. With the resources of the US military I cannot think of a likely opponent who would have adequate control of a portion of the battlespace to be able to deliver a chemical or biological weapon. Anthrax's use as a weapon is best illustrated with the attack on the Senate. Concentrated exposure (via a powder-filled envelope) will result in death within days, as the above poster pointed out. It seems to me that it is an effective weapon for individual attacks where the target is unprepared and unprotected (essentially terrorist attacks). I don't see why we must inoculate the entire military for such a limited threat. A more cost-effective approach to mitigating the risk would be in agent detection and accelerated treatment for affected troops. Other chemical weapons such as mustard gas do have an immediate tactical impact. However, their utility is limited

because if they were to be deployed on a vast scale they are just as likely to affect the attacker as well as the attacked.

Biological weapons cannot cause mass destruction and will not be used in war. The Washington Note. "Wolfowitz's Xmas Present to Troops: Anthrax vaccine?" 19 Dec. 2004 http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/000241.php Depending on the biological weapon used, delivery can become even more difficult. An infectious agent needs to be introduced into the target population. This may be possible in a terrorist scenario, but it is highly unlikely that troops would allow an enemy to walk up and sneeze on them, for example. A less facetious example would be a shell filled with an ebolalike virus. But just because the shell is delivered does not necessitate infection amongst the target. This is not to minimize the risk, but as with anthrax it is more effective to monitor for signs of infection and have treatment (including quarantine) ready. The threat from chemical and biological weapons is at its most acute in the sphere of terrorism, not conventional warfare. Biological and chemical weapons are NOT weapons of mass destruction of the same caliber as nuclear weapons. While one vial of some horrible substance may be enough to wipe out thousands, there still remains the problem of a reliable delivery system. The best way to mitigate that threat is to have freely available medical care. One warhead really can wipe out millions and the delivery systems are well-tested. That is a weapon of mass destruction. I can only guess as to why the administration has spent so much time and effort on the danger of anthrax. I suppose it has something to do with maintaining the fiction that Iraq really was a "gathering threat".

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Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

AT Bio War Biological Weapons are unlikely to be used in War. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky.(Director emeritus of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, is a member of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors). "Dismantling the Concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Arms Control Today. April 1998 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_04/wkhp98.asp Biological weapons have not been used in warfare in modern times, but they have been and are still being stockpiled. The former Soviet Union had an extensive program, the status of which remains under some cloud. The United States had an offensive BW program until the early 1970s. The future threat of biological weapons is real. Modern technology has produced and will continue to produce a long list of potentially powerful agents and toxins, and several means of dispersal have been tested. Much has been written recently about the lethality of biological weapons. If virulent BW materials were to be widely

, for this horrifying scenario to occur, the materials cannot be dispersed by a single-point explosion, but instead must be spread by an appropriate mechanism such as spray tanks or by "fractionating" a missile's payload and dispersing separate mini-munitions over a wide area. Moreover, survival of BW material depends critically on local meteorological and other conditions which define the delivery environment. The survival of agents is generally of short duration and effects are delayed for days. Fortunately, there is no operational experience and test data are limited. distributed over an exposed population, then the ratio of potential lethality to the total weight of the material could be comparable to that of nuclear weapons. However

Chemical weapons were used extensively by the Central and Allied Powers during World War I, and to a very limited extent in World War II when Japan used them in its invasion of Manchuria. Iraq has used chemical weapons against both its own Kurdish population and Iran, and Egypt reportedly used CW against Yemen in the mid-1960s. The United States and Russia still possess their Cold War inventories of 30,000 and 40,000 tons of agents, respectively, which they are committed to destroy over the next decade at a cost of as much as $15 billion to $20 billion. There is little question that the lethality of chemical weapons-as measured by per unit weight of delivered munitions-is lower by many orders of magnitude than it is for nuclear weapons or the undemonstrated and inherently uncertain potential of biological weapons. Thus, it is misleading to include chemical weapons in the category of WMD; "weapons of indiscriminate destruction" or "weapons of terror" might be a more appropriate designation. Feasibility of Defenses Meaningful defense against nuclear weapons, either by passive or active means, is extremely difficult if not impossible. This conclusion stems both from the extreme destructiveness of a single nuclear explosion and the multitude of delivery options available to an attacker. Each attempted intercept would have to be extremely effective and the defense must be all-inclusive against feasible means of nuclear attack. Delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons in the form of land- or sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles of various ranges, artillery shells and aircraft have been developed and deployed. Nuclear explosives have been "weaponized" into atomic demolition munitions, anti-submarine weapons, earth penetrators, and air and missile defense warheads. Nuclear weapons can also be delivered on short-range missiles fired from nearby ships, detonated on board ships in a harbor, or simply smuggled across national borders. During World War II, British air defenses succeeded in shooting down approximately one in 10 attacking aircraft carrying conventional bombs. As a result, German air force units were reduced by a factor of three after flying 10 attacking sorties. London stood, although it was badly battered. Yet a single, successfully delivered large thermonuclear warhead would have wiped out most of the population and structures of that great city. Thus, the standard which a defense against nuclear weapons has to meet is vastly higher than that required for conventional military exchanges. Such a standard simply cannot be met, particularly given the action-reaction dynamics between defense and offense. In response to deployed defenses, the offense can deploy countermeasures (such as decoys) and multiple or maneuvering vehicles, or can even change its means of delivery and bypass the defense altogether. Undoubtedly, such offensive stratagems would, in almost all cases, be much cheaper than the cost of the defense and still leave the threatened country just as vulnerable. Passive defenses are of limited value because a nuclear explosion results both in intense prompt effects (such as blast, radiation and heat) and delayed effects (such as firestorms and radioactive fallout). Consequently, independent of the outcome of the highly politicized debate whether to develop and eventually deploy an expensive national missile defense (NMD) system, protection against nuclear weapons by technical means will remain elusive. Protection, therefore, must be sought through dissuading potential opponents from acquiring or delivering nuclear weapons, or through their global prohibition. protective clothing)

Technical defenses have a much more significant role against BW and CW. Passive defenses (such as gas masks and can be quite effective against both BW and CW, and such protection can be made generally available to troops and, to a more limited extent, to civilian

. Preventive vaccinations against biological agents can be effective, but only if the type and strain of enemy biological weapons are known. Unfortunately, due to populations (as Israel did, for example, during the Gulf War). While masks and protective clothing are available to the military, they are only reluctantly used because they interfere with the performance of troops in combat

advances in biotechnology, the list of potentially lethal agents has lengthened and strains of agents resistant to particular vaccines continue to evolve. Thus, mass vaccinations against a single agent, such as those recently ordered against anthrax for U.S. troops deployed in the Persian Gulf, can be negated if an attacker has an alternate agent available. In general, it is difficult for either side to estimate in advance the effectiveness of passive countermeasures against BW and CW. Active defenses against BW and CW are equally difficult to evaluate due to the large number of delivery options available. It is interesting to note that the currently proposed U.S. NMD system, as designed, would be ineffective against delivery of BW by ballistic missiles if their payloads were fractionated to assure dispersal of the agents, which is necessary to achieve a major impact. Potential Missions In view of their inherent differences, the potential military roles of the three types of weapons are entirely different. Nuclear weapons remain in the inventories of the five declared nuclear-weapon states, and India, Israel and Pakistan either possess usable nuclear weapons or can rapidly assemble them. Because there are currently no deployed NMD systems besides Russia's old and very limited deployment around Moscow, and because such systems are expected to be ineffective at any rate, hostile nuclear explosions can only be prevented by successfully maintaining the tradition of non-use of such weapons, converting this tradition to policy and eventually removing such weapons from national inventories. The tradition of non-use has been enforced in the past by treaty, by political dissuasion and through deterrence of nuclear weapons use by the existence of nuclear retaliatory forces. One can only hope that such measures will continue to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the future. Much has been written-without general consensus-on whether nuclear deterrence should be credited for the absence of nuclear weapons use during the Cold War, as well as for the absence of direct armed conflict between the superpowers. However, it will always remain difficult to explain confidently why something did not happen. The nuclear weapons policies of the United States and Russia continue to evolve, but at this time in opposite directions. Russia, confronted with the deterioration of its conventional forces, has withdrawn the former Soviet no-first-use declarations and adopted a policy akin to the former NATO doctrine of compensating for its perceived conventional inferiority through reliance on nuclear weapons. For its part, the United States has made limited moves in the direction of constraining nuclear weapons to a purely deterrent role. The latest step in this direction is the November 1997 presidential decision directive (PDD) on nuclear policy that reportedly eliminated the requirement that the United States be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. Yet, U.S. policy still remains ambiguous given the "reduce and hedge" policy outlined in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Reductions of strategic nuclear weapons are being pursued via the START process, while the United States is still planning for an "enduring stockpile" of about 10,000 nuclear weapons in order to "hedge" against the emergence of a more hostile Russia. The "weapons of last resort" doctrine of NATOpermitting first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks-has not been revoked. Notwithstanding this complex situation, there is a growing recognition in the U.S. military that, in the words of a 1991 National Academy of Sciences study, "the principal objective of U.S. nuclear policy should be to strengthen the emerging political consensus that nuclear weapons should serve no purpose beyond the deterrence of, and possible response to, nuclear attack by others." As long as nuclear weapons remain in the legal inventories of the nuclear-weapon states and the de facto possession of India, Israel and Pakistan, that mission of nuclear weapons will continue. Today, that mission should be the only valid use of nuclear weapons. This view, however, is not the avowed policy of any of the nuclear-weapon states except China. Terrorist use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely. Barring the clandestine acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon, the successful construction and use of nuclear weapons requires access to substantial technical infrastructure as well as technical knowledge and skill. Such an operation would be extremely difficult to carry out clandestinely without a state sponsor. One cannot, however, exclude nuclear terrorism sponsored by a state which has a nuclear weapons program. The only technical means to forestall nuclear terrorism or accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon is by stringent safeguards and controls over nuclear weapons and the weapons-usable fissile materials essential to their construction. The military situation with respect to BW and CW is generally the inverse of that pertaining to nuclear weapons. As a terrorist tool against civilians, chemical weapons, and particularly biological weapons, are a clear danger. The science and technology underlying these weapons is widely known, and terrorist use of nerve gas was demonstrated in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult in Japan. While the technology to detect small quantities of released agents is improving rapidly, technical tools to forestall terrorist use are limited and most ingredients have legitimate civilian as well as offensive military uses. Therefore, prevention must largely rest on intelligence gathering and sharing, infiltration, law enforcement activities and other measures. Even inspections as intrusive as those conducted in Iraq by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) cannot definitively prevent clandestine efforts to maintain residual inventories. Moreover, such an

Chemical weapons are demonstrably a relatively ineffective tool in warfare. The effectiveness of biological weapons during military conflict is uncertain. In either case, a military commander would not have confidence in their use against a designated target because he could not judge the effectiveness of defenses. The effect of a broad-scale BW attack against opposing troops is impossible to predict and would be delayed by days under any circumstance. But even more than in the case of chemical weapons, biological weapons remain a formidable tool of terror as an adjunct to war. intrusive inspection regime cannot be practically extended to other states suspected of possessing biological and chemical weapons.

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Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

AT: Democracy = Peace Democracy Will Not Solve Peace – Can’t Come To Terms With The Causes Of Conflict Schweller 2000 (Randall- Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, p.43) The bad news is that extending the democratic zone will not lead to perpetual peace among nations. This is because the fundamental causes of international conflict will remain, for they cannot be transcended. The spread of democracy promises to dampen potential conflicts but it will not effect a major ‘qualitative change’ in international politics, which will remain much as it has always been: a struggle for power and influence in a world of, at a minimum, moderate scarcity. Though I am willing to concede the point— though other realists have challenged it —that democracies have not fought each other in the past, I, like Kydd, ‘find it perfectly possible that democracies could fight—indeed could fight long and bloody wars against each other—so long as the aims of the populations are in fundamental conflict.’

There Is No Historical Proof Of The Democratic Peace Theory Schwartz & Skinner 2002 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science at UCLA, Kiron K- Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Hoover Institution, Orbis, Winter) Here we show that neither the historical record nor the theoretical arguments advanced for the purpose provide any support for democratic pacifism. It does not matter how high or low one sets the bar of democracy. Set it high enough to avoid major exceptions and you find few, if any, democracies until the Cold War era. Then there were no wars between them, of course. But that fact is better explained by NATO and bipolarity than by any shared form of government. Worse, the peace among the high-bar democracies of that era was part of a larger pacifism: peace among all nations of the First and Second Worlds. As for theoretical arguments, those we have seen rest on implausible premises.

Democracies Are Not Peaceful – Last Twelve Years Prove Schwartz & Skinner 2002 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science at UCLA, Kiron K- Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Hoover Institution, Orbis, Winter) During the past twelve years, states with elected governments have fought each other in the Balkans and Caucases while democratic pacifists have barricaded themselves behind adjectives: it is not democracies that avoid war with each other but "well-established" democracies (Weart), "nontransitional" democracies (Mansfield and Synder), or "liberal" democracies (Zakaria). Outside of academia, plain "democracy" is still favored and, therefore, withheld from elected but "bad" governments. Thus, Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic was called a "dictator" by U.S., British, and NATO officials and journalists with far greater frequency than any nonelected national leader had ever been called "dictator" before. It was continually pointed out that Milosevic had been (often "is") a communist and that his government had radio and television stations that slanted the news in his favor. Fair enough, but anyone who tried to explain that Milosevic faced an active parliamentary opposition, thereby intimating a degree of democracy, would risk being branded an apologist or worse. Over and over the unconscious convention is to count only those of whom we approve as democratic, or adjectivally democratic, and to tar enemies who run for office and compete for votes with the brush of autocracy. The convention extends from foes to friends. Those friends who lead patently authoritarian regimes might be called "king" or "president," sometimes "leader," but never "dictator" or its ilk; though we cannot use the word "democrat," we studiously avoid its antonyms.

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AT: Democracy solves terrorism Democracy can’t solve terrorism F. Gregory Gause III

2005

Gause is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and Director of its Middle East

Studies Program. [“Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” F. Gregory Gause III From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html]

Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the data available do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for them. But this begs a fundamental question:

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Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

Turn / Democracy = War Democracies are more warlike and engage in more intense conflicts than other states Zakaria 1997 (Fareed- Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs and a Contributing Editor for Newsweek, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, lexis) Over the past decade, one of the most spirited debates among scholars of international relations concerns the "democratic peace" -- the assertion that no two modern democracies have gone to war with each other. The debate raises interesting substantive questions (does the American Civil War count? do nuclear weapons better explain the peace?) and even the statistical findings have raised interesting dissents. (As the scholar David Spiro points out, given the small number of both democracies and wars over the last two hundred years, sheer chance might explain the absence of war between democracies. No member of his family has ever won the lottery, yet few offer explanations for this impressive correlation.) But even if the statistics are correct, what explains them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace, contended that in democracies, those who pay for wars -- that is, the public -- make the decisions, so they are understandably cautious. But that claim suggests that democracies are more pacific than other states. Actually they are more warlike, going to war more often and with greater intensity than most states. It is only with other democracies that the peace holds.

Democratic Transitions Increase The Risk Of Civil War Hegre et al. 2001 (Havard. International Peace Research Institute and University of Oslo, American Political Science Review, March, p.34) The road to democracy is complicated and can be marked by internal violence and even collapse of the state. Autocratic countries do not become mature consolidated democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, in which mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Political change deconsolidates political institutions and heightens the risk of civil war, as discussed by a number of scholars. In a classic argument, de Tocqueville points out that “revolutions do not always come when things are going from bad to worse….Usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempts to reform itself.” Huntington finds that political violence is frequently coupled with democratization. Such changes are unlikely to occur without serious conflict, especially in countries with different ethnic minorities. Communal groups in liberalizing autocracies have substantial opportunities for mobilization, but such states usually lack the institutional resources to reach the kinds of accommodation typical of established democracy. When

authoritarianism collapses and is followed by ineffectual efforts to establish democracy, the interim period of relative anarchy is ripe for ethnonational or ideological leaders who want to organize rebellion.

Democracies Are More Prone To Go To War – Democratic Regime Change Will Spur Worldwide Conflict Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?, p. 68-70) My findings refute the monadic level DPP, which suggests that democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies, and they reveal that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to be involved in—and to initiate—interstate wars and MIDs. Wedding these findings to those in Chapter 2, it appears that the spread of democracy may precipitate an increase in the likelihood of wars as individual states become democratic and, subsequently, more war-prone. Further, casting these findings in the light of recent studies of the DPP highlights some daunting prospects for global peace. For example, recent empirical findings indicate that regime changes are much more likely to occur during or following wars and that losing states are much more likely to experience regime change. Since democracies are more likely to win wars as compared to nondemocracies, it follows that nondemocracies are more likely to experience regime change, which in some cases may result in their full democratization. The result is that war

involvement may actually increase the proportion of democratic states in the system and, subsequently, increase the likelihood of warfare for those newly democratic states. From this perspective, the spread of democracy will create more of the most war-prone states, thereby increasing the likelihood of war involvement and initiation for those states. These relationships hardly encourage a sanguine view of the prospects for peace with a democratic enlargement strategy.

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Democracy Doesn’t Cause Peace – Attempts To Spread Democracy Increase The Likelihood Of War Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?, p. 18-19) The findings suggest the need to clearly delineate the separate impact of joint democracy and regime dissimilarity when analyzing the DPP. They call into question the utilization of “weak-link” specifications in analyses of the DPP while challenging researchers to be very careful in drawing inferences from relationships at one level of aggregation to those at another. The clearest policy implication of these

findings is that democratic enlargement, as a strategy, is not likely to be effective in reducing the likelihood of wars between or within states, and it is apt to increase the probability of war involvement for individual states. Although Western democracies, following the enlargement strategy, may rationalize their involvement in international wars by suggesting the need to democratize states in order to make them more peaceful, such a rationale is gainsaid by the findings from this study. On the whole, the

findings indicate that democracy is hardly a guarantor of peace and in many cases increases the probability of war. To be sure, the findings do not suggest the undesirability of democracy, as a form of government, as much as they remind us that foreign policy is much too complex to simply rely on a single factor to guide it. Instead, we need to devise multifaceted and multidimensional foreign policy strategies to reduce the likelihood of war.

Democracies Are Not Inherently Peaceful – They Are More Likely To Fight – Prefer Our Studies Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?, p. 146) The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether democracy is coded dichotomously or continuously) and that democracies are more likely to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained from analyses that control for a host of political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the onset of interstate war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level processes from dyadic level observations as was done in earlier studies. The results imply that democratic enlargement is more likely to increase the probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to become involved in—and to initiate—interstate wars.

Democracy Spurs Imperialist Wars Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?, p.78) The result of this process often takes the form of “aggressive imperialism” on the part of a strong democracy that attempts to “enforce its hegemony over other peoples.” Weart suggests that such aggressive imperialism has been facilitated by the fact that in the colonies “the distinction between the domestic citizen and the foreign potential enemy was already blurred.” He avers that “republics in general, with their ideals of equality and tolerance, tend to define their in-group of citizens as those who follow republican practices”; however, “approximately republican regimes may turn to violence exactly at the point where the principles of equality and toleration are not fully established domestically.” That is, in the cases of democratic imperialism, “the readiness of leaders to use force abroad was almost predictable in view of how they coerced people, if not exactly at home, then certainly under their domination.” Nevertheless, Weart insists, “No matter how severe the differences between rival republics, their style of diplomacy contributes to a mutual trust which moves them toward alliance rather than war.”

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Countries transitioning to democracy are increasingly war-prone Mansfield and Snyder 2005 Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political. Science at Columbia University and author of Power. Trade: and War. Jack Snyder: Professor of Political Science and Direct or of the institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University: i3 the author of Myths of Empire. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of International Security. “why emerging democracies go to war”

War has never happened between mature democracies, yet democratizing states are disproportionately war-prone toward regimes of all types, when they lack the coherent political institutions that could manage the intensified domestic political competition that characterizes the transition to democracy. When political institutions are weak, the rising demand for mass participation in polities forces elites to recruit popu/ar allies, yet elites are insufficiently accountable to the average voter.' Some groups that are threatened by democratization exploit this chance to evade accountability. They invoke the populist creed of rule for the people while simultaneously resisting rule the people. Even those groups that might prefer stable democracy find that nascent democratic institutions are too ineffec-tual to defend their interests. I71 this setting, both rising new elites and falling old elites have the motive and the opportunity to resort to the rhetoric of nationalism, which mobilizes mass support through the language of popular sovereignty while evading the accountability that would be provided by free and fair elections and the rule of The nationalist politics that this unleashes. often embroils the country in military conflicts with other states, for reasons we explain in this chapter.

Democratizing states go to war Mansfield and Snyder 2005 Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political. Science at Columbia University and author of Power. Trade: and War. Jack Snyder: Professor of Political Science and Direct or of the institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University: i3 the author of Myths of Empire. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of International Security. “why emerging democracies go to war”

The politics of democratizing states that initiate war are likely to exhibit at least some of the following causal mechanisms; exclusionary nationalism that generates enemy images or perceptions of conflicts of interest with other slates; pressure-group politics b y military r ethnic, or economic groups that seek a parochial benefit from policies that raise international tensions: logrolling among elite factions that include such groups; persuasion and outreach by such groups to gamer mass a[lies; ineffectual brokerage of political bargains by the ruling elite; contradictory and unconvincing signaling in foreign affairs; the use of aggressive foreign policies by groups gambling for domestic political resurrection; the use of partial or complete media domination to promote nationalist ideology; and nationalist bidding wars between old elites and rising mass groups. We do not expect that all of these mechanisms will be present in every democratizing state that fights a war, but we do expect at Least a few or them. Which mechanisms are expected to be present in a particular case depends on two factors: the adaptability of elite interests and the strength of the country's political institutions during earl y democratization.' Together, these two factors determine the intensity cat the democratizing country's nationalism and the form that nationalist exclusions are likely to takeRepresenting the resulting possibilities ass .a schematic simplification, this yields four types of nationalism, which are portrayed in Table 7.1; counterrevolutionary, revolutionary, ethnic, and civic nationalism- Each type of nationalism is to reflect a somewhat different mix of causal mechanisms that affect the chance of war

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Alt Causes to democracy collapse Terrorism kills democracy, terrorism is deeply rooted in the government with policies and ignorance [Newsletter, 27 June 2008, Terrorism doesn't fit with democracy, Accessed: Thursday, 17th July 2008, http://www.newsletter.co.uk/letters-to-the-editor/Terrorism-doesn39t-fit-with-democracy.4229916.jp] The International Victims of Terrorism Conference was held in Belfast, and a very clear message was sent out by the delegates and by the international speakers. That message was the total inappropriateness and wrongness of having terrorists in the government of any democracy. We learned how democracy is undermined and eventually destroyed by terrorism, instead of democracy destroying terrorism – a message that is as urgent as it is necessary. The futility and offensiveness of having terrorists defining what terrorism is, and indeed, defining what a victim is, this is what is happening at Stormont. One of the lies that terrorists have succeeded in getting people to believe, is that they had a very good reason why they resorted to terrorist violence to get where they are today, a lie that was refuted powerfully. The issue surrounding "one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter" was also aired and demolished with great precision, and those who hold to such a viewpoint were shown to be very foolish. The conference heard that the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland can be encapsulated in one word: terrorism. It is this (terrorism) that must be destroyed rather than accommodated by our institutions. If democracy does not destroy terrorism, terrorism will destroy democracy. Rather than human rights being there to protect democracy, it is being used to undermine it, and to protect terrorists and their activities. The use of politically correct language is an attempt to sanitise the language we use to describe what has been visited upon us during the past four decades. Practically everyone speaks about the conflict and the Troubles. A few describe it as it really was – an evil terrorist campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the decent people in Northern Ireland. Unless and until there is accuracy in language and definition, there will be no possibility to deal with the continuing terrorist threat and activity. If you do not know precisely what you are talking about, you cannot deal with it. The message is very clear: democracy and terrorism are incompatible and mutually exclusive. This message was reinforced by the acceptance of the Belfast Declaration at the end of the conference, and the setting up of a European-wide network of victims of terrorism groups. Victims are not stupid, they can discern who the genuine people are, and those who are playing games with them. Indeed, victims are very deeply hurt and feel insulted when such politicians pretend that they are committed to addressing victims' issues, when in fact they have betrayed them. We have not been fooled by their honeyed words and their fine talk. Nor are we impressed by their secret deals done in the name of helping victims. Victims will not be used as political pawns, or as instruments to give legitimacy to institutions at Stormont where terrorists are accepted as bona fide democrats, the very thing they are not! We have said consistently that if victims' issues are not dealt with in a way which gives victims proper recognition and which supports them in opposition to those who made them victims, Northern Ireland's future will be bleak. The fact is, that this is still not being done, despite fine-sounding words.

The proliferation of small arms undermines democracy. Colombo Press Release. 2001. “Civil Society Regional Strategy Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons” http://hei.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/r_%20measur_pdf/Asia%20Pacific/20010700_south%20asia%20partnership. pdf

The spread and use of small arms and light weapons in South Asia has increased violence, resulted in the loss of precious human life, impacted negatively upon sustainable development, human rights and human security, and fractured peace in the societies and amongst nations of the region. Small arms undermine democracy, election process, threaten democratically elected regimes and impede peaceful resolution of conflicts. More than 500,000 people are killed annually due to small arms, more than the conventional wars. Many more wounded or injured. Millions of people made homeless refugees. Humanitarian relief work inhibited and economic development deferred. In Nepal two generations of the Royal family were wiped out by small arms. These were the concerns expressed by South Asian civil society representatives present at the two-day regional strategy meeting on small arms and light weapons held in Sri Lanka. They felt that the elimination of these weapons of civilian destruction should be a priority of the civil society and governments of South Asia.

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Culture differences prevent the democratization of areas like the Middle East. Inglehart and Norris 2003 (Ronald, Research Professor for U of M, Center for Political Studies Ph.D., and Pippa, Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at John F. Kennedy school of government Harvard. “The True Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Policy, No. 135 (Mar. - Apr., 2003), pp. 62-70) Huntington's response would be that the

Muslim world lacks the core political values that gave birth representative democracy in Western civilization: separation of religious and secular authority, rule of law and social pluralism, parliamentary institutions of representative government, and protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state. Thisclaim seems all too plausible given the failure of electoral democracy to take root throughout the Middle East and North Africa. According to the latest Freedom House rankings, almost two thirds of the 192 countries around the world are now electoral democracies. But among the 47 countries with a Muslim majority, only one fourth are electoraldemocracies--and none of the core Arabic-speaking societies falls into this category. Yet this circumstantial evidence does little to prove Huntington correct, since it reveals nothing about the underlying beliefs of Muslim publics. Indeed, there has been scant empirical evidence whether Western and Muslim societies exhibit deeply divergent values--that is,until now. The cumulative results of the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey (wvs), conducted in 1995--96 and 2000--2002, provide an extensive body of relevant evidence. Based on questionnairesthat explore values and beliefs in more than 70 countries, the wvs is an investigation of sociocultural and political change that encompasses over 80 percent of the world's population.

A comparison of the data yielded by these surveys in Muslim and non-Muslim societies around the globe confirms the first claim in Huntington's thesis: Culture does matter--indeed, it matters a lot. Historical religious traditions have left an enduring imprint on contemporary values. However, Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islam is over political values. At this point in history, societies throughout the world (Muslim and JudeoChristian alike) see democracy as the best form of government. Instead, the real fault line between the West and Islam, which Huntington's theory completely overlooks, concerns gender equality and sexual liberalization. In other words, the values separating the two cultures have much more to do with eros than demos. As younger generations in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, Muslim nationshave remained the most traditional societies in the world. This gap in values mirrors the widening economic divide between the West and the Muslim world. Commenting on the disenfranchisement of women throughout the Middle East, the United Nations Development Programme observed last summer that "no society can achieve the desired state of well-being and human development, or compete in a globalizingworld, if half its people remain marginalized and disempowered." Butthis "sexual clash civilizations" taps into far deeper issues than how Muslim countries treat women. A society's commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization proves time and again to be the most reliable indicator of how strongly that society supports principles of tolerance and egalitarianism. Thus, the people of the Muslim world overwhelmingly want democracy, but democracy may not be sustainable in their societies.

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AT: Trade Wars Advantage impacts Interdependence does not deter war – states don’t calculate economic losses Christopher Layne 2005 china’s role in american grand strategy: Partner, regional power, or great power Rival? http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter5Layne.pdf The ‘interdependence leads to peace’ argument, however, is inherently suspect. After all, Europe never was more interdependent (economically, and intellectually and culturally, as well) than it was on the eve of the First World War. Obviously, the prospect of forgoing the economic gains of trade did not stop Europe’s great powers from fighting a prolonged and devastating war. Implicit in the ‘interdependence leads to peace’ argument is the notion that statesmen think like accountants; but they do not. Calculations of possible economic gain or loss are seldom the determining factor when policymakers decide on war or peace. And even if they were, there is little reason to believe that economic interdependence would be a deterrent to war. This is because even for the losers, the negative economic consequences of modern greatpower wars have been of short duration.

Economic interdependence does not foster peace – just creates strategic entanglements Layne 1996 “less is more” the national interest Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is necessary. Analysts who ignore the importance of this political order are like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe.

Security is like oxygen -- you tend not to notice it until you

begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.(12) Either way, the idea that economic links forged by interdependence foster peace is a myth. Far more often, interdependence of the sort that requires military forces to preserve it generates costly and dangerous strategic commitments. Such commitments do not shrink but expand the frontiers of American insecurity.

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Alt causes to trade war Plan doesn’t solve for other US-EU trade wars—beef, poulty, gmos, airlines, etc. The Guardian 8 “Trade War Brewing Over US Biofuel Subsidies”. The Guardian. April 28 Posted by Truth About Trade and Technology. http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/11584/54/.

The EU and US are embroiled in several high-profile and long-standing trade wars, including over beef and poultry imports from the US, genetically modified seeds and foods and, above all, subsidies for the rival plane-makers Airbus and Boeing.

EU airline pollution plan could spark trade wars Agence-France Press Jul 4, 2008 EU airline pollution plan could spark trade wars: industry officials GENEVA (AFP) http://www.google.com/search?q=AFP&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

A plan by the European Union to impose a carbon dioxide emissions quota for all airlines flying into and out of the bloc could spark trade wars, EU airline pollution plan could spark trade wars: industry officials Jul 4, 2008 GENEVA (AFP) —

aviation industry officials warned. The so-called emissions trading scheme, which is to be voted on by the EU lawmakers next week, aims at cutting aviation pollution by forcing airlines to lower emissions by 3.0 percent in the first year and by 5.0 percent from 2013. Airlines can exceed these caps, but they would have to pay for permits to do so. All airlines -- European and non-European -- flying in and out of the EU would be brought into the scheme from 2012. In addition, between 2013-2020, airlines also would have to pay for 15 percent of their emissions. Officials from the International Air Transport Association, which represents the interests of the airline industry, told AFP that while the industry supported the principle of an emissions trading scheme, it wanted a global standard to be set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). They said IATA was opposed to EU's "unilateral" plan, which it they said violated an international aviation convention. IATA Director for Government and Industry Affairs Carlos Grau Tanner said the EU's move could push non-European states to seek redress through global governing bodies such as UN-agency ICAO or even the International Court of Justice. But beyond legal tussles, there could also be diplomatic flare-ups. "What could happen is a typical trade war where they retaliate through completely different channels. You impose this on me, I'll find something else to hurt you. That's exactly the position that airlines don't want to be in," said Grau. He noted that such a scheme would require an airline flying from outside Europe -- but making a stop at an EU airport -- to pay a fee to pollute, even though the flight was headed for a non-European destination. Indications are already pointing towards fierce opposition led by the United States. When the idea for the emissions trading scheme emerged last year, the ambassadors of Australia, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States raised their concerns in a letter to the German ambassador to the European Union. Germany at the time held the rotating EU presidency. "Inclusion of our airlines in the EU scheme without the consent of our governments would potentially violate EU Member State international obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, as well as bilateral agreements," said the letter, which was also circulated to other EU representatives. At an ICAO General Assembly meeting last September, countries lined up behind the US to oppose the EU initiative. However, the EU pushed ahead as it felt that ICAO was dragging its feet on a global standard. IATA spokesman Anthony Concil said he was confident that ICAO could deliver on a global solution. He also said the current case was reminiscent of a long-drawn US-EU trade war on aircraft noise rules almost a decade ago. In 1999, the EU banned so-called hush kits, or mufflers fitted on older US-made planes. The US ended up taking the case to ICAO, before the EU finally dropped the legislation in 2001. "At a time when airlines are already feeling the heat from higher fuel prices, getting dragged into a trade war is the last thing that airlines need," said Concil.

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New EU Pollution legislation will lead to trade wars EU Buisness.com 08 July 2008ATA criticises EU move on aviation emissions,

Burk/Stone/Walters lab 2008-2009

http://www.eubusiness.com/news-

eu/1215530315.93 18:23 CET (GENEVA) - Aviation

industry association IATA on Tuesday slammed the European Parliament's move to force airlines to cap their greenhouse gas emisisons from 2012 and to pay for some of their pollution. In a vote earlier Tuesday, 640 lawmakers at the European Parliament voted in favour of the plan to require all airlines operating in the 27-nation European Union -- including foreign carriers -- to join the emissions trading scheme. Only 30 parliamentarians voted against and 20 abstained. Giovanni Bisignani, IATA's Director General and CEO said: "It's absolutely the wrong answer to the very serious issue of environment. We support emissions trading but not this decision." Europe has "taken the wrong approach, with the wrong conditions at the wrong time," he said. At a time when the industry was weighed down by soaring fuel costs, the scheme could add 3.5 billion euros (5.46 billion dollars) to industry costs in the first year of operations, IATA said. But there was "no guarantee" that the money would go toward environmental purposes, it added. It's time for Europe's politicians to be honest. This is a punitive tax put in place by politicians who want to paint themselves 'green.' Worse, it's not even part of a coordinated European policy," said Bisignani. He reiterated that the move could even spark trade wars, as IATA officials

have earlier warned. IATA officials previously described the EU's plan as "unilateral" and said it violated an international aviation convention. "Fuelling legal battles and trade wars is no way to help the environment. Already over 130 states have vowed to oppose it," said Bisignani. IATA instead said that only a global scheme brokered through the United Nations agency, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, could work. In addition, IATA said if Europe was serious about cutting emissions, it should hasten the conclusion of a Single European Sky proposal that aimed at reducing traffic jams in the skies and preventing planes from having to fly further to get to their destinations.

US cap and trade causes US/EU trade war. Lloyd’s List, (British Monetary Newspaper). “Emissions plan could trigger trade war with US; EC president Jose Manuel Barroso above wants US companies to participate in EU carbon trading scheme.” January 24, 2008 THE European Union could be heading for a trade war with the US over its carbon-trading scheme. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso wants to bring non-European manufacturers into the system but the signs are that a furious Washington would retaliate.The situation will worry those who view the EU's move as protectionism sneaked in through the back door. On a purely practical level, it could also damage shipping interests by acting as a restraint on world trade.Commentators believe that Mr Barroso might have been influenced by France, which has long sought what have been dubbed "climate change sanctions", particularly against the US.Yet Mr Barroso has been keen to stress the free market logic of the policy. He said: "The reality, of course, is not so much that we are bringing climate change to the marketplace, but that climate change is happening to the market place."He said that it is necessary to "incentivise the saving of the planet". The cap and trade system has shown companies that if they invest in emissions reduction, they can profit from the opportunity of selling their carbon allowances.While not mentioning shipping directly, he made clear that the existing scheme will be extended to "all major industrial emitters", a category that clearly includes the shipping industry.All of this is not likely to go down well on the other side of the Atlantic. A precursor to the US's likely reaction, can be found in a quote

from the notes to a speech recently delivered by US Trade Representative Susan Schwab: "The unilateral imposition of restrictions can lead to retaliation, and dramatically impact economic growth and markets worldwide; while accomplishing nothing or worse when it comes to advancing environmental objectives."British Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks has also reacted unfavourably to Mr Barroso's speech. He told the BBC: "We believe in global trade, we want more of it in the future, not less, and that is good for the European economy. So we are against any measures which might look like trade barriers.

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Trade wars don’t escalate No impact to EU-US trade conflicts Raymond J. Ahearn April 11, 2007 CRS Report for Congress Trade Conflict and the U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship Updated Raymond J. Ahearn Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL30732.pdf In other disputes, technological progress can be a force for change. The audiovisual dispute is a case in point where EU efforts to increase protection of this sector have faced growing technological obstacles, as well as consumer resistance. Rapid technological innovation in the form of cable and satellite television, innovations strongly supported by consumers, offer new products that are difficult to block or regulate. Regulations in this environment often are too complex to enforce or, if enforced, prove adverse to the interests of European producers.45 Trade Conflict in Perspective Mark Twain reportedly once said of Wagner’s music that “it is not as bad as it sounds.” Similarly,

U.S.-EU trade conflicts may not be as ominous and threatening as they appear. Despite the rise in trade tensions and episodes of tit-for-tat retaliation over the past few years, the notion that the relationship between the world’s two most powerful economic powers is constantly teetering on the brink of a transatlantic trade war seems a stretch. Nor does it appear that the trade conflicts represent or symbolize any kind of fundamental rift that is possibly developing between the United States and Europe. At the same time, the disputes do not appear to be ephemeral distractions or mere consequences of a mass media that tends to sensationalize and define the relationship unfairly. Nor are they products of trade negotiators, who like generals, are often accused of fighting the last war. Nor are they trivial or silly squabbles because they represent a mere 1-2% of transatlantic trade. Trade conflicts rather appear to have real, albeit limited, economic and political consequences for the bilateral relationship. Perhaps more significantly, trade disputes may also pose very real obstacles for the two partners in their efforts to play a leadership role in promoting a more open and prosperous world economy. This is particularly evident in the way bilateral trade disputes may be testing the functioning of the World Trade Organization.

No Transatlantic Trade Wars Linn 2004. Linn, Johannes F, Executive Director, Wolfensohn Center for Development. The Brookings Institute. “Trends and Prospects of Transatlantic Economic Relations: The Glue That Cements a Fraying Partnership?” 28 April 2004. http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20040428linn.pdf. In contrast,

I do not see trade wars or serious commercial conflicts dominating the transatlantic dialogue and driving apart the partnership. There are too many common interests among the business communities on both sides of the Atlantic to let this happen. Moreover many of the current trade issues and conflicts are not principally among the industrial countries, but are more pressing and conflictual between the industrial and the developing countries as the Doha Round, and especially the failure to reach agreement in Cancun have shown. And while conflicts may well arise in other areas of commercial transatlantic relations, there are no reasons to expect that they will be more disruptive than similar disputes have been in the past. Of course, there is always the risk that careless leadership could lead to unexpectedly serious and intractable conflicts. More importantly, there is the risk that a serious recession on either side of the Atlantic, most likely brought about by poor macroeconomic management, would lead to political backlash and protectionism. Particularly in the U.S., where welfare system reforms in recent years have significantly reduced the social safety net and increased American’s dependence on holding jobs, any serious and protracted spike in the unemployment rate might well cause the kind of political firestorm that would make it attractive for political leaders to seek redress in protectionist responses.39

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EU/US trade wars are occurring now, with no impact. McCarthy, Shawn and Reguly, Eric, (Staff Business Writers), The Globe and Mail. “Canadian Hopes, Global Risks”, Jul 14 ,2008 Bombardier has set its sights on selling the new jets in Europe and the Middle East, as troubled North American airlines are not in a position to add to their fleets. Much of the work is to be done in plants around Montreal, where the project will create as many as 3,500 highpaying jobs. Governments of Northern Ireland and Britain are contributing about $311-million (U.S.) in loans to support the fabrication of CSeries wings in Northern Ireland. Ottawa will provide $350-million, and the government of Quebec will contribute $118-million. Bombardier is flying into some turbulent airspace as it seeks to take on Boeing and Airbus, the

battling powerhouses of the aerospace market. The U.S. government and European Union have been engaged in a nasty trade war involving accusations and counteraccusations over subsidies for years. The World Trade Organization is expected to rule on both trade actions later this year. Even Foreign Minister David Emerson acknowledged in 2005 - when he was a Liberal industry minister - that the subsidy program would "no doubt" entail "trade risks."

EU and US already fought over GMOs and their was no impact. Empirically denied Schifferes 2003 US launches GM trade war By Steve Schifferes Tuesday, 13 May 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3025217.stm BBC News Online,

Washington has brought a complaint against the European Union for refusing to allow the sale of genetically modified (GM) food or crops, escalating trade tensions between the world's two biggest economic blocs. The United States - and twelve other agricultural exporting nations - want the EU to repeal its five-year moratorium on GM foods, or Washington

face trade sanctions under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said that the US had run out of patience after years of EU procrastination on the issue. "The EU's persistent resistance to abiding by its WTO obligations has

perpetuated a trade barrier unwarranted by the EC's own scientific analysis, which impedes the global use of a technology that could be of great benefit to farmers and consumers around the world," he said. The EU is unlikely to lift the block on GM food imports, which is widely supported by European consumers, and is also developing tough new labelling regulations which worry US farmers. EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy questioned the motives behind the US case, and denied there was a "moratorium" on GM foods. "The EU regulatory system for GM authorisation is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and nondiscriminatory. There is therefore no issue that the WTO needs to examine," he said. And EU consumer and green lobby groups vowed to oppose the US decision. "If this attempt succeeds, the US will force GM foods onto European markets regardless of the wishes of consumers," said Friends of the Earth Policy Director Liana Stupples.

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Trade disputes between Europe and the U.S. are insignificant and won’t escalate. Kull ’01 [Steven, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, “Culture Wars? How Americans and Europeans View Globalization”, The Brookings Institute, Fall 2001, Accessed July 17, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/fall_globaleconomics_kull.aspx]

Given the consistent message of the polls to the contrary, what is the source of the view that Americans are promoting and Europeans are resisting globalization? In the first place, several high-profile U.S.-European disputes on agricultural subsidies, bananas, American films, steel, pasta, hormone beef, and more have received substantial attention in the press. Some of these disputes lend themselves to the impression that the United States is trying to force something on the Europeans—to make small family farms unviable, to stop favoring former colonies, to watch American films, to eat beef grown with hormones. But this exaggerated image does not resonate deeply with the public. The media hype has made the disagreements seem fundamental and enduring when in fact they are little more than intrafamily conflicts over which side is going to make more adjustments within a fairly consensual broad framework and set of values. Attempts to understand the attitudes of the publics on both sides of the Atlantic are complicated by the strident voices of vocal groups who are suffering the negative consequences of globalization or who are sympathetic to those who are. Sometimes these groups are taken as representative of the general public.

But in fact the American and European publics seem to agree that globalization is more positive than negative. At the same time, both are uneasy about the impact of globalization, especially on workers. Both desire to keep some trade barriers for now, at least long enough to help workers adapt to the changes that globalization entails. To reassure both publics, it will probably also be necessary to address globalization's effect on workers in developing countries and on the environment as well. The United States and Europe will probably continue to engage in periodic disputes over exactly how to address these concerns, but the disputes should not obscure the shared underlying support on both sides of the Atlantic for the broader process of globalization.

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US-EU relations are resilient The transatlantic partnership is resilient Roland Dannreuther. “European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a neighbourhood Strategy.” New York, Routledge. 2004 p. 195-6 The global setting is thus primed for a continuance of the transatlantic partnership, but with ongoing and sometimes fractious policy bargaining that is frequently stoked by status dissonance. What are the implications for policy cooperation in the EU's neighbourhood? It is important to stress that the unipolar structure paradoxically increases the salience of regional international politics across the globe for two reasons. First is the declining pole-to-state ratio. The nineteenth-century international system was composed of six or eight polar states out of a total of roughly 30 significant powers. In the early Cold War there were two poles, but the number of states had doubled to just over 70. Today there is one pole in a system whose population has

trebled to nearly 200 states. As a simple matter of numbers, there is bound to be more going on in regional international relations in today's system. Not only are the numbers of lesser powers growing, so are their aggregate capabilities. By one measure, the conventionally defined Great Powers comprised over 80 per cent of global capabilities in the mid-nineteenth century, 65 per cent in the early Cold War, but only around 55 per cent today.15 Second, many regional dynamics are measurably less constrained by

Great Power politics than they were in the Cold War for purely structural reasons. The current international structure is looser than Cold War bipolarity, even though it is more unequal. The gap between the most powerful state and the rest is much larger now than under bipolarity, but the system is less constraining on many important regions. This comparative looseness does not mean that the system is not unipolar. On the contrary, it is a result of the fact that unipolarity limits the very intense Great Power contradictions that tend to force lesser powers to choose sides. The contemporary international system, in short, is characterized by unprecedented US hegemony within the Great Power club, and a novel proliferation of lesser states outside that club. The likelihood that regional dynamics will fall outside the limits of a polar state's national interest or capability is thus greater than in preceding systems. Because there are now far more, and more capable, states relative to poles than in prior eras, and because the abeyance of intense security rivalries among Great Powers increases the latitude for regional interstate dynamics, there is a heightened demand for inter-state cooperation at the regional level. Notwithstanding US primacy, today's international system puts a premium on the ability of the United States and the EU to coordinate policy in the regions.

Relations Resiliant - Economic and political culture. Danie Dombey. "US-EU Relations: Transatlantic Climate Shift." 4 Jun. 2007. FT.COm. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3d74c1b6-1060-11dc-96d3-000b5df10621,dwp_uuid=1612d234-0ad4-11dc-8412000b5df10621.html US and European officials insist that whatever differences exist should not make the US and Europe forget that they are more united by economics and political culture than any other two regions in the world. Indeed, the economic partnership between the US and Europe is still the most important bilateral trade and investment relationship there is, accounting for about 40 per cent of world trade and more than 60 per cent of world gross domestic product. “Our task is not to put our relationship on the Freudian couch and anxiously take its temperature every few weeks, but to put it to work in the world to resolve the problems only we can resolve together,” said Dan Fried, the US State Department’s top official on Europe, last month.

Relations are resilient. US-EU Relations.com. "2004 Apolitical Overview of US-EU Relations." 2004. http://www.useurelations.com/index2.html Despite centuries of transatlantic disputes, Americans and Europeans have not been torn apart by any subject, including Iraq in 2002 and 2003. US-European relations were not at risk of being severed even at the worst moments of animosity between Americans and Europeans during the US – “Old Europe” War-of-Words over Iraq. Both the US and the EU are children of the same 18th Century Enlightenment and, like siblings, define themselves in part by the values and actions of the other. But unlike siblings that may walk away from each other producing descendants that never meet, each successive generation of Americans and Europeans rediscovers the other side of the Atlantic and its inhabitants with a youthful excitement and interest.

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US-EU partnership is extremely resilient. European Commission President Barroso, Brussels. 2/9/2005 [http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=category§ionid=7&id=29&Itemid=59/--European Union: Delegation of the European Union Commission to the USA]

“The relationship between the United States and Europe constitutes the world’s strongest, most comprehensive and strategically most important partnership.” European Commission President Barroso (pictured, extreme right), Brussels, 9 February 2005. “Today, security and justice and prosperity for our world depend on America and Europe working in common purpose. That makes our transatlantic ties as vital as they have ever been.” US President Bush, 19 February 2005. As the two greatest powers on the world scene, the relationship between the EU and the US is central and irreplaceable. It has a long, mutually beneficial history based on shared and strong fundamental beliefs in democratic government, human rights and market economies. Since its very inception, the process of European Integration has been strongly supported by the US. Without US vision and assistance, the European founding fathers would have had enormous difficulties. That support still exists. During his visit to Europe in February 2005, President Bush stated:“My government and the United States want the European project to succeed. It's in our interests that Europe be strong (…). It's in our interests because the values that caused the European Union to exist in the first place -- the values of human rights and human dignity and freedom -- are the same values we share. And we have an opportunity to work together to spread those values.” Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic believe that the relationship is valuable at all levels -- for European and American business, civil societies and citizens -- and that it is the task of governments to promote the building of bridges across the Atlantic. Its importance is reflected in trade relations, the fight against terrorism and the handling of crisis and conflicts. This joint commitment of the EU and the US has found clear expression in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership of 1998. This partnership was further reinforced at the EU-US Summit of 2002 through the launching of a “Positive Economic Agenda.”

Bilateral trade between the EU and US amounts to over $1 billion a day; investment links are even more substantial, totaling over $1.8 trillion a year. Each partner creates jobs for about 6 million workers on each side of the Atlantic, and EU-US trade accounts for almost 40% of world trade. But the EU-US economic partnership goes way beyond pure trade matters: it is supported by a number of institutionalized dialogues and regulatory cooperation between the partners.Through continued dialogue and cooperation the EU and US also work together to promote global peace, stability and democracy. On a global level, the EU and US are major powers and as such have a global responsibility. Exercising that power and responsibility effectively inevitably means working together. In that respect the EU and US are jointly promoting democracy, freedom, stability and prosperity throughout the world. Whether it is in the Middle East, Afghanistan or the Balkans, Europe and the US can only succeed in advancing these values if they act together. Together the EU and US are committed to the challenge of alleviating poverty and disease and provide almost 80% of global development assistance. To respond to global threats and protect their citizens, intensive EU-US discussions have taken place since 9/11 which have yielded strengthened cooperation and coordination in the fields of counter-terrorism and domestic security. As a result, an Enhanced Security Dialogue on transport and border security was established in 1994, yet another example of the willingness to tackle challenges together. “For myself, I am totally committed to working closely with the new US Administration to achieve our common

objectives, an indeed firmly believe that the realization of these objectives will only be possible through such a close cooperation.” Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Brussels, 3 December 2004.

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No US Europe War No risk. Charles A. Kupchan Fall 1999 World Policy Journal "Life after pax Americana" It is fortunate that the near-term challenge to U.S. primacy will come from Europe. After decades of close cooperation, Europe and North America enjoy unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity. European states have gone along with U.S. leadership not just because they have not had the power and influence to do otherwise; despite cavils,they also welcome the particular brand of international order sustained by the United States. A more equal distribution of power across the Atlantic will no doubt engender increased competition between a collective Europe and the United States. But such conflict is likely to be restricted to economic matters and muted by the mutual benefits reaped from high levels of trade and investment. Furthermore, the underlying coincidence of values between North America and Europe means that even when interests diverge, geopolitical rivalry is not likely to follow. Efforts to preserve an Atlantic consensus may well lead to a lowest common denominator and produce inaction (as has occurred repeatedly in the Balkans). But it is hard to imagine the United States and Europe engaging in militarized conflict.

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India Deal Good – US/India Relations US-India deal builds US-India relations Khaleej Times 9 July 2008 Bush pushes US-India nuclear deal TOYAKO, Japan - President Bush defended a languishing deal his administration negotiated to sell India nuclear fuel and technology, saying he reassured India's prime minister that the pact was important for both countries despite heavy opposition on both sides. Bush's meeting on Wednesday with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was one of a series of one-and-one sessions the president scheduled on the final day of the three-day G-8 summit of economic powers. ‘I respect the prime minister a lot,’ Bush said, speaking with reporters after their meeting. ‘I also respect India a lot. And I think it's very important that the United States continues to work with our friend to

develop not only a new strategic relationship, but a relationship that addresses some of the world's problems. We talked about the India-US nuclear deal - how important that is for our respective countries.’ Singh said, ‘In this increasingly interdependent world that we live in, whether it the question of climate change or whether it is a question of managing the global economy, India and the United States must stand tall, must stand shoulder to shoulder.’ If ratified by Washington and New Delhi, the pact would reverse three decades of US policy by allowing the sale of atomic fuel and technology to India, which has not signed international nonproliferation accords but has tested nuclear weapons. In return, India, would open its civilian reactors to international inspections. US critics worry the agreement could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia and weaken international efforts to prevent states like Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. In India, critics say it would undermine India's weapons program and give Washington too much influence over Indian foreign policy. Singh's communist allies withdrew their support for his four-yearold coalition government on Tuesday to protest the government's plan to push forward with the nuclear deal. Bush is trying to prod Congress to approve the pact before time runs out on his administration in January. Before returning home late in the day, Bush was also meeting separately with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Chinese President Hu Jintao and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Many South Koreans have protested the recent resumption of US beef imports. Both China and South Korea are important players in the international effort to get North Korea to scale back its nuclear weapons program.

India deal will increase relations between the US and India The Independent 07 (The Independent: “Nuclear deal with US 'good for India'”, by Y.P Rajesh in Delhi (a staff writer),Tuesday, 14 August 2007 )

India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has mounted a strong defence of his nuclear energy deal with the United States, saying it was crucial for the country's prosperity. The deal, seen as the cornerstone of a new friendship between Delhi and Washington, has drawn criticism from across the political spectrum and raised fears it could destabilise Mr Singh's coalition. Critics say the deal is unfair, compromises India's nuclear sovereignty, and forces it to accept US influence over foreign and strategic policies. But Mr Singh, said in a speech in parliament that he had redeemed a pledge to secure the best agreement. The pact finalised last month was "good for India, and good for the world", he declared. The deal aims to give India access to US nuclear fuel and equipment for the first time in 30 years to help meet its soaring energy needs, even though it has stayed out of non-proliferation pacts and tested nuclear weapons.REUTERS

India Deal will increase India/U.S. relations and be an asset to U.S. businesses CBS 06 CBS, The Nuclear Deal With India, Wolfson: Good For Relations, Good For Business, But Is It 'Good' Good Enough?” ,March 3, 2006)

“Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good” is a catch-phrase often used by negotiators trying to conclude a deal and it applies to this week’s agreement signed in New Delhi by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Now, the question is: is "good" good enough? The pact will open India's civilian nuclear program to international inspection and safeguards and "remove a basic irritant" in U.S.-Indian relations over the past 30 years, according to the chief American negotiator, Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns. American businesses stand to reap huge profits from the expected sale of equipment, nuclear technology and nuclear fuel as India expands its civilian nuclear program to help fill its demand for more power to meet the needs of its expanding population and economy.

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India Deal Good / AT: China No impact—China will not feel contained by the India nuclear deal Hindustan Times, July 17, 2008 “China may not oppose India-US nuclear deal”, Indo-Asian News Service, New Delhi, , http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=&id=4f278312-4ae6-424da07f-13517fcc9ad5&&Headline=China+may+not+oppose+India-US+nuclear+deal&strParent=strParentID China Thursday indicated for the first time that it may not raise any objections when the 35-member IAEA board considers the India-specific safeguards pact in Vienna Aug 1. "I believe countries could under the presentation of fulfilling international obligations carry out peaceful cooperation in peaceful (use of) nuclear energy and I hope the relevant issues can be resolved through negotiations between relevant parties," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told reporters in Beijing. "We have taken note that the US and India are making further contact on this (nuclear) issue," Liu said when asked if China was planning to raise any objections when India's case comes up before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The spokesperson's remarks has raised hopes in New Delhi that Beijing, which has maintained an ambivalent stance on the India-US nuclear deal, will not stand in India's way in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

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India Deal Bad – Proliferation India deal would increase the chances of proliferation, double standard and close relations with Iran are possible causes LEONOR TOMERO. Director of Nonproliferation, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. The Washington Post. July 12, 2008. The Rush to a Flawed Nuclear Deal. 7/17/2008 In his July 7 op-ed piece, "New Life for the India Nuclear Pact," Bill Emmott said that Congress must not allow India's close ties with Iran to hold up the U.S.-India nuclear deal and that the deal is worth pursuing. In reality, the India-Iran relationship should be cause for concern. The two countries have undertaken two joint naval exercises, and Indian companies have been subject to sanctions by the United States for exporting expertise and technology related to weapons of mass destruction to Iran. Ultimately, however, India's close relationship with Iran isn't the most serious problem with the pact. Rather than integrating India into the nonproliferation mainstream, the proposed deal would set a risky double standard that would shatter the delicate bargain upon which the global nonproliferation regime is based. In addition, by increasing India's capability to produce nuclear weapons, the deal will exacerbate an already perilous nuclear arms race in South Asia, because Pakistan is likely to respond by expanding its own nuclear capability.

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India Deal DA / India won’t agree to deal India won’t agree - The Communist party of India opposed to the India Nuclear Deal Matthew Rosenberg. Associated Press. Jun 18, 2008. US-India nuclear deal appears to be in trouble. 7/17/2008 Google News NEW DELHI (AP) — The future of a landmark nuclear energy accord between India and the United States looked deeply uncertain Wednesday after India's government put off talks with powerful communist opponents of the pact. The meeting is now scheduled to take place next week. But even if it goes ahead, it's unclear what difference it will make with the communist parties steadfast in their opposition, reinforcing doubts over whether the deal can be clinched before President Bush leaves office. "We have several times made our position clear — we are opposed to it," Nilotpal Basu, a top official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), told The Associated Press. The deal would "undermine the independent foreign policy of India," he said, citing U.S. pressure on New Delhi to aid Washington's efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program. "We do not think this deal gives us any advantages." U.S. policymakers see India as a counterweight to an ever-more powerful China, and the deal reverses three decades of American policy by allowing the shipment of nuclear fuel and technology to India, which has never signed international nonproliferation accords and yet has tested atomic weapons.

The India Nuclear Deal is dead due to India’s communist parties, and it’s too late Matthew Rosenberg. Associated Press. Jun 18, 2008. US-India nuclear deal appears to be in trouble. 7/17/2008 Google News And even though the deal only covers civilian nuclear power, it tacitly acknowledges India as a nuclear-weapons state, giving its weapons program a degree of international legitimacy — and adding to India's growing clout. But a wave of opposition from India's communist parties, which provide the governing coalition with its parliamentary majority, appears to have scuttled the pact for now. U.S. officials said earlier this year that with American elections coming up — and no guarantee the next U.S. administration will keep the deal on the table — India needed to complete its end of the pact by May to give the U.S. Congress enough time to pass it. Congress breaks for the summer in early July, and many lawmakers will be busy campaigning in the fall. It's now mid-June, and New Delhi has made no progress in reaching a separate deal with the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency that's needed before Congress can approve the pact. Wednesday's meeting was intended to persuade the communists to allow the government to secure a deal with the IAEA. It was canceled because of scheduling conflicts, Basu said. Following the postponement, an Indian Foreign Ministry official said the deal was in "meltdown," although he held out hope for a last minute communist reversal. The official insisted on anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation. A day earlier in Washington, U.S. State Department spokesman Tom Casey stressed that the Bush administration would "make every effort to move it through Congress" before leaving office in January. But he, too, suggested that is unlikely to happen. "We would certainly hope that the next administration, whoever comes to office in January, would also see this agreement as something fundamentally in America's interest," he told reporters on Tuesday. Both Barack Obama and John McCain have endorsed the deal. But it is not clear if either would make it a priority. The nuclear deal faces opposition in the U.S., too. Critics there, including some in Congress, say providing U.S. fuel to India would free up India's limited domestic supplies of nuclear material for use in atomic weapons, which they argue could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia.

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California Economy Low California is entering into a recession now Gene Gleeson Wednesday, July 16, 2008 Report: State economy close to recession http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/business&id=6267821 New numbers out Wednesday morning confirm what many have felt in their gut and their wallet for some time. The state's economy is close to recession, and parts of Southern California are already there. Experts said the state's economy looks bleak for the next couple of years. The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation released two reports that give reasons why the state economy is a mess. Chief among them were the housing market crash, soaring gas and diesel prices and the writer's strike. ""If you go to the Riverside-San Bernardino area, they had a huge boom in new home building. They actually have what you call a housing supply bubble there, and then the other key industry for them is international trade imports started falling in early 2007," said Jack Kyser from the L.A. County Economic Development Corporation. "The decline has picked up so far this year, and so they're getting hit a couple ways too." Already in L.A. County, the unemployment rate has jumped from 5 percent in 2007 to 6.2 percent in 2008. Kyser said the worst is yet to come for places like Orange County and the Inland Empire: 18,600 jobs are expected to be lost from Orange County, and 20,500 jobs are expected to be lost in the Riverside/San Bernardino area in 2008. LOS ANGELES (KABC) --

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