Book 2 Cases 2000 Up.docx

Lidia Gelig v. People, GR 173150, 28 July 2010 (Direct AssaultArt. 148, 151)

FACTS: Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals that vacated and set aside the Decision of the RTC, Cebu City, Br 23, RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries. Lydia and Gemma B. Micarsos, were public school. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case. On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.

ISSUES: 1. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal . 2. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.

[Doctrine(s)] HELD: 1. Liable for Direct Assault – It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal's office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma's fall to the floor. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 2. NOT liable of Unintetional Abortion - There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's abortion.

People v. Julio Recto, GR 129069, 17 October 2001 (Direct Assault) FACTS: April 18, 1994, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his residence together with Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay TanodMelchor Recto, appellant‟s cousin. They were trying to settle a land dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in progress, Orbe was summoned by SPO4 FortunatoRafol to proceed to the bodega of Rance. “While SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the group Julio Recto, et. al. arrived. The group stopped at the first „trampa‟ near the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, Recto, while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: „Do not do it. We‟ll just settle this. (Ayoson ta langine).‟ Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay KagawadMacalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground. While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter‟s thigh. Before he could take a step, he was also shot by Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano „Renato‟ Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant.” RTC: Convicted them to 4 offenses ISSUE: WON Julio is guilty of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide as one count of the complex crime. [Doctrine(s)] HELD: Qualified Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971) Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by “any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;” and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, “shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed

with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. For MELCHOR RECTO (Criminal Case No. 1970) An agent of a person in authority is “any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.” In the case at bar, the victim, MelchorRecto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not “engaged in the performance of his official duties” at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked “on the occasion of such performance,” … however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault. (HE MUST IN THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY) For PERCIVAL ORBE (Criminal Case No. 1971) the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on PERCIVAL ORBE – then a barangay captain, a person in authority -- amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups. Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being fired at. Although appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed attempted homicide. Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should be the penalty for the most serious crime -- in this case qualified direct assault -- the same to be imposed in its maximum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law should also be applied in this case.

Union Bank v, People, GR192565, 28 February 2012 (Perjury-Art. 183) FACTS: The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank‟s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized inMakati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati Citysubsequently denied Tomas‟ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: The issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court. [Doctrine(s)] HELD: Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made. … the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the

oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed. Tomas‟ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.

PCGG Chairman v. Reiner Jacobi, et.al., GR 155996, 27 June 2012 (Falsification-presumption FACTS: The records show that on two occasions - evidenced by the December 22, 1988 and May 6, 1991 letters - then PCGG Commissioner, and later Chairman, David M. Castro, purportedly acting for the PCGG, agreed to pay Jacobi a fee of ten percent (10%) of any amount actually recovered and legally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines from the ill-gotten wealth of Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his family, associates, subordinates and cronies, based on the information and evidence that Jacobi would furnish the PCGG. Chairman Castro sent another letter dated December 19, 1991 to Jacobi confirming “that actual recovery [of] the Kloten gold account managed by Union Bank of

Switzerland (UBS) subject of [Jacobi‟s] information and other efforts done will be properly compensated as previously committed.” A few years later, a similar letter dated August 27, 1998 (De Guzman letter) was sent by the new PCGG Chairman, Felix M. de Guzman, to Jacobi, confirming the PCGG‟s promise (as contained in the PCGG letters) to pay Jacobi and his intelligence group a 10% fee for the US$13.2 billion ill-gotten wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, trustee or fronts in UBS still/now being claimed and recovered by the Philippine Government. ISSUE: Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion - in finding that no probable cause for falsification and use of falsified document exists against the respondents? [Doctrine(s)] HELD: a. Determination of probable cause, an executive function , the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive. To justify judicial intrusion in1to what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive,[130] the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,[131] before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. All these, the petitioner failed to establish. Lack of probable cause for falsification For purposes of filing an information in court, probable cause refers to facts and circumstances sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents probably committed it. To guide the prosecutor‟s determination, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused; the quantum of proof to establish its existence is less than the evidence that would justify conviction, but it demands more than bare suspicion. No definitive basis to determine probable cause has been established, except to consider the attendant facts and circumstances according to the prosecutor‟s best lights.[133] No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific

kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.[134] In going through the process, the prosecutor should carefully calibrate the issues of facts presented to him to the end that his finding would always be consistent with the clear dictates of reason.

Richard Chua v. People, GR 183132, 8 February 2012 (Art. 172-elements) FACTS: In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired Richard Chua as a general clerk in its International Banking Division which processed the opening of domestic and international letters of credit, domestic and international remittances as well as importation and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to process trust receipts, accept trust receipt payments and issue the corresponding receipts for these payments. In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding the non- application of his payments, an internal audit was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine (29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus foreign remittances were discovered. The audit led to a finding that these remittances were not supported by the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign bank concerned. Two of these remittances were with instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings Account No. 1000-209312 which turned out to be under Chua‟s name. 1. Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 29 October 1984 in the amount of ₱16,729.96:

2.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 6 August 1984 in the amount of ₱16,024.70:

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents considering that it has categorically ADMITTED that there is no direct proof that petitioner was the author of the falsification in the case at bar. [Doctrine(s)] HELD: …appellant (Chua) did not acquire juridical possession over the subject payments. The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of no moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified documents and “uttered” or used the same for his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present – (i) Chua is a private individual; (ii) he used fictitious “inward foreign remittance advice of credit” to cause the funneling or transfer of the two named bank clients‟ payments into his own account,[23] squarely falling under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code[24]; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two commercial documents, namely, “inward foreign remittance advice of credit” and the “debit tickets.” Without doubt, his subsequent conviction to a lesser crime was not unfounded.

Mark Clemente v. People GR 194367, 15 June 2011 (Art. 168-elements forged notes) FACTS: Mark Clemente was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an Information, that on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, the said accused, in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs P500.00 bill. Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant. Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit. ISSUE: WON the possession of false treasury or bank notes alone is punishable? [Doctrine(s)] HELD: The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not

payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used orpossessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.

People vs Bringas Case Date:April 23, 2010 Topic: Arbitrary Detention

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Facts: Accused-appellants were indicted for Carnapping or violation of RA 6539 when they executed a kidnap for ransom of a minor child named PATRICK TENG, with intent to gain and with violence and intimidation, did then and there, take a motor vehicle, Toyota Corolla, with Plate No. TNK-782, owned by Erick Teng. They were likewise indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom or violation of Art. 267 of the RPC for the kidnap and detention of Teng for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release which was effected after payment by his parents of the amount of P2.5 Million. 

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Eric’s house helper Maricel received a phone call purportedly from Eric’s brother-in-law, Johnson, informing that a gift will be delivered for Patrick. At around 1:30 p.m., the doorbell rang and Maricel went to check the gate.When she asked who it was, the men outside answered that they were delivering the gift for Patrick from Johnson.Peering through the gate she saw two men, whom she came to know later on to be Rosales and Calaguas with the latter holding a large gift in Christmas wrapper. Maricel opened the gate. Calaguas then poked a gun at Maricel and pulled her towards Eric’s house.She was made to knock at the front door which was opened by Sweeney, the sister of Eric. Maricel, Sweeney, and the other house helpers, Dina and Melanie, were herded by Calaguas to the children’s room at the second floor together with Eric’s children, Patrick and Mikee. While on the stairway, Rosales asked for the key to Erics car. Maricel was then gagged with packing tape by Pajarillo, and the three of them went down. Maricel pointed to the car key in the kitchen.Thereafter, Maricel was brought upstairs to the children’s room by Pajarillo. Already inside the children’s room were Sulayao and Calaguas.Pajarillo then tied the hands and feet of Maricel,while the others did the same to Sweeney, Dina and Melanie.However, Dinas feet were not tied.Maricel identified Ross as among those who took Patrick.The kidnappers also took Eric’s red Toyota Corolla (Model GLI 1994). At around 3:10 p.m., Eric received the first call from one of the kidnappers (negotiator) demanding a ransom of PhP 10 million for his son and ordered him not to report the matter to the police else Patrick will be harmed.A friend of the grandparents of Patrick, however, reported the kidnapping to the PACC Special Operations Task Force Habagat. At about 4:00 p.m., Eric received a call from Gen. Panfilo Lacson, then head of the PACC Special Operations Task Force Habagat. Negotiator instructed Eric to produce six individuals for them to interview and choose from to deliver the money. They then called Racquel Chung, the wife of Eden Sy Chung (Chung), asking if Chung could help. He agreed.

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Eric was then instructed to have the ransom money delivered, which at that time was significantly reduced to PhP 2.5 million and which he was able to raise that day.  On the way, Chung called Eric telling him that he was intercepted by two cars which he had to follow. The PACC operatives tailing Chung who were on radio contact with the PACC, however, belied Chung’s allegation of interception.The PACC then suspected Chung to be in cahoots with the kidnappers.Gen. Lacson thereafter instructed Eric to delay Chung upon his return. Eventually, Chung, bringing Patrick, arrived at Eric’s place past midnight. Five minutes after Chung’s arrival, Gen. Lacson and his men arrived and arrested Chung. Chung pointed out Navarro and Jimboy Bringas as the other kidnappers. The accused admitted the taking of Patrick Teng but denied doing any violence and the use of handguns. Jimboy Bringas maintained that he was only implicated by Chung and Navarro for he was neither involved with the crime nor participated in its commission as he was only tasked to look for factory workers by Chung and for tourist guides by Navarro. Issue: W/N kidnapping for ransom was proven beyond reasonable doubt? –YES Held: It must be noted that when the victim is a minor and the accused is any of the parents, the crime is Inducing a minor to abandon his home defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 271 of the RPC. While if it is a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person but detains said person without any legal ground is liable for Arbitrary detention defined and penalized under Art. 124 of the RPC.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. Moreover, if the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential.Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. In the instant case, all the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The accused are all private individuals. The kidnapping of Patrick Teng, then three years old, a minor is undisputed. That ransom was demanded and paid is established. The instant criminal charge is DISMISSED as to accused ERICSON PAJARILLO and EDGARDO SULAYAO on account of their death. Accused BRYAN BRINGAS is hereby ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt as to his involvement. All the rest

of the accussed were directed to pay civil indemnity to Eric Teng plus damages with interest and costs.