Bigamy And Rape Case.docx

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Centro Escolar University School of Law and Jurisprudence Makati City

Legal Research: Case Study Submitted by: Group 2 Nizzane Vico Yssa Joanna Castillo Andres Teodoro Sarah Mae Bogador

Submitted to: Prof. Milagros S. Ong Legal Research and Thesis Writing

Defendant’s Argument on Bigamy case: It was established in the facts of the case that Alberto and Carmen did not obtain a valid marriage license when they celebrated their marriage. A valid marriage licence is a formal requisite for a valid marriage as provided in Art. 3 of the Family Code. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio (Art. 4, Family Code). Therefore the second marriage contracted by Alberto is void. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” In connection to the above provision, the court enumerated the elements of bigamy in Montanez v. Cipriano 1 as follows: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisits for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

In Santiago v. People 2, The Supreme Court states: Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.

Another relevant jurisprudence in Santiago v. People is the case of People v. De Lara 3, where the court found that when Domingo De Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on August 18, 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on August 19, 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy. In Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan 3, the Court ruled that Benjamin Bangayan, Jr, did not commit the crime of bigamy because the parties to the second marriage just signed a purported marriage license. In the case at bar, Alberto’s subsequent marriage is void due to the lack of valid marriage license. Following the principle of stare decisis, Alberto should be acquitted from the bigamy.

Defendant’s Argument in Rape case: Alberto was charged with the rape of his daughter Bernadette. According to Bernadette, Alberto threatened her with a gun and that he will kill her and her mother. Although she fought back, Alberto was successful in raping her. After the incident, Bernadette called her boyfriend who then brought her to the hospital. Bernadette also claims that Alberto had made several attempts in the past to rape her. As a result of the incident, Bernadette become pregnant. On the other hand, Alberto’s arguments were as follows: 1. He was in Davao on his regular visit 2. That it could have been Franco since he frequents their house even when they are not around. 3. That he does not own a gun. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, defines Rape as follows: ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed. 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mention in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

In the case of People v. Ocdol 4, the Supreme court laid down the elements of rape: At the outset, for conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. First and foremost, in adjudging rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Again, by way of emphasis, we adhere to the rule that due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential

fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding.

In the case at bar, Our position remains that the court has to further prove that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support their guilty verdicts for settled is the rule that in every criminal prosecution, the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is established by the prosecution. In People vs. Salidaga 5, the Supreme Court, ruled that judges are duty-bound to carefully scrutinize the testimony of an alleged rape victim and not to treat it as “gospel truth”. In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. It is inherent in the crime of rape that the conviction of an accused invariably depends upon the credibility of the victim as she is oftentimes the sole witness to the dastardly act. Thus, the rule is that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and that if her testimony meets the crucible test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. However, the courts are not bound to treat the testimony of the victim as gospel truth. Judges are duty-bound to subject her testimony to the most rigid and careful scrutiny lest vital details which could affect the outcome of the case be overlooked or cast aside. In highlighting the supposed weakness of appellant’s defense of alibi, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked the basic question of whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support their guilty verdicts for settled is the rule that in every criminal prosecution, the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is established by the prosecution. Thus, if the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak, or indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The prosecution, at all times, bears the burden of establishing an accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No matter how weak the defense may be, it is not and cannot be the sole basis of conviction if, on the other hand, the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. If there exists even one iota of doubt, this Court is under a long standing injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner. The accused may offer no more than a feeble alibi but we are enjoined to proclaim him innocent in the light of insufficient evidence proving his guilt.

Footnotes: 1

Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012

2

Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015

3

People v. De Lara, CA, 51 O.G., 4079

4

People v. Ocdol GR 200645 August 20, 2014

5

People vs. Salidaga GR 172323 January 29, 2007

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