Bhr Politics Internals

HBR SDI 08

Politics Internals

Political Theory Political Theory................................................................................................................................................................................................................................1 Partisanship – Still Exists................................................................................................................................................................................................................2 Bipartisanship Key to Pass..............................................................................................................................................................................................................3 Divided Government Not Significant..............................................................................................................................................................................................4 A2 Bipartisanship Key to Pass.........................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................6 Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................7 Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................8 Bipartisanship Turn – Ignore Presidential Agenda..........................................................................................................................................................................9 Lame Duck – No Push...................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 Lame Ducks = Advantage..............................................................................................................................................................................................................11 Lame Duck Destroy Party..............................................................................................................................................................................................................12 Lame Duck – No Vetoes................................................................................................................................................................................................................13 Political Capital Key to Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................14 Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................15 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................15 Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................16 A2 Bush Takes Blame....................................................................................................................................................................................................................17 President Gets Credit/Avoids Blame.............................................................................................................................................................................................18 Presidents Get Blame/Credit – Agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................................19 Blame Game – Conflicting Agenda...............................................................................................................................................................................................20 Concessions Key to Agenda...........................................................................................................................................................................................................21 A2 Concessions Key to Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................22 Public Support Key to Agenda.......................................................................................................................................................................................................23 Party Control Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................................24 GOP Base Key...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................25 Presidents Control Agenda.............................................................................................................................................................................................................26 Winners Win..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................27 Lobbyists Key to Agenda...............................................................................................................................................................................................................28 A2 Lobbyists Key..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................29 Filibuster – Not Prevent Pass.........................................................................................................................................................................................................30 Income President Need Party Unity...............................................................................................................................................................................................31 Coattails Key President Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................32 Vetoes – Need Political Support....................................................................................................................................................................................................33

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Partisanship – Still Exists Partisanship still exists Nivola 6/16 Pietro S., Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ The Brookings Institution, Is 2008 a Post-Partisan Year? http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0610_postpartisan_nivola.aspx?p=1, WEDNESDAY JULY 16, 2008

The speculation these days is that American politics may be at the dawn of a “post-partisan” age. The profound philosophical divide between Democrats and Republicans is said to be narrowing, and a new era of bipartisan comity just around the corner. Exhibit A:

Witness the rise of two seeming centrists as the presidential front-runners, McCain and Obama. Not so fast. A chasm continues to separate the parties on salient issues. For all the relatively moderate-sounding tenor of the campaigns so far, the substantive contrast between the candidates is deep and stark—arguably sharper than between contenders in the last two presidential elections. In 2004, Democratic nominee John Kerry spoke of “winning” the war in Iraq, not about a firm timetable for pulling American combat troops out. Nor did he champion high-level discussions, no preconditions asked, with America’s nastiest foes. Barack Obama’s stance on these important matters clashes head-on with McCain’s. In 2000, Vice President Al Gore (whose running mate was Senator Joe Lieberman) flirted with populism in some of his rhetoric. But, unlike Obama, Gore never distanced himself from NAFTA, one of the Clinton administration’s signature achievements. Neither Kerry nor Gore proposed plans for universal health care coverage, now a centerpiece of the Democratic agenda.

Parties are still divided among each other Nivola 6/16 Pietro S., Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ The Brookings Institution, Is 2008 a Post-Partisan Year? http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0610_postpartisan_nivola.aspx?p=1, WEDNESDAY JULY 16, 2008

The ostensibly orthodox party lines of the McCain and Obama candidacies might eventually melt away when either of these men becomes president. A healthy discount factor should always be applied to campaign rhetoric. Yet, one doubts that either candidate would be able to disown with impunity his clearest campaign promises. Obama, for example, has accorded himself precious little wiggle-room in his commitment to withdraw expeditiously from Iraq. Similarly, McCain has not left himself much space to renege on such matters as his pledge to extend (deficits notwithstanding) the Bush administration’s tax reductions. Powerful constituencies in the respective party bases will hold these leaders to their word, or at least punish them if they stray. Ask George H.W. Bush what happened to a president who first uttered “read my lips” and then tried to say, in essence, “I changed my mind.” So, two notes of caution: Don’t discount campaign positions entirely, and don’t be too beguiled by the style or tone in

which they get packaged. President Bush came to the White House claiming to be “a uniter, not a divider.” The spirit of the slogan had been heard before. As a presidential candidate in 1968, Richard M. Nixon, too, had told the nation that it needed a leader who would “unite America.” But in both cases it was just a matter of time before the talk of unity, change and new politics faded, and old partisan polemics resurfaced with a vengeance. Why the polarization of our parties has become a firm fixture in American politics, and if anything has intensified, is a long story that’s been the focus of a three-year joint study by the Brookings and Hoover institutions. The central finding of the study is that

the roots of our polarized politics lie not only in the postures of political elites--such as contestants appealing to the staunchly liberal or conservative partisans in nominating primaries and caucuses, delegates attending party conventions, politicians elected to Congress in safely liberal or conservative states or districts, and so forth. Polarization now also runs quite deep within the mass electorate. There, Democratic and Republican voters remain very much at odds on a significant range of questions—everything from how leniently to treat undocumented immigrants to what America’s role in the world should be.

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Bipartisanship Key to Pass Bipartisanship key to overcome presidential vetoes Ornstein 5/14 Norman J. Ornstein, Scholar at American Enterprise Institute, A Week of Activity Can't Mask the Hard Feelings in Congress http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.27994,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, Wednesday, May 14, 2008 The good news is that Congress

is buckling down to a full schedule of meaty, substantive issues, the most robust planned agenda in a long time. The bad news? It will be nothing short of a miracle if we end up the week with anything significant that is on its way to presidential signature--or if we see any signs of hope that we are emerging from the prolonged unhealthiness in our politics and policy process in Washington. The plans for action range from the long-awaited omnibus farm bill to the war funding in the supplemental with its range of add-ons, including a new GI bill and an extension of unemployment benefits. Add to those the Public Safety EmployerEmployee Cooperation Act to force states and localities to engage in collective bargaining with its police and firefighters, the flood insurance bill and the attempt to suspend contributions to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This week, indeed this whole month, will be a key test in whether the

political process in Washington can rise above the dysfunction that has been the norm for this Congress. Last week, the House was dominated by interminable delays and protests by the minority at the majority's abuse of the regular order by bypassing the Appropriations Committee and process. Leave aside the irony of indignation coming from lawmakers who made a habit of bypassing the regular order on appropriations and elsewhere; the spectacle reflected a House as deeply divided along partisan lines as it was in the previous Congress--and a House with no common denominator of trying to do something to solve the problems we have at home and abroad. The

problem has been exacerbated, by the president. President Bush signaled after the 2006 elections that he believed that he and the newly elected Democratic Congress could do some business together, on immigration, education, energy and the environment, among other issues. But when his immigration plan went down the tubes in the Senate--driven in that direction when only 12 of 49 Republican Senators rallied behind their own president's signature domestic goal--the aim of significant progress on policy built around a significant working relationship with Democrats went with it. What followed was a string of vetoes (after six years of none) and even more veto threats that both of course,

constipated the legislative process and gave Congressional Republicans traction to block action or at least gum up the works. It also gave Congressional Democrats traction to use the process any way they could to gain leverage over the president in a protracted policy war.

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Divided Government Not Significant The legislative and executive branches are able to withstand the effects of divided government Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 221 third paragraph

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A2 Bipartisanship Key to Pass Just because a bill is bipartisan doesn’t mean that it ensures passage PR Newswire US 7 American Diabetes Association: Embryonic Stem Cell Research Offers Great Promise for Americans with Diabetes; ADA Urges U.S. House of Representatives to Pass Reintroduced Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act; H.R. 3 Offers Best Hope to Advance Search for a Diabetes Cure Lexis, January 10, 2007 Wednesday The American Diabetes Association (ADA) -- the nation's leading voluntary health organization supporting diabetes research, information and advocacy -today urged the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act (H.R. 3). The ADA is a strong supporter of the legislation, which would accelerate stem cell research by easing existing restrictions and supporting research that uses embryonic stem cells, while maintaining strict ethical guidelines. Congress passed the legislation last year with bipartisan support, but was

unable to overcome President Bush's veto. A vote on the reintroduced legislation is expected in the House of Representatives on Thursday.

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Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda Organized bipartisanship in Congress leads to Congressional agenda but not presidential agenda Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 4 last paragraph through pg 5 last paragraph

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Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda Organized congressional consensus ignores presidential agenda Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 8 last paragraph through pg 9 third paragraph

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Bipartisanship Turn – Ignores Presidential Agenda Strong unification in congress ignores the presidential agenda – very hard for president to build political resources after congressional majority shifts Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 12 second paragraph through third paragraph

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Bipartisanship Turn – Ignore Presidential Agenda Political methods today have led to Congress controlling the agenda – majorities ignore the presidential agenda and support theirs instead Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 214 third paragraph through pg 215 first paragraph

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Lame Duck – No Push Lame ducks can’t push policies The Sunday Telegraph (London) 7 Allies desert 'lame duck president' Unable to pass domestic policy and with his hands tied abroad, Bush can achieve no more, say his former aides Lexis, April 8, 2007 Sunday

Bush a "lame duck'' who had forfeited the support of senior Republicans. They spoke out after a week in former member of Mr Bush's inner circle launched a withering description of how the president had "become more secluded and bubbled-in'' with a shrinking band of loyalists. Matthew Dowd, the chief strategist of the 2004 reMr Nuzzo branded Mr which a

election campaign, said that Mr Bush had lost his once fabled "gut-level bond with the American people'' and called for him to respond to a growing public desire to pull out of Iraq. The sense of a presidency unravelling was reinforced last week when it was revealed that several of Mr Bush's key aides were to depart the White House, including deputy national security adviser, Meghan O'Sullivan, the architect of the surge strategy to boost troop numbers in Iraq, and Peter Wehner, a strategic thinker who sold Mr Bush's ideas to the power players in Washington. Mr Frum said: "The Bush White House has always been a strong band of brothers. But the same things that bring your triumphs also bring your tragedy. There is little difference of views. If you're wrong, it's hard to change direction.'' Domestically, Mr Bush is seen to have failed on two pressing issues. His plan to overhaul social security

policy, once seen as potentially a key part of his legacy, is stillborn, and he is at odds with his own party over plans to relax immigration rules. The root cause of his weakness is the Democrats' seizure of both the Senate and House of Representatives in November's mid-term elections. Without sufficient support to push legislation through Congress, the president was finished, said Mr Frum. "There's no domestic agenda,'' he said. "There's no possibility at all of the president advancing anything that is acceptable to both the Republicans and Democrats.'' Mr Nuzzo, who served as policy director for George Bush, added: "He's a lame duck. Any affirmative domestic policy is at an end. Republicans have lost patience with the Bush administration. At this point the only parts of the presidential office he can fulfill are those that do not require cooperation with the legislative branch - which means foreign policy.''

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Lame Ducks = Advantage Lame ducks have an advantage – they can force Congress to have to override their veto Christian Science Monitor 7 Bush's lame-duck advantage Lexis, April 27, 2007, Friday

As his term winds down in disarray, President Bush enjoys what could be called the lame-duck advantage: He doesn't have to worry about losing at the polls. He has devoted little attention after the Virginia Tech massacre to issues such as campus safety and gun control, except to reiterate support for gun ownership. He has left it to the Democrats to take on the gun problems that usually divide Congress. Senate majority leader Harry Reid says, "I hope there's not a rush to do anything. We need to take a deep breath." Earlier in his administration, Mr. Bush might have by now accepted the resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, a liability for the administration. But these days, Bush is playing the "loyalty card" all the way. After Mr. Gonzales's disastrous appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee last week, Bush said he has more confidence than ever in his beleaguered attorney general. For Democrats, the most ticklish situation has become the $124 billion emergency spending bill for Iraq and Afghanistan. With growing sentiment for ending military involvement, the Democrats are looking for some compromise with the White House: a timetable, benchmarks; the latest being advisory opinion. The

White House, less concerned about losing votes in the next election, is sticking to its guns (almost literally). The legislation passed by Congress this week - with its Iraq withdrawal schedule - is certain to be met with a presidential veto. And, since he is less concerned about voters, Mr. Bush apparently feels he can afford a veto, which is not likely to be overridden anyway.

Lame Duck does not mean the President is powerless The Hotline 7 BUSH; MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING Lexis, July 27, 2007 Friday National Journal's Cannon looks at whether or not Bush can be considered a lame duck, noting that Bush

"is not extinct, but his troubles are manifest." GMU prof. James Pfiffner: "President Bush may be a lame duck politically, but he is not a lame duck as chief executive and will lose many of his powers only" upon leaving office; "He is still head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief, and has many unilateral powers that he can -- and has -- used." But "it's indisputable that Bush's influence has waned, both inside and outside his political party." Many will try to point a specific date at which Bush became a lame duck, but "it could simply be that Bush's ability to drive great events was compromised many months before the storm," when he was sworn in for a 2nd term. "The 22nd Amendment introduced a systematic weakness to the highest office in the land."

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Lame Duck Destroy Party Lame ducks are destructive to their party The Advertiser (Australia) 6 A lame duck in the White House Lexis, November 10, 2006 Friday IT IS concerning that at a time of world tension on many fronts, the United States congressional

elections have left President George W. Bush publicly humiliated and politically shackled. His authority, both in the United States and the world, has been diminished. He has become a Republican lame duck in the White House. Although President Bush will remain in the White House until the 2008 elections, in the turn of a page in history, his Republican Party has lost control of the House of Representatives, the Senate and, presumably, the confidence of the American people. He has responded by accepting the resignation of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld but a scapegoat is hardly likely to neutralise the mounting disenchantment in the United States over the long-term military engagement in Iraq. The Democrats must use their new-found congressional potency conservatively and responsibly. They have the power to veto any legislative initiatives. That path would be foolish and destructive. It will be more dangerous for the Republicans, and more beneficial to the Democrats, to let the administration govern with only limited constraints.

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Lame Duck – No Vetoes Lame Ducks issue empty veto threats Riechmann 7 Deb, Associated Press Writer, Bush pushes agenda without Congress August 16, 2007 Thursday 7:32 PM GMT With 17 months left in office, Bush

has veto power and an arsenal of other executive powers to change policy. But his critics say he moved across a symbolic line toward lame duck status on Monday when his longtime political adviser, Karl Rove, announced he was leaving the latest in a growing line of senior officials to head for the door in the closing months of the administration. Rove said there was unfinished business on energy, education and health care that the president would continue to pursue, with or without Congress' help. Rove said the administration might end up doing things by executive action. "We have No Child Left Behind, which we can either do by law or regulation; we want to do it by law," Rove said. "The energy, 20-in-10 we can do both by legislation and regulation." The Democratic Congress is going to be challenging Bush every step of the way on his agenda, the budget and particularly the war in Iraq as he runs out of time and influence and 2008 elections overshadow him. John Podesta, former White House chief of staff for President Clinton, said Bush is "running into a brick wall in Congress" and will be forced to use executive action to further his domestic policy desires. "Hardly a bill goes by that he doesn't issue a veto threat," Podesta said. "The places where he could find common ground, he's in a `Just say no' mode. I find that kind of surprising given the place he's at in his presidency." White House advisers

blame the Democratic Congress for some inaction on the president's agenda, although it was Bush's fellow Republicans who helped sink his immigration bill. The White House says Bush still has clout in Congress and points to recent legislative successes: signing a bill to implement many remaining recommendations of the Sept. 11 Commission and getting temporary authority to expand the government's ability to eavesdrop without warrants on communications that pass through the United States.

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Political Capital Key to Agenda Political Capital key to push agenda USA TODAY 7 Bush's job-approval rating stuck below 40%; Only Nixon, Truman had longer slumps Lexis, April 9, 2007 Monday Bush's job-approval rating in a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll taken Monday through Thursday is 38%. His standing has stayed below 40% for seven consecutive months. Since the advent of modern polling, only two presidents have suffered longer strings of such low ratings. One was Harry Truman, whose popularity sank during the final 26 months of his tenure as the Korean War stalemated. The other was Richard Nixon during the 13 months leading up to his resignation amid the Watergate scandal. "It's pretty hard for a president to get ratings this low in general, and then

to be in the position where you basically don't budge -- that's been reserved for some of the least popular presidents during the worst times of the last 60 years," says Jeffrey Jones of the Gallup Poll, who analyzed the historic data. White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said Bush pays little attention to polls and is "laser-focused" on such issues as fighting terrorism and reforming immigration. "If we're reviewing consecutive streaks, one of the most impressive is our 60-plus months of economic growth and 42 months of job creation," she said. "Look, we're aware of the polls," Perino said. "We realize the war is unpopular and that people wanted to see a change. That's why the president announced a new strategy in Iraq and Gen. (David) Petraeus is starting to implement it." Faltering public support drains a president's political capital

and makes it more difficult for him to persuade others to follow his lead -- for instance, to support embattled Attorney General Alberto Gonzales or pass an Iraq spending bill without restrictions.

Political capital key to agenda The Daily Telegraph (London) 6 How president's 'political capital' has slipped away Lexis, November 8, 2006 Wednesday Mr Bush also took on his own party, this time on immigration reform. His business-friendly proposal for a guest-worker programme divided Republicans in Congress, many of whom insisted upon tougher enforcement and the construction of a fence along the Mexican border. The failure

to achieve his goals on either of the two biggest domestic policy issues of his second term drained strength from his presidency and undermined confidence that he could control the agenda and spend the political capital he had trumpeted.

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Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda Divided government frequently hits a roadblock where the only way for presidents to pass their policies is through cooperation with Congress Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 39 second paragraph through pg 40 first paragraph

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Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda Presidential leadership in Congress is key to ensure legislation and the agenda Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 216 second paragraph through third paragraph

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A2 Bush Takes Blame Politicians avoid getting the blame – rather avoid potential blame than take credit Weaver 86 Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame Avoidance Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' 'negativity bias': their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, 'passing the buck' and defection (jumping on the bandwagon') that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.

Policymakers have increased needs to avoid taking blame Weaver 86 Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame Avoidance Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

Fiscal stress has given politics an increasingly zero-sum cast. Programs are forced to compete in the political marketplace for funds. Budget deficits have also increased the involvement of budget guardians (notably the Office of Management and Budget and congressional Budget commit- tees) in public policymaking. These developments have undercut the ability of clientele and policy specialists to keep decision-making within a narrow (and favorable) policy subsystem, and have forced politicians to engage in more loss-allocating activities. Incentives for blame avoidance have also increased in recent years by the decline of party as a determinant of electoral behavior. Incumbent legislators have responded to party decline '[b]y developing a reputation with a minimal amount of partisan or ideological content, . . . induc[ing] constituents to evaluate them separately from the state of the nation and the performance of parties and administrations' (Ferejohn and Fiorina, I985: 94-95). In this situation, voters are likely to continue returning

the incumbent unless they are given a reason not to. Legislators know it, and their potential opponents know it. Thus legislators must be concerned primarily with avoiding giving their opponents a popular election issue. But challengers have been given new tools as well. In particular, the ability of television advertising to present quick, simple negative images in voters' minds can undermine confidence in the incumbent, reinforcing legislators' reluctance to vote against positions likely to appeal to poorly informed constituencies.

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President Gets Credit/Avoids Blame Decisions by policymakers are based around accepting credit or avoiding blame Weaver 86 Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame Avoidance Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

GENERATING AND AVOIDING BLAME: Policymakers' motivations are not determined entirely by the distribution of costs and benefits among their constituents. They are also determined by the way choices are structured (Riker, I986). If, for example, alternatives which place policymakers' and constituents' interests in direct conflict can be kept off the agenda, policymakers may be able to reduce blame-avoiding behavior. On the other hand, the importance of blameavoiding motivations among policymakers can provide an important boost to those with opposing views. The motives of those opponents may be based on their own notions of good policy or desire to claim credit with their own political constituencies rather than upon blame avoidance. Nor is it necessary that a majority of policymakers (legislators, for example) have strong blame-avoiding motivations for there to be a substantial impact on public policy: it is enough that blame-avoiders hold the balance of power in decision-making. If sponsors of 'hard to vote against' legislation such as Congressional pay freezes and Social Security benefit increases can force the issue onto the agenda and shape it in such a way that it activates blame-generating pressures, they can use others' fears of electoral retribution to force blame-avoiders to support their own proposals.

President will receive credit

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Presidents Get Blame/Credit – Agencies The President will take the credit or blame for agency actions

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Blame Game – Conflicting Agenda Blame games occur when Bush and Congress have conflicting agendas Gilmour 1 John B. Department of Government College of William & Mary, Sequential Veto Bargaining and Blame Game Politics as Explanations of Presidential Vetoes http://jbgilm.people.wm.edu/veto.pdf Until recently there

has been little scholarly consideration of why presidential vetoes occur, perhaps because the answer seemed of offensive legislation is undeniably the root cause of vetoes, but that explanation is incomplete. It begs the question of why Congress obvious. Vetoes occur, one might reasonably conclude, because Congress passes bills the president does not want to become law. Passage

passes bills that the president will veto even though the president is in frequent communication with Congress about whether he will veto proposed bills. Given the ample communication between branches, it is surprising that differences cannot be resolved without a veto. Vetoes represent bargaining failures, and the cause of these failures requires explanation. There are currently two well-developed, contradictory theories explaining why presidential vetoes occur.

A “blame-game” theory holds that vetoes occur because Congress deliberately provokes them by passing bills that the president detests, knowing they will be vetoed. The “sequential veto bargaining” theory holds that vetoes occur because Congress lacks complete information about what bills the president will sign, and sends the president bills unsure of whether they will be vetoed. This paper tests these alternative explanations and finds that blame game politics accounts for far more vetoes than incomplete information.

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Concessions Key to Agenda In divided government concessions are key to ensure legislation Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 21 second paragraph through pg 22 first paragraph

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A2 Concessions Key to Agenda Concessions won’t work – Democrats are skeptical The New York Times 7 Democrats Face Limits In Reshaping Bush Budget Lexis, February 6, 2007 Tuesday One development could reopen the tax cuts to revision this year, Democrats

say: a signal from the administration that it would be willing to consider a repeal of some cuts for the wealthiest as part of a deal to pay for other priorities. The issues most often mentioned that might entice Democrats to the bargaining table with the administration would be a package to finance future Social Security benefits, possibly combined with a curb on some benefits. Democrats might also want to cut a deal over the alternative minimum tax, which was devised to make sure that wealthy taxpayers with numerous deductions paid some taxes but which is increasingly ensnaring the middle class because of inflation. Democrats say that in both cases the administration would have to move first to put discussion of taxes on the table. Both Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Rob Portman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, have dropped hints of such deals, ruling out ''preconditions'' for talks on Social Security. The implication is that private investment accounts to replace Social Security for future retirees are not a requirement for a deal. ''By saying there are no preconditions and we should all come to the table, that was a change in position,'' Mr. Portman told reporters Monday, noting that in the past the administration had pushed its plan for the investment accounts from the outset. He also said it was an ''olive branch'' to propose the

accounts but to delay their enactment until 2012. Democrats remain skeptical and distrustful. They note, for instance, a recent comment by Vice President Dick Cheney to Fox News that overtures by Mr. Paulson and Mr. Portman did not signal a change in administration attitudes on taxes, only a desire to get Democrats to negotiate. Moreover, despite Mr. Portman's talk of olive branches, Democrats see only

trapdoors. They say Mr. Bush's claim to reach the goal of balancing the budget by 2012 rested on what they see as shaky assumptions.

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Public Support Key to Agenda Public support key for Bush to push policies USA TODAY 7 'Lightning rod' reshaped politics Lexis, August 17, 2007 Friday The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial: "The events of September

11 and Iraq have made this predominantly a war presidency, and that fact has also the political capital to retake the Senate in 2002, pass the Bush tax cuts that spurred the economy, and frame the Bush Doctrine. ... For the worse, the trouble in Iraq sapped Bush's public support early in his second term and diminished his ability to pass major domestic reform. ... Rove is no Merlin or colored Rove's record for better or worse. For the better, it provided

Rasputin. ... He is above all a George Bush man. His rare mastery of history, demographics and policy made him a formidable political force, and we suspect it is his success far more than his methods that infuriates his critics."

Public support is key to the president’s agenda CNN 5 3-29, Lexis KING: The president won that election, Dana, but he is in the middle of another campaign to get his domestic agenda, principally Social Security, through the Congress. They cannot be happy at the White House about the timing of this. Are they worried? BASH: Well, certainly they understand here that the

president's credibility and that his public support is really crucial to getting his domestic agenda passed, primarily Social Security. And they do understand that his poll numbers, as we've been reporting over the past several days, have -- they have been going down.

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Party Control Key to Agenda Party control is key to ensure legislative success for president – divided government poses unique challenges Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 217 second paragraph through pg 218 first paragraph

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GOP Base Key GOP base key to the agenda Chaddock 7 Gail Russell, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, Bush tries to win back GOP lawmakers June 14, 2007

For President Bush to pull off a legacy in the final 19 months of his presidency, he needs to shore up support within GOP ranks on Capitol Hill, especially among those who will face voters in 2008. From immigration and the Iraq war to embryonic stem-cell research and hirings and firings at the Justice Department, Republican lawmakers are increasingly breaking with the president on key votes - and the defections are coming from many who were once his staunchest supporters. Thirty-eight Senate Republicans voted against moving ahead on immigration reform last week, sidelining Mr. Bush's top domestic priority. Then, on Monday, seven Republicans - five of them up for reelection in 2008 - joined all Senate Democrats in a vote of no confidence in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. But the most searing intraparty rows could come in early September, when Congress plans a close look at progress in the war in Iraq. "If President Bush had been a more popular president running a more effective war in Iraq, Republicans would still be in the majority, and that's how many of them still look at it," says Jennifer Duffy, senior analyst with the Cook Political Report. Until Republicans lost control of the House and Senate in the midterm election in November, Bush sustained a level of support from his own party that his father and President Ronald Reagan seldom approached. Senate Republicans have backed Bush on key votes about

85 percent of the time during his presidency, according to a January survey by Congressional Quarterly. But the Iraq war and, most recently, the president's support for comprehensive immigration reform have eroded Bush's standing with his Republican base and emboldened Republican lawmakers on Capitol Hill to go their own way. "The problem for the president is that the coalition of ... Republicans who are alienated

and opposing him shifts from issue to issue, so it requires different responses and palliatives," says Ross Baker, a political scientist at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. GOP senators who are straying

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Presidents Control Agenda Presidents control the agenda setting

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Winners Win Presidents can use wins to create momentum Ornstein 4 Norman, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, ACT TWO: FOR BUSH, NO CAKEWALK IN CONGRESS Lexis, November 14 There are other ways the

president could begin his second term. Perhaps he'll be able to start with some issues that are left over from his political capital to ram them through, and then using the capital replenished by those victories to build momentum until he's ready to fight the larger battles on Social his first term, such as medical malpractice reform and his comprehensive energy bill, using Security and taxes.

Political capital decreases if not used – it helps regenerate itself when used Ornstein 2 Norman Ornstein, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, What cards should Bush play? Lexis, January 28, 2002 That lesson is as clear now as it was then: Political capital is perishable. You use it or you lose it. It is a lesson Bush junior has mentioned himself, and one his political advisers, Karl Rove, refers to often. Bush now has an approval rating in the mid-80s, a bit lower than at his peak, but still stratospheric. He has erased any serious doubts about his qualifications to serve, or the legitimacy of his victory. He has as much political capital in the bank as there is gold in Fort Knox. So what does he use it for? A string

of domestic issues are possibilities, but economic stimulus sits atop the heap. capital skillfully, he will first help Americans, many of whom are hurting as a result of the recession, and he will get more political capital back in return. If he uses his political

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Lobbyists Key to Agenda Lobby groups are extremely prevalent in government

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A2 Lobbyists Key Lobbyists no longer have an influence in government – anti-corruption bill limits their influence The Philadelphia Inquirer 7 Extreme makeover, Congress edition Lexis, January 23, 2007

The U.S. Senate has approved one of the strongest anti-corruption bills in a generation to crack down on coziness between lobbyists and lawmakers. Showing an unusual level of bipartisan cooperation, senators agreed to shed more light on their fund-raising practices. They even committed to paying a more honest fare when lobbyists fly them hither and yon on corporate jets. It's rare that lawmakers take such concrete steps to limit the corrupting influences that protect their incumbency. The House, which earlier adopted new ethics rules but must now match the Senate's stricter lobbying guidelines, should make sure Congress doesn't lose momentum in this needed effort. Then House-Senate negotiators should send completed legislation to the president as soon as possible.

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Filibuster – Not Prevent Pass Filibusters don’t obstruct Senate business – constructed approach to them Ornstein 3 Norman J. Ornstein, Scholar at American Enterprise Institute, The Debate to End All Debate http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.17199/pub_detail.asp, Wednesday, May 14, 2003

Attempts to change the Senate's filibuster rule rarely succeed, partly because the attempts themselves are vulnerable to filibuster. In 1975, Senator Walter Mondale, with assistance from Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, proposed that Rule 22 be revised by a simple majority vote, with the move to change the rules itself not subject to filibuster. The result was even more extended debate, followed by bitterness and recriminations; eventually the vice president apologized to the Senate. Four years later, as vice president, Mr. Mondale discussed ruling that the Senate was not a continuing body from one election to the next and thus could write its rules afresh--with no filibuster. Fearing the fallout, he wisely dropped the idea. While filibusters have long been a major weapon for senators and parties, their use has changed over the past 40 years. For

most of its history, the filibuster resembled the one depicted in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: one or more senators would take to the floor and debate around the clock to block action on something about which they felt deeply. Of course, these filibusters were inconvenient to the Senate and interfered with the rest of the legislative calendar. So in 1961, Senate leaders adopted a two-track approach, allowing other business to go on while a filibuster took place, avoiding the cots-in-the-hall drama and pain of the old-fashioned filibuster. Instead, there would be periodic votes to see if the three-fifths quota could be reached. This had the effect of making filibusters almost routine. Filibusters now happen all the time, but basically

change nothing about Senate business--except to raise the bar for passage from 51 votes to 60. This is wrongheaded and unfortunate. For most issues, a sliding scale of cloture votes, to allow for extended debate but also force eventual votes, makes sense. (For significant and highly charged issues-including judicial nominations--the traditional 24-hour filibuster process still should apply.) Dr. Frist has proposed something similar for all presidential nominations. But reform should proceed in a straightforward fashion under existing rules.

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Income President Need Party Unity Difficult conditions for incoming presidents collapse their legislative leadership – empirically proven Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 192 last paragraph through pg 193 second paragraph

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Coattails Key President Agenda Coattails ensure presidential success in Congress Conley 3 Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government pg 17 second paragraph

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Vetoes – Need Political Support Vetoes mean nothing without political support Abramowitz and Kane 6/16 Michael and Paul, Washington Post Staff Writers, Congress Easily Overrides Medicare Veto http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071501361_pf.html, Wednesday, July 16, 2008 President Bush

sought to block a bill yesterday aimed at forestalling an 11 percent cut in payments to doctors taking care of Medicare patients, but Congress quickly overrode his veto. The House voted 383 to 41 to override the veto, while the Senate voted 70 to 26, in both cases far more than the two-thirds necessary to block the president's action. With organized medicine and other lobbies promoting the popular measure in an election year, Republicans broke heavily from the White House. A total of 153 House Republicans voted to defy the White House, 24 more than in a June 24 vote that started the momentum toward passage of the Medicare doctors' bill yesterday. Twenty-one Senate Republicans voted for the bill this time, including four senators who had voted "nay" in the two previous Medicare votes. The Medicare bill is the third, along with the recent farm bill and a water resources bill, to become law despite Bush's veto. Overall, Bush has vetoed 12 pieces of legislation during his presidency, At issue in this bill was how the government should respond to a planned reduction in Medicare doctors' fees, mandated by a formula that requires the cuts if certain spending targets are not reached. Under the formula, a 10.6 percent cut in fees for doctors was supposed to go into effect July 1, but Congress overwhelmingly voted instead to reduce the reimbursement to insurance companies that serve Medicare beneficiaries under its managed-care program. Those reductions would allow the postponement of the pay cut to doctors for 18 months, but would cost the insurers $14 billion over five years.

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