Bcci And Law Enforcement 9

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BCCI AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: District Attorney of New York Introduction While the Justice Department's handling of BCCI has received substantial criticism, the office of Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York, has generally received credit for breaking open the BCCI investigation. It did so not on the basis of having any witnesses or information available to it which were not available to other investigators, including the Justice Department, and the Federal Reserve. Rather, District Attorney Morgenthau broke the case because he recognized BCCI's importance and significance as a case of global international organized crime, and devoted sufficient attention and resources to force out the truth. As District Attorney Morgenthau testified, he made the decision to target BCCI once the bank's activities came to its attention because of his recognition that prosecuting a financial institution handling many millions in drug money could, in the long run, have as much impact on fighting crime as the hundreds of prosecutions his office was making every week against traffickers themselves in New York. [J]ust as illegal drugs are smuggled into this country, illegal profits must be smuggled out. The sums involved are truly staggering . . . the

simple truth is that the wire transfer and the bank book are as much the tools of the drug trade as the scale and the gun. . . the nexus between drugs and money means that if we are to succeed in the war against drugs, we must be as vigorous in our prosecution of corrupt bankers as we are of street dealers.(1) In going after BCCI, Morgenthau's office quickly found that in addition to fighting off the bank, it would receive resistance from almost every other institution or entity connected to BCCI, including at various times, BCCI's multitude of prominent and politically well-connected lawyers, BCCI's accountants, BCCI's shareholders, the Bank of England, the British Serious Fraud Office, and the U.S. Department of Justice. Each, while professing to cooperate with the District Attorney, in fact withheld information from the District Attorney and in some cases, impede, delay, or obstruct his inquiry for months. Ultimately, Morgenthau proved BCCI's criminality, not because of information or cooperation provided by other government agencies -- with the key exception of the Federal Reserve, there was almost none -- but because BCCI had left a trail of evidence of wrongdoing there for anyone with the tenacity to pursue it.

Information From Senate Aide Initiates Investigation In the late spring of 1989, Jack Blum, who had

been the chief counsel to the Subcommittee investigation concerning "Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy," during 1987 and 1988, went to New York to meet with prosecutors working for District Attorney Robert Morgenthau concerning information he had about criminal activity involving BCCI. Blum knew Morgenthau's reputation as an aggressive prosecutor, and had worked with Morgenthau in the course of the 1987-1988 Subcommittee investigation. Morgenthau had testified as the lead witness before the Subcommittee in February, 1988 concerning the importance of money laundering in attacking crime. In that testimony, he had stated that some $5 billion to $10 billion a year was being laundered through New York banks and other financial institutions, suggesting that laws combatting money laundering were inadequate, and that the New York banks had a role in preventing the laws from being tougher.(2) In that testimony, Morgenthau made a commitment to the Subcommittee concerning his approach to money-laundering: We are going to spend more resources now in trying to trace [illegal] funds. I think we are going to be successful, although, again, that is a labor-intensive kind of activity.(3) Based on the statements made to the Subcommittee by Morgenthau, Blum believed he might be in a position to follow up on the information Blum had developed about BCCI in

connection with his work for the Senate. As Blum testified, he believed he had critical information and witnesses about BCCI's criminality, and had taken that information in March, 1989 to the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida in Tampa who had prosecuted BCCI on money laundering charges as a result of the Operation C-Chase sting. Blum had brought in two witnesses with information concerning, and arranged for a lengthy conversation to take place between him and the witnesses under circumstances where they could be secretly taped by the government. Moreover, Blum had convinced both of the witnesses to cooperate with the Justice Department. Yet in Blum's view, after all of his efforts, the Justice Department had done nothing with the information: The strange thing is that after that effort to put this all in the hands of the Justice Department -- and I might add that at the time I went to Miami, at the instruction of the chairman [Senator Kerry], I shared with the agents working the case materials we had gathered, memos I had written, and other materials we had gathered, so that they would have a complete picture of what we knew. I waited for something to happen, and what happened was, I started getting calls from the two guys I took to Tampa who said, they're not following up. Then I talked to the agents, and

the agents said well we're very busy. We're working on preparations for the trial. No follow up, and I began to worry that something was very wrong with this case. In . . . late May, I decided that I would bring this matter to another jurisdiction, and that was New York. Our Federal system mercifully allows for parallel activities. If the State government fails, the Federal Government is there, and vice versa. . . So I went up to New York and I talked to Bob Morgenthau and essentially told him what I knew. On the basis of the same evidence, essentially, and he ultimately communicated with the same witnesses, he produced the indictment that you read about the other day.(4) After Blum met with Morgenthau, he was introduced to other prosecutors in the New York DA's office, and debriefed them. He told them he believed BCCI had engaged in moneylaundering in New York, and described the evidence that BCCI owned First American. Morgenthau's prosecutors found his information to be startling, and viewed it with skepticism. As Michael Cherkasky, Morgenthau's chief of investigations later stated: Blum's story was ridiculous. [He said] the entire Third World was involved and that they had bought and sold entire governments and maybe some United States officials. It was a

fascinating tale -- this guy was telling us the world was corrupt!(5) Morgenthau decided to move forward, and assigned the investigation of the case to John Moscow, an experienced fraud prosecutor. Moscow in turn interviewed Blum's witnesses, looked at documents, investigated the case Blum brought to them, and, in Cherkasky's words, Blum's "'story' was proven to be true."(6) While the Justice Department prosecutors who had the most information about BCCI regarded Blum as a "wacko," and his information as worth little, the New York District Attorney's office took it seriously, investigated it, and proved it out.

BCCI's Reputation

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