Report To Senator Christopher J. Dodd (CT) On Kosovo Refugee Issues With Recommendations
By William B. Seebeck April 9, 1999
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Confidential
Report to Senator Christopher J. Dodd On Kosovo Refugee Issues With Recommendations
TABLE OF CONTENTS
© 1999 Seebeck International, L.L.C. All rights reserved. This document is confidential. It is meant to be released only to its those who requested it. Any reproduction of this report, in whole or in part, without the express written permission of Seebeck International, L.L.C. is prohibited. This report contains information developed by Seebeck International, L.L.C. that is proprietary and confidential and therefore should be considered and treated as a confidential by the recipients.
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Introduction The purpose of this report is to briefly review the Balkan Refugee issues in light of the author’s experience in the housing and resettlement of Indochinese refugees in 1975 and 1976. Further, I have been asked to make recommendations to Senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut based upon my observations In both the Balkans and Indochina, refugees “appeared” almost instantaneously and action was required immediately. In the Indochinese situation, some 150,000 refugees were evacuated from land or were rescued from the South China Sea. Operating within a military theatre, every transport available was utilized to accomplish this task, although many were left behind. We know now that those left behind were imprisoned or terminated by hostile forces. In the Balkans, the Serbian leadership has used the people of Kosovo as human bargaining chips played as if on a geographic game board. More than 250,000 of them have been pushed in our direction, deflecting NATO’s ability to wage a ground war by effectively clogging roadways and severely impairing the infrastructure of its surrounding nation states. Whatever the purpose, we now have to meet every need of a community of people twice the size of the city of Trenton, the capital of New Jersey. It should be pointed out that this report is not an effort of days, but of hours and therefore is not complete, and its recommendations and observations are drawn only from data I have been able to assemble myself. A Look at the Refugee (Excerpts of Dr. C.V. Teodoru’s 1975 Review of the Needs of the Indochinese Refugee As Compared to the Post-World-War II European Refugee) (The late Dr. C.V. Teodoru, a physician, was actively involved in the resettlement of European refugees at the end of World War II. Upon completion of that effort, he was named the director of the Romanian Red Cross. Dr. Teodoru was able with members of his family to seek political asylum in the 1950’s, while attending an International Red Cross conference in Paris. In 1975, we asked Dr. Teodoru if he would visit the Indian Town Gap Refugee Center in Pennsylvania and give us his opinion of the situation. His comments were 91 Wolfpit Road
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audiotaped and excerpts of that transcript follow below. Many of Dr. Teodoru’s views were implemented in 1975 to the benefit of the Indochinese Refugee. You will find that his comments provide an interesting organizational, medical and human perspective that has pertinence to the current situation in the Balkans. His son, Dr. Daniel Teodoru, dedicated a substantial part of his life in 1975-76, at his own expense, to the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees and today practices medicine in New York City). Initial Psyche of the Refugee “...According to my observation, the very first factors that may determine the success or failure of such an enterprise are of a psychological nature. I assume that the same thing will happen to the Vietnamese, as I know happened in Europe, the first year the refugees developed a kind of complex -- everyone was scared at the beginning. They came into other countries with established excellence in many fields [of work, e.g., teachers, pharmacists, scientists, etc.]. They were afraid of not corresponding to the standards of another country or locale. They had all types of complexes, particularly guilt for the people left behind and of inadequacy and confusion. The result is that they tried to overcompensate. They tried to reassure themselves almost unconsciously, but they avoided taking a job or responsibility, always finding a reason that the job was too small, that they are too educated or prepared for the job. But, in fact it was simple fear that they would not be able to correspond or to adapt. Inability to Communicate If there is a lack of communication in addition to the psychological background, this will complicate the situation even more. Many refugees were able to understand English because English literature was widely read in Europe, but unable to talk or to make themselves understood because of the accent or difficulty in finding the proper expression. Keeping the Refugees Together So, it is my feeling that the first thing you have to do is to give reassurance to those people and to keep them together for a period of time. In this way, they can find, at least for certain psychological needs, somebody nearby of the same culture and habits that can better understand their needs and feelings Even if that someone cannot satisfy those feelings, at least they have a shoulder to cry on or someone who can understand their feelings of despair or disappointment. 91 Wolfpit Road
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Questioner: What you are saying Dr. Teodoru is that being together they lend a support system to one another. Yes, at least until they succeed to orient themselves and understand a little, the new environment and especially to start to get means of communication and to learn the language and to understand the other people. Recreating Community and Economy In addition to it, I think that they should be kept as near as possible to their professional or trade habits. For instance, I think that in a community like this if anyone repairs shoes, they should find a shoemaker within the group. The shoemaker if he needs a tailor, he should find a tailor within the group, so whatever money is within the group circulates within the group and it will reach much further than if it is dispersed in the community around. Now, this may seem a small matter to the community-at-large [the host country] but it maybe very important for a small group. In addition to the fact that they have the feeling that they have not quit completely their professional trade and are still able to foresee the possibility of continuing to make a living in their given trade. Many people, as you know define themselves by their professions. This was one of my first observations of the refugees.
Leadership – Positive and Negative/From Within and Without I think, however, now among them as you very well have pointed out here, there are many infiltrations whose aim is the failure of the program. Those involved will favor failure in anyway possible. First of all, they will point out how the refugees have many differences from themselves and others within the group will point to the many differences of those in the host country. This will create discontent within the group and it will demoralize them. Both those inside and outside who harbor such negative attitudes will also try to attack the natural leaders that first grow up among the group as a whole. What we found in Europe was that each person would have an older man or someone who they consider wise man to go to and ask advice. If these people are 91 Wolfpit Road
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deprived of such morale support, represented by their own leaders, the people will become to very confused and irritated and very susceptible to being pushed in a certain way. So, that it is important that the supervision be with local American military types able to understand and communicate with them [the refugees], then subversive actions will not take place and certain failure may be averted. Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity My experience also shows that various groups have a very serious need for some specific cultural activity – religious, artistic or any other kind of such activity. This must be supported within the group. Now some artistic manifestations, whether art, music, dance, folklore of any kind are useful for the refugees and their group. It is a way to make a fusion with the community at large [outside the refugee centers]. Once they organize a little, some cultural activity is critical so that they feel that they are also perpetuating their traditions from which they have been torn. Once they have an opportunity to express their cultural activity, then I would suggest that there be an exchange between this group and the population at large. In this way, the local population can view for themselves the “unusual” habits of this “strange” group of people now living amongst them and with the new culture. This knowledge and shared understanding will make it easier to disperse these people within the community-at large. It will also help alleviate pent up fears and concerns. Education Naturally, these people should be given the opportunity to learn English or anything else that will help them become assimilated into this population as quickly as possible. Children can go to the public schools, once they have an understanding of the language. From this point, if possible, it would be useful to give them an opportunity to work, first within the group as I described earlier.
The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions 91 Wolfpit Road
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My observation in Austria and Germany, wherever there were camps for refugees, one of the most dangerous decisions that was made was not to let the refugees work. The International Refugee Organization was aware of the fact that if the refugee were to work in the camp or in the city, it would take some of the jobs of the local population and would create a great deal of adverse reaction. The result of this was that some people who were extremely productive individuals and many who had been professionals in their fields were obliged to spend 12 hours a day laying down on a hard bed and looking at the ceiling living. They lived on a very low caloric intake – around 1200 to 1500 calories per day, an existence that didn’t let them die or live. My observations was that those who have a very active mind need to conceive, to build, to construct, to work. As they were not allowed to work in any way, these camps created all types of subversive activities and the people became dissatisfied. Questioner: It creates a type of depression that leads to destructive subversion The Danger of Destructive Subversion Exactly, but a destructive subversion that is sometimes is directed toward themselves. They become apathetic, not fighting anymore and not looking for anything, and that’s how you create material for welfare. And some others, more aggressive and dynamic are directing this destructive subversion at the society at large, which they blame for their depression. This is again a very dangerous situation. History has shown us that whenever we deal with a group that can be recognized for their differences by physical features or by culture or whatever, it will only take one individual of this group to do wrong, and it will reflect upon the whole group. This is one thing that should be avoided. Discontent and depression should be detected before it takes a form that can be aggressive or dangerous to the society as a whole. Questioner: Or irreversible. Yes, or irreversible as you say. Now I hope that irreversibility does not exist in people that have strengthened by so many years of adversity and suffering and 91 Wolfpit Road
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so on. For usually people that survive and revive every time with the slightest hope that anyone pains them. This is what comes first in my mind. Simple Solutions Can Cause Despair You must recognize that the refugees and I was concerned mainly with the refugees from Romania. I had to recognize that although we are democratic in nature and do not believe in qualitative differences between human beings, we have to recognize however, that the necessities especially cultural and sometimes physical differ from one group to another. They depend on the habits they had before and how they used them. For instance, I found out that giving beds without the mattress was a cause for extreme depression I would even say despair for a man who had all his life a very soft mattress. However, this condition may be perfectly satisfactory for one who had lived that way before [without a soft mattress]. Now this doesn’t mean that one of the two men was better, what it means is that on so little may depend the happiness and the disposition of progress for one individual over another. This is why I believe you have to take into consideration of various groups and must meet their particular needs. For instance, those that came from an academic rank, they need very much material for reading. Material that was advanced in their own fields of activities, therefore, they should be given access to libraries. Other types, farmers, for example, would be very disoriented in an city environment really need to go to the farm. They would be the easiest to place, because they have necessity and they want to learn the new techniques. Other workers would be highly interested in the skills of the host country and in one way or another should be exposed to these skill sets and processes. They then should be given an opportunity to test “hands on” with what they have been shown. This might be called the training and preparation period. Food as an Expression of Identity Somebody should tell the U.S. government that food in every country is also an expression of the culture of their native country or region. It is also a need induced by the environment. I experienced this myself as a refugee. One of the secrets for good integration and adaptation in a new culture is to start with the idea that the new people are bringing certain things different than what you are doing within your own country. The ability to present food is a simple but dramatic way to offer something to the host country that represents their identity. Summary 91 Wolfpit Road
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So, what follows are key issues that Dr. Teodoru indicated pertain to all refugees. These should be considered when making any type of decision in relation to their disposition, either temporary or permanent. We found these points rang true with the Indochinese and I believe they pertain today to the Kosovo refugee. The Initial Psyche of the Refugee – Fear Loss of Identity Inability to Communicate The Importance of Keeping the Refugees together Create An Environment Free From Fear and Hostility Recreate Community and Economy Among the Refugees Make Room for the Growth of Leadership The Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity Education The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions Provide Sustenance that is more than Survival Subsistence Support the Development of a self-sustaining Environment The Danger of Destructive subversion Simple Solutions can Cause Despair Food as an Expression of Identity Provide emotional strength by understanding their culture and heritage and using it to achieve some level of acculturation.
Indochinese Refugee Resettlement of 1975-76 The Indochinese Refugee effort was very difficult, not only because it was so immediate, involved some 150,000 people, but also because it occurred at a time when the American people no longer wanted to hear the word “Indochina” or “Vietnam”. Raising funds for the effort were difficult because President Ford did not want to go to Congress for additional funding and possibly suffer a defeat that would demoralize the refugees and further agitate the country.
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We were also unable to ask Congress that the Indochinese refugee be covered under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1961, which would have solved many “red tape” issues. These “red tape” issues included the refugees being designated simultaneously as both parolees and refugees by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This meant that as a parolee, they were not permitted certain aid support including qualifying for a “green card” and therefore were unable to work. Further, if they did “something wrong”, technically they could be sent back to their country of origin. However, they could not be sent back to their country of origin because they were also political refugees with asylum in the United States. When we began the effort with the Indochinese Refugees, we encountered many issues such as the parolee/refugee issue. To follow Dr. Teodoru’s view, we had put the refugee in a no-man’s zone that caused only pain and despair. Another example of this “red tape” factor involved South Vietnamese military personnel. Under the Vietnamization program, we had trained the ARVN recruits in the very same way we did American troops, using American personnel. As some 50+% of the refugees were South Vietnamese soldiers, we asked the Department of Defense to draw up a plan that would allow the American military to accept such refugees into a special force that over time would be fully assimilated into our military. If we had succeeded in this effort, we would have supported our claim that Vietnamization worked, housed, fed and otherwise provided jobs for thousands of refugees virtually overnight. DOD thought this was a great idea, but a few days later came back to tell us that they couldn’t take the Vietnamese military types because they were officially parolees and not eligible for a green card. To enter the U.S. military, you need at a minimum, a green card. Fortunately, the American people responded to the call by the President to help the refugees. Thousands of citizens provided funds, housing, and support of all kinds. We followed many of Dr. Teodoru’s ideas and kept families and natural communities together, resettling them in same or adjoining housing units, etc. Vietnamese who were rice farmers, we moved to Louisiana and other areas where rice farming was possible. Former Vietnamese vice president and air marshal Ky went along with that group. The area between San Francisco and Santa Cruz is known today as “little Vietnam or Saigon”, where Vietnamese own thousands of businesses, hotels, restaurants, etc. I have visited these areas and found that many of the decisions that we made did prove helpful to these people now nearly 25 years later. 91 Wolfpit Road
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There are so very many issues that are faced with refugees, particularly those who are stripped of all identification. It is so very important to give them “back” their identity. It is also important to feed them, house them, clothe them and to free them from a hostile environment, so that they can breathe free and without fear. Yet, as Dr. Teodoru said, “...you can’t provide them with an existence that doesn’t let them die or live...” That is now the challenge in the Balkans.
My E-Mail on the Kosovo Refugee Situation (The following e-mail’s represent contact with Janice O’Connell of Senator Dodd’s staff and Bob McPhearson of CARE. Bob was seriously injured on Wednesday, April 7, 1999, when a vehicle he and four other CARE workers were in went off a cliff in Macedonia. All were seriously injured and U.S. military personnel later evacuated him to Germany). Subject: Kosovo Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:09:38 -0500 From: "William B. Seebeck" <
[email protected]> Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C. To:
[email protected] Dear Janice, This is a follow-up to the voice mail I left you a few minutes ago about the Kosovo Refugee Issue. I have become very concerned over the movement of people from Kosovo to Albania and Macedonia, particularly since both of these nations are so illequipped to deal with such a crush of humanity, so in need of every aspect of care. Today, I called Secretary of State Albright to see how I might be helpful. Her assistant connected me with the Kosovo Task Force. 91 Wolfpit Road
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Why I thought I might be helpful is because in 1975, I was appointed to the business/labor committee of the President's Commission on Indochinese Refugees (I had also been on the U.S.-Nicaraguan Earthquake Relief Committee in 1973, following the earthquake that demolished Managua). It was our task in the Indochinese effort to see to the organization, care and resettlement of some 150,000 refugees. Fortunately, DOD had successfully housed these refugees into I believe three sites (memory fails me a bit). The largest was Indian Town Gap (Pennsylvania). This was a two year intensive inter-agency and public effort with little budget (as President Ford did not want to go back to Congress for yet more funds for Vietnam related issues). I believe that what we had accomplished for the Indochinese refugees given a similar size group may also be a method for the Kosovo refugees. I am not of course suggesting they come to the U.S., but I know that in the archives, DOD must have a report that would deal with the methods and resources they used back in 1975-1976 to house, feed, clothe and otherwise maintain 150,000 refugees over a two year period. I thought that if the cost of that might be adjusted for current pricing that a refugee aid bill using such a model might be put before the Congress by Senator Dodd and an appropriate House member. I realize that DOD has addressed refugee issues since 1976, particularly with Somalia. However, I believe that in the case of Kosovo, it may be different, as we may need to support and maintain them in an adjoining country for an extended period of time, with the end objective being returning them to their homeland once it is safe to do so and with an infrastructure that will support them. From your experience in the Peace Corps Janice, I don't need to tell you how quickly this situation can become horrific. Further, I want you to know that when I spoke today with the Kosovo Task Force at the State Department, they seemed confused and unorganized (net, net, I did not get a feeling of anyone being "in-control"). They told me that right now they were trying to figure out how to get food to the people at the borders. I asked for the DOD liaison and they said they didn't have one. They instead referred me to the Balkan Task Force and I am currently awaiting a call from that task force's humanitarian officer Tony Banberry. I also spoke with Bob McPhearson from CARE early this morning (just before he left for the region) and told him about what I was doing (trying to help get an organized refugee aid program) and he told me he 91 Wolfpit Road
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had Iridium uplinks and asked that I stay in touch. By the way, in addition to being a business consultant, I am also an ordained Episcopal deacon. Back in 1975, when the Indochinese refugee mission began, I was managing the day-to-day operations of the Grace Foundation for W.R.Grace & Co. My involvement in Vietnam was not in uniform, but as a member of a public policy group during that time...” Subject: Kosovo Refugee II Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:28:43 -0500 From: "William B. Seebeck" <
[email protected]> Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C. To:
[email protected] Dear Janice, A few minutes after sending you my first e-mail, I received a briefing from the Balkan Task Force Humanitarian officer. He told me how the UNHCR will be handling this effort and described how aid is on the way and how profound that aid will be in support of these refugees. I was most heartened to hear of this program. Consequently, I gather that my note may be moot. I guess what I am still left with is the feeling that as a citizen, I am very disconnected with participating our nation's effort in this war. In the Persian Gulf War, I felt as a citizen fully engaged (writing letters to servicemen, visiting families, sending packages, etc, etc.). Now, we learn about so many things thirdly (first NATO, then State or NSC, the press secretary, occasionally our military [haven't seen Gen. Clark yet], occasionally our elected officials -- the president, never the vice president, then the press). I have heard more on CNN from the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and U.S. Ambassador than from our own leaders. I realize that this is a result of the structure of NATO, but it is also NATO's first offensive engagement and we did not anticipate the same public communications needs when we were in a defensive mode (i.e., we would already been attacked in the original NATO plan).
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Is there more we can do as citizens in addition to sending a financial donation to CARE or other such organizations? Subject: Update Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 10:46:50 -0500 From: "William B. Seebeck" <
[email protected]> Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C. To:
[email protected] Dear Bob, Paul told me today that you had problems in transit. Trust they are clearing up and you are on your way. I promised that I would give you updates from my vantage point. Please realize that no one understands the power and delivery capability of CARE more than I do, but many in the general public do not. Communication with the general public about what is going on with the refugees is very limited. Finally, I am trying to be helpful in this difficult human situation. If I get in the way at all, please tell me. Now the Update: When I spoke with Tony Banberry, the Humanitarian Officer of the Balkan Task Force on the 31st, he told me that UNHCR would be coordinating aid to the area, but that soon after the president signed Presidential Determination No. 99-20 that day at 1:00 pm, that DOD had relief planes ready to roll. The President did sign the Order, but as of right now, no one has been able to confirm that these relief planes ever rolled. This morning, I spoke with Will King, CNN's VP & Head of International Newsgathering. He told me that their conversations this morning with Christiane Amanpour indicated a further deteriorating situation. I asked him to have someone at CNN ask DOD at their daily (hopefully to be held today) briefing to ask about the refugees -- Food, Housing, Infrastructure, etc. (in yesterday's briefing, the press did not ask a single question about the refugees, their current situation, let alone what happened to the men).
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As you may recall, on the 31st, I sent a series of e-memo's to Sen. Dodd’s foreign policy advisor (Janice O'Connell), whom you may come across in your current travel. I gave her my views and concerns, shared my own experiences and described the results of all of my calls and the U.S. government responses to my questions. This morning, the President is meeting (as I type) with State and DOD (further described as an inter-agency meeting) and reportedly a number of private organizations (Red Cross and others not named), because "...he is very concerned about what the U.S. is doing on an interagency basis..." Net, net, other than the terrible pictures on television, the refugee situation has still not hit page one of government focus. It in fact may have, but that is unknown to the general public. I mentioned this to CNN's King, but he said that as far as they knew, nothing had changed in terms of aid on the ground. Finally, I also spoke this morning with Wallace Coggins who is the legislative fellow (on loan from DOD) to my congressman Jim Maloney who sits on the National Security Committee (the subcommittee charged with funding military procurement and personnel) of the House Armed Services Committee. I know Jim and Wallace are making appropriate inquiries. That's it for now. God be with you Bob, be safe. Bill Seebeck (
[email protected]) (As I finish this, the White House reports via CNN that the refugee number is now close to 250,000 [AID estimate]). Subject: Update 4:45 PM EST Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 16:51:05 -0500 From: "William B. Seebeck" <
[email protected]> Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C. To:
[email protected] Bob, Here is the update: 91 Wolfpit Road
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Congressman Maloney's (CT) national security committee liaison Wallace Coggins, reported to me around noon, that DOD's Task force gave him an update of the situation. According to that update, food from UNHCR and NGO stores are moving into the region. However, they have been delayed by lack of infrastructure. However, the word was that the food is in transit to the refugee site (see below). Further, it is reported that estimates of pre-positioned food from UNHCR/NGO's in the region will last through mid-April. Wallace also reported that the Pentagon will be moving HDR's (Human Daily Ration) into the area from U.K. by air (200,000 units) and from U.S. by ship (500,000 units) to the region. Shelter is reported as the worst situation. According the update, only 700 tents are available in the region (each able to house 7 to 8 adults). An effort is underway to secure plastic sheeting. Coggins on behalf of the Congressman offered DOD assistance on any procurement requirements. Its 4:00 PM EST, Lt. Gen. John McDuffie, Logistics Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is just now completing his press conference (viewed on CNN) on these matters. His direct dial is 703-697-4121, his Exec. Officer, who I just spoke with, is Col. Gary L. Border 703-697-1408. In his press conference, McDuffie confirmed the Task Force report to Coggins. The General indcated that there current estimates as of 2:00 EST today were that there are 138,500 refugees in Albania, 17,400 in Montenegro and 86,000 in Macedonia. He said that the Macedonia number could double by the end of the weekend. He indicated that there were USAID Disaster Recovery Teams in the area and a DOD team would be arriving within 24 hours. Further, General McDuffie indicated that the whole operation "in country" will be coordinated by Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., who is in Naples, Italy (Direct Dial from U.S. 011390817212302). Admiral Ellis is the former deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He was also former director of plans, policies and operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, I spoke at the end of the press conference with Colonel Border who also confirmed the Coggins report. He agreed that there is very little infrastructure in the area, hindering smooth operations. Col. Border also confirmed that the food is getting to the site only because of the assistance of the Albania army and people, who have pitched in to help. I asked Border why DOD isn't sending a combat construction unit into the area to build temp housing and he said that State hadn't requested it. I felt that he wished they had.
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The process for aid, as described by McDuffie, was that requests would go from State Department or NATO to UNHCR then back to State and then to NATO and then back to DOD. Not a smooth operation. I just spoke (4:16 PM EST) with Congressman Maloney directly and he said he would contact either the Secretary of Defense or the President about streamlining this process. I trust you are doing well and that's it from here. Very best Bob. --- Bill Seebeck Subject: Update Date: Sun, 04 Apr 1999 09:24:53 -0400 From: "William B. Seebeck" <
[email protected]> Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C. To:
[email protected] Bob, I am just going to assume that you are getting this e-mail. My update is as follows: There is a growing public concern now over the refugees here at home and the government and media are speaking much more to the issue. That's good. Poll numbers are going up on public concern and want for action, etc. What still isn't good is that we are talking about small units of what is needed right now. I spoke yesterday afternoon NYC time with Captain Burnett, USN in Naples Italy, who is on the staff of Admiral Ellis. As I indicated in my earlier message Ellis now has NATO/U.S. military responsibility for relief and Captain Burnett is the staff coordinator for that effort reporting to Admiral Ellis. Burnett's direct dial from U.S. is 011390817212263 and his e-mail is
[email protected]. In the conversation, Burnett indicated that the food while on site or arriving on site, still wasn't getting where it needed to go (he didn't seem happy with the UNHCR effort) and I could tell he was frustrated. By the way, he seems like a great guy who like most of the DOD people I have spoken with wants to get it done ASAP.
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He said the big problem was housing and they are bringing tentage from all over the world (primarily from U.S. bases), but he said it still won't be enough. I told him that I had a conversation with Congressman Maloney about pushing to get combat construction teams to the site for temp billeting. He wouldn't comment on it other to say, it is needed. He also indicated that they have turned much of the NATO force already in these countries to the relief effort. It was also announced last night that 20,000 Italian troops have been assigned to the effort. Not surprisingly, the continuing problem is lack of infrastructure and also I think, the enormous pressure that is being put on these small countries to shoulder so much of this burden, while trying to protect themselves against Milosevic. I will be monitoring today and expect to follow-up with Congressman Maloney in the morning. Recommendations I have divided my recommendations into three categories – policy, infrastructure and the refugees. I have included policy as I have found that there are too many “hands in the pot”. The result has been inaction or slowed reaction. In part this is because requirements are being set by agencies and groups not able (because it is not in their charter to do so) to follow through on the ground or to “make things happen”. This has delayed vital and timely aid to the refugees that can have horrific results. Policy Diplomacy has not succeeded in this effort. The response was military action. As a result, the Department of State should no longer act as an intermediary in this action determining military or other requirements in a theatre of war. Rather, DOD should immediately assume these functions. The same action should be taken with all NATO allies. Clearly, the command structure of NATO as it pertains to civilian, diplomatic and military authority has failed. I would recommend that the structure used in World War II be put in place. That is, the heads of state acting in direct concert determine overall goals and objectives. Then the military chiefs present their plans for meeting those goals and objectives to this group (not their 91 Wolfpit Road
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representatives). Then they should be left to carry out those plans, in the pursuit of an end victory. As this is the first action of NATO, we should not apologize. NATO was created as a defensive mechanism and only in the last eight years has it pursued the possibility of an offensive posture. We should expect things to break and not work. However, when it is clear that something doesn’t work, dump it especially when you are already engaged in combat. The United States of America should never forget that it started NATO and it has been a hallmark of U.S. foreign and military policy for 50 years. Therefore, we must lead NATO forward, just as we planned and promised to do, albeit defensively at the beginning. Now that the chips are down, we should not say, well it’s a European problem. This must also provide better communications with the people of the U.S., who have supported NATO for half a century and will not and have not been surprised by the objectives of NATO. Some may find fault with the recommendations outlined above, but understand that the Department of State is not structured to physically ACT overtly on behalf of the nation. We are now engaged in war, with the lives of many at stake. It is now time, as President Bush described it in the Persian Gulf War, to pass the ball from the diplomats to the military, so that our objectives might be met. At that time, it became the responsibility of the president to act as commander-in-chief and the then secretary of state spent his time, running between allies to make sure they were doing what they said they would and we were doing what we said we would. The SOS was not being consulted on daily targeting, nor should he have been. This also applies to the National Security Council, whose job is not to run the war, but to report on the impact of the action on allies, the enemy and potential enemies. This is the lesson of Vietnam. The president and military in consultation with the Congress run wars. When you do that, it works. Let’s do it. Infrastructure in Support of the Kosovo Refugees Infrastructure does not exist in the countries where the refugees are now positioned. Diplomats cannot create infrastructure.
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Infrastructure requires action in the field, especially in a military theatre and that means military intervention. If the U.S. has to go it alone on this it should. The President should order combat construction teams immediately into these areas to build roads, airports and shelter. Ranger forces should also be ordered into these countries to protect these aid teams. The refugees must not be put in a position where they are in a no-man zone separating aggressive forces. The United States and other NATO nations should provide immediate hard currency aid to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro to assist them in the efforts that they have already voluntarily begun, but also to strengthen them in whatever means necessary to protect themselves against Serbian aggression. The food and material available for these refugees will exhaust in a few months. Plans must be initiated to deal with this situation. Failure to do so, will result in possible worldwide shortages for other yet to be experienced disasters. The Refugees Refugees must stay in the region (at the very least Europe). Refugees must not be sent to Cuba. It should also be remembered that Cuba is not the United States. If they are to be sent anywhere in the U.S., it should be to a like climate area such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire or Maine, where DOD sites are available and Albanian communities that can support them are within reach. The Department of Defense should run the refugee camps. If refugees are brought to the United States, a commission similar to that created by President Ford in 1975 should be initiated. Those appointed to the commission should be U.S. leaders in business, health, social services, housing, religion, etc. Ideally, these leaders should be of non-Serbian Balkan background 91 Wolfpit Road
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(there are plenty of such people). This will better support the needs of the refugees, especially since it is the intent to send them back to their homelands. If refugees are sent to the U.S. with the idea of assimilation, they should not be designated simultaneously by the INS as both parolees and refugees. The President must ask the American people for their involvement in this effort. We have not been asked to do anything more than contribute to NGO’s providing aid in the region. About William B. Seebeck William B. Seebeck is an ordained deacon canonically resident in the Diocese of New York. Bill began his studies for priestly formation in 1986. At the end of those studies, he completed a full-term clinical pastoral education program at Bellevue Hospital in New York City (1989-1990) were he served on the hospital's emergency room/trauma team. The Rt. Rev. Richard F. Grein, Bishop of New York, ordained him in 1990, in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Bill has served the parishes of Christ Church, (Bronxville, NY), Trinity-St. Paul's (New Rochelle, NY), St. Peter's (Port Chester, NY), St. Paul’s (Norwalk, CT) and Christ Church (Rye, NY). He also served as a member of the Council of the Diocese of New York. In his secular life, Bill is the managing director of Seebeck International, L.L.C., an online commerce & communications consulting company. Previous to this, he served as an executive for a variety of companies including the Chase Manhattan Bank, W.R. Grace & Co., LEXIS/NEXIS, Inc., Global Scan, Ltd. (UK) and Ziff Communications Company. Mr. Seebeck, who has traveled extensively in Europe and the Middle East, is a member of the Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the International Security Systems Association (ISSA), and the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. He was an author of a report on the Progress of Vietnamization presented to President Nixon in 1971; served as a member of the U.S./Nicaraguan Earthquake Relief Committee (1973); and was appointed by President Ford to the business/labor advisory committee of the President’s Commission on Indochinese Refugees in 1975. He served as chairman of the corporate urban 91 Wolfpit Road
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affairs advisory committee (CUAAC) and a member of the executive committee and board of directors of the National Urban Coalition (1974-1980). In 1979, Bill was the recipient of the New York City Junior Chamber of Commerce Big Apple Award as an Outstanding Young New Yorker. In 1968, Bill was named the Outstanding Catholic Youth of the United States by the U.S. Catholic Conference. He is also the author of the song Roll Up Your Sleeves America. He resides in Wilton, Connecticut.
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