Babri Masjid

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november 28, 2009

17 Years since 6 December 1992 There will never be a closure to the black event that was the Babri Masjid demolition.

I

t has taken 17 years for the Justice M S Liberhan Commission set up to investigate the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992, to arrive at what has been known from the time the mosque was brought down. The Liberhan Commission has delivered a searing indictment of the Sangh parivar as the primary culprit for the demolition. It also names (in the commission’s words) the “pseudo-moderate” leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the secondary culprit and officials of the state machinery and administration as tertiary participants in the horrendous act that stripped the ­Indian state’s claim to be secular. The Liberhan Commission’s report focuses on the ideology, world view and organising power of the Sangh parivar, and the manner in which it single-mindedly attempted to create a frenzy among the masses for the demolition. It details how “the inner core of the Parivar” – the leadership of the Rashtriya Swaya­ msevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the B­ajrang Dal, the BJP and the Shiv Sena – bears “primary responsibility” for the crime. It also points out how the BJP leadership, comprising Atal Behari Vajpayee, L K Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi, was privy to the decisions of the Sangh parivar on the demolition, but protested innocence in order to project a “moderate” image because it had been tasked to shed the “best possible light” on the plan of the RSS. And last but not least the commission indicts officials of the Kalyan Singh government in Uttar Pradesh for deliberately colluding with the parivar in razing the Babri Masjid. The one-man commission has no doubt done a painstaking and thorough examination of the events that led up to the demolition – the intrigue, the subterfuge, the sabotage of law and ­order and even the inter-mixing of religion and politics. But did it have to take close to two decades to present its findings? Justice ­Liberhan’s original brief was to conclude its investigations in three months, but he took 40 extensions to finalise his report. The commission certainly faced many obstacles in its work. The culprits did everything possible to delay and stretch out the proceedings. But the commission has taken an inexcusably long time since 16 December 1992, when Justice Liberhan was appointed head of the judicial commission, to i­nvestigate the events that led up to the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya. Justice Liberhan points to the failure of many an institution of the Indian state – including the media and bureaucracy along Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   november 28, 2009  vol xliv no 48

with the polity – but he reserves his indictment for the Sangh parivar and is silent on the Congress Party.  Indeed, even as the commission has revealed the conspiracy underlying the demolition, what is intriguing is the clean chit it has given to the then Narasimha Rao government in New Delhi and the s­ilence it has maintained about the role of previous Congress governments in fuelling the “Ram Janmabhoomi” claim. If there is a contemporary marker in the events leading to the demolition it is surely the decision taken by the local administration in January 1986 to remove the “judicial” locks that had been placed on the mosque for nearly four decades. This too is common knowledge, that it was done at the instance of the then Rajiv Gandhi government, which was anxious to “win” Hindu support to compensate for its decision to placate the Muslim clergy after the Shah Bano judgment. The report is also silent about the poor mobilisation of central paramilitary forces at the Ayodhya site even after the demolition, where kar sevaks c­ontinued to run riot following the dismissal of the Kalyan Singh government. The aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition is well known. As much as this incident legitimised communal rhetoric in Indian politics, leading of course to the BJP heading a government at the centre for six years, it also hugely damaged public administration, the results of which were immediately evident in the handling of the Bombay riots of January 1993. Despite indicting 68 individuals as being directly responsible for the demolition and pointing fingers at the Sangh parivar and the BJP leadership, the commission is quiet about pressing c­harges against those individuals and organisations who have hitherto escaped arraignment. Instead the report waxes eloquently on the reforms needed in the functioning of the bureaucracy, on regulations for the media and on upholding secularism. The Action Taken Report also does not suggest that the central government is thinking of initiating proceedings against those identified as responsible for the demolition. Therefore, all the effort taken to lay out the details of the conspiracy and the failure of the state government of Uttar Pradesh, and the recommendations and the responses listed in the Action Taken Report end up as a futile exercise.  Justice Liberhan has described how the Sangh parivar corroded and shamed the secular image of the Indian state and

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editorials

how officials sworn to the Indian Constitution were brazenly complicit in this crime that changed Indian politics and public administration for the worse. But given how every single institution of the Indian state and polity has pussy-footed around the Babri Masjid demolition and continues to do so, there will never

be any closure to this shameful event. The BJP may have been electorally vanquished in two Lok Sabha elections but the virus it nurtured in the course of its campaign to destroy the mosque at Ayodhya remains implanted in India’s social and ­political fabric.

The Right to Know The proposed amendments to the RTI Act will reduce and not expand its scope and power.

W

hen the Right to Information (RTI) Act was enacted in 2005 it was hailed as an iconic people-empowering legislation. In the four years since, the experience of citizens has been mixed. While the United Progressive Alliance government has basked in the approbation it has received for the law, it has also made attempts to amend the Act. In 2006, the union cabinet had cleared a set of amendments, which would have, amongst other things, exempted from the purview of the Act, notings in files by government officials (except those on ­social and development issues) and examination papers of the Union Public Service Commission. The outcry and disagreement within (and outside) the ruling coalition led to the proposals ­being dropped. Now, once again the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) at the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance and Pensions has said that it is considering amendments to the Act, but will invite public discussion in a transparent manner. The amendments being contemplated are many and will, if effected, restrict the coverage of the Act. The proposal to exempt file notings from disclosure is being revived. This time these notings are being described as “official discussions and consultations before a decision is arrived at”. Another proposal is to prohibit what are called frivolous and vexatious applications. Yet another is the addition of a “citizens’ charter” to Section 4 of the RTI Act. The response to these proposals has been swift. The National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) has protested against what it sees as a move to reduce the power of the Act. The DoPT’s argument is that the law is being misused through frivolous applications, which are overburdening the public information officer (PIO). However, the RTI Act does have checks and balances. Section 8 lists the kinds of information that cannot be disclosed. These include information that might jeopardise the nation’s sovereignty and security, lead to contempt of court, breach of privilege of Parliament or state legislatures, information which could affect the competitiveness of third parties, and more. There is also Clause 9 of Section 7 which allows for not providing information if it disproportionately diverts the public authority’s resources or is detrimental to the safety of the record. Incidentally, Section 7 is already being used by many PIOs who cite a lack of resources, and staff to dismiss citizens’ applications. It is also going to be difficult to define “frivolous and vexatious” without giving arbitrary powers to the bureaucracy, which may choose to decide against answering queries it is unlikely to be in agreement with. In regard to the proposed exemption on dis­ closure of file notings, the official contention is that access to the

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deliberative process poses a problem in the taking of decisions. However, an amendment of this nature would defeat the purpose of an RTI application where the intention is to elicit information on why and how an official decision was arrived at. In fact, many activists say that honest officials find this a reassuring aid whilst taking decisions. It is interesting that the government says its move to amend the law comes from the speech of the President in Parliament where it was announced that the RTI law would be amended to strengthen proactive disclosure. The government says it wants to add other things like a citizens’ charter to the list for proactive disclosure. Since Section 4, a very powerful part of the RTI Act allows citizens to suo motu inspect government files and documents, activists say there is no need for a citizens’ charter, instead the current provisions of Section 4 need to be implemented. In any case, Sub-section xvii of Section 4 (1) b allows the government to add to the list of information to be disclosed “such other information as may be prescribed”. Activists hold that all the existing problems cited by the DoPT can be remedied through better implementation and some changes in the rules. Two recent national studies based on surveys, one commissioned by the government of India (the Price WaterhouseCoopers study) and the other by people’s organisations (Right to Information Assessment and Analysis Group and NCPRI study) on the working and efficacy of this law have both pointed to the gaps in awareness levels and the lack of training of staff and poor record management as the main constraints in the implementation of the RTI Act. Section 4 of the RTI Act requires that public records be catalogued, indexed and computerised to ensure easy access and that public authorities put as much information as possible in the public domain and on web sites. If this is effectively implemented, this could ensure reduction of so-called “frivolous and vexatious” applications. In Maharashtra, which leads in the number of applications filed, not only are over 15,000 appeals pending but just 1% of the fine imposed on erring PIOs has been recovered in the past year. According to the RTI Act, the penalty for not providing information within the stipulated deadline must be deducted from the monthly salary of the official by the concerned department. It is ironical that while RTI activists are asking for a widening of the coverage of the Act to include the private sector and even bank transactions, the government is proposing these changes. Rather than proposing amendments to the legislation, implementing the recommendations made by the study that the dopt commissioned would go a long way in making the RTI Act of 2005 more effective. november 28, 2009  vol xliv no 48  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

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