Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Asianised Orientation Dr. Pankaj Jha Associate Fellow, IDSA
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Australia’s Defence Capability Plan released in July 2009 and Defence White Paper released in May 2009 highlight the major changes which are on the cards for Australian Defence Forces due to overstretching of US global commitments as well as rise of China which is perceived as threatening by Australian Defence Forces (ADF) and few strategic thinkers alike. Australia is trying to enhance its self defence capabilities and project its strategic clout in Indian Ocean region. As part of its alliance commitments with US under Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty, Australia is trying to reconfigure its role in Afghanistan and for that its defence minister has sought to confirm the logistics as well as facilities available to the Australian troops stationed in Afghanistan. During the same time Australia has made it clear that it would induct Arabians, Africans and Asians in its armed forces. This shows that Australia is gearing up for structural reforms in armed forces and relinquishing its ‘only whites’ orientation. Not only that, Australia also prepared a blueprint for charting out its larger geo political and geo strategic role in Asia. Australian Defence White paper which was released in May 2009 clearly deciphers the role that the Australian armed forces has to play in order to keep the air and seas reaches of Australia devoid of any adversary’s intrusions as well as secure its immediate and extended neighbourhood. It clearly stipulates that in order to defend Australia in the New Asia Pacific century with a vision of Force 2030, its armed forces particularly navy has to play a more positive role. In the forwarding remarks in the paper the then Minister of Defence Joel Fitzgibbon had highlighted that apart from traditional threats, cyber warfare has become a major security issue while piracy has become a major concern for maritime security. Within the White paper it has been argued that maintenance of a credible defence capability would deter any adversary from using force and also would imbibe a sense of security among the Australian citizens. In the paper, it has been stated that Australia wants to extend its strategic influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood and in that it has clearly deciphered the area of strategic interest for Australia stretching from North Asia to Eastern Indian Ocean. This clearly shows that Australia wants to get out of the oceanic/ south west pacific cocoon and look for greater role play in the Asian region. Thus three main policy prescriptions listed for Australia are; act independently, pilot military coalitions and make provisional contributions for military alliance obligations. Though it talks about forming alliances and partnerships with a likeminded countries but it also tries to get out of the US shadow to a certain extent. 1
Time and again Australia has been accused as the deputy sheriff of US in South Pacific. In the white paper it has been argued that surface combatants, underwater capabilities, maritime surveillance aircraft, air combat are necessary components of protecting see stretches as well as monitoring coastal access. Though provisions have been made for Air Force and Army modernization also but the stress has been more on maritime capabilities. It has been envisaged that the government will have to phase out the Collins class submarine which are six in number and double the size of submarine force to 12. This means more fund allocation for gaining such capability and take carefully scrutinized procurement process so that the phasing out could be done without any interregnum deficit in capabilities. Also provisions have been made with regard to replacing the current ANZAC class frigate with the more capable Future frigates programme which would be accustomed to anti-submarine warfare. This would enhance the capability with regard to offshore maritime warfare, coastal monitoring and mine countermeasures. Although plans are mooted for Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) but clear cut timelines are not drawn in this regard. The first such AWD is likely to be integrated into the naval command by 2015. This clearly indicates that Australia is aiming for blue water capability with enhanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities through a dozen submarines. The submarines would be latest in its class and would be able to sustain at the time of crisis. The submarine assets mean that Australia’s defence forces assets would be protected even at a considerable distance from the shores. But this would also propel other major powers to procure more stealth frigates and submarines. In fact it has been discussed in the paper that Australia would have to maintain both strategic and defence superiority over its adversaries( though no particular country has been listed) because of its prolonged off shore deployments as well as protecting Australia from non-state actors capable of procuring Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). In chapter nine of the defence white paper it has been envisaged that the future submarine would be more competent with regard to multiple tasks like anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare as well as greater capability with regard to surveillance, intelligence, the logistical support and mine detection. The submarines will have remarkably low signatures and long endurance at sea. The nuclear propulsion aspect has been denied during the manufacturing stage of the submarines. Apart from these lofty planning apprehensions has been raised with regard to the complicated assignment of design, structure and timelines but the Australian government has planned for a project office for this intricate task. Even otherwise the training of personnel, spares and life cycle costs need to be taken into account while planning for huge procurement in terms of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters. Australia under Kevin Rudd is trying to forge very good relations with China as it is the second largest trade partner (US$ 54 billion trade in 2008) but the augmentation of naval and maritime capabilities show that in the hindsight rising China has been seen as a threat for the future. Within Australia there has been a rather vociferous dissent among academics for such huge financial outlay for defence when there are job cuts and global economic crisis. But the issue is
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to shift away from US assurance and build national deterrence capability and the move was also meant to secure the domestic defence industry. The Australian Defence Capability Plan which was released after White paper clearly stipulates the time lines for procuring capabilities. In the 2009-2011 phases the stress is more on enhancing combat capability and augmenting repair and upgrades of the weapon systems. The second cycle from (2011-2012) stresses on enhancing communication and defence capabilities. The third phase (2012-2013) discusses the importance of training and management of defence assets. The fourth phase (2013 and beyond) emphasizes on large acquisitions, complex communication systems, information warfare and encryption and the enhancement of strike capability. These plans are also to assist Australian Defence industry in preparing for the demand and look for possible technological cooperation for high technology intensive weapon systems. Australia is also planning to upgrade its naval facilities in Darwin(which is in the Indian Ocean) and Cairns(northern Australia) in order to cater to the exigencies in East Timor, Papua and also protect its sparsely populated northern coastal reaches. The defence white paper though a sketchy one but its shows that Australia is planning for the future and maritime capabilities as well as creating deterrence capability for any armed or WMD attack by both state and non-state actors. The projection for future as well as sustaining procurement has showed that Australia wants to knock at the Asian geo strategic scene and its Asian Orientation shows rather subtle signs eroding of US hegemony in Asia and so the preparedness of its allies in promoting their self defence capabilities.
These initiatives which are listed in Defence White Paper and Defence Capability Plan shows that Australia is gearing for playing a greater role in Asia and the plausible reason that has been cited in this regard is the rise of China and reconfiguration of the global order due to increasing role of non state actors and the looming threat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons(CBRN).It is sure that Australia which was oblivious of its strategic role in southeast Asia and larger Asia, is gearing up for more strategic footprints apart from those involving treaty obligations and assisting southeast Asian nations in countering terrorism.
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