Assoc Cases(1).docx

SOLIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS This contention of petitioners is not meritorious. Suffice it to state that even a void donation may be the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription (Pensador vs. Pensador, 47 Phil. 959, 961). It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period (ten years) named in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who had the better title is barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not depend upon, and has no necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim under which the possession is held. x x x” (Vda. de Lima vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970, citing Conspecto v. Fruto, 129 US 182 [1889]). The “just title” required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not “titulo verdadero y valido”—or such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse but only “titulo colorado”—or such title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner (See Doliendo vs. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232). The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino took possession of the land in 1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in force. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every actual possessor of such land a full complete title. In Ongsiaco vs. Dallo, (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme Court said: ‘Under the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, good or bad faith was immaterial for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Adverse possession in either character ripened into ownership after the lapse of ten years (Miraflor vs. CA, L-40151-52, April 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 18, 29). SALVADOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other coowners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. HUANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust. Trust is either express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trust comes into being by operation of law. The latter kind is either constructive or resulting trust. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another’s property. On the other hand, a resulting trust

arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the beneficial interest in the property. It is founded on the presumed intention of the parties, and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. Guided by the foregoing definitions, we are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and respondent court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. A resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. Petitioners raise the issue of prescription. But the action to compel the trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe. If at all, it is only when the trustee repudiates the trust that the period of prescription commences to run. The prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the repudiation of the trust. It is ten (10) years because just as a resulting trust is an offspring of the law, so is the corresponding obligation to convey the property and the title thereto to the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code, which is the law applicable, provides: “The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (a) Upon a written contract; (b) Upon an obligation created by law; (c) Upon a judgment.” Thus, the reckoning point is repudiation of the trust by the trustee because from that moment his possession becomes adverse, which in the present case gave rise to a cause of action by Dolores against the Huang spouses. However, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.

BUENAVENTE, ET AL. vs. HON. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR When their continued occupation of the lot becomes one against the will of the owner, even if the latter had allowed their occupation at the beginning without even collecting rentals, the owner is certainly not barred, under any known principle of law, either by estopped or waiver, to demand that the lot be vacated so that he may himself enjoy his dominical and possessory rights thereto. In any case, petitioners have no right to continue in occupation of the land, whether, as legally defined, they are squatters or not. Their occupation by mere tolerance can by no means give rise to a right that the law should protect in their favor as against the true legal owners. That the land is a public land can neither be denied as to give any semblance of plausibility to petitioners’ contention that they are not squatters under the definition they have invoked because the land is not a public land. It is owned by the NDC; hence a “public land” in the broad acceptation of these words. LEE VS CA As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies: “Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.” The right of action accrues when there exist a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records. Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed. It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.

DINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS As a rule, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, we held in Ramos v. Osorio, viz.: “It is settled law in this jurisdiction that the defense of prescription is waivable, and that if it was not raised as a defense in the trial court, it cannot be considered on appeal, the general rule being that the appellate court is not authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the lower court (Subido vs. Lacson, 55 O.G. 8281, 8285; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, p. 784, 1947 Edition).” However, this is not a hard and fast rule. In Gicano v. Gegato, we held: “. . . (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.” (emphasis supplied) In Aldovino, et al. v. Alunan, et al., the Court en banc reiterated the Garcia v. Mathis doctrine cited in the Gicano case that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, the action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription was not invoked by the defendant. It is apparent in the records that respondent made the last delivery of vinyl products to the petitioners on September 28, 1988. Petitioners admit this in their Memorandum submitted to the trial court and reiterate it in their Petition for Review. It is also apparent in the Complaint that petitioners instituted their action on July 24, 1989. The issue for resolution is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals could dismiss the petitioners’ action if the defense of prescription was raised for the first time on appeal but is apparent in the records. Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.” (Emphasis supplied)

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT The petitioner’s argument that the case of Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, supra, is not applicable to the instant case deserves scant consideration. From the context of both decisions in the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Bondoc and Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, it is clearly seen that the same issue was raised. This is whether the ten-year prescriptive period to file an action to enforce a judgment pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code commences to run from the finality of the original judgment or from the revived judgment. Under the later case of Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, the 10year prescriptive period must commence from the finality of the original judgment. The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This judgment became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September 1, 1982, the petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period. The decision in Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, supra, is the later and better interpretation of the law. We apply it to the instant case. We find that the right of the petitioner to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an accomodation party and a defendant in Civil Case Nos. 59506 and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already prescribed considering that more than ten (10) years had already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on April 13, 1967. The failure of the private respondents to raise prescription in their “Comment to Claim” does not imply the waiver of such defense. In the instant case, there is no new issue of fact that arises in connection with the question of prescription. All the pertinent dates showing that the petitioner’s enforcement of the judgment under Civil Case No. 93268 has already prescribed can be found in the petitioner’s allegations in the “claim” as well as its evidence filed in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291. This removes the case from the general rule that prescription if not impleaded in the answer is deemed waived (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 706; and Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250).

POTENCIANO SUNGA, ET. AL. vs. BENITO DE GUZMAN, ET. AL. What is notably significant from the above-quoted testimony is that appellees, while they knew of the possession of petitioners commencing in the year 1940, they knew of the sale only when they were told by their brothers who sold their share. As to when the information was given to appellees, the quoted testimony does not indicate in any positive manner. Had the information been given upon the execution of the document, and if the sale included the whole fishpond, not only the share of the vendors, there is no reason why appellees did not similarly sign as vendors on the private instrument of sale. What this proves is that appellees where not definitely aware that appellant’s possession extended over the whole fishpond, including that which pertained to them as their share. In that state of their knowledge as to the extent and nature of petitioners-appellant’s possession, said possession cannot be said to be adverse and open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor of petitionersappellants. In the case of a fishpond, owned in common, one or some of whose co-owners sell their undivided share to another, the only way the whole fishpond, including the shares of the other co-owners may be said to have been held in adverse possession by the vendee, as against the co-owners who did not sell, is if he harvests all the fish in the fishpond, leaving nothing for the other co-owners who did not sell their share. This is not as easily ascertained as in the exercise of possession over a piece of land, which is relatively quite easy to show that the possession is to the exclusion of the other co-owners by the extent of the possession, as by actual occupation if the land is for occupancy, or the extent of the enjoyment of the produce of said land, as when it is for cultivation or raising of products sustained by the soil. When one harvests from a fishpond, of which he is only part-owner, it must be assumed that his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully entitled to, until the contrary is positively shown, which was not done in the present case.

Likewise, against appellants’ pretension is the fact that the tax declaration (Exhibit “B”) over the land has remained up to the present in the name of the original owners, the deceased parents of respondents-appellees. The possession of petitioners-appellants, was, therefore, not completely adverse or open, nor was it truly in the concept of an owner, which are indispensable elements for prescription to become legally effective as a means of acquiring real property. The argument of petitioner-appellant that they have not been giving respondents-appellees their share in the harvest, and by such act, they have shown repudiation of the trust which may have been created is not quite convincing. With the undisputed fact that petitioners-appellants had promised one of the respondents-appellees, Benito de Guzman, to pay him for nis share in the land, petitioners-appellants have manifested their continuing recognition of the right of said respondent-appellee, including his two sisters, his co-respondents-appellees herein, over their corresponding share of the fishpond, as long as the promise was not expressly withdrawn, but has, as is apparent from the evidence, remained subsisting and continuing, since no definite date was fixed for the promise to be fulfilled. To constitute the failure to pay as promised as an act of repudiation of the trust, or as a manifestation of adverse possession, there should be an unequivocal act of refusal to make payment, or a definite reneging from the promise, This can happen only if a date has been fixed for the fulfillment of the promise, but the period had lapsed without the promise having been redeemed. As also correctly held by the respondent Court, the promise of petitioners-appellants to pay for the share of respondents-appellees interrupts the possession as a source of prescriptive rights. THE OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs. HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ We hold that the lower court erred in holding that each of the demand letters suspended the prescriptive period for one day only. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period. An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). “The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor” (Art. 1155, Ibid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L-20086, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648. Harden vs. Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711). Interruption of the prescription of actions by means of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor is a rule of Civil Law origin. Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, from which article 1155 was taken, provides that “la prescripcion de las acciones se interrumpe por su ejercicio ante los Tribunales, por reclamacion extrajudicial del acredor y por cualquier acto de reconocimiento de la deuda por el deudor”. Article 1155 specifies that the extrajudicial demand and the acknowledgment should be in writing. A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period.

JAIME LEDESMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case the 10year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al. in this wise: “x x x. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the

prescriptive period. x x x “A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. x x x. The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., thus: “Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the ‘prescription of actions is interrupted’ inter alia, ‘when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.’ This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered inefficacious. On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold that the correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company, not only because they are later in point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner therein.

MIGUEL, ET AL. vs. CATALINO As in De Lucas v. Gamponia. 100 Phil. 277, the four elements of laches are present in the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving- rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor's approval. The vendor, and also his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to annul the sale from that time, since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they did not have to wait for 34 years to institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filed against him by such passivity, and also because he "bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be barred (See Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622; De Lucas v. Gamponia, supra). The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not (30 C.J.S., p. 522, See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177, cited in Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 Dec. 1966, 18 SCRA p. 1040). In the present case, the sale of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio (a non-Christian inhabitant) to Catalino Agyapao, defendant's father, is null and void ab initio, for lack of executive approval (Mangayao, et al. v. Lasud, et al., L19252, May 29, 1964). The laws applicable to the said sale are: Section 145 (b) of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, providing that no conveyance or encumbrance of real property shall be made in that department by any non-christian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other requirements, the deed shall bear indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial governor or his representative duly authorized in writing for the purpose; Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every contract or agreement made in violation of Section 145 "shall be null and void"; and Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, extending the application of the above provisions to Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya. Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellant's. Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino

Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellant's proposition that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's 'efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense (De Lucas v. Gamponia, supra). LOLA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS We also agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from recovering the lot in dispute. Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of the respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the respondent’s failure to assert her claim and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. VICTORIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS Likewise, We agree with the Court of Appeals when it barred Victoriano’s action to recover possession of Lot No. 897, premised on the principle of laches. Defined as “such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.” (Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, G.R. No. L-27088, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 125) the Court of Appeals observed: “However, defendant-appellee disregards the fact that plaintiffs-appellants have been in continuous possession of the land since 1927 and they were not ousted therefrom by the grandfather of defendant-appellee who sold the property to them, nor by the immediate successors of the seller. It was only after decades had passed that it was discovered that the sale was never registered or the title cancelled and transferred in the name of plaintiffs-appellants. True, titled lands cannot be acquired by prescription, however, defen-dant-appellee’s inaction for more than 50 years now bars her from acquiring possession of the land on the ground of laches.” (p. 25, Rollo). Again, the principle of laches was mentioned to refute Victoriano’s claims that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Sec. 46, Act No. 496, now Sec. 47 of PD No. 1529). Thus, the Court of Appeals stated: “At this state, therefore, respondentsappellants’ claim of absolute ownership over the land cannot be countenanced. It has been held that while a person may not acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.” (p. 25, Rollo) HAW PIA vs. THE CHINA BANKING CORPORATION As the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets or funds of the China Banking Corporation, and for that purpose to liquidate it by collecting the debts due to said bank from its debtors, and paying its creditors, and therefore to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator with the consequent authority to make the collection, it follows evidently that the payments by the debtors to the Bank of Taiwan of their debts to the China Banking Corporation have extinguished their obligation to the latter. Said payments were made to a person, the Bank of Taiwan, authorized to receive them in the name of the bank creditor under article 1162, of the Civil Code. Because it is evident the words "a person authorized to receive it," as used therein, means not only a person authorized by the same creditor, but also a person authorized by law to do so, such as guardian,

executor or administrator of estate of a deceased, and assignee or liquidator of a partnership or corporation, as well as any other who may be authorized to do so by law (Manresa, Civil Code, 4th ed., p. 254). The fact that the money with which the debts have been paid were Japanese war notes does not affect the validity of the payments. The provision of article 1170 of our Civil Code to the effect that "payment of debts of money must be made in the specie stipulated and if it is not possible to deliver such specie in silver or gold coins which is a legal tender," is not applicable to the present case, because the contract between the parties was to pay Philippine pesos and not some specifically defined species of money. The Philippine peso and half-pesos including the Philippine Treasury Certificate was and is the legal tender in the Philippines under section 612 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 4199. As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Knox vs. Lee and Parker (Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457-681; 20 Law. ed., 287). "The expectation of the creditor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the contract would be discharged by the payment of coined metals, but neither the expectation of one party to the contract, respecting its fruits, nor the anticipation of the other, constitutes its obligation. There is a well-recognized distinction between the expectation of the parties to a contract and the duty imposed by it. Aspdin vs. Austin, 5 Ad. & Bl. (N. S.) 671; Dunn vs. Sayles, Ibid., 685; Coffin vs. Landis, 46 Pa., 426. Were it not so, the expectation of results would be always equivalent to a binding engagement that they should follow. But the obligation of contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made. If there is anything settled by decision it is this, and we do not understand it to be controverted." (Know vs. Exchange Bank of Virginia, 12 Wall., 457; 20 U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 20 Law. ed., 287, 311.) In said case it was held that the Legal Tender Acts of Congress which made the treasury notes legal tender for payment of debts contracted before and after their passage were not inappropriate for carrying into execution the legitimate purpose of the Government, And this court, in Rogers vs. Smith Bell (10 Phil., 319), held that "A debt of 12,000 pesos created in 1876 can now (1908) be paid by 12,000 of the Philippine pesos authorized by the Act of Congress of March 2, 1903, although at the time the loan was made which created the debt, the creditor delivered to the debtor 12,000 pesos in gold coin." SINGSON vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor (Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560). Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accomodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.” PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA vs. ROBLES Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission. LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180

of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasidelicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasidelicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: “Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employeremployee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case is undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer’s own negligence. As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, and thereafter, we have consistently held that where the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarity liable for damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual, as the solidarity of the obligation is justified by the very nature thereof. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that “(t)he mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were

followed.” Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SENDAYDIEGO The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability, meaning his obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. x x x The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code x x x, and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent’s heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned x x x the title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect. x x x Sendaydiego’s appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.

PETRALBA vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal liability x x x. Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art. 89(1), Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil liability is also extinguished. In People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 410, and in People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, We ruled that only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is pecuniary, but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil liability survives Petralba but only if the offense can be proved. VDA DE PAMAN vs. SEÑERIS Against the foregoing considerations, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides, however, that “when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.” That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons composing the twins. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law. Said provision will be rendered meaningless if the subsidiary civil liability is not allowed to be enforced in the same proceeding. To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Señeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings

in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. Moreover, it has been invariably held that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil. 495 that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim.

VILLEGAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the case of People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on September 2, 1994, viz.: “It is thus evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. x x x x x x x x x (I)n recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused (under Sec. 1, Rule 87, infra) and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, ‘the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.’ Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x x x x x x x e) Quasi-delicts. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with (the) provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.” The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused’s civil liability dependent on two factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a criminal case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action was impliedly instituted with it? The answer is likewise provided in Bayotas, thus: “ ‘Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala’s civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.’ ”

HEIRS OF GUARING, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara, it was held: . . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . .