Article 2004 Tracing Memories Versus Common Memories

Ticu Constantin

TRACING MEMORIES VERSUS COMMON MEMORIES. A NEW TAXONOMIC APPROACH Ticu Constantin Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, « Al. I. Cuza » University, Iasi, România [email protected]

ABSTRACT Starting from the meaning of the „flashbulb memories” in the view of Martin Conway, an authority in the field of memory, the author of this study made a comparative analysis, sustained by an empirical research, and finally drew a different taxonomic conclusion. Thus, while M. Conway considers that both „vivid memories” and „traumatic memories” belong to the category of „flashbulb memories”, this study argues that all three types are subsumed to another and larger category, the author has called „tracing memories”. He identified enough similarities between flashbulb, vivid (positive), and traumatic memories, to have reasons to consider them as tracing memories, opposite to the common memories. On the other hand he noticed differences between the three kinds of tracing memories, able to make them distinct between each other. The empirical data reveal that the differences between flashbulb, traumatic and vivid memories are mainly induced by the weight (intensity) of the predictive factors for the memories detailing, and the difference between the tracing memories and the common ones emerge from the differences in the configurations of the factors that are responsible for the memories detailing level. According to the results reported by different researchers of autobiographic memory, the mechanism that lie at the bottom of remembering the memories over a longer period of time seem to be the emotional impact and the importance attached to the events. (Conway 1995, 1997; Conway and Rubin, 1993;

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Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986, Eysenck, 1995). The attached emotion and the importance to an event make the memories about it be frequently recalled in mind or during discussions with other people being thus consolidated. In M. Conway and D. Becherian (1987), Pillemer and collab. (1988) and M. Conway (1995) demonstrate that emotions (either negative or positive) are important factors in creating persistent memories, the intensity of emotion felt in the very moment of the event and the impact on the personal life are predictors of the event clarity. Using linear regression analysis, M. Conway and D. Becherian, in a 1987 research, have demonstrated that consequences, emotion and repetition uniquely and significantly correlate with the vivacity of the personal events. For unimportant memories, only the changes in the emotional state forecast the memories vivacity. (Conway, 1995, p. 70). M. Conway (1995, p.71) presents and analyzes a series of studies building up by Pillemer et al, proving that emotion is the critical factor in tracing memories during the first three years of college and in other studies Pillemer et al (1986) identified a very similar pattern. Taken together both studies offer us a strong argument that emotions (both negative and positive), together with the importance attached to the event and its consequences in time represent important factors in building a persistent memory. Another research trend proved that the memory of the information assimilated by learning or that of the less important personal information (details of the everyday life) follow a desolation rate represented by a monotonously decreasing curve (logarithmic curve).

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach This was the main conclusion of the research conducted by H. Ebbinghaus, one of the first researchers of the retention (learning) and oblivion processes of the useless material: the oblivion (forgetness) is faster at the beginning ( in the first minutes, hours, days) and slower after some time (weeks, months, years). The life time distribution of memories; the 66 years old group 20%

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Figure 1. The life-time memories distribution ; the curve that we obtained on the sixty-six-year old group (105 s).

In exchange, the personal autobiographic information follow a non-monotonous distribution/retention curve, with two periods and the number of recalled memories is: a) significantly larger – adolescence and early youth (between 15-25) and the last period of life (the last twelve months); b) significantly smaller for the first decade of life (the childhood amnesia) and after the first period of life (after 30-35), especially at over-forties. Results confirming this idea have been reported by a large number of researchers: J. L. Monteil (1993); Rubin (1989); D. C. Rubin s.a. (1986); Franklin si Holding (1977); M. A. Conway, S. J. Anderson (1997) etc. I have arrived at the same conclusion by conducted a similar research on a group of 594 subjects using two different techniques of data gathering1. The Figure 1 below is the curve 1 I have used in this research two data sampling techniques : the stimulus word technique (25 stimulus words) and the one of the most important moments in life. The result is 5.457 events, evoked as being the most importnt in one’s life (2.373 events for the 20 years old subjects ; 2.114 for the 46 years old subjects ; 1.010 for the 66 years

that we have obtained on the basis of the research data (2001) and it illustrates the probability of the memories appearance every 10 years, for a typical sixty-six-year old subject. But analysing the typical events described by the investigated subjects (5,597 events recalled as the most important of their lives and 14,176 as an answer to 25 clue words), I have asserted the hypothesis that, among the autobiographical memories there is a special category of memories that participate in obtaining such a memories distribution curve. Besides the “autobiographical landmarks” memories, marking the beginning or the end of certain periods of life (“First Job”, “Birth of the First Child”, “Faculty Admission” etc), there are three categories of memories frequently referred to in personal narrations, in the description of personal experience or their most important life events. These memories – named “tracing memories”, do not follow the resolution rate represented by the forgetting curve and have been staying accurate tens of years after the original event took place. We consider that the category of tracing memories is made of: a) “flashbulb memories”- memories about the context or background in which we receive a surprising public event of great individual/national importance b) “vivid memories” - intensely positive memories about positive surprising life events; c) “traumatic memories”– negative memories about unpleasant traumatic life events. In this material we present the results of our research on these persistent memories, which have lasted over time and kept the details precisely. In the beginning we shall expose a synthesis of the three types of memories and then we shall make a comparative analysis with arguments that they are different categories of memories and can not all be included in the category of flashbulb memories. In the old subjects). On the same group of subjects, the number of the events evoked and dated as a response to the 25 stimulus words was of 14.176 / 6.450 events for 20 years old subjects ; 5.243 for 46 years old subjects ; 2.483 for 66 years old subjects).

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Ticu Constantin second section of this material, we shall present a research approach whereby we have checked up if there is a similitude between the three categories of memories (flashbulb, traumatic, vivid ones) in contrast with the relatively common memories. Otherwise, wether the first three memory categories (that we have included in the “tracing” memories category) have a similar structural and functional pattern which differs from the one of the relatively ordinary memories. We think that the answer to this question is extremely important because the tracing memories are the main memories depending on which the individual’s autobiographic and social memory is built up defining and offering narrative “landmarks” in the personal history. TRACING MEMORIES: FLASHBULB, TRAUMATIC AND VIVID MEMORIES “Flashbulb” Memories The concept of “flashbulb” memory was first suggested by Roger Brown and James Kulik, in 1977. They consider that when emotionally intense events happen during one’s life his memory retains both those events and minute details of some unimportant background elements for many years. In a research study published in 1994 and then in a volume edited in 1995, M. Conway carried out a very serious analysis of the concepts regarding the “flashbulb”- type memories elaborated until then and, on the basis of his own extensive research, he suggested an explanatory pattern for the functional mechanisms of the “flashbulb” memories. Analysing the memories about the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s resignation, M. Conway concludes that the main construct that operates in forming “flashbulb” memories is represented by the knowledge/interest one (knowledge and information about the events development or the individual’s interest in the political field). The greater the construct value is, the more the levels of the personal and national importance (that the individual attributes to the event), emotion (expressed by surprise and feeling 226

intensity at the news reception moment) and rumination (expressed by recalling in mind and discussions following mass-media information and debates) increase. This significantly contributes to the variation of the other constructs and, finally, although indirectly, to the variation of all the measured variables. If the importance is positively associated with the affect and rumination levels, affect and recollection do not influence the knowledge/interest and importance constructs. Therefore, in the pattern suggested by M. Conway, the effect of knowledge/interest and importance on “flashbulb” memories is indirect and operates by means of the affect and rumination constructs that it directly influences (Conway, 1994). This is the most important conclusion in M. Conway’s theory: that the accuracy of the “flashbulb” memories increases directly proportionally to the emotional experience (expressed by surprise and experience intensity). In conclusion, when one individual attached reduced importance to an event, this happens in a field which he/she has neither too much information in, nor a special interest in, but there is a minimum emotion level and the three sub-components contribute to the building of a “normal” memory. But when an event is considered as having a great national or personal importance, that is grafted on some former information or interest in the field and finally brings about a high level of surprise and emotional intensity; this is the situation when “flashbulb” memory may occur. In the volume “Flashbulb Memories” (1995), M. Conway extends the concept of “flashbulb memories”. Besides the public memories, in the category of “flashbulb memories” he includes the memories referring to personal events, directly experienced by the individual not like a “spectator”, as in public memories. This time, in the category of “flashbulb memories”, M. Conway includes both vivid intense positive memories (“vivace memories”) and negative, traumatic ones (“traumatic memories”). As we shall try to demonstrate in the next pages and in the “Research Data” section, the three memories categories are still distinct from one another;

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach the type and the weight of the factors that lye on the basis of their building, maintaining and recollection are different, although they have common features. Traumatic memories Traumatic memories come from negative events or incidents, perceived by the individual as threatening at the moment they occur, with a very negative emotional impact and an exceptional feeling intensity, being evaluated with medium and long- term negative consequences. The effect of trauma and the traumatic events have been analyzed by psychologists and psychiatrists since the 19th century. Pierre Janet and S. Freud are among the first remarkable analysts in the field. In 1925 Pierre Janet recognized the importance of the trauma recollection in the origin and development of the emotional diseases, but he also admitted that many feeling / emotional disorders are not in connection with traumatic memories, consequently we have to avoid “detecting” traumatic memories where they do not really exist. He also referred to the importance of depression in generating vulnerability to the traumatic experiences. In his opinion, a pre-existent depression and a low self-esteem increase the vulnerability to the post-traumatic-stress syndrome. The traumatic recollections may vary as consequences, according to the previous experience in traumatisms, previous self-esteem and the extent in which the current traumatism feeling will debilitate the self-esteem, enhance the helpless feeling and touch the past experiences of the previous unsolved traumatisms (Green, neurosis 1, p.2) 1993. S. Freud considers that the neurosis ethiology lies in the traumatic experiences, especially in those that the individual felt during his/her childhood. The recall of these experiences, their verbalization and psychical elaboration would constitute the therapeutical effect of the analytical cure together with the abreaction act. Although in the first part of his theoretical work, S. Freud stated that there lies a real traumatic experience at the basis of the

current neurotic conflict - usually a sexual one - in the second part of his life, he reconsidered this aspect asserting that the sexualorigin “traumatic memories” that lie at the basis of neurosis are not real events, but visions with sexual content from the individual’s childhood. On the other hand, in Freud’s opinion, the childhood amnesia (the small number of memories from the early years) is explained by the fact that a large number of this period’s traumatic memories are “hidden”, “covered” by unimportant common memories, named “screen-memories”. The main role played by the trauma (physical, emotional, sexual or neglect/abandon one) in creating a variety of symptomatic behavioural and emotional stress is more and more in the nowadays specialists’ attention. According to recent studies, the long-term consequences of precocious childhood traumatisms are very difficult to predict and depend on a large number of variables. These variables refer to: the nature, duration, intensity and significance of a trauma; the frequency and time interval the traumas have occurred; the age, the preexistent state of health, the temperament and the victim’s constitution. The severe repetitive traumas may lead to a phobic anxiety and panic attack. The trauma may be in connection with a lot of symptoms, including depression, anxiety, drugging abuse etc. The various trauma symptoms may include the absence of a coherent self-image, a low self-esteem, defensive repetitive or self-destructive behavior, instable mood and even hallucinations. (Green, 1993). One of the most frequent trauma syndromes is the Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD). Shelve (1995 aped Van deer Kola and Fisher 1996) considered that the PTSD complexity is better understood as a co-occurrence and some interrelational pathogenic processes including: a) an alteration of the neurobiological processes affecting the stimuli discrimination (expressed by an attention arousal and decrease), b) the acquisition of a fear-conditioned answer to the trauma stimuli and c) the alteration of the cognitive scheme and 227

Ticu Constantin the social understanding of the situation Referring to the PTSD incidence, Foy (1992) reports a PTSD rate of 30-50% among the Vietnam war veterans, 45% among the beaten women, 50% among the abused children, 65% among the adults sexually abused in their childhood and 35% among the rape victims. Horovitz and Reidbord (1982) show that 90% of a heterogeneous large group of PSTD pacients report frequent intense recollections of the traumatic events. As Van deer Kola underlined, traumatic memories may be differently encoded in comparison with the memories about ordinary events, probably because of the alteration of the attention focussing ability or collision between the extreme emotional activation with the hypocampic memory functioning. The results of the research work conducted by B.A. Van der Kolk and Rita Fisler in 1996 on 46 individuals suggest that there are significant differences between the way people/individuals experience the traumatic memories and memories about other significant personal events/experiences. The study argues the idea that traumatic memories are dissociated and initially stored as sensorial fragments without a real descriptive component. All the subjects admitted that they had begun to develop a narrative account about the trauma after a time interval. Some of them who had been sexually abused in their childhood were not able yet, as adults, to develop a complete account referring to what had happened to them. They simply had only fragmented memories confirmed by other people(Van der Kolk and Fisler, 1996). Traumatic amnesia Analysing the studies that underlined the existence of traumatic amnesia, Van der Kolk (1996, p. 3), stressed that amnesia – for some or all the trauma aspects – has been noticed at various traumatized patients. Thus the amnesia after traumatic experiences with partial or total later memories recover has been reported in numerous studies on ex-warriors, natural disaster or accidents survivors, kidnapping victims, physical or sexual abuse victims etc. 228

The Dissociation Christianson (1982) demonstrated that when people feel fear or threat, they experience a significant narrowing of their consciousness and they simply remain centred on the main perceptual details. The intense emotional experience and the narrowing of the consciousness field associated with the centring on perceptual aspects determine the socalled “memory phobia” hindering the traumatic events assimilation and integration (their synthesis) and separate the traumatic memories from the normal consciousness (Van der Koln & Fisler, 1996; Critchlow, 1998). The dissociation refers to an experience division: the elements of experience are not integrated in an unitary whole, but stored in the memory as isolated fragments under the form of sensorial perception, emotional states or behavioural reactions. Whereas the dissociation may temporary serve as an adaptive function, on a long term – the missing of the integration of traumatic memories seems to be the critical element that leads to the development of a complex bio-behavioural change, named the Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Repression The conscious attempts to forget a traumatic episode can reduce the information accessibility. In the most case studies reported by J. W. Schooler (1997), the subjects confess that having been abused they tried not to think about the event any more and put it out of their minds This voluntary behaviour may lead in time to the loss of the memories about the traumatic event even if later, in circumstances that would allow this some details could be recovered. Another process, this time unconscious, repression, refers to the fact that because of some unconscious defence mechanisms memories about some traumatic experiences are unconsciously rejected, suppressed in such a measure that they are not reachable to consciousness anymore. The concept of repression has a long history in psychoanalysis, but a fragile support in the research itself. In his studies, Freud presents repression as a defensive and uncon-

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach scious process that protects the “self” from the threatening material. It is not possible to do such an experimental lab research in order to prove the pertinence of this concept because it suppose simulating some extremely traumatic and treating situations. As we mentioned above, the clinical studies on psychogenic amnesias other arguments for the existence of the defensive repression was greater than that of the unimportant one (5.8/5.1). In 1997 D.L. Schachter underlined, in the case of retrograde amnesia, that the psychic trauma brings about massive but temporary amnesia extended on a large section of the personal past. Extended oblivion or intense remembrance? There are many research works which demonstrate that individuals sexually abused in the past may experience periods of amnesia of the traumatic event putting it out of their conscience. Therefore certain forms of temporary memory loss are often associated with trauma. It paradoxally trauma may be connected to either a strong remembrance or an extended oblivion. A study by Wilkinson (1983, apud. Schachter, 1997) – on people witnesses of a tele-ski fall in Kansas city showed that almost all these people had obsessive memories about the trauma none of them reporting amnesia about that dramatic event. Almost half of them

Singular event

Repeated event

Involved Mechanisms

tried to put the disaster out of their minds and almost a third reported post-traumatic memory-problems caused by ceaselessly event remembrance. According to M. Conway’s review, similar conclusions have been drawn by other researchers; they all underline that there is an amazing accuracy in reporting the details about the incidents in different situations: robbery with gunshots and deads (Yuille and Cutshall, 1986), witnesses or participants to serious offence situations (Fisler, Geiselman and Amador, 1989) or kidnapped children (Terr, 1979, 1983). They all conclude that the details about all these traumatic situations are extremely vivid and can be accurately described after long periods of time. In our opinion, the tendency of the traumatic memories either to be minutely kept in mind and sometimes remembered untimely or strongly rejected and scarcely accessible (sometimes forgotten) is linked to the way the individual perceives the threat by the traumatic episode to the current “self” (the current selfesteem and self-image). If threat was perceived only in the past, then memories about the incidents seem to be very well kept in mind. If previous threat is relevant also for the current moment affecting (both in the past and in the present) the subject’s self-esteem and self-image (as in sexual abuse or rape) then it is possible that unconscious defence mecha-

The threatening affects the subject’s current self image and self respect Rape Singular physical abuse with sexual shade Repeated sexual abuse Repeated war traumas Degrading detention, “rehabilitation” involuntary driving back, involuntary defence and avoiding mechanism Possible demoting amnesia

The threatening does not affect the subject’s current self image and self respect Robbery Natural disasters “Flashbulb” memories (public) Detention War Sometimes involuntary repression, the effort not to think any more; sometimes recollection Possible intensive remembrance

Table 1. Types of traumatic events; causes and consequences

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Ticu Constantin nisms to be involved; in time, they are pulled out of the conscious area. As for memories perceived as not being threatening to the current self anymore, most of the time an intense remembrance may occur, either during inner recollections or in social context descriptions., At least in the beginning, we may encounter the obsessive intrusion of the event images in the situation the images being rejected or avoided. If we take into account both the factorpresence or absence of threat to the current self and the factor uniqueness or repetition of the traumatic event, then the description and the classification of some traumatic events types, of the implied mechanisms (unconscious or conscious repression) and of the effects on amnesic contents – they all may be represented as in Table 1. At least in the beginning the individual must make voluntary efforts to reject these traumatic episodes perceived as threatening to the current self. Simultaneously with this conscious repression we think that some unconscious defence mechanisms will work being responsible for the repression of the amnesic contents in the unconscious and their dissociation in the conscience. We believe it is wrong, only on the basis of the conclusions of the studies on natural disasters or accidents, to argue that for traumatic memories an intense remembrance may occur rather than repression or amnesia of the traumatic event. Post-event reactions may be different for a sexual-abuse event in comparison with car-accident events. Thus what differentiates the two types of traumatic memories making some of them memorable and others very difficult to remember is connected with the way the individual perceives or not the threat that the event memories exert on the post-event self-image and self-esteem. Vivid Memories Vivid memories represent the positive equivalent, opposite to the traumatic memories. When they are asked to describe their 230

most important life memories, the subjects are tempted to describe their positive vivid memory events. There are only a few references to vivid memories in the specialized literature. Usually these references are made in the context of research works about the accessibility of memories (Linton, 1975, 1986; Wagenaar, 1986) the way of memories’ distribution over the entire life (Fromholt & Larsen, 1991, 1992; Besides & Fitzgerald, 1998) or flashbulb memories (Conway, 1995). Fromholt & S.F. Larsen (’91 and ’92) abandoned the idea of “index-words”, asking the subjects to talk about their most important life events for 15 minutes. This was the first autobiographic memory approach in similar terms to “vivid memories”. The results confirmed the former studies conclusions: the most important life memories are distributed similarly to those obtained by means of indexwords. Besides conducted similar research studies on 30 normal individuals and 30 individuals affected by the Alzheimer syndrome; the distribution of their memories on the entire life being similar for both groups and accordingly with the previous studies. Gergen & Gergen (1992) specify that “intense memories represent a part of this personal story and the increase of their appearance frequency happens during the identity building period.” Neisser (1998) adds that not all intense memories are formed during this period but without contradicting the fundamental hypotheses formulated by Fitzgerald. According to the most researchers’ opinion, the first circumstance of a repeated event is better remembered and serves as a model for later similar events. Supplementary arguments are offered by Cohen and Faulkner’s studies; they agree that 20% of the intense memories reported occurred “for the first time”, 73% are “unique in a life time”; and only 7% for general events. The data presented by Cohen and Faulkner do not contradict Fitzgerald’s reasoning (1998). Fitzgerald asserted that only 14% of the “general memories” from this period are memories referring to events “experienced for

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach the first time”, while Cohen and Faulkner considered a percentage of 20. In a research study conducted by Rubin and Kozin (1984, apud. Conway, 1995), 58 students described the three most intense/vivid memories and then evaluated them on 7 step scales with regard to: personal and national importance, surprise, personal consequences, intensity, emotional changes and repetition. From the total of 174 memories, 31 were related to accidents, 20 to sport events, 18 to heterogeneous relationships, 16 to animals, 9 to death, 9 to the first week at college, 9 to holidays, 5 to public appearances and 5 to school incidents; only 4 memories were related to public events. In the second stage of the study, Rubin & Kozin isolated the most frequent types of events and the subjects evaluated then on scales the whole list of the abovementioned events. The evaluation averages were: consequences (3.45), surprise (3.68), emotional changes (4.07), and repetition (3.76), all of them below the 7 steps scale average. M. Conway and D. Becherian (1987) developed a study in which subjects had to recall an event without any special personal importance and another one with a special personal importance and then fill in a FM (Flashbulb Memories) questionnaire for both of them. The emotional intensity of the important event was greater than that of the unimportant one (5.8/5.1). Having analysed the regression, it was found that consequences, emotion and repetition correlate with the personal events vividness uniquely and significantly. In other research works developed by Pillemer (1998) and M. Conway (1995) it has been demonstrated that emotions (both negative and positive) are an important factor in building up tracing memories and the intensity of the emotion felt at the moment of the event and the impact on personal life are predictors of the event clarity. Moreover, referring to an unpublished study, Conway (1998) showed that the emotional intensity and the repetition significantly and positively correlate to the memories vividness (Conway, 1995, p. 73). Thus according to Conway’s conclusions

drawn after analysing the data in these studies, personal importance, emotional intensity and sometimes personal consequences were associated with intense memories (M. Conway considered them as FM events – flashbulb memories). An important feature of this memories category is due to the fact that they often refer to experiences had “for the first time”. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TRACING MEMORIES In our opinion, in spite of sometimes contradictory results and dissimilar opinions, as they have resulted from the data analysis previously presented and from the explanatory patterns proposed by different authors, the three categories we have taken into account have some common characteristics and some differential elements: Common characteristics of the traumatic, vivid and flashbulb memories Time persistency All three types are persistent in time, many unexpected details about the original event may resist tens of years later. As we have shown before a single problem appears as for the traumatic memories when, although rarely, partial or total amnesia phenomenon may occur. But a recovery of these memories is possible after some time even in these situations. High emotional impact All the three memories categories have a memorable character because of the intense emotional impact experienced in the moment of their reception. For the vivid-type memories, the impact is positive, for flashbulb type it is variable (for many Romanian subjects investigated about the 22 December events flashbulb memories we identified feelings oscillating between fear, hope and happiness); for the traumatic-type memories, the impact is obviously negative. All three memory types are experienced with a high level of surprise 231

Ticu Constantin and intensity in comparison with normal memories. Great importance attached The importance of memories is firstly expressed in terms of personal importance. The traumatic-type memories, as well as the vivid or flashbulb-type memories are considered by the individual to have had a special importance for his/her later evolution. As we underlined above, in the case of flashbulb memories “importance” is one of the main constructs in the model that M. Conway suggested. Thus importance was evaluated in terms of both personal and national importance. Importance may be evaluated in a negative sense (rejected, unaccepted) – when the event influenced the subject’s later evolution negatively or in a positive sense – the event being perceived like source of positive changes for his/her later evolution. Intense remembrance All three types are intensely recalled. For traumatic-type memories, subjects often try to avoid recall being avoided and rejected. The tendency to avoid recollection may appear also

after events which finally had benefice effects (as the subject himself /herself admits) because it would awake unpleasant experiences (for example, the fear and pain of a difficult confinement). Elements differentiating between memories of the traumatic, flash and vivid type Above we have passed in review the characteristics common to the three types of tracing memories. But we consider that , besides the common factors that intervene in the processes of maintenance and recollection of these memories, there are also specific factors that make each of them work distinctly subjecting to distinct principles. The main differential elements of the three types of memories refer to: positive/negative feature, witness/ main character positive effect on self-esteem, type of remembrance; threat perception in the past/present. They can be represented as in Table 3. In order to conclude and demonstrate the distinctiveness of the flashbulb-type memories and the vivid or traumatic types, we believe REMEMBRANCE

IMPOR TANCE

NEGATIVE (unaccepted)

ACCEPTED, VOLUNTARY “Flashbulb” memories (“The terrorist attack on NewYork”)

REJECTED, INVOLUNTARY “Traumatic” memories (“Rape attempt”)

POZITIVE (appreciated)

“Vivid” memories (“You have a boy!”)

“Landmark/life stage” memories (“Divorce”)

Table 2. The importance and remembrance as determinant factors for tracing memories “Vivid” memories Pozitive - negative characters Main character or witness Self-esteem effect Self-scheem effect The revocation need Self threat (past) Self threat (present)

positive main character positive assimilation tendency yes no no

“Flashbulb” memories variable witness neutral no yes moderate, variable no

“Traumatic” memories negative main character negative disassimilation tendency no yes sometimes yes

Table 3. Differential elements of the vivid, flashbulb and traumatic memories

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Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach the following ideas as being the most important and worth to be mentioned: • the details retained in flashbulb memories refer to the “reception frame” of some public events and not to personal events; • in the “flashbulb memories” situation, the individual is the spectator and not the main character, as in traumatic or vivid memories; • the public events that bring about flashbulb memories may affect only indirectly the individuals’ lives while the events that bring about vivid or traumatic memories have a direct impact on the individuals’ lives; • the public events bringing about flashbulb memories have a weak impact on individual self-esteem; they can influence only the collective or identity self-esteem, while the events that bring about traumatic and vivid memories have a strong and direct effect on the individual self-esteem. OVERVIEW As we previously mentioned, searching other authors’ theoretical patterns and our own research results, this thorough examination suggested us that “tracing” memories represent a special category of memories, with special features. Thus, in the autobiographic memory (part of the episodic memory) distinctly from other types of memories, the tracing memories prove to be very persistent in time, with a strong emotional impact and the subjects evaluate them as having important consequences on their lives and having extremely intense remembrance. In the same time, this category has also distinct sub-categories, each of the memories component (traumatic, flashbulb, vivid) functions in a particular way because of their differential elements. The aim of our research work was to check up if, by reference to some factors as: period of time, surprise, intensity, consequences and recall - there is a similitude between the tracing memories (flashbulb, traumatic, vivid) in opposition to the relatively “ordinary” memories. In other words, the first three types of memories that we have included in the category of “tracing” memories have a

similar functioning and structure pattern, being different from that of the relatively “ordinary” memories. METHOD Participants The data we present we present here for analysis refer to the two distinct research works using the questionnaire as the main method: one of them was implemented in May – June 2001 on 596 individuals and the other one in June 2001, on 432 subjects.As we shall make only few references to the first study( in connection with the data concordance), we shall make the discription of the investigated group and the method utilized only for the second research group .The investigated group (432 subjects) had the following structure: Education: 14.6% secondary school; 49.9% highschool; 35.5% graduate; Sex:

48.1% females, 51.9% males;

Age:

13.6% 38.4% 17.1% 14.3% 16.6%

under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 over 50 Measures

The measures used for the present study were very closed to the ones used by M. Conway: (1994, 1994). The questionnaire had three sections, each of them asking to recall and evaluate a different type of event: • relatively ordinary events (“Please, think about the last one moment you had to deal with a policeman on duty”); • flashbulb events (“Please, think about the moment when you heard on radio/TV the beginning of the 1989 Romanian Revolution and Ceausescu’s runaway”); • vivid events (“Please, think about one of the most beautiful, surprising and special event/moment of your life); 233

Ticu Constantin • traumatic events (“Please, think about one of the most unexpected, unpleasant and traumatic events/moments of your life”) After identifying and recalling the event (in writing, in few words) the subject was asked to evaluate, for each separate situation, on five-step scales, the following elements: the rank of memory’s details (1-very few details; 5-a lot of details); the surprise of the event (1-not at all; 5-very surprised); the intensity of experience (1-not very intense, 5-very strong intensity); consequences on personal or national life – in flashbulb events situation (1not at all; 5-very important); the frequency of recalling (1-very rare; 5-very often). All four three types of events have been evaluated using the same technique (the 5-step scale); moreover, the subjects were asked to specify the period of time passed from the moment the event happened.

ated, on the average, as being recalled rarely in comparison with the vivid-events one. We believe this difference is explained by the human tendency to remember more frequently the pleasant events than unpleasant one. The surprise-value was estimated as being more intense for vivid events in comparison with the traumatic ones, while the consequences were estimated as being more important for the traumatic memories in comparison with the vivid ones. Comparative reprezentation of the vivid and traumatic evaluation mode (596 s) 5,0

4,0

3,0

Vivid memories 2,0

Traumatic memories

The research hypothesis 1,0 details

We assumed that the vivid, traumatic, flash memories have a common pattern, different from that of the “ordinary” memories. This involves the following subordinate hypothesis: • There are statistically significant differences between the relatively ordinary memories and the tracing ones (the flashbulb, traumatic, vivid) regarding to the evaluation of the surprise, consequences and recall; • The detailed description of each of the three categories of memories is dependent on different factors configuration; both in nature and in weight of each of them in the process of evaluation each event.

surpise

intensity

consequences

rumination

Figure 2. Traumatic and vivid memories evaluation (N=596 Ss)

It is noticeable that – on the 432 subjects group, we have got almost identical values for both types of events. In the second study, in addition we asked, more, for the evaluation of the “Revolution Unleash/Ceausescu’s Runaway (flashbulb event) and the evaluation of the relatively ordinary event (“Last encounter with a policeman”) Comparative evaluation of the four types of memories (432s) 5,0

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4,0

People were asked to identify one of the most traumatic/unpleasant event and one of the most beautiful/happiest event of their lives, both events being evaluated regarding the dimensions of details, surprise, intensity, consequences and recall, with values over the average. The rumination variable for traumatic events is an exception which subjects evalu234

3,0

Vivid memories Traumatic memories

2,0

Common memories Revolution memories

1,0

details

surprise

intensity

consequences

rumination

Figure 3. The evaluation of memories (N=432 Ss)

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach Thus, we created the possibility of a comparative analysis of the way the four types of events are evaluated by the same group of subjects and of the relative weight of variables years interval, surprise, intensity, consequences and rumination, in a predictive pattern of the detailing memories rate about these events. Looking for an ordinary event, we estimated that the age, the educational level, subjects' life experience would be very different and that is why we could refer but to a casual event, with a similar value for all subjects (at least theoretically) as close as possible to commonplace, but the subjects had some elements of it for being able to evaluate it. Unfortunately, we could not refer to an absolutely common event because it could belong to the category of events the individuals had no memory about and a comparison could not have been made. . The relatively common event we used as comparison reference point (“The encounter with a policeman”) is not really the prototype for an absolutely common event. On the contrary, as the subject is able to remember and evaluate it, it already belongs to the category of events bringing about persistent memories. But, if there are statistically significant difference between the method of evaluating this event and the noteworthy ones, so much the more there will be differences between an absolutely ordinary event and a noteworthy one, differences on which basis we can make inferences referring to building up and maintaining persistent detailed memories. A first data evaluation shows us the differences in the evaluation of the four types of memories. The relatively common event was evaluated at very low values as consequences and recall and at average values for details, surprise and intensity (statistically significant differences at values p<.001). The detailing rank of the memories about these moments is similar to that of the “revolution” event. Between the other types of events (vivid, traumatic and flashbulb ones) all differences are significant (when p<.001), with the following exceptions: the detailing rank of the

memories is similar between the relatively common memories and the flashbulb type (“Revolution”); the surprise has been similarly evaluated for the flashbulb memories and the vivid type; the intensity the vivid memories were experienced with was equivalent to that of the traumatic type events; the recall was similar for the flashbulb and traumatic type memories. Considering the detailing degree of memories as an indicator for their persistence and analysing the correlations of this variable with the others variables (surprise, intensity, consequences, rumination, years interval), for each of the four types of memories we notice specific configurations. The detailing degree of a memory (how many details a subject has about it, in his/her subjective perception) positively correlate with all the other variables. EVENT general revolu- vivid tion 1.000 1.000 .253** .342** INTENSITY .08** .630** CONSEQUENCES .140** .275** RECALL .188** .357** LONG TERM -.155** , DETAILS

SURPRISE

1.000 .100* .342** .315** .321** -.048

traumatic 1.000 .200** .377** .303** .237** -.059

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2tailed). * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2tailed). Table 4. Correlations between the detailing degree of memory and other variables.

We observe only two noticeable exceptions: there are no correlations between the detailing of the memories and the yearsinterval variable (from the event) for the vivid and traumatic-type events, and for the vivid events, the correlation between detailing memories and surprise is a little significant. It is remarkable the great correlation coefficient (r=630, p<0.01) between the detailing degree of the revolution memory and the intensity the 235

Ticu Constantin event was experienced with, the later seem to be the main indicator of building up and maintaining stabile, detailed memories about the event. So for analyses seem not to make evident significant differences between the four types of memory, except for the relatively ordinary events where the greater time intervals are the less distinct these events details tend to be. Detailing vivid or traumatic memories do not depend on their oldness taking into account that the event oldness average was of nine years for the vivid events, 8.5 years for the traumatic and 5.3 years for the relatively ordi-

nary one. These results have confirmed that as for relatively ordinary events loss and dissolution are dependent on time, thus in concordance with the research on the oblivion curve. Along the same line, it is remarkable that as for the other categories of memory the time passing seem not to affect their details, and that is argument for the idea that "tracing" memories constitute a special memory class with distinct characteristics. Supposing that there are structural differences in the way the variables we have taken into account intervene in building up memories about these events, we decided to make a lin-

Model Summary

Change Statistics

Adjusted R Square ,047

Std. Error of the Estimate 1,1272

R Square Change ,048

,114

,112

1,0880

,066

,187

,185

1,0427

,073

,366

,364

,9210

,179

347,787

Model 1

R R Square ,220a ,048

2

,337b

3

,432c

4

,605d

F Change 62,518

df1 1

df2 1233

Sig. F Change ,000

91,252

1

1232

,000

110,514

1

1231

,000

1

1230

,000

a. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA b. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN c. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN, REMEMOR d. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN, REMEMOR, INTENIST

Table 5. The variables introduction impact in the model for tracing events Coefficients a Standard ized Coefficie nts

Unstandardized Coefficients Model 1 2

3

4

B 3,094

Std. Error ,107

SURPRIZA

,207

,026

(Constant)

2,188

,140

SURPRIZA

,203

,025

CONSECIN

,240

,025

(Constant)

1,725

,141

SURPRIZA

,191

,024

CONSECIN

,153

REMEMOR (Constant)

(Constant)

Beta ,220

t 28,906

Sig. ,000

7,907

,000

15,597

,000

,216

8,039

,000

,256

9,553

,000

12,192

,000

,202

7,860

,000

,025

,163

6,003

,000

,265

,025

,286

10,513

,000

,595

,139

4,285

,000

SURPRIZA

2,550E-02

,023

,027

1,099

,272

CONSECIN

8,300E-02

,023

,089

3,645

,000

REMEMOR

,150

,023

,162

6,479

,000

INTENIST

,571

,031

,490

18,649

,000

a. Dependent Variable: DETALII

Table 6. The regressive equation coefficients for the tracing events.

236

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach ear regression analysis for rendering evident how these variables contribute in building up memories and for the variables weight in a predictive equation. In the linear regression analysis we aimed at the class of tracing memories (as cumulated values of the flash, vivid and traumatic memories) and then at the class of general memories ("The latest encounter with a policeman"). The independent variables were : interval of years from that event, the surprise of the event, the intensity the event was experienced with, the consequences on the possible life and event rumination frequency; the detailing degree of the memory being the dependent variable. The prediction equation of the detailing degree of the tracing memories (as cumulated values of the flash, vivid and traumatic memories), has the following elements: • adjusted R2 is 0.364, that means the model explains 36% of cases; • introduction in equation of the first four variables (surprise, consequences, rumination and intensity) significantly improves the pattern prediction (Sig F Change <.001); • the F test values (Anova) and the significance coefficients having values of p<.001 confirm the fact that the model is valid. • The pattern constant value is of 0.6 , the evaluation of detailing degree starts from a threshold of 0.6 on our 5 step scales; • The regression equation could be expressed by the formula: detailing degree of the memory = 0.6 + (0.57) intensity + (0.15) rumination + (0.08) consequences. • The beta standardized coefficients show that the intensity variable is three times more important than the rumination variable and six times more important than the consequences variable in predicting/determining the detailing degree. These results reveal that the detailing degree of the memory about an noteworthy event greatly depends on the intensity this event was experienced with and almost insignificantly on the personal consequences attached to that event. The same analysis indicates us that the

pattern is not complete, that there are also other factors which influence the detailing variable of the memories. After a similar analysis of the event we considered relatively ordinary event ("the latest meeting with a policeman") we established that, for an R2 adjusted to 0.10 (a very limited predictive potential, for only 10% of the cases), we obtain a valid pattern in which only intensity and intervals of years variables have an explanatory potential; detailing degree of the memory =2,4 + (0.25) intensity + (-0.13) interval of years. It means that the greater the intensity an event is experienced with and the less the time interval from that event are, the more the detailing degree of the memory about it is. As we have already mentioned , it is impossible the isolation of some absolutely ordinary events, for comparing them with noteworthy events, because they should respect some similarity terms (time interval from that event, significance equal in value or equally distributed to all subjects are minimal elements useful in evaluating these events), that is why we asked for quite striking events since the subjects have memories about it and they can be evaluated. Only by extrapolating could we state that ordinary events respect the same condition. The first conclusions we draw from here demonstrate that memories about noteworthy events have a common pattern, different from that of the relatively ordinary memories, because: • they are evaluated at high levels of intensity, surprise, consequences and rumination, in comparison with the relatively common event taken as a milestone; • their detailing degree does not depend on the time-factor (their oldness); • emotional intensity of the experienced events plays an important role in building up and keeping the tracing memories. Personal consequences associated to these events and the surprise of the experienced event have minimum contributions. • the memories about the relatively common event taken for comparison, firstly, depend on the emotional intensity at that moment and this 237

Ticu Constantin time in the second plan we find the interval from that moment and not the recollection frequency, as in the case of the tracing memories, all of them being at a very reduced predictive probability value. In both analyses, the regression equations show that there are also other variables which condition the detailing degree of the memories referring to these events, variables that are not included into our equation. Carrying out our analysis even further, into what we have called the class of tracing memories, the same type of linear regression analysis has been achieved for each component memory. Thus, referring to the evaluation of the memories regarding the “Announcement of the Revolution / Ceausescu’s running away”, the regression equation, having as dependent variable the detailing of memories and as independent variables the surprise, the intensity, the consequences and the recall, have evidenced the following aspects: • the adjusted R2 is of 0.437, which means that the model explains 47 % of the cases, heaving a great prediction rate; • the progressive introduction of the variables into the equation (surprise, consequence, rumination and intensity) considerably improves the pattern prediction (Sig F Change<.001); • the F test (Anova) values and the significance coefficient having constant values p< .001 show that the model is valid; • the constant of the model is of only 0.2; it is remarkable that this constant value does not contain residues namely three variables which can be involved in predicting the dependent variable; • for this constant, the significance coefficient is higher than .05, which means that our model is completed that explaining / predicting the detailing degree of the memory for the flashbulb event do not occur any other variables besides those encountered in the model; • the surprise and consequence variables do not have a major contribution to the model (from separate analyses of the regression equations made by excluding these variables we

238

inferred that they are included in the constant); • the regression equation could be expressed by the equation: detailing degree of the memory = 0,2 + (0,61) intensity + (0,15) rumination; • correlated with this formula, the beta standardized coefficient show that the intensity variable has four times more important contribution than the recall variable. In conclusion, the prediction of the detailing degree of the memories about a flashbulb event, the only necessary variables are the intensity, with which this event has been received and the frequency with which the subject has recalled this event. If we go back to Figure 2, we can see that in the model obtained by M. Conway the affect (which contains as a main variable the intensity) and rumination, are the only constructs that directly influence the recalling attributes. Our results agree with the ones obtained by the English author, although his study was done with reference to another event, in a different cultural space and using different design and methods of statistical analysis from those used by us. For detailing vivid memories, the obtained valid model has a less potential (R2 = 0.132), the main predictive variables for the detailing degree of these memories, with a similar predictive potential (standardized coefficients of similar magnitude) being: intensity, rumination and consequences: the memories detailing = 2.5 + (0.13) recall + (0.21) intensity + (0.08) consequences. In other words, there is a predictive pattern for the vivid memories detailing, but this has a low predictive / explaining potential, his main determinants being rumination frequency, intensity in the event has been received with and the importance attached to that event. In the analysis aiming the traumatic memories detailing, the obtained valid model has R2 = 0.194 (that explains almost 20% of the cases), and the regression equation can be expressed by the memories detailing formula = 1.3 + (0.34) intensity + (0.16) consequences + (0.08) recall. It means that in explaining the memories referring to traumatic events (or in the prediction of their detailing degree) the

Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach THE EVENT TYPE

constant (unstandardized coefficient)

interval in years

Common (relative)

2.4

-.131

Tracing Flashbulb Vivid Traumatic

0.6 0.2 2.5 1.3

the surprise (standardized coefficient)

intensity (standardized coefficient)

consequence (standardized coefficient)

rumination (standardized coefficient)

.089

.162 .146 .188 .112

.221 .490 .569 .179 .270

.126 .212

Table 7. The coefficients of the regression equation (Synthetic table)

first place is occupied by the intensity with which that event has been experienced and the importance of these events consequences (the standardized coefficients having close values) and a secondary place is occupied by those events rumination frequency. If we collate the corresponding standardized coefficients of the four kinds of regression equations (of the four predictive models) we can see that: • the intensity variable (the intensity with which the event has been experienced) is the main explanatory variable for all the models; this variable is defining in building up flashbulb memories (shocking memories about public events); • the long term variable (the memory oldness) has a predictive value only for the model referring to the relatively common/ banal events; • the surprise variable, although it significantly correlates with the detailing degree of the memories for each of the four types of events, bring no major contribution to any of these models; • the main differences between the predictive model of detailing of the relatively common memories and the predictive model of tracing memories detailing are: (a) the different weight of the intensity variable, (b) the role played by the events oldness in the first model and (c) the importance of the recall and consequence variables for the second explanatory model;

• Inside the tracing memories class, while for the flashbulb memories the reception emotional intensity of the event is decisive, the recollection having a minor role, in the case of vivid and traumatic memories, all the three variables are important, the remembrance in the vivid memories and intensity, in traumatic ones; being somehow detached from the others. • The only complete explanatory model is the flashbulb type memories. It means that explaining the memories about the revolution we have two variables (intensity and recall) which depending on them are enough to predict, the detailing degree of these memories. For the other situations, the models are incomplete (there are expressed also other variables in the constants magnitude, which can contribute to increase the model accuracy, of their predictive degree). CONCLUSIONS The first and the second hypotheses of the research have been confirmed. It means that there are significant statistical differences both in the way surprise, intensity, consequence and recall are evaluated for relatively common memories (“The meeting with a police officer”) and the tracing ones, and between the latter components (flashbulb, traumatic, vivid memories). Unfortunately, the check-up of these hypotheses cannot give us any guarantee that these differences are at the basis or the result of different building up, maintaining and 239

Ticu Constantin recalling processes of these memories. The third hypotheses, which stated that memories detailing for each of the 3 categories of memories (flashbulb, traumatic and vivid ones) are dependent upon a different configuration of factors, both as type and weight, is also confirmed. As we have shown above, in the explanatory models for the four categories of memories there are different variables, with different explanatory potential. The only similitude in terms of predictive variables / factors is that between the vivid and traumatic memories: in both cases, detailing is dependent on the intensity with which the event has been experienced, the consequences importance upon the personal life and the recall frequency of that event in mind or in discussions with the others. But, as the results show, the weight of these factors is different: for the vivid memories, the recall has the main importance, the remembrance frequency about those moments, while for the traumatic memories the recall is less important, being decisive the intensity with which the event has been experienced and the importance attached to its consequences upon personal life. Of great importance is the conclusions referring to the flashbulb type events – “The beginning (announcement) of the revolution in mass media / Ceausescu’s running away”. The memories referring to this special event of our social memory and, by extrapolation to other flashbulb type events in the social memory are dependent upon two factors (variables): the intensity with which the moment has been experimented and the later event recall. According to our analyses, these two factors are sufficient to explain the variability degree of the flashbulb type memories detailing, the predictive model achieved by us being complete (it does not accept any other variables) and having a high prediction potential (the model explains 47% of the cases - a higher value for the regression equations). These results confirm the model proposed by M. Conway (1994, 1995) to explain the building up the normal and flashbulb type memories. With the only difference that the English writer, an authority in the field, offers 240

a larger extension to the flashbulb memories concept (“flashbulb memories”) and considers as belonging to the flash type also the personal event memories in which the individual is directly involved, not only as a "spectator", like in public memories. In the flashbulb type memories, M. Conway (1995) includes also the vivid intensive, positive memories (“vivid memories”), as well as those negative, and traumatic ones (“traumatic memories”). As we have mentioned in the second section (“The comparative analysis of tracing memories”), there are indeed many similarities, as well as remarkable differences between the three types of memories, referring, in our opinion, to different kinds of memories, which observe the distinct principles of building, maintaining and recollection. Through this study we support this point of view with arguments from the analysis of the empiric data, showing that between the four types of memories (common, flashbulb, traumatic and vivid ones) there are not only differences of weight (intensity) of the explanatory factors, but also different configurations in explaining the detailing degree of these memories. Although we accept these arguments as being convincing, we do not consider the debate closed, because we do not have the certainty that these are the only factors involved or that these are the causal ones, responsible for creating, maintaining or recollection the four types of memories. REFERENCES Baddeley, A. (1993). La mémoire humaine, Presses Universitaire de Grenoble, France. Brown, N. R.., Shevell, S. K. and Rips, L. J., (1986). Public Memories and Their Personal Context, in: “Autobiographical Memory”, Duke University, Cambridge University Press. Constantin, T. (2000), Amintiri “flash” – amintiri la intersectia între social si personal, în: ”Revista de psihologie sociala”, Nr. 5, Editura Polirom, Iasi, pp. 85-100.

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