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Public Organization Review: A Global Journal 5: 55–67 (2005) # 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands.

The Quest for Indigenous Administration: Asian Communist, Islamic Revivalist, and Other Models KEITH M. HENDERSON [email protected] State University College at Buffalo, 1300 Elmwood Avenue, Buffalo, NY 14222, USA

Key words: Comparative Administration, indigenous administration, Chinese government, Iranian government, grass-roots movements

Abstract This paper briefly explores instances of administrative indigenizationVdefined as native patterns neither imposed nor copied from Euro-centric systemsVand implications for the study of Comparative Public Administration. China and IranVas presented in the Comparative Public Administration literature, broadly definedVare suggested as iconoclastic administrative models which are both viable and interesting and in contrast with Western (Northern) models of study and application. Other emerging modelsVmany of them based on grass-roots movements (not to be confused with terrorist movements)Valso provide alternatives to the prescriptions of the New Public Management as well as to the conventional secular, ‘‘non-political’’ hierarchies. Comparative Public Administration needs to accommodate such alternatives on a coequal basis.

Introduction Comparative Public AdministrationVas it moves into the Twenty-First CenturyV faces an interdependent world of instant access and open communication andVarguablyVincreasing distrust of Western (Northern) models of study and application. The ‘‘Washington consensus’’Vthe package of free-market reforms which in John Williamson’s expression encompassed conventional World Bank and bi-lateral wisdom (Williamson, 1990)Vrevealed weaknesses in application, and academic study analyzed the consequences of New Public Management reforms around the globe. ‘‘Indigenous solutions for indigenous problems’’ may become the guiding preceptVeven in American CPA circlesVand grass-roots organizations of various persuasions may become pervasive. The degree of disaffection with imposed, ‘‘neo-colonial’’ models of administration tied to a single, international free-market economy dominated by a handful of nationstates should not be underestimated. The quest for indigenous models of administrative reformVas this article will attempt to showVhas already taken unexpected turns including the success of Iran’s Islamic Revivalist and China’s Asian Communist modelsVto name two which are system-wide.

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Other efforts to recast (or at least rename) institutions, to design training and education programs for officials without Western advice, and to develop policy models which are not simply derivative are currently underway. Formal statements such as the African Charter or Kampala Document andVmore recentlyVthe New Partnership for AfricaVmay present a critical policy challenge to Westernimposed programs. The centerpiece of the New Partnership is a peer-review mechanism to apply pressure on corrupt or incompetent regimes. Unlike previous plans, this one is designed to have enforcement powers. Under the New Partnership, countries that voluntarily participate will pledge to meet standards for clean government, democracy, and human rights and will be responsive to peer-review panels that will help with self-assessments (Economist, 2004). On the academic front, indigenous literaturesVsome highly polemicalVare arising to counter the ‘‘captive mind’’ and ‘‘colonized curriculum’’ (Alatas, 1993). Rather than a universalized, open exchange of ideas with continued Western (Northern) dominance, this scenario suggests increasing fragmentation. Administrative Theory has begun to address the putative inclusiveness of its models based on assumptions of regularity and order. Models of development often assume a linear movement from primitive to modern, underdeveloped to developed, or non-Western to Western. As Jamil Jreisat emphasizes, we need to ‘‘break down the ethnocentric fences in order to achieveVa deeper understanding of administrative problems and solutions in different contexts’’ (Jreisat, 2003, p. 162). This brief paper will explore two indigenous modelsVIran and ChinaVas examples of viable (not to be confused with desirable) alternatives to imposed or copied administration, andVfor small, decentralized instancesVwill attempt to describe the importance of grass-roots administrative movements. Implications for Comparative Public Administration will also be discussed.

Asian Communist Administration, the Chinese model Deng stated: ‘‘Streamlining organizations constitutes a revolution’’ (jingjian jigou shi yi chang geming). He said, seriously: ‘‘If we fail to carry out this revolution, if we let the present overstaffed and overlapping Party and state stay as they areVwithout clearly defined duties and with many incompetent, irresponsible, lethargic, under-educated and inefficient staff membersVwe ourselves will not feel satisfied and we will not have the support of the lower cadres, much less of the people’’ (He, 2001, pp. 187Y188). In the post-Communist world, the one major Communist system remaining is China’s. Although sometimes similar in stated objectives, the approach to development and administration has been primarily indigenousVin the sense of being neither imposed nor copied from Euro-centric systemsVandVin this caseVhas been implemented throughout the entire nation-state.

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China seems to have avoided most of the initial dislocations of ‘‘shock therapy’’ as employed in some former Communist systems. Its ‘‘gradualist approach’’Vwidely discussedVappears successful. Chinese reformers knew that there would be no guidelines for reconstructing a socialist economy. The process was necessarily open-ended, and lacking in detailed plans or blueprints (Wong, 2003, p. 287). The concept of mozhe shitou quo he (cross the river by feeling the stones) captures the methods used. Deng did not seem to trust ready-made designs andVunlike Mao and his set of doctrinesVbelieved practice was the best standard for judging truth (He, 2001, p. 287). In China the indigenous Communist Party remains significant in supervision of administrative activity even though some party officials have lost influence in the process of reform and decentralization. The Party reveals its importance in anticorruption drives, disciplinary measures, control over recruitment and training, indirect control through communal groups and in other ways. Following rejection of the Russian pattern of administration along with the expulsion of Russian advisors and, later, the shattering experience of the Cultural Revolution under Mao, the Chinese Communist Party in late 1978 and 1979Vunder Deng XiaopingVbegan introducing policy changes and accompanying administrative reforms. By any standard, it was a massive task in a controlled economy of over one-billion people. The first target of policy change was the agricultural sector, for which a new rural management system was introduced. The industrial sector was then addressed, with attempts to modify the large state-owned enterprises originally designed and operated with Russian assistance. Generally, the command economy was decentralized and designated areas of the country were used for experiments which, if workable, were then extended to other regions. The reform policies of Chinese political leadership beginning in the 1980s gave prominence to administration. Problems related to corruption, nepotism, and procedural obstaclesValong with questions of control by the PartyVwere the objects of reform. The ‘‘Gengshen’’ reforms attempted broad shifts in the roles of the party, army, and government, with considerable attention given to the separation of Party and government. In a case study of the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry, Oliver Williams showed how the mandate to modernize administrative management was executed. He pointed out that even though advanced management techniques used in other countries were studiedVincluding computerized information processingVthe Party maintained its cells and committees to ‘‘ensure that party and state policies were effectively implemented’’ (Williams, 1993). Official reports on the ‘‘democratic supervision’’ of government agencies through the party’s top political advisory body (the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) emphasized that supervision is mainly through suggestions and criticisms. There are interesting parallels between the New Public Management thinking and the structural administrative reforms in China. However, as Lee and Lo point out, there is no evidence that Chinese policy makers have ever consulted the

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gurus of New Public Management (Lee and Lo, 2001). Even though a younger generation of Chinese technicians and administrators has returned from higher education in the United States and other Western countries, its technical/ engineering/scientific training precluded contact with academic NPM. David Shambaugh points out that some of the central government reforms carried out by Deng were merely cosmetic, such as the merging of Ministries of Water Conservancy and Electric Power into a single Ministry. ‘‘But Deng’s administrative reforms (Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji’s to be more precise) did have the net effect of streamlining government organs, reducing overlapping functions, and substantially lessening party control over a wide range of economic and technical policy areas’’ (Shambaugh, 2000, p. 177). The more recent reforms of central administrative structure were a serious attempt to rationalize and downsize the hierarchy, according to Shambaugh. Similarly, other recent types of reform have been successful without undermining the ultimate control of the Chinese Communist Party (see Dickson, 2003; Dittmer, 2003). Community policing has enlisted the community including Public Security CommitteesVelected at the local levelVin almost all communities. These citizen organizations provide a link between policy and the people, using mechanisms of social control found in Chinese culture (Chen, 2002). The military enjoys a privileged position and has been able to develop a variety of commercial activities on its own. Basically exempt from governmental controls, at one point more than 20,000 business enterprises were developed ranging from transport and hotels to securities firms and pharmaceutical companies. The People’s Liberation Army exerted considerable influence, using its power to enter into foreign business arrangements and, through front companies, investing in Hong Kong, which became an administrative region of China in 1997. Evidence suggests that the ties between the Party and military are being strengthened as more officers are co-opted into the Central Committee and the Party continues an indoctrination campaign through all ranks. A recent definitive study of the People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Rand, 2003) suggests that the reorganization of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) was driven by careful analysis of the lessons of the Tiananmen failure. The PLA reasserted leadership over the PAP and brought about a more loyal and disciplined corps. It also transferred some PLA units to the PAP. According to the Rand study, issues of business involvement and logistical/ funding concerns have not been resolved (Rand, 2003, pp. 587Y633). An important aspect of administrative reform concerns the Civil Service and involves an intricate intermixture of Party and government. John P. Burns indicates that the Chinese Communist Party has managed the civil service system directly. It has appointed, transferred, and dismissed higher civil servants through the nomenklatura lists and promulgated rules and regulations for public officials. Traditional ideological training schools run by the Party have sought to maintain their status by undertaking modernized management training. Curricula have been updated in Party schools to include training in finance, real estate and securities,

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and exchange markets. A National School of Administration was authorized to retrain mid-level officials in public finance, law, and public economics (Burns, 1993). In 1993, the ‘‘Provisional Regulations of State Civil Servants’’ were promulgated with the intention of finally replacing the cumbersome and monolithic cadre system. The debate over development of this system in China reveals why and how it differs from formal Western systems. ‘‘It would be misleading to call the attempt to create a civil service system in China just an administrative reform’’ (Lam and Chan, 1995, pp. 1297). The role of the Communist Party and its previous tight control over management of cadres was reformed, in a uniquely Chinese manner. Party-state relations and state-society relations were both affected. A new round of administrative reform began in 1998 and was adjusted to the requirements of a socialist market economy. Jiang Zemin indicated that ‘‘Following the principles of simplification, uniformity and efficiency in the reform, we shall establish a highly efficient, well-coordinated and standardized administrative system, with a view to improving services to the people’’ (Huque and Yep, 2003, p. 145). Considerable success was realized with 11 of 40 ministries and agencies of the State Council eliminated, and half of the 32,000 civil servants in central government and nearly 1 million provincial and local officials transferred or dismissed (Huque and Yep, 2003). State enterprises remain a problem area. They have been granted considerable autonomy although they are still subject to constraints imposed by government departments through various forms of regulation. The emergence of a private sector over the past 10 or so years challenges the State Operated Enterprises. Individually owned and operated small enterprises and industrial operations with hundreds of workers are now found (Dickson, 2003). Interestingly, at the village level, the Party itself (through the National People’s Congress) initiated popularly elected village committees to replace the top-down leadership resulting from decollectivization of agriculture. The hope is that elected leadership with support from the people will be more capable of implementing central directives (Manion, 1996). In other areas, the state has also established a large number of economic and social organizations to help replace direct controls, channel interest articulation, and weed out unwanted groups (Dickson, 2003, p. 4). This helps to maintain Party control by sponsoring surrogate organizations. Cautious observers of the Chinese administrative scene are occasionally reminded of the differences between perception and reality and the difficulty of drawing conclusions from casual observation. Sometimes the impression of change belies underlying continuities. However, the unique example of China’s incremental approach to public administration reform suggests an important alternative to Northern/Western patterns. Because of the size and economic growth of that country it will remain important and has been the subject of a growing literature. Other Asian Communist systems include Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in SE Asia and, of course, North Korea.

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Islamic Revivalist Administration, the Iranian case TEHRAN (IRNA)V‘‘Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei here Sunday underlined the appointment of pious officials to the administrative posts.’’ ETTELA’AT (‘‘The Only International Persian Newspaper’’) May 31, 1994. Development of new administrative patterns may proceed along the path of sudden or gradual rejection of existing practices. Iran illustrates the contemporary extreme of the former; more than in a military coup or other abrupt political change, the entire rationale for administration was altered. KhameneiVin the quote aboveVwas addressing a group of senior officials, including then President Rafsanjani, on the occasion of Eid al-Ghadir, an important religious holiday. He related the appointment of officials to the philosophy expounded by Prophet Mohammad in naming Imam Ali as his successor. ‘‘The Islamic republic, which was established by the leaders of the revolution, was based on the Imamate model.VStructures had to be adapted, modified, or newly created, in a way which would equip them to fulfil Islamic functions’’ (Asaf, 1985, p. 135). Staffing of those structuresVadministrative as well as politicalVhad to be by men (and, peripherally, women) whose Islamic credentials were genuine, whether they were clerical (Ulema) or laymen. ‘‘Correct’’ Islamic institutions, under an Islamic rather than secular Constitution, would replace the ‘‘incorrect’’ and new political organizations would be created. The Universities would be closed; Western influences would be eradicated; administrators would meet the test of ‘‘political correctness,’’ Iranian style. In the same country that had received a massive amount of public administrative advice and assistance since the 1950s, little could be continued which was tainted by Western corruption in the eyes of the religious leadership. Under the Shah, the state bureaucracy had served as a pillar of the regime. It grew from 12 ministries with 150,000 civil servants to 19 ministries with over 300,000 officials in the fourteen years prior to the Revolution. New ministries included Labor and Social Services, Art and Culture, Housing and Town Planning, Information and Tourism, Science and Higher Education, Health and Social Welfare, and Rural Cooperatives and Village Affairs (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 438). The number of provinces was also increased, providing additional jobs and benefits for the population and simultaneously supplanting traditional powers of the local mullahs and landowners. A massive bureaucracy infused every aspect of daily life. The role of the civil bureaucracy in the Revolution was largely passive but it was a target of the Revolutionaries. ‘‘It was a popular expectation among the general populace that the bureaucratic ‘machine of the regime’ would be smashed or at

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least reorganized in a way as to be accountable and responsive to the public.’’ (Farazmand, 2001, pp. 890) In spite of this, Farazmand reports, there were no immediate changes in the structure of the bureaucracy. This changed as grassroots organizations assumed various administrative functions and displaced the traditional bureaucracy. The Reconstruction Crusade, the Economic Mobilization, the komitehs (neighborhood committees), the Housing Foundation, and other revolutionary organizations took over administrative tasks. Gradually, government officials were discredited, harassed, or hounded out of office by pressure from the top or the Islamic associations. Tasks were simply transferred to someone in favor (Salehi, 1988, pp. 165Y166). In 1982, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ministry was established following three years of activity by the Guards in numerous small Islamic militias. Each recruit had to pass tests in the Quran and Ayatollah Khomeini’s edicts, then undergo training at the hands of the Ulema. In addition to military-type functions, the Guards played a major role in the war with Iraq, handling internal security, anti-subversion, and ethnic repression. A vast economic conglomerate which began by taking over the properties of the Pahlavis and othersVmany of whom had been executedVgrew in the early years after the Revolution to include over 250 companies. This Mustazafan Foundation, with some 85,000 employees, at the time, was larger than the Iranian Oil Company (Hiro, 1985). Currently, the Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation (bonyad) is still functioning after 24 years and manages about 400 companies and factories in food and beverage, chemicals, metals, petrochemicals, construction materials, transportation, and other areas. It seeks partners interested in investing in Iran (www.iran-bonyad.com). Another unique aspect of the Iranian bureaucracy outside the Ministerial structure is the ‘‘Martyrs Foundation’’ (also a bonyad) which was designed to assist the families of those who die for Islam. Khomeini initiated it in February 1980 for those killed in the 1977Y79 period and its task expanded enormouslyValong with its budgetVduring and after the war with Iraq (Hiro, 1985, p. 252). While similar in purpose to Islamic welfare organizations in other parts of the Islamic world which are administered by political groups or associated with the mosques, the Martyrs Foundation along with other foundations (bonyads) appear to enjoyVby their scope and importance in relation to other organizationsVa special place in Iranian administration (Buchta, 2000, pp. 72Y75). Well before the death of Khomeini in June, 1989, ‘‘rebureaucratization’’ had taken place in the regular ministries. ‘‘One of the conclusions of this study is that not only has the Iranian bureaucracy not been abolished by the Revolution, it has survived and prevailed. It exercises a great deal of power and is being used for system enhancement as well as public administration under the Islamic Republic’’ (Farazmand, 2001, p. 894). At the top of each agency is a group of religious representatives who not only exercise political decision-making and oversight of day-to-day operations but, also, assist in coordination with other agencies. The Council of Guardians

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exercises ultimate control under the Ayatollah, who ‘‘answers only to God’’ (Abdo and Lyons, 2003). The 1990s saw many administrative reforms supported by two elected presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami. Extensive plans were initiated for privatization of state-run enterprises and contracting out for development projects. Bridges, roads, schools, electrical networks and other facilities have been extended into rural areas (Farazmand, 2001, p. 897). Pressures have been felt, however, from donor organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and European Union. Farazmand believes that responding to such pressures is a mistake since it compromises Iran’s independence (Farazmand, 2001, p. 896). Jahangir AmuzegarVa Finance Minister before the RevolutionVargues, on the other hand, that responsiveness to donor organizations is necessary to obtain access to foreign credit (Amuzegar, 2003). Reopening of the universities did not return academic curricula and programs to their previous condition. In the Islamic stateVas defined in IranVeducation must reflect Islamic thought and be cleansed of all Western values and influences; ‘‘spiritual purification’’ is required (Menashri, 2001, pp. 112Y113). It is not at all clear how this can be reconciled with the need for administrative skill and competence but some ingenious rationales have been attempted (see Adelkah, 2004). The conflict is not limited to Iran; traditionalists and modernizers vie for control of the agenda in a number of countries and public administration training can be either primarily technical or essentially ideological. The question arises as to just how viable is this new Iranian bureaucracy and the regime as a whole. Amuzegar, among others, points to workers’ demonstrations, teacher strikes, and student protests as signs of the growing discontent of the generation born after the Revolution, in 1979. In his view, this is more significant than the often-discussed schism between reformers and religious conservatives within the government and it will eventually topple the regime. Such predictions have been heard throughout the 25 years of the Islamic Republic and have consistently proven wrong.

Other emerging indigenous approaches The Chinese Communist and Iranian Revivalist models of administration are among the most important alternatives to imposed or imitated Western (Northern) styles but are by no means the only ones. A variety of approachesVincluding important grass-roots movementsVmay be found in the past and the present. Some, such as the Balinese subak organizations and the Indian Self-employed Women’s Association have been well studied. The former involves an intricate, traditional mixture of religion and management for agricultural irrigation (see Barth, 1993; Lansing, 1991). The latter has some 100,000 members in Ahmedaebad alone and relies on Gandhian values to provide maternal, health care, and micro-credit programs. (see Rose, 1992). Two other well-known examples are

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the Indian state of Kerala and Porto Alegre, a city in Brazil; both have successfully experimented with participatory administration (see Fung and Wright, 2003; Evans, 2004). Self-governing cooperative systems are found many places and may be focused on health provision, education, housing or other functions. Self-governing squatter communities, for example, may enjoy enough grass-roots support to pressure governments for both resources and autonomy (Mathey, 1997). Of particular concern to students of Comparative Public Administration seeking new alternatives are the spontaneous, often temporary movements and organizations that may become institutionalized as NGOs (non-governmental organizations). Lester Salamon refers to a global ‘associational revolution.’ ‘‘From the developed countries of North America, Europe and Asia to the developing societies of Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc, people are forming associations, foundations and similar institutions to deliver human services, promote grass-roots economic development, prevent environmental degradation, protect civil rights and pursue a thousand other objectives formerly unattended or left to the state’’ (Salamon, 1994, p. 109). Along with the larger efforts such as the ‘Village Awakening Movement’ in India which operates in thousands of villages, the similar Sarvodaya Shramadana movement in Sri Lanka focused on small-scale village improvement projects in more than 8,000 villages are the Christian Base Communities found in Brazilian rural areas. In Africa, numerous small-scale self-help projects have been initiated by peasant farmers such as banking schemes, food storage arrangements, barter exchanges, family planning, and traditional medicine centers (Pradervand, 1989). Traditional chiefs continue to play a governance role in many areas of Africa (Herbst, 2000). In the Caribbean, NGOs serve as intermediaries between the micro level of the poorest household and the formal apparatus of the stateVa role which might otherwise be served by political parties or trade unions. ‘‘NGOs and local development organizations (LDOs) are widely perceived as agents for alternative development, particularly because, as a sector, they have begun to formulate development policy, often with a direct impact on official aid policies’’ (Lewis, 1994, p. 128). Lewis reports a massive growth of NGOs and LDOs in the Caribbean over the last decade, including a variety of women’s groups and environmental groups. Other indigenous organizationsVusually on a small scaleVare found in all parts of the world: cooperatives, associations, federations, religious and charitable enterprises, entrepreneurial military organizations, and many others (Henderson, 1999). These may be unifunctional or multifunctional; they may be officially sanctioned or not. SomeVsuch as Bangladesh’s well-known Grameen Bank which supplies credit to the poor, particularly womenVhave been so successful that they have been widely copied over a long period of time. Others have filled gaps in unique circumstances where education, health services, or welfare was lacking. A considerable literature of relevance to Comparative/Development

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Administration has arisen; performance and accountability of NGOs and similar grass-roots organizations, for example, have been studied as part of a larger concern with the development of civil society and the role of non-governmental actors in representing needs of the poor and disenfranchised (e.g., Edwards and Hulme, 1996). ‘‘Co-goverance’’ has been summarized with examples from India, Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere (Ackerman, 2003). The problem of co-opting NGOs into larger World Bank designs has also been addressed as a threat to selfdetermination (Nelson, 1995).

Implications for comparative public administration Most areas in the Developing World and former Second World seek some degree of separation from Western administrative hegemony. The ‘one size fits all’ administrative prescriptions associated with loans, grants, and outside interventionsVparticularly the New Public Management versionVdo not consider indigenous practices, often treating them as aberrations. It is widely believed in the West thatVsimilar to principles of scienceVother concepts including ‘development’ and ‘administration’ are universally applicable. Even the term ‘development’ is an invention of the West andVas applied to the Developing WorldVimplies linear movement, accelerating rates of change, and removal of impediments to ‘progress.’ Dwivedi notes that simply because a ‘principle/concept’ has originated in the West, it does not automatically become the only truth (Dwivedi, 1994, p. 12). Gandhian ‘swaraj’ like Zapata’s ‘ejidos’ offer striking instances of evolutionary change which does not accord with Western linear ‘development.’ Long-standing administrative practices in the Middle East such as diwan and wasta deserve greater recognition. The notion of SHOURAV Islamic government through consultationVand the inseparability of religion and administration could become dominant concepts. Willingness of the elites in developing countries (and former Communist countries) to accept externally-inspired prescriptionsVarguing for a ‘trickle-down’ benefitVoften masks perceived opportunities for those elites to benefit. ‘‘Pushing marketization and privatization, with a globally dominant public administration model, will have a tendency to empower further the ruling elitesVthe big capitalists, large landowners, big corporate powers, and regimes that are too often corrupt, undemocratic, and repressive’’ (Farazmand, 1994, p. 81). This paper has attempted to show how an extreme alternative to the usual prescriptions by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund/bi-lateral donorsVIslamic Revivalist AdministrationVis manifested in Iran and how Asian Communist Administration reveals a second alternative. Additionally andV arguablyVmore desirable alternatives are found in associational forms. The importance for a global cross-national study of administration of viable alternatives to Western/Northern ideas andVultimatelyVbodies of supporting academic materials is considerable.

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One contrary scenario is complete fragmentation of study and practice, an administrative ‘clash of cultures’: African administration; Islamic administration (already a clearly defined area without the Revivalists); Asian Communist/ Confucian administration; Hindu administration; Japanese administration; Slavic administration; Latin American administration; Native American administration, and others. Even more specific study and application would involve individual countries or narrowly defined regions, much as currently found in the West: U.S. public administration; French public administration; German administration; etc. This fragmentation would be less desirable than internationalization to global designers, with open exchanges, but it would be without dominance by any group of countries. In addition to breaking down ethnocentric fences and moving beyond teleological development models, prescriptive Comparative Public AdministrationVif it is to offer guidance to policy makersVneeds to recognize and explore non-Western alternatives and to expand its theoretical horizons. For the latter, several arenas offer promise including resource-dependency theory which assumes organizations require resources and, hence, must accommodate resource providers (see Jaffee, 2001). Also important are the New Institutional Economics, Game Theory, and Chaos and Transformation Theory. The ‘new institutionalist’ literature sees institutions as dynamic and draws attention to the broader context in which institutions are embedded (see Cortell and Peterson, 2001). In Transaction Cost Analysis (probably the most prominent part of the New Institutional Economics) institutions evolve to economize on transaction costs (see Hindmoor, 1998; Horn, 1995). Game Theory can explain adaptation of institutions or organizations to sudden drastic changes in the environment and breaking out of equilibrium patterns (see Kreps, 1990; Osborne, 2004). Chaos and Transformation Theory moves towards constructing deterministic, nonlinear dynamic models that attempt to explain irregular, unpredictable behavior (see Tsonis, 1992; Farazmand, 2003). As one relevant application of Chaos Theory, Farazmand has shown how a supposedly stable system in Iran under the Shah collapsed by the ‘butterfly’ effects of the Revolution, producing shock waves that pushed the system to the edge of chaos. The emergence and rise of the new system is explained in terms of its adaptive dynamics which not only allows for survival but stability, power, and self-reliance in the face of foreign interference (Farazmand, 2003). Organizational analysis, and reform strategies, need to be informed by such theoretic perspectives and adjusted to the realities of an administrative world no longer willing to accept Western/Northern hegemony.

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Keith Henderson is Professor of Public Administration, Department of Political Science, State University College at Buffalo. He is the author of many articles and editor or co-editor of several books in American and comparative public administration.