Administrative_proceedings_digest.doc

Sandoval v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation is a government-owned and controlled corporation organized and existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 which was enacted on July 11, 1983. Pursuant to Sections 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869, respondent PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country.Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose. Similar favorable opinions were received by PAGCOR from the Office of the Solicitor General per its letter dated June 3, 1996 and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel under its Opinion No. 150 dated June 14, 1996. Thus, PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons. Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque pelota games by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for being patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and in usurpation of the authority that properly pertains to the legislative branch of the government. Issue:

Whether or not PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai.

Held: The Supreme Court ordered the closure of all jai alai betting stations in the country after it found the game operators did not have the required franchise from Congress. SC justices said that contrary to what it says, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. (Pagcor) does not have the power to grant a franchise for jai alai operations. It was ruled that Pagcor had erred when it granted Bell Jai Alai Corp. and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corp. (Filgame) the authority to manage, maintain and operate jai alai. From its creation in 1977 and until 1999, Pagcor never alleged that it has a franchise to operate jai alai.Twenty-two years is a long stretch of silence. It is inexplicable why it never claimed its alleged franchise for so long a time, which could have allowed it to earn billions of pesos as additional income. Four congressmen earlier questioned Pagcor approval of the revival of jai alai operations. Petioners claimed that Pagcor and the two private companies usurped Congress authority of granting franchises to legal gambling. Pagcor cannot use the decrees issued by deposed dictator Ferdinand Marcos on jai alai since these had been revoked when Corazon Aquino took over the presidency in 1986. It was noted that on May 1987, Aquino issued Executive Order 169 which repealed Marcos presidential decrees 810 and 1124. "The new order revoked the jai alai franchise. The law is clear on the extent of Pagcor’s powers. There can be no sliver of doubt that Pagcor’s franchise is only to operate gambling casinos and not jai alai.

Solid Homes v Teresita Payawal Facts: On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,developer,dealer,broker or salesman? Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction. As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential Decree No 957” Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: a) unsound real estate business

practices, b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and, c) cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The challenged decision of the respondent court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.

Gerochi vs. DOE Facts: RA 9136, known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001. Petitioners Gerochi et al contest the constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented. Issues:1.Whether or not there is a procedural lapse through violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts Held: First issue: Yes. As taken from the decision of the Supreme Court: “Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus

standi. However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this "Complaint" directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition. Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution27 categorically provides that: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action. This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein.”

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the

said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of nondelegation of powers. RULING: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)." It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: 1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the

delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007) FACTS: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. ISSUE: Whether the proceeding is adversarial in nature RULING: Yes. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.

With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition

Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007) FACTS: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. ISSUE: Whether the proceeding is adversarial in nature RULING: Yes. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition

Ponce v. NLRC G.R. No. 158244 August 9, 2005 Ernesto Ponce and Manuel C. Balignasay, petitioners v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division), Innodata Philippines Corp., Innodata Processing Corp. (Innodata Corporation) and Todd Solomon, respondents Summary: Private respondent is a corporation engaged in data processing of raw data supplied by its clients. A revised policy for absences and tardiness was then issued by said company, which lessens the allowable absences for employees as well as increased the corresponding penalties imposed. A labor union from the said company challenged such issuance going through the entire process of arbitration, from the grievance machinery all the way to the National Labor Relations Commission. Herein petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal due to lack of

just cause by reason of the on-going arbitration at the time of their dismissal of the policy to which their employment was terminated. The Labor arbiter sided with the petitioners however, the 2nd division of the NLRC reversed the arbiter’s decision. This was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals and subsequently dismissed the petition while a motion for reconsideration was still pending with the NLRC. Petitioners now assails that the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to dismiss their petition while a motion for reconsideration was still pending with the NLRC. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction due to the pendency of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC Ruling of the Court: 1.) The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent notwithstanding the pendency of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. It was held in the case of M. Ramirez Industries v. The Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment that: “A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction.” WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. The Ombudsman Facts: 1. Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s Association (PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on the public bidding conducted by MWSS for projects APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat Water Supply Optimization Project (AWSOP), which aims to provide 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million residents in the metropolitan area. 2. The letter of complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent plan even before the bidding to favour suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to hold in abeyance the award of contracts.

3. The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued an injunction directed to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS (1) to set aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids, and Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that contract no. APM01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and (2) to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder. 4. Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged order contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint and has the power to issue orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside the recommendation of PBAC-CSTE and to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder. Held: No, while recognizing the investigatory and public assistance duties of the Ombudsman, the assailed orders were an undue interference in the adjudicatory responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law. The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals a predisposition against the use of fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal matter. As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation of waterwork system to insure uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of potable water. Therefore, it is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans. The exercise of this discretion to reject a bid and to award contracts, which is a purely technical matter, is vested in the MWSS entrusted with such function that even courts or the Ombudsman cannot unduly interfere from.

HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO vs. FILIPINO T. TANDOG FACTS: Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August 1983, she was appointed Municipal Assessor. Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report based on an investigation he conducted into alleged

irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brother-in-law Marcelo Molina. Respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its report recommending petitioners separation from service, Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 1 dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner. Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC and CA, which affirmed respondent Mayors order of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process RULINGS: In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even brought the matter to this Court for final adjudication. Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. Thus, in the case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias .The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails. Neither are we persuaded by petitioners argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the complainants were never presented for cross examination. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense Nothing on record shows that she asked for cross examination. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that she has been deprived of due process merely because no cross examination took place. Again, it is well to note that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for reconsideration of the recommendation of the committee dated 22 November 1996. The essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

The Court finds far little basis to petitioners protestations that she was deprived of due process of law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair.

As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner means is that the assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence.

The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.

Dy-Dumalasa vs Fernandez Facts:

The respondents filed a complaint against HELIOS, (a closed domestic corporation engaged in soap manufacturing located in Muntinlupa, of which petitioner is a stockholder, a member of the Board of Directors, and Acting Corporate Secretary) for illegal dismissal or illegal closure of business, non-payment of salaries and other money claims. Despite service of summons, of the remaining four members of the Board, only Leonardo Dy-Dumalasa, HELIOS’ President and General Managerhusband of petitioner, appeared with counsel. With the repeated non-appearance of the members of the Board in the scheduled hearings, the Labor Arbiter required the parties to submit their respective position papers. Only respondents complied with this directive. Despite the grant of a 10-day extension, HELIOS et al. failed to submit theirs, hence, the cases were deemed submitted for decision. In the meantime, HELIOS et al. moved to have their position paper admitted. There being no proof of service of the motion upon respondents, hearings/conferences between the parties were again scheduled, but HELIOS et al. failed to attend the same despite due notice. Hence, the Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro denied HELIOS et al.’s motion to admit their position paper and again deemed the cases submitted for decision. The Labor Arbiter, who took into account HELIOS et al.’s position paper despite the earlier denial of their motion to admit it, found HELIOS, its members of the Board, and its stockholders, by Decision, liable for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. After respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the Labor Arbiter set a pre-execution conference. Again, only respondents appeared during the scheduled conference, drawing the Labor Arbiter to issue a Writ of Execution. Pursuant to the Writ, Sheriff Antonio Datu issued a Notice of Levy on Real Property under which a house and lot in Ayala-Alabang in the name of petitioner and her husband Leonardo Dy-Dumalasa were levied upon. Petitioner moved to quash the Writ, putting up the defense of corporate fiction as well as lack of jurisdiction over her person, claiming that the labor tribunal never acquired jurisdiction over her person due to lack of summons, and reiterating her defense that HELIOS has a separate personality, but this was denied. Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff despite absence of valid summons to the plaintiff herself. Held: YES. The Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over her person regardless of the fact that there was allegedly no valid service of summons. It bears noting that, in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. In the cases at bar, petitioner, her husband and three other relatives were all individually impleaded in the complaint. The Labor Arbiter furnished her with notices of the scheduled hearings and other processes. It is undisputed that HELIOS, of which she and her therein co-respondents in the subject cases were the stockholders and managers, was in fact heard, proof of which is the attendance of her husband, PresidentGeneral Manager of HELIOS, together with counsel in one such scheduled hearing and the Labor Arbiter’s consideration of their position paper in arriving at the Decision, albeit the same position paper was belatedly filed. Lastly, the petitioner’s act of filing the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution as well as her submission of a Memorandum of Appeal was tantamount to submission to the Arbiter’s jurisdiction.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR Facts: The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a motion for reconsideration wherein the court has considered the legal conclusions stated in Spanish language. The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment of the majority of this court and remanded the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for new trial averring among other issues that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was shortage of Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made him necessary to lay off the members of the National Labor Union, Inc. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine Army. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood. Issue: Won the issues should be properly directed, resolved or determined by the Court of Industrial Relation. Held: Yes, The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It is more an administrative than part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a more receptive organ of the Government. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. Accordingly, the motion for new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR with instruction that it

reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance w/ the requirements set forth hereinabove.

Bautista vs WCC Facts: Andres Bautista, spouse of the petitioner, was employed a switchman by respondent PNR. The nature of his work was rigorous and the place of his work was dusty and he was constantly exposed to the elements. His duties include the loading and unloading of cargoes, operating the railroad switch, and cleaning the premises of the PNR station. He was found ill of tuberculosis, by reason of which he was forced to stop working even before the compulsory age of retirement. However, his application for early retirement was not approved. Dr. Lopez diagnosed claimant's illness as PTB, Far Advanced; and further opined that claimant's illness of PTB was the result of the nature of his employment. Thereafter, he filed a notice of injury and sickness and claim for compensation. Andres Bautista died while his disability compensation claim was pending review by the respondent WCC. The hearing officer dismissed the compensation claim because of repeated nonappearance of the claimant and the counsel. On their motion for reconsideration, petitioner through her counsel pointed out that the hearing of the case was delayed by reason of the repeated non-appearance and motions for postponement on the part of counsels for the respondent PNR. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The WCC affirmed the decision dismissing the claim. Hence, this present petition. Issue: WON petitioner is denied of due process. WON petitioner is entitled for the disability compensation claim. Held: The respondent WCC gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and in not passing upon the issue of denial of due process squarely presented by claimant's counsel. The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter so as to ensure observance and protection of an

interested party's right to a hearing Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counsel's "repeated non-appearance" at the hearings cannot stand. As for the disability compensation claim, the attending physician’s conclusion that the deceased illness of tuberculosis was the result of the nature of his employment warrants the claim for disability compensation. Under Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, tuberculosis directly caused by employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of said employment, is compensable. Furthermore, under the presumption of compensability, claimant's illness of tuberculosis is presumed compensable; and the employer assumed by force thereof the burden of showing the contrary by substantial evidence. Respondent employer failed to discharge this burden even at this late stage. Hence, the prima facie presumption became conclusive.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., vs. THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA FACTS: National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under the name of "Philippine National Lines" is the owner of steamship "S.S. Doña Nati" whose local agent in Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August 4, 1960, the Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp & Company informing it that S.S. Doña Nati was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations in that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21”. C.F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the latter answered the notice stating, that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense." The Collector of Customs replied to stating that the television set in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactory enough to exempt the vessel from liability, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. ISSUE: whether or not the collector of customs acted properly in imposing said fine without first giving the operator an opportunity to be heard.

RULING: No We find this action proper for it really appears that petitioner Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. A violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents. FACTS: * PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 [7] on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. * respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling

PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. * the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. * the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district. * respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law. HELD: * In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction. * Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

* In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. * Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

DOMINADOR DANAN and ADORACION FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. A. H. ASPILLERA, and HON. ALEJANDRO A. GALANG, Commissioners of PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and CORTISAN & COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Facts: Petitioner spouses were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the installation, maintenance, and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan, issued to them by the Public Service Commission in 1958, which ice plant was acquired by purchase from third persons. However, for abandonment or non-operation, the said certificate was cancelled and revoked. Petitioners filed a joint motion for reconsideration with regards to the orders of Public Service Commission cancelling and revoking the certificate of public convenient of herein petitioners to operate a 4-ton ice plant and the subsequent certificate of public convenience granted Cortisan& Company. It appearing from the report, dated February 1, 1960 the engineer of this Commission who inspected applicants' ice plant in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, on January 29, 1960, that applicants stopped the operation of their ice plant since October 1956, and have not resumed operation of the plant to the time of inspection, so that there has been abandon of service for almost three (3) years, it is ordered that certificate of public convenience for the installation, maintenance and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan, issued to applicants by virtue of the decision rendered in case on January 17, 1958, be, as it is hereby, CANCELED and REVOKED for abandonment of service. Thus the petitioners filed motion for reconsideration which was denied and the Public Commission insisted that the decision have already become final, irrevocable, and executory. Issue: Whether the Commission violated the right of the petitioners in not giving the operators previous notice and opportunity to explain their side which is a violation of due process of law. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. This practice violates the due process clause of the Constitution, the express provision of section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act, and the doctrines of this Court (Bohol Land Trans. vs. Jureidini, 53 Phil. 560; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Halili, L-6075, 31 August 1954; Collector vs. Buan, L-11498, 31 July 1958). The Public Service Commission is an agency of the comment, and should at all times, maintain a due regard the constitutional rights of parties litigant. Also, the Commissioners (who are not judges in the true sense) would do well to ponder the implications of Article 32, No. 6, of the New Civil Code on the individual responsibility of public officers and employees who impair a person’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission Facts: Petitioner, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Public Service two (2) applications, namely, one for the reduction of rates for non-residential customers and commercial customers and another for the reduction of rates for residential customers. Subsequently, MERALCO filed a third application, this time for the reduction of general power rates. The last application was provisionally approved, whereas the first two (2) were granted. Respondent Public Service Commissioner (PSC) rendered a decision setting the rates MERALCO was authorized to charge its customers. The decision was based on the report of the General Auditing Office which had audited and examined the MERALCO’s books of account. The PSC denied MERALCO’s request for a hearing and reception of evidence on the rate of return it was to be allowed on its invested capital. Two (2) of the Commissioners denied the motion stating, among other things, “the desire of the MERALCO to cross-examine witnesses and present oral testimonies may just lead to more years of protracted and delayed hearings, which will undoubtedly affect adversely the public interest. Hence, the procedure followed by the Commission in deciding cases was the usual practice long adopted by the Commission in fixing rates of electric power plants. Issue: Whether or not MERALCO was afforded due process of law Held: No, The procedure followed by the PSC in deciding rate fixing cases for electric power plants upon the submission of prepared forms issued by the agency or the submission of pleadings, briefs and memorandum or even by mere inspection, without any hearing, amounts to a denial of the petitioner’s day in court. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal.

BISSCHOP V GALANG 8 SCRA 244 (1963) FACTS: George de Bisschop (Bisschop), an American citizen, was allowed to stay in the country until 1 August 1959 as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc. (Bissmag), of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. However, this application was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration – in view of damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin De Mesa to the effect that Bissmag is a gambling front and that Bisschop is suspected of tax evasion – in a communication of 10 September 1959 and Bisschop was advised that he should depart within 5 days. Bisschop’s counsel requested a copy of the decision. The legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, where the result of an application for extension is a denial, no formal decision, order, or resolution is promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and expediency. Bisschop then filed this petition for prohibition. The RTC granted the petition, ordering the Board to refrain from arresting Bisschop and that it should first conduct formal hearings. ISSUES: * Whether or not the Commissioners of Immigration required to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens RATIONALE: * Since CA 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, the Court is inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate due process because the letter instructing Bisschop to depart is a mere formality, a preliminary step.

o The requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. Furthermore, a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. o Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law.

Realty Exchange Venture Corporation vs Lucina Sendino

FACTS: Private respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a house and lot in a subdivision. She paid a partial reservation fee and paid the full down payment. However, for alleged noncompliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract. Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).The HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered REVI to continue with the sale of the house and lot. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public respondent. Appeal dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not HLURB has Quasi-Judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of express grant by E.O. NO. 90 which created it. HELD: Yes. While E.O. 85 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a reading of its provisions that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which continued to exercise its powers and functions. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating what it considered the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its

intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those juridical agencies which performed vital administrative functions. The President subsequently issued Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the government.Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing development in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB, would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition. Moreover, this Court, in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, has had the occasion to definitively rule that the HLURB could exercise the same quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers possessed by the HSRC under the MHS in the exercise of its regulatory functions. Section 1 of PD 1344: the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648: Transfer of Functions. — The Regulatory functions of the NHA are hereby transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. . . . Among the regulatory functions are . . . (11) Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices, claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific performance. There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, instead of by a division of three:Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division. We cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held "to

be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld."

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, ET AL VS DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ FACTS Petitioners are parties to various “inter partes” cases before the Philippine Patent Office. Under the Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166), the Director of Patents have original jurisdiction over “inter partes” proceedings. This Rule, however, was subsequently amended by the Director of Patents, with the Approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, authorizing any ranking official designated by the Director of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings.

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners’ cases to hearing officers Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein. Petitioners filed their objections to the Authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of Rule is illegal and void because under the law, the Director must personally hear and decide “inter partes” cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether the designation of hearing offices other than the Director of Patents is a violation of due process. HELD No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”