Admin 2nd Case.docx

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005 Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not. Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Discussions: Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means is that the

initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Rulings: R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007 ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), petitioners vs DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), respondents. FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC HELD: No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation. Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.

Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010 FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained. Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as follows: 1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva 2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales 3. Armi Jane Borje The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC. Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy; 2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping; 3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and 4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls. RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the

higher number of votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment. The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.