Acta Astronautica Vol. 40, No. 2-8.

Acta Astronautica Vol. 40, No. 2-8.

pp. 545-560,

1991

81997 International Astronautical Federation. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain 0094-5765/97 $17.00 + 0.00

PII: sw4-5765(97)00147-l

THE NEW U.S. GOVERNMENT SPACE SYSTEM ACQUISITION POLICY ITS IMPACT ON RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

AND

Chester L. Whitehair and Malcolm G. Wolfe The Aerospace Corporatton El Segundo. CA 902454691. USA

INTRODUCTION

keepmg costs to a mintmum. are used to describe the benefits and penalties that can be encountered.

In its efforts to reduce the budget deficit. the Umted States (U.S.) government has &utiated new acquisition policies which are caustng significant repercussions throughout the space mdustrv. Drasttc budget cuts have been made m both the civil and military sectors, at a ti*me when the dependence on the use of space is expandmg exponentially. Private industry IS being asked to carry a greater responsibility for space system development and. tn the interest of cost savtng, is also being encouraged to incorporate foreign [particularly Former Sovtet Union (FSU)] subsystems and technology into U.S. space systems. The intent of the new acqutsition policy IS to place the responsibihty for the mtegrtty of the systems on the private contractor by reducing specifications, documentatton and government oversight. A risk that is faced is that the Integrity of space systems. unlike many other systems produced for the commercial markets, cannot be fully demonstrated on the ground and often is not challenged until the system is required to perform a critical life-or-death function. Tradittonally, space systems designed for the government have been subjected to constant detailed scrutiny from conception to operational use. either by the customer or by an independent organization [a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)] which does not produce hardware and has no vested interest other than misston success.’ Although the new acquisttion policies are intended to reduce acquisition costs m an envtronment of ever-decreasing budgets, it IS not clear that reducmg front end costs and customer overstght will necessarily reduce the total program cost of bringing systems to a rehable and fully operational state.

WHAT

IS

ACQUISITION

REFORM

Acquisttion reform IS a widespread activity pervading all departments of the U.S. government to reduce the cost of government procurement of goods and services.’ It is being Implemented tn response to declining government budgets, the ristng cost of government procurement, and the perception that private sector space technology is outstripping government technology. A recurring theme is to replace government oversight by Insight and to transfer the responsibility for government space system development to private industry. Its implementation in government organizations such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Department of Defense (DoD) is having considerable Impact on the whole U.S. space community. ‘.’ This new way of doing business is summarized in Figure I. Under the acquisition reform process, Request for Proposals (RFPs) contain no government standards or specifications [for example, military standards (MIL STDs) or Military Specifications (MIL SPECS)]. as either compliance or reference documents. The government philosophy is to not tell the contractor how to run the program. Instead, the government outlines what the contractor must achteve and allows maximum flexibility for the contractor to pursue what they see as the best solution to the government requirements. Instead of a detailed Statement of Work (SOW) the government provides only a Government List of Objectives (GLO) which merely describes the broad objectives of the program. The number of Contract Data Requirement Lists (CDRLs) is strictly limited. The government needs to know how the contractor will address the system level requirements while allowing the contractor to propose the methods, procedures, policies, materials, and resources by which they will satisfy those requirements. The key management challenge is to replace the highly centralized, micromanaged government bureaucracy with a simple orgamzattonal structure. The general approach to

This paper discusses the issues raised by the new policies. the possible consequences, and proposals to ensure that the government and the contractors fully understand and manage the process so that it does not Inadvertently build risk mto one phase of a program that can cause catastrophic failure and excessive cost of recovery further down stream. Lessons learned, such as from the Air Force Space Test and Expertmentatton Program (STP), which has a long history of usmg a management philosophy which allows for acceptmg greater risks in the interest of 545

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546

InthePast) Government

lndush

Detailed SOW

Performed Government Way

Detailed Spec

Constrained Solution

Many Mil Specs and Standards

Limited Flexibility

Many CDRhs

Huge Cost

Massive RFP

Massive Proposal

Becomes

Source:

Joint Air Force/Industry Figure

Acquisition 1.

REFORM

IN

-I

Government

Industry

Statement of Objectives

Determines “How”

erformance Spec

Best Solution

Fewer Mil Specs and Standards

Greater Flexibility

Limited CDRLs

Report as Needed

streamlined RFP Performance Based Proposal Reform Training

New Way of Doing Business

acquisition reform is common to all U.S. government departments. It can be illustrated by describing how it is being applied by the Department of Defense.

ACQUISITION

NOW ._

DOD

Acquisition reform in the DOD was initiated by William Petry, Secretary of Defense, in 1994.’ In 1995. DOD Directive DoDD5000. I and DOD Instruction DoD15000.2, which have been the centerpiece of defense acquisition policies and procedures for nearly 25 years, were modified. ‘.’ ’ The modified DOD 5000 documents were approved by the Secretary of Defense on March 15, 1996.’ These documents, along with the 5000.2-M documentation manual that was introduced in 1991, describe a disciplined management approach for acquiring systems and materiel to satisfy valid military needs. The intent of the change is to make a complete break with the present system and the creation of a new system which will allow the integration of the defense industrial base with the commercial industrial base. The update incorporates new laws and polictes that have been enacted since the last update. These include the Federal Acquisition Streamlmmg Act (FASA) and the institutionalization of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).”

DOD Directive 5000. I emphasizes the mterrelationship of the three principal acquisition decision support systems: 1) the Requirements Generation System, 2) the Acquisition Management System. and 3) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Several important themes now run throughout the documents. Teamwork. ‘Theprocedures described in DODD 5000.2 help to create an acquisition system that capitalizes on the strengths of all participants in the acquisition process. The importance of working as cross-functional teams is emphasized. Tailoring. While all programs must accomplish certatn core activities, the appropriate Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) has the authority to tailor how and when these activities occur. MDAs strive to tailor most aspects of the acquisition process, including program documentation, acquisition phases, and the timing, scope and level of decision reviews. MDAs management should be tailored to specific program circumstances, rather than treating every program identically. Empowerment. Program managers have the authority to do anything not prohibited by statute, Executive Order FAR/DFARS, or the DOD 5000 documents. The DOD has long relied on volumes of

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guidance and regulation, prescribing every detail of both process and documentation, and has traditionally dealt with Industry through a rigid system of military specifications. The updated documents reflect current efforts to empower contractors to do the best they can. The documents do not reduce responsibility. but balance responsibility with authority. They reduce the burden of mandatory procedures and specifications. but encourage prudent risk management. They imbue the acquisition process with a customer focus: to provide the best, most effective system or capability. in the most timely fashion.

contract changes without having to share the savtngs with the government. However, if block changes to fixed-price development contracts yield what the Pentagon government deems “significant one-sided” savmgs. the company is expected to negotiate a spht of the money with the DOD and cost-benefit analyses will have to be submitted. No such analysis is required for “low value” or “short life” contracts. Failure to define “short-life” and “low-value” leaves considerable room for interpretation by government administrative contracting officers (ACOs) and corporate lawyers.

Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). The new acquisition process must consider both

“Lightning

performance requiremknts and fiscal constraints. Accordingly, cost must be an independent variable in programmatic decisions, with responsible cost objectives set for each program phase.

Commercial Products. Historically. DOD has relied on segments of the U.S. technological and industrial base principally dedicated to supporting DOD requirements. Today, the number of vendors capable or willing to provide Items or servtces to the DOD has decreased. However. technology advancements in some commercial sectors outpaces Government-sponsored research. Procurement of some commercial items, when practical. may provide the rapid and affordable apphcation of these technologies to validated DOD missIon needs. Best Practices. The cost of the current defense acquisition process, in dollars and time. is too high. Reporting requirements, cost accounting practices, oversight, audit, and quality assurance provisions all contribute to an overloaded management process. The Intent IS to replace outdated management techniques and philosophies by a simplified and flexible management process, modeled on sound commercial busmess practices. Using the contractor’s best practices imphes a significant reliance on the abihty of the conuactor to carry out the contract and completely fulfill all mission requirements.

Single Process Initiative. The Single Process Initiative was issued by Paul Kaminski. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology in December, 1995.” The intent is a complete break with the present system and the creation of a new system which will allow the integration of the defense industrial base with the commercial industrial base. It IS to enable firms to consolidate or eliminate most (preferably all but one) of the manufacturmg processes they are applying to ongoing military contracts. Where appropnate, companies may also consohdate military and commercial production processes. Industry has pushed for the right to make

Bolt” Initiatives. Darleen Druyun. the .4lr Forces Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Management announced on 28 February, 1995, that the Air Force will add two acqulsmon reforms to what are termed the “Lightning Bolt” mltiatives. “’ One will look at the science and technology business practices in the Air Force laboratortes and the other will aim to cut the time between formation of a requirement and award of contracts. On the laboratory measure, the Air Force IS lookmg to remove federal acquisition restrictions on certain contractual agreements, much the same way as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) operates. In terms of cutting the time between formulation of a requirement and contract award, Druyan confirmed that it will require more electronic contracting. She predicts that RFPs will come out on CD-ROMs and source selection will also be electronic. Presently, eleven Druyun “Lightning Bolt” initiatives have been issued. Establrsh a centralized Request for Proposals (RFP) support team to scrub all RFPs, contract options, and contract modifications over $10 milhon Create a standing Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP) composed of senior level acquisition personnel from SAF/AQ. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (AFMC) and the usier Develop a new System Program Office (SPQ) manpower model that uses the tenets established In the management of classified/SAR level programs Cancel all AFMC Center-level acquisition policies by 1 December, 1995 Re-invent the AFSARC process through Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) Enhance the role of past performance in source selectlons Replace acquisition documents with a Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) Revise the Program Executive Officers (PEO) and DAC portfolio review to add a section that deals specifically with acquisition reform Enhance the acquisition workforce with a

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47th IAF Congress comprehensive education and training program that integrates acquisition reform initiatives Look at the science and technology busmess practices m the Au Force laboratories Arm to cut the time between formation of a requrrement and the award of a contract

GENERAL

balanced program, identify and resolve issues. and make sound and timely decisions. IPTs may include members from both Government and industry. including program contractors and sub-contractors. They mclude program management, engineering. manufacturing. test, logistics. financial management. procurement, and contract administration. IPTs operate under the following broad princtples.

PRINCIPLES l

DODD 5000.1 articulates genera1 principles to guide all defense acquisition. These principles are representative of the approach being taken to acquisition reform across all government departments and are organized mto three broad categories:

l l

l l

. .

.

l

Translating operational needs mto stable, affordable programs Program stabihty Risk assessment and management Total system acquisition Cost as an Independent variable Program objectives and thresholds Acquiring quality products Event oriented management Hierarchy of materiel alternatives Communication with users Competition Test and evaluation Independent assessments Orpamzmg for efficiency and effectiveness Streamlined organizations Acquisition corps Teamwork Limited reporting requirements Automated acquisition information

INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT

PROCESS (IPPD)

AND

PRODUCT

Integrated Process and Product Development (IPPD) is a management technique that simultaneously integrates all essenttal acquisition activities through the use of multi-disctplinary teams to optimize the design, manufacturing and supportability processes. IPPD facilitates meeting cost and performance objectives from product concept through production, including field support. One of the key IPPD tenets is multidisciplinary teamwork through Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Another that is evolving in a similar vein is through Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams (PATS). Other manifestations of IPPD include the Army’s Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs) and NASA’s Technical Coordination Teams (TCTs). Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs consist of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplmes working together to build successful and

Open discussion with no secrets Qualified. empowered team members Consistent, success-oriented, proactive participation Continuous. “up the line” communications Reasoned disagreement Issues raised and resolved early

Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams (PATS). Druyun Lightning Bolt number 5 calls for reinventing the AFSARC process through the formation of IPTs known as Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams (PATS). Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs). The U.S. Army is planning to use Intepated Concept Teams (ICTs) to develop requirements. ” ICTs will consist of mdividuals from Army user, requirements and acquisition communities. and relevant DOD staff, industry and academia. Under the new concept, the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command will be responstble for all decisions on requirements. Technical Coordination Teams (TCTs). NASA is totally committed to acquisition reform in its Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Technology Demonstration Program.” Figure 2 summarizes how what are termed Technical Coordination Teams (TCTs) are being used to streamline the activities of the industry/government RLV development partnership.

MILESTONE

DECISION

AUTHORITY

Certain core issues must be formally addressed at appropriate milestones for every acquisition program. Before making program decisions, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) designatedto approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase should rigorously address core issues such as: . . . . . .

Why is the program needed Has the need been validated What specific capabilities are needed When do the capability need to introduced into the field or fleet How much will the program cost Is the program affordable and fully funded

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X-Vehkk RLV PwDociola” RLV-LllHP

STS-suppwl I cvoluuon IHPRPT

IRlD X-Vohkk LT I HP Program k lully rllgned with RLV indultry pattwn. Highw undrrstanding and support of LTI HP by Mustry. Technology tasks am: - not duplicatlvr - mrrimiza synergy to w~pporl htgher number of programs and oroonm activitks . high;, I~vwaga with lxkbng 6 pknned activities build on. nthrr than repeat past efforts - htghw kvol of integration with existing efforts and rinds - initiitrd I mrintainrd with idontifurd requirwnwM for a sp*cific application(s) Metrics, mllo~ton~s, and technology delivwabks based on idantifkd needs

RLV Pre.D9cirk” RLV-LTlHP

slssuppor(I Evolutlo” IHPRPT ,n#uSllvcuwiu. Facilltks Expwtke

Figure

. . . . . . l

. .

.

’

2.

NASA

Technical

Why was this solution selected Have alternate solutions been reviewed Has the program’s risk been assessed Has a program baseline been developed What is the acquisition strategy Is the system or item producible Can the system be supported Has the stabihty of the design and the operational capability of the system been verified Is the system operationally effective and suited to the need

HOW IS ACQUISITION IMPLEMENTED

REFORM BEING

Acquisition reform is being applied to both on-going and new programs SPACE NEWS reports an Air Force claim that acquisition reform has already helped the Air Force avoid $13 bilhon in costs it would have incurred under previous rules.” Reforms so far have saved about $326 milhon on the Milstar program, f80 million on the Global Positioning System and 5579 million on the Talon Shield program, according to SPACE NEWS. One of only four Air Force lead programs, the EELV Program IS in the forefront in implementing the new DOD acquisition policy.” Streamlined management concepts are m force. includmg a small SPO. dedicated IPTs. acceptance of government Insight rather than traditional oversight to nurture maximum contractor flexibility and responsibility, paperless documentation. and the reduction of bureaucracy with only three levels of management (System Program

Coordination

RLV RLV-LTlHP SrSsup~

I EVotutlo” IHPRPT

kwwFwflltks II

EXpWt&

I-

Team (TCT) Process

Director, Program Executive Officer and Service

Acquisition Executive). The EELV goal is to reduce the cost of launch by at least 25 percent. The NASA Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program IS entirely dedicated to acquisition reform.”

HISTORY

OF ACQUISITION

REFORM

The application of streamlined government procurement practices is not new. One example is the U.S. Air Force Space Test and Experimentation Program.“, ” Another is the Advanced Launch System (ALS).” U.S. Air Force Test Program (STP) The U.S. Space Test Program (SIT’) has suppoqed the DOD space research community since 1966 by providing umque space flight testing opportunit/es for experiments ranging from basis research to advatjced development. Budgets have always been limited and. in response, the program has developed a management philosophy to minimize costs by using private industry’s best practices, eliminating imposition of government specifications and standards, and minimizing the size of the program office. STP specializes in providing access to space using excess payload capability on the Space Shuttle or other government. commercial, and foreign maipline launchers. and on dedicated small launch vehicle/s. The STP has flown more than 50 missions in the pas1 30 years. More than 370 experiments have been flown in support of operational missions, including communications, navigation, weather, surveillance

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and reconnarssance.

Space Test Experiments Platform (STEP) Program. In 1989, drastically reduced budgets drove STP to explore new ways of fulfilling its mission. To accomplish this, STP imtiated the STEP program in an effort to demonstrate that contractor’s best practices could effectively replace restrictive government control. A contract was awarded in April 1990 to TRW Space and Electronics Group in Chantilly, Virgtnia, and their major subcontractor CTA Space Systems tn McLean. Virginia. The contract called for a series of small modular satellite buses whose largely of-the-shelf components could be assembled to meet the unique requirements of experimental payloads from the Tri-Servrce Expertment Revtew Board (Tri-SERB) list. The contractor’s best practices would be used tn lieu of military specifications and standards. Program documentation and configuratton control would be minimized. non-redundant subsystems used. test requirements relaxed, and a mintmum staff employed. The contract type would be fixed price with a penodic award fee during the destgn, build. and test phases of the program and a performance-based incentive that could be collected during on-orbit operattons. T&Service Space Experiments (TSX) Program. The Tri-Servtce Space Experiments (TSX) Program represents the latest STP initiative in streamlining the acquisitton process. TSX goes beyond STEP by assigning to the contractor the role of provtdmg not only the spacecraft, but also the launch services. TSX permits the contractor to decide what percentage of the total contract dollars they are willmg to assign to the on-orbtt Incentives. The government will match dollar-for-dollar the amount placed in these incenttves. This new contracting approach transfers much of the risk management effort from the government to the contractor.

focus on contractor responsibility for the product, and the application of Total Quality Management (TQM) practices.

ACQUISITION REFORM COMMERCIALIZATION

AND THE OF SPACE

Acquisition

reform in both the civil and the military sectors of the space community has provided a major

impetus to the commercialization of space. Reduced federal budgets and the threat of closure of government facilities has encouraged state government officials to look to surplus federal resources and the private sector to generate economic benefit. As a typical example. in a January26. 1996. letter to President Clinton, Florida’s Governor Lawton Chiles suggested that unused military launch infrastructure at Cape Canaveral be converted to accommodate a variety of foreign launch vehicles, including Russian rockets. The Florida Spaceport Authority said the proposal is intended to offset the negative economic impact of U.S. agreements allowing Russian, Ukranian. and Chinese launchers to fly as many as 60 U.S.-built commercial satellites through 2001. Flying foreign launchers from American soil would generate jobs for the domestic workforce. Public / private partnerships between the Air Force, NASA, private industry and Florida’s Spaceport Authority are evolving. The Spaceport Authority is already converting one facility for multiple U.S. launch services providers, and has requested a second facihty to serve other government and commercial missions. “Creating a Floriaiz-based intemational spacepon at Cope Cunuveml would provide &iitional capaciQ and greater synergy to domestic satellite builders and would augment the joint development of the International Space Station, ” Chiles said. “It would also offset some of the economic and job impacts to Florida of recent defense downsizing and reductions in NASA ‘s workjorce, ” he added.

Although the STP program is considered a success for experimental mtsstons. it is clear that its practices may not transfer easily to the operational world. This IS demonstrated by the fact that, in 1994. implementing the TSX inittattve resulted in all three operational small commercial U.S. launch vehicles, the Lockheed Martin Lockheed Launch Vehicle (LLV). the EER Systems Conestoga. and the Orbital Sctences Corporatton (OSC) Pegasus failing.

The FAA, which like other departments of government is committed to acquisition reform, through its Department of Transportation Office of Commercial Space is faced with ensuring the safety of commercial space launches and, at the same time, encouraging industry to privatize access to space.

The Advanced Launch System (ALS) Program The Advanced Launch System (ALS) program

WHAT IS THE EXPECTED ACQUISITION REFORM

(Initiated in 1988 and later cancelled) was the first DOD program to implement some of the cost-savmg concepts bemg incorporated into the new acqutsttton reform process, such as paperless environment, P

Acqutsitton

OUTCOME

OF

reform, if it is applied as quickly as its proponents would like, will cause radical change in how the whole space community (government and

47th IAF Congress pnvate) conducts its business. Cost savings will be achieved in the near term. Whether these cost savmgs will be sustainable throughout program life cycles IS hard to predict. Reduced Control

D’ocumentation

and

Configuration

Cost savings should be realizable if the number of documents required to be delivered under each contract IS reduced. Large programs such as the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) and Milstar require up to 70 contractually deliverable documents. In additton. the contractor’s format can be used for documentation Instead of burdensome government documentation. Consolidation

of Space

Resources

Acquisition reform is causmg consohdation and reduction in force in government as well as Industry as management practices converge Two Air Force program offices that are products of previous consolidations - the Military Satellite Communications Office and the Space-Based Infrared Systems Program Office, have embraced acquisition reform initiatives to produce faster, better and cheaper space systems. Two launch vehicle system program offices. the Titan and the Medium Launch Vehtcle offices, at the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (AF/SMC) have been combined into one. The new organization’s focus will remain on the products. with launch systems organized into IPTs with separate support functions for each. The Program Director still reports to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and the PEO for Space on Titan IV. The SMC Launch Programs System Program Office @MC/CL) consolidated with the Launch Programs System Program Office which included Atlas, Delta, and Inertial Upper Stage with Titan Systems Program Office. The Titan Systems Program office was responsible for the Titan II, the Titan IV, and the Centaur Upper Stage. Program

Office

Consolidation.

According to Co]. Brazie, Program Director, the organization will more closely resemble re-engineered businesses that have cut corporate bureaucracy and have flattened their organizational charts for a leaner, more efficient organization. Standardized operations and streamlined organizations are expected to reduce Titan IV launch processing time by 43 days at the Cape Canaveral Eastern range and by I34 days at the Vandenberg Western range. The Air Force expects to cut Tttan IV program costs by IS to 20 percent tn the next three years. Contract Consolidation. NASA hopes to cut $850 million from its long-term budget hy

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eltminating duplicative management functtons. The agency may consolidate as many as a dozen space operations contracts worth $500 to $600 million in the areas of maintenance and operations support. sustaining engineenng and general support of its worldwide space networks, mission and network control facilities. data processtng and planning systems and telecommunications systems. if Implemented, four field centers could be affected: Johnson, Marshall, Goddard. and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This is in addition to the on-gotng consolidation of about 28 Space Shuttle operations contracts. Human Resource Consolidation. Acquisition reform WIIIinevitably lead to consolidation of human resources, both in government and private industry. resulting tn loss of jobs in the space community. Consolidation of Military and Commercial Processes. In many government contractor’s

facilities there are different processes imposed to manufacture similar product lines. In one example quoted by Dr Kaminski. a defense contractor was forced to use eight different soldering specifications five for the government and three for commercial customers purchasmg similar types of products. Three separate production processes were maintained by General Dynamics for the Atlas Centaur vehible one for DOD, one for NASA, and one for commercial vehicles. The DOD single process initiative will consolidate multiple processes to one or two and reduce costs. The Single Process Initiative authorizes firms to consolidate or eliminate all but one of the manufacturing processes they are applying to ongoing military contracts. Where appropriate, companies may also consolidate military and commercial production processes. Industry has lobbied for the right to make contract changes without having to share the savings with the government. However, if block changes to fixed-price development contracts yteld what the Pentagon government deems “stgniticant one-sided” savings, the company ~$1 be expected to negotiate a split of the money with the DOD and cost-benefit analyses will have to be submitted. No such analysis is required for “low value” or “short life” contracts. Failure to define “short-life” and “low-value leaves considerable room for Interpretation by government admmistrative contracttng officers (ACOs) and corporate lawyers. Consolidation of Government Agency Satellite Management Responsibility.

For more than three decades, the U.S. government’s satellites have been lumped into three management spheres: defense, intelligence and civil, Within each

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sector, various agencies or military services have been responsible for tasks such as budgeting, operations, and maintenance. To reduce cost. the General Accounting Office (GAO) claims there is an opportunity for agencies to share some of these responsibilities. In the words of a GAO audit report. “The lack of strong coordination and cooperation incentives among the agencies within these sectors has encouraged both direrent solutions to similar problems and overlap in capabihty. ----- We recommend that the Natlonal Science and Technology Council develop an inter-sector space policy ---- that would integrate, consolidate. and share to the extent feasible, the nation’s satellite control networks. ” The agencies affected would be NASA, the National Oceeanio Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). the DOD. and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Government Outsourcing The DOD believes it can save up to $15 billion by embracing new outsourcing initiatives, particularly in areas such as depot maintenance, base operatmg support, waste disposal, distribution and transportation, warehousmg. housmg. finance and accounting, and data centers. To reduce the cost per flight, NASA is also making drastic cuts in the number of government and contractor personnel mvolved in Shuttle operations. Privatization of Shuttle operations has been discussed, but the present plan is to consolidate Shuttle operations under a single sole-source Space Fhght Operations Contract (SFOC) with United Space Alliance, a 50-50 joint venture by Lockheed Martm and Rockwell International, in order to launch the first Space Station element in December, 1997. Presently, the two companies control almost 70 percent of the current Shuttle operations contracts which is an argument for not re-competing the contract. Government Acquisition of Commercial Products and Services The dynamic nature of information technology has outpaced the development of military information systems. The military’s acquisition system for information technologies lags behind commercial developments. It has been recommended that Air Force laboratories “recast” themselves as users of commercial and university research, rather than developers of information technologies since the commercial sector IS developing faster, better and cheaper. In the software area, although there is pressure to use “commercial-of-the-shelf’ (COTS) systems to meet military needs, the military has a tendency to modify

the commercial products even when modificatton is not required. Since the commercial sector is now advancing at breakneck pace the military can profit from using commercial products. Encryption is needed m some areas but ndt everything needs to be encrypted. Also. as the commercial sector depends more and more on software products for day-to-day operations It will inevitably develop and incorporate encryption safeguards to protect itself against cyberterrorists and industrial espionage. Increased Emphasis on Dual Use Technology Development The DOD has admitted that, in some areas, private sector technology is more advanced than the military. This factor, combined with the intent of the military to encourage m their supphers the application of the “Smgle Process Initiative” will naturally lead to an emphasis on dual use technology development. Importation of Private Corporate Practices into Government NASA is bemg brought into line with private corporate structure. Virtually all pro@am oversight authority IS expected to be transferred to the centers. The top level of managers, known as Associate Administrators, would remain at Headquarters with responsibility for obtaining funding, making policy and determining requirements for programs. Program managers who run the projects and handle funding would be based at the centers and report to the center directors. Capital investment board of directors would Implement full-cost accounting methods that include personnel and facilities in budget estimates. As stated earlier, the reorganization being carried out at AF/SMC will result in the SPOs taking on the character of re-engineered commercial organizations. Privatization of Traditional Government Functions Reductions in government budgets will mandate that certain functions traditionally performed by the government, or by government regulated organizations, will be dropped or transferred to the private sector. NASA Institutes. According to SPACE NEWS, NASA plans to create new, university-run institutes to take over scientific research conducted by the agency, as it cuts its staff by more than 30 percent.” The institutes are not intended to replace NASA’s 12 research centers, but, as NASA downsizes, will take over much of the scientific work now conducted at these centers. Three mstltutes that may be set up within the next IWOto three years include: a Biomedical Research

47th IAF

Institute at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Houston; an Astrobiology Instiwe at the Ames Research Center. Moffett Field, California; and a MicrogravIty Institute for Fluid and Combustion at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Otuo. Already m existence are: the Global Hydrblogy and Climate Center at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntville, Alabama; the Astromaterials Institute at Johnson Space Center; the Goddard Institute for Space Studies at Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; and the National Space Science Data Center. Goddard. Additional proposals include: a Space Science Institute at MSFC; a Space Power Institute at Lewis; an Atmospheric Science Institute at Langley Research Center, Hampton. Virginia; and a Microgravity Institute for Materials and Biotechnology at MSFC. By forming independently managed institutes. NASA hopes to ensure a vibrant research program as the agency cuts thousands of staff positions as part of the government agency-wide downsizmg initiative. Some NASA personnel are expected to be hired by the new organizations. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, such as those operated by The Aerospace Corporation and the MITRE Corporation, will be subjected to budget cuts proportional to those Inflicted on their sponsors. Dr Kaminskr stressed at a press conference on February 5. 1996. that FFRDCs are important DOD partners and major contributors to national security. However, the new acquisition policy and the move towards the government becoming a customer of the commercial sector mandates change. The DOD has scrutinized FFRDCs and introduced several major mitiatlves to manage these organizations more effecuvely. .

.

.

.

Sponsors of’each FFRDC have idenufied focused “core” work appropriate for each FFRDC. Current work that is not core work is bemg transitioned out of the FFRDCs A new DOD policy requires use of stringent cnteria for the acceptance of work outside the core by the FFRDC’s parent corporation. This will ensure a focus on FFRDC operations by the parent and eliminate concerns regarding “unfair advantage” in the acquiring of such work An independent Advisory Committee of highly respected individuals from outside of DOD has been established to conduct a review of DOD management. use, and oversight of its FFRDCs A new set of guidelines has been developed to ensure that management fees provided to FFRDCs are based on need and detailed

Congress

553

Justification. One proposal is to reduce fees to zero

MF has already spun off a separate company, Mitretek Systems. 10 pursue government work outslde the FFRDCs that MITRE opeiates for the DOD and the FAA. and eventually start a commercial business sector. In order to retain its unique cadge of skilled aerospace professionals, The Aerospace Corporation is planning 10 merge with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) ad is also seekmg work outside the Air Force-sponsored FFRDC from domestic, foreign and international clients.

Corporate Mergers and Consequent Downsizing In response to the new government policies, U.S. aerospace companies are universally merging and downslzing their work force. Unfortunately, in the process, they are eliminating their human knowlidge base which could have a serious detimental affect on future programs. Increased Emphasis on International Agreements and Cooperauon For several years U.S. space policy has encouraded the domestic space industry lo impon foreign technology, and particularly Former Soviet Union (FSU) technology. where benefit can be obtaineq. This has resulted in a number of agreements between U.S. and FSU firms. particularly in the rocket propulsion area. ” It has also resulted in Russia becoming a partner in the International Space St+on program and the formation of new international organizations to market FSU launchers.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ACQUISITION REFORM In principle, acquisition reform is obviously a “good thmg” but there are some pitfalls that have to ba considered. Grave concerns have been expressed1 for Instance, by senior government officials, such as Mr. Derek J. Vander Schaaf, Deputy DOD Inspector General.“’ In a prepared statement lo the House Small Business Committee, Mr. Vander Schaaf said: “Acquisition refoml ... . is carrying out a longstr+zding industrial or supplier agenda to cunail or elimin@te many ofrhese key safeguards which have been +ift ituo the United States procurement process over: the past 200 years. I broadly class these as disclosure requirements. certifications. price-reduction requirements and audit rights. Certain of rhese safeguards help ensure cosf #Gr price) and quality, borh of which become greater risks as we rely wore on commercial products and practices. It is our

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e.rperience .... that large private sector purchasers consistently require these same apes of safeguards in their own dealmg with suppliers . High Cost of Program Recovery if Untried Policy is Applied Without Scrutiny but titer Proves to be Faulty Examples are the Shuttle Challenger failure m 1986 and the Titan III failures in the mid 1980s. Many launcher families have experienced a series of failures when oversight principles have been bypassed.

Transfer of Space Private Sector

Product

Liability

to the

Traditionally, U.S. government contractors have been shielded from product Itability lawsuits. The basis of that protection has been the practice of the government to dictate, in excruciaung detail. how space systems should be developed. tested and manufactured. Once the product was accepted by the government, all legal liability shifted to the government. Under these conditions. attempts to sue government contractors have been unsuccessful. As the use of commercial processes and performance standards become the rule, manufacturers will be held responsible for the integrity of their products. The aerospace / defense industry could be exposed to the kind of judgments imposed on other types of commerctal activities, such as those suffered by the auto and oil industries. This could amount to hundred of millions of dollars a year and escalating insurance costs.

increase

In Insurance

Premiums

The new acquisition policy is expected to generate an increased need for insurance services in the aerospace industry. As the government transfers responsibility to the private sector, it can also be expected to disavow liability. Acceptance of delivery of a product or service to the government will no longer automatically shift the liability for damages caused by that product to the government. The contractor may no longer be shielded from litigation by the government and its exposure to risk could be the same as if it had delivered the product to a private sector customer. It can be expected that a broader insurance base will be required and insurance premiums will increase. Establishing a protocol for converting to performance standards and commercial practices from the world of “mils pets” may be as risky as tt is potentially rewarding because of possible product liability problems and lawsuits. If Rockwell International had been held responsible for the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986. for instance. litigation costs IO the corporation could have been overwhelming. Expendable launch vehicles do not have a long history.of offering a threat to the life and

limb of the civilian population, but deaths have occurred in two recent Chinese Long March failures. If this had been the result of a Delta Atlas or Ariane launch expensive litigation proceedings would have immediately been inittated and the fleet would have been grounded for years, resulting in extensive loss of revenues. The latest Long March failure was clearly caused by the Chinese launch vehicle. However, in the case of the previous two Long March failures, blame for the failure was never assigned or accepted by either the launch vehicle or the satellite. If a similar event occurs in the future where loss of life takes place, we can expect an enterprismg American litigation lawyer to file a lawsuit against an American company such as Hughes m the U.S. courts on behalf of the families of the deceased, whether they are American citizens or not. History shows that the courts could easily rule agamst the defendant.

Undiagnosed Oversight

Failures

because

of Lack

of

Space systems will continue to fail. Acquisition reform mandates insight rather than oversight of private industry and oversight rather than insight into the FFRDCs that have traditionally performed the unbiased oversight role over industry for the government. There are many examples of the problems generated when the oversight function has been relaxed or eliminated. Examples include the Space Shuttle and the DMSP, IUS. Titan III. Pegasus, LLV, Conestoga. and Long March programs.

Cost Overruns

Late

in a Program

The MDA concept, which is intended to avoid cost overruns. could result in exactly the opposite. Each MDA could still pass his/her problems downstream. The acquisition reform initiative, like the U.S. justice system, does not incorporate a fool-proof way to assign crime and punishment.

Lack

of

Program

Continuity

Putting aside the debate as to whether the Space Shuttle Program was good or bad, the Shuttle would never have flown if the new acquisition reform policies had been in place. An MDA would very likely have stopped the program.

Overly Conservative Program Management Value Criteria Based on “‘Avoid Failure” rather than “Succeed” At a critical pomt in a program the MDA could be too cautious, resulting in the kind of event that occurred in the case of the X-34 program but with greater down-stde consequences if a national security issue were at stake.

47th IAF Congress Neglect of Total Quality Management Principles The acquisition reform initiative had part of its

genesis m the space launch industry as a guiding principle in the joint DOD/NASA Advanced Launch System (ALS) Program.” The ALS program, although cancelled in 1993, was planned to revolutionize the procurement of a new family of launchers to achieve a recurring cost goal of 5300 per pound to orbit. The ALS program pioneered some of the management practices that are being re-invented and partially applied in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Propam. The experience and lessons learned at the program office and contractor level (that is, at the day-to-day working rather than the Washington bureaucracy level) during the ALS program do not appear to be reflected in the acquisition reform initiative and appear to either be bemg ignored or are unknown to the architects of the acquisition reform initiative. Degradation of Customer Cause of Failure

Insight

into

A lack of formalized oversight could degrade the level of customer and contractor insight into the cause of a particular failure resulting in uncertainty and risk in the recovery decision process. Examples of this phenomenon are: the run of Titan III failures in the mtd-1980s; the Long March failures of December 21, 1992, January 26. 1995. and February 14. 1996. when neither insight or oversight information was made available to the customer: the Lockheed Martin LMLV and Conestoga failures; and the Pegasus XL failure where insight identified only a single anomaly tn both the first failure and the second, but when an oversight review was implemented for the second failure. 87 anomalies were dtscovered. Disruption Functions

of

Critical

Government

Reduction in oversight and excessive outsourcing will place cxtenstve dependence on the private sector to protect the public interest. Labor strikes or the vested interests of management or stockholders could degrade critical government functions at a time of crisis. Public Interest Lawyers

Held

Hostage

by Corporate

Corporations may have increased opportunities to exploit the U.S. legal system against the public interest by pitting highly paid experienced, wellconnected court lawyers against possibly young, less well-pald government lawyers.

Conflict of Interest in Consolidated Business Relationships The wave of mergers and consolidation in private

industry could result in one prime contractor’s

555

subcontractor being acquired by a rival prime contractor. This could result in the “blacklisting ” of suppliers to protect proprietary interests. As companies merge in response to declining budgets. fewer and fewer may remain to serve as independent contractors whose fortune is linked directly to the success of the prime contractor’s efforts. Merging companies (an example is the Lockheed Martin I Loral merger) are having, as a condition of permission to merge, to accept an agreement with the Federal Trade Commission that strictly limits the amount of information a company’s subsidiarieslwill be able to share with the parent company. However, in practice. such an agreement is obviously impossible to enforce and likely to result in expensive litigation, the costs of which will be passed on to the customer. the U.S. taxpayer.

INTERNATIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

The new DOD acquisition strategy encourages the use of foreign sources and international cooperative developments where advantageous and within the law. The potential exists for enhancing reciprocal defense trade and cooperation, including international cooperative research, development, production, logistic support, and the sale of military equipment, conststent with the maintenance of a strong national technology and industrial base and mobilization capability. Ail Western defense departments are facing the challenge of reconciling high operational capabilbties with reduced budgets and instituting changes sin&r to those being pursued by the DOD.” The U.K., for example, is concluding that outsourcing is the solution. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) isi one of the British government’s key policies in the drive to deliver higher quality and more effective public services.‘? Other policies with a similar aim are privatization and the Competing for Quality (CPQ) initiative. PFI differs from privatization in that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) retains a substantial role and controlling interest, either as the main customer for the services provided or as an essential enabler of the program. It differs from CFQ in that the private sector is involved as the provider of the product as well as the services. These policies represent a fundamental change in the role of the MOD, which, like the U.S. DOD. is moving away from being a provider of services to becoming a purchaser of services. The MOD has identified six areas as particularly fertile ground for PFI. Increased private sector involvement also is being pursued through the government-wlde CFQ. Thus far. 123 defense support activities with

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annual operating costs of more than 1 billion pounds (%1.S2 billion) have been reviewed with savings of 250 million pounds ($380 million) bemg forecast. Four activities were abolished altogether. Other national and international aerospace organizations are dedicated to acquisition reform, particularly m Europe. At a recent space transportation workshop chaired by Mr. Chester Whitehair, Vice President, Space Launch Operations, The Aerospace Corporation, a prestigious international panel of experts concluded unanimously that the assured access to space that everyone desired would be best accomplished by international cooperation.” ’

WHAT IS THE CORPORATION

AEROSPACE DOING

Many people are concerned that, in the attempt to streamline government space system acquisition, space system expertise that has been accumulated over the past 35 years will be lost. Several hundred spacerelated military specifications and standards and Commander’s Policies were cancelled as part of acquisttion streamlining. DOD cancelled these “milspecs” with good reason: to concentrate on product performance rather than the manufacturmg process. However, mvaluable. hard-won. and enduring lessonslearned were painstakingly embodied m those specifications and standards. MIL-STD- 1540 is one of the better-known examples. containing methods for restmp satellites on the ground to prevent failures on orbn. Because The Aerospace Corporation was heavily mvolved in the creation of many space-related specifications and standards it is in a unique position to document these lessons-learned. Sponsored jointly by the Chtef Engineer’s Office and the Oflice of the Executive Vice President, a threeyear prqject is underway to develop an Aerospace lessons-learned handbook. The purpose of the handbook is to capture expertise that Aerospace has acquired over 35 years and to document ways to mittgate technical risk in the acquisition reform environment. The handbook is envisioned as a “sage wisdom” reference tool for program managers and matrix personnel to reduce technical risk in their programs. Each chapter will cover a particular military specificauon. standard or Commander’s Policy. Chapters will include the historical background of each lesson: problems that led IO its creation: why certain methods. procedures or requirements were adopted; why other approaches were discouraged or

forbidden: and the types of programs or development phases important to the lessons-teamed. When appropriate. chapters will contain provisions for recommended language. with tailoring instructions to be included m an acquisition package if a prooffice wants to ensure that the “spirit” of the document is to be contractually required. The Aerospace Corporation is working closely with AF/SMC on this project. AF/SMC is carrying out a complementary effort entitled Critical Processes Assessment Tool (CPAT). CPATs are aimed at those who write RFPs and do not contain background rationale. The Aerospace Corporation lessons-learned handbook will provide the background. The handbook is expected to capture lessons learned from approxtmately 45 space-related specifications and standards and accessing the human knowledge base of Aerospace Corporation space veterans is crucial to the success of the project. At this time, chapters have been written to capture the lessons learned previously embodied in DOD-E-83578A. General Specification for Explosive Ordnance for Space Vehicles; MIL-A83577, Moving Mechanical Assemblies: and MILSTD-498, Software Development and Documentation. The Aerospace Corporation has been actively involved in program office consolidation at AF/SMC. This has resulted in several primary streamlining actions that have been heralded as acquisition streamlining success stories by the Assistant Secretaty of the Air Force (Acquisition), Darleen Druyan. By reducing FFRDC support, it is estimated that the Delta II Program will achieve cost savings of $9.5 million from FY95-01. The Atlas II Program has reduced its manpower support by 30 percent. In i 8 months. the Titan Program achieved a 33 percent reduction in contract settlement time, a 25 percent reduction in FFRDC/SETA support, a 90 percent reduction in contract provisions, and a 78 percent reduction in both mil specs/standards and CDRLs; SPO manning was reduced from 329 personnel to 247 personnel between August 1994 and March 1996. The IUS Program will achieve a cost saving of $9.4 million from FY96-FYOO due to a reduction in FFRDC support. While The Aerospace Corporation is helping the Government to make acquisition reform a success, it is also considering its own future. As Government financial support declines, the corporation expects, through its merger with SAIC, to maintain its unique carp of expertise by offering its services to non-DOD customers. This will enable it to retain its traditional level of excellence in its support to its Force, and at the same time participate effectively in the expanding globalization of space.

47th IAF Congress SUMMARY

failure of the first flight of the European Atiane 5 and two consecutive Soyuz failures, in spite of extreme vtgilance and care, demonstrate that routine access to space has yet to be achieved by any nation. Perhaps traditional oversight procedures are still required by the space launch community. The effect of acquisition reform on mission success will be validated over the next few years by the results of the mandated changes made in the Air Force/Aerospace Corporation launch risk mitigation procedures and the success of the EELV and RLV programs. In the meantime, Aerospace is documenting the corporate knowledge base, built up over more than 35 years, to ensure that lessons-learned are not forgotten. Also, in response to the downsizing of government technical work, which is the inevitable consequence of acquisition reform, the company is packaging the products it has developed for the government in a form that can migrate easily to the private sector. In this way, the investment in space technology made by the U.S. taxpayer over the last 40 years will1not be lost but will be available to help private industry carry the responsibility being transferred to it by acquisition reform.

/ CONCLUSIONS

Insight into the Pegasus failure revealed a single anomaly on each of a series of flights. When concern over, the series of failures resulted in a traditional government oversight review being applied, the result was more than 80 anomalies were identified, and finally a successful flight achieved. The Chmese Long March launcher had three out of five flights fail without any clear understanding as to why the failures occurred. The range of potential failure points is broad, as illustrated in Table 1. It is believed that the intense scrutiny traditionally applied to U.S. government launches, and particularly the revtew which takes place when a failure does occur, would have mitigated this sttxng of failures. Relaxatton of these stringent requirements may stall be detrrmental to U.S. launch industry although, because these requirements have been imposed for many years by the U.S. government. their best features have already been incorporated into the private industry culture for mamline launches. Nevertheless, Figures 3.4 and 5 demonstrate the historical effectiveness of the launch risk mitigation practices and procedures traditionall!, used for U.S. government launches. The recent Table

1.

Air

Force/Aerospace

Date

Launch

Launch Vehicle

Atlas SLV-3D Tttan 3C Atlas E Atlas E Apr-83 IUS Titan 34D Aug-85 Titan 34D Apt-86 Delta 3914 May-86 Atlas G Mar-87 Titan 34D Sep-88 Titan 3* Mar-90 Atlas I* Apr-9 I Atlas I Aug-92 Atlas I* Mar-93 Titan 4 Aug-93 Pegasus XL Jun-94 Pegasus XL Jun-95 Aug-95 ----Delta 7925.-_ * moderate involvement Sep-77

Mar-78 De3380 Dee-8 I

557

Failure

Investigations:

Failure

Site

Booster gas generator Stage 2 hydraulic pump Booster engine lube system Booster gas generator SRM-2 nozzle Stage 1 propellant feed system SRM insulation Stage 1 electrical Guidance (lightning) Transtage pressurization system Payload separation system Centaur turbopump Centaur tutbopump Booster engine control SRM insulation Autopilot (incorrect aero) Stage I/2 interstage SRM separation

1976

- 1996

558

47th IAF Congress

I

I

USAF/Aerosoace

Al/n

Atlas

I 1

SuDDorted ..

h

I

Al

A

(

I

Delta

I

I

07

66

IA*

Titan

Atlas Delta Titan 86

69

91

90

v Figure

92

93

94

U.S. Launch

96

97

6/m/96

Launch Failures 3.

95

Record

bird t

Id tmkl hame

;at 7

90

89

Figure

4.

European

91 v

92 93 Launch Failures I Chinese

Launch

94 95 8/29196 Record

96

559

47th IAF Congress

L

orosi

86

87

88

89

90

91

VSatellite Figure

5.

93

92

94

95

Failures in First 12 Months

U. S. Satellite

Infant

Mortality

96

97

6/21/96

Record

REFERENCES I.

WhItehair. C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Space .!$sten~ Risk Management and Mitigation: Assuring Mission Success. ” Presented at the 46’

International Astronautical Congress, Oslo. Norway, 2-6 October 1995 (IAA Reprint IAA-95 IAA.6.2.01). 2

3.

4.

5.

Perry, Wilham. U.S. Secretary of Defense. “Specifications and Standards - A New WC?\of Doing Business. ” 29 June 1994. Donohue. George L. FAA Acquisition Reform: The Road Ahead. ” Aerospace America. April 1996. DOD Directive 5000. I, “Defense Acquisition. ” 1995. DOD Instruction. DoDI 5000.1. “Defense 1995.

9.

Kaminski, Paul G. “Commentary The DaD Single Process Initiative. ” Aerospace Ametica. February 1996.

IO. Druyan. Darling, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. “Acquisition Reform Lightning Bolt Initiatives. ” June 1995. I I. Reimer. Dennis, Gen Army Chief of Staff, and TRADOC Commander Gen William Hartzqg. Draft of Document outlining the new requilrements determination process. February 1995. 12. Whitehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Curreqt Status and Future Potential of the United States Fully Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. ”

Presented at the 47” International Astronautical Congress, Beijing, China. ( IAF Reprint IAF-96V.3.01).

Acquisition. ‘*

13. SPACE NEWS. Vol 7, No 9. March 4-10, 1996. 6.

Executive Summary. DODD 5000-I. DoDI 5000.2, and Appendices. 10 November 1995.

7.

DOD 5000 Fmal Approval Signed by SECDEF. I5 March 1996.

8.

Statute - Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA 94).

14. McKinney, R.W., R. K. Steele and P. L. Portanova. “Affordability Through Innovation: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. ” Presented at the 47* International Astronautical Congress, Beijing, Chma. (IAA Reprint IAA-96IAA. I. I .02).

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47th IAF Congress

15. Lutz. Roald F. and Richard M Macheske. ‘5% Space Test Program, A Case for Dedicated Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in Space. ‘* 33” Space Congress. Cocoa Beach. Florida. April 1996. 16. Ward. M. J., et al. “Risk Managementfor .&all Satellite Programs. ” 33n’ Space Congress. Cocoa Beach, Florida. April 1996. 17. Wolfe. M. G., et al. “The Advanced Launch System - Application of Total Qualiy Management Principles to Low-Cost Space Transponation Development. ” ACTA ASTRONAUTICA. Vol 25. No 516, pp 339-346, 199 1. 18. SPACE NEWS. “6cience Institutes Moving Closer to Realig. ” March I l-17, 1996. p. 6. 19. Whttehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “An Assessment of the Long-Term Potentialfor Cooperative Space Propulsion System development. ” Presented at the 46’h International Astronautical Congress. Oslo. Norway, 2-6 October 1995 (IAF Reprmt IAF-95 S.2.01). 20

Vander Schaaf. Derek J.. Deputy DOD Inspector General. “Debunking Acquisition Reform Myths. ‘* DEFENSE ISSUES Volume 10, Number 79. Prepared statement to the House Small Business Committee. August 3, 1995.

2 1. Whitehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Future Space Transportation Systems and Their Potential Contribution to the NATO Mission. ‘* Presented at the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) Mission Systems Panel 5 Ih Symposium - Space Systems as Contributors to the NATO Defence Mission, Cannes. France, 2-6 June 1996. 22. Arbuthnot, James. U.K. Minister for Defense Procurement. “U.K. Turns to Private Sector Reconciles Milita? Capahili~ with Tight Budgets. *’ DEFENSE NEWS. April 1-7, 1996. 23. Space Transportation Working Group Report. Third AIAA Workshop on lntemattonal Space Cooperation. Frascati, Italy, May 26-30, 1996.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Portions of the contents of this paper are extracted from the Internet Air Force Acquisition Homepage. Readers who wish to continue to follow the progress of acquisition reform are encouraged to perlodically visit the Air Force Acquisition Reform Homepage at .