Abuses Of Human Rights In The 2008 South Ossetia War: Two Perspectives

Neil Hilton and Alexander Pugh PSPA 235 Professor Wael Kheir June 4, 2009

Abuses of Human Rights in the 2008 South Ossetia War: Two Perspectives

Neil Hilton and Alexander Pugh PSPA 235 Professor Wael Kheir June 4, 2009 Abuses of Human Rights in the 2008 South Ossetia War: Two Perspectives

In the summer of 2008, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia were embroiled in a regional conflict over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. South Ossetia in particular has traditionally aligned itself with Russia, despite the fact that the international community (save Russia and Nicaragua) recognizes it as falling under Georgian sovereignty. The conflict came to a head when conflicting reports of preemptive aggressive troop movements by both sides surfaced. Though the subsequent conflict only lasted one week, the damage to infrastructure and human life was extensive. Questions immediately arose regarding respect for human rights by all participants. Particularly, attention was raised regarding protection of noncombatants, indiscriminate munitions uses, and questions of nationality and sovereignty. By researching the two main aggressors separately, an image has emerged that shows mutual disrespect for and violation of international humanitarian law. Through the study of the conflict, a clear picture can hopefully by painted of how best to identify and avoid human rights violations in the future, pertaining to conflicts around the world.

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Civilian Targeting, Illegal Weapons, and Forced Russian Citizenship Neil Hilton

Much attention is placed upon Russia for its frequent disregard of human rights, both of its own citizens and those of other nations it finds itself opposed to. This goes back generations, before the Cold War between East and West, to common practices by tsarist rulers and other despots. Russia is widely regarded as a harsh country, and the policies of its government are often questioned for their legitimacy in the face of international agreements regarding the rights of the individual. During the 2008 conflict with Georgia, this came into the international spotlight even more strongly. Whenever there is armed conflict in the world, one of the primary concerns is what happens to noncombatants. Civilian populations are extremely threatened by warfare, especially when it is as intense as the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. All authorities have a moral obligation to protect the lives of innocents, be they their own citizens or not, simply on a humanist level. Beyond that, though, there exists an incredible amount of legislation and agreements regarding the treatment of noncombatants. Article IV of the 1949 Geneva Convention, of which both Russia and Georgia are signatories, concerns the rights and treatment of “protected persons,” or those who find themselves “in the hands of a Party or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” 1 The basic premise of the Convention is that Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 1

"Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. 12 Aug 1949. United Nations. 1 Jun 2009 .

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This commitment to the protection of civilians has been expounded upon in many subsequent protocols and other documents of international humanitarian law, and is almost unanimously regarded as a “natural law” that should apply universally. Though this right extends to citizens of Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia/Abkhazia, evidence exists that implies that the Russian Federation was responsible for extensive violations of this contract. Amnesty International, upon reviewing evidence and taking eyewitness accounts, stated in an extensive report that the organization is “consequently concerned that [Georgian] civilians and civilian objects may have been directly attacked [by Russia] in violation of Article 51(3) of Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, or that they were hit in the course of indiscriminate attacks in violation of Article 51(4).”2 Extensive accounts tell of Russian aerial bombardment of public squares in towns that did not have any Georgian troops or military objectives, or of fleeing convoys of civilian vehicles as they attempted to evacuate conflict zones. For the most part, it appears that Russian troops on the ground conducted themselves in a professional and orderly manner, and were not responsible for any extensive violations of human rights of Georgian civilians. By contrast, the Russian-backed South Ossetian soldiers were accused of widespread looting, pillaging, and attacks on civilians, often while Russians watched on and failed to intervene. Amnesty International’s report is especially strongly worded regarding this point, stating that …the Russian authorities singularly failed in their duty to prevent reprisals and serious human rights abuses being carried out by South Ossetian forces and militia units. In the “buffer zones”, Russia was bound by its obligations as an occupying power as codified in the Fourth Geneva Convention. This means that it was primarily responsible for the security and welfare of Georgian civilians in those areas.3 2

Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. London: Amnesty International Publications, 2008. Pg 29.

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Clearly, Russia’s failure to protect the civilians of Georgia, both from South Ossetian soldiers and from aerial bombardment, is a grievous offence. Fortunately, a relatively small number perished—only 69 civilian deaths were confirmed by the Georgian government. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that a single noncombatant killed, mistreated, or otherwise stripped of his rights is enough to raise alarm over Russia’s conduct. Those civilians that were killed usually died through inappropriate use of weapon systems that are unreliably targeted or otherwise indiscriminate in nature, which represents a separate infraction against international law. During the conflict, Human Rights Watch spoke out against Russia’s use of large, truck-mounted rockets in built-up areas. Holly Cartern, the Europe and Central Asia director at HRW, stated that “these are all indiscriminate weapons when used in populated areas, as they cannot be targeted against only military targets and therefore risk causing unnecessary harm to civilians…They simply shouldn’t be used in areas where there are civilians.”4 In the process of its frequent disregard for civilian life, the Russian military was responsible for the use of several weapons systems that go against international treaties in all circumstances, not just in civilian areas. The most notable of these systems are “cluster bombs.” These weapons distribute smaller sub-explosives, which spread over a very wide area and frequently fail to detonate immediately. However, they remain armed after their dispersal, and have caused injuries and deaths a significant amount of time after wars in places like South Lebanon, where the Israeli Defense Forces deployed them. In May 2008, an agreement was signed in Dublin to ban the use of cluster munitions because of their unsystematic nature and the

3

Ibid. Pg 32.

4

"Georgia/Russia: Use of Rocket Systems Can Harm Civilians," 11 Aug 2008. Human Rights Watch. Web.1 Jun 2009. .

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threat that they pose to civilians after hostilities have ended. Through Russia was not a signatory; there exists great precedent against the use of indiscriminate weapons through other international accords and conventions, which the nation has agreed to. Additionally, it has a responsibility to clear the field of unexploded munitions, as noted by Amnesty International: Russia is already a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as well as its protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, which entered into force in 2006. States party to the Protocol, and which control an area with explosive remnants of war are responsible for clearing such munitions. The Protocol covers munitions, such as artillery shells, grenades, and cluster sub-munitions, that fail to explode as intended, and any unused explosives left behind and uncontrolled by armed forces.5 However, Russia continues to deny using cluster munitions in Georgia, in the face of what Human Rights Watch calls “overwhelming” evidence to the contrary. An article by that organization expressed the belief that Russia’s “use of cluster munitions in populated areas was indiscriminate, and therefore in violation of international humanitarian law.”6 Furthermore, despite widespread international outcries against landmines, Georgia’s government asserts that Russian troops planted them at strategic points—namely railroad tracks and roads used by the government to transport goods like crude oil. An anti-personnel mine was also claimed to be responsible for a civilian death in the city of Gori, when a woman was killed by an explosion in her garden. The most enduring Russian abuse of human rights, however, extends beyond the civilian casualties inflicted on the Georgian population or the weapons used to do so. More longstanding is the annexation of ethnic Georgian populations into Ossetian territory. There have been several well-documented cases of Russian forces extending a “buffer” outside of South Ossetia into

5

Amnesty International. Pg 17.

6

"Georgia: More Cluster Bomb Damage Than Reported," 4 Nov 2008. Human Rights Watch. Web.1 Jun 2009. .

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Georgia. Those unfortunate enough to live within this buffer area found themselves presented with an extremely bleak choice—accept Russian citizenship, or leave. Anyone who remained but attempted to resist the occupation of their village would be harshly punished. Russia’s strategy of using citizenship as a tool is not new to the region. According to the UK Telegraph, “Passports are a vital plank in Russia's strategy of securing a toehold in democratic Georgia. By issuing citizenship to South Ossetians, Russia gained a pretext to invade in early August, claiming to be defending its own from Georgian attacks.”7 They continued this policy after the short August war, extending it to absorb ethnic Georgians as well as the Ossetians who may have a more legitimate claim about sovereignty. On the most basic and obvious level, this violates Article 15.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” Every individual is entitled to their nationality, without interference from outside powers. The international system operates on a clear and defined set of rules regarding national sovereignty, and citizenship is an important part of this structure. A state is obligated to protect its constituents, and has no right to penetrate into territory beyond their borders and essentially “steal” citizens. Furthermore, the tactics used by the Russian authorities and troops to annex the land represented a separate rights abuse. In the town of Akhalgori, more than 3,000 civilians fled their homes permanently when faced with such an option. These citizens’ found themselves exiled from their ethnic and cultural homeland, violating their basic right as guaranteed under Article 9 of the same document, which forbids “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Amnesty International reported in mid-November of 2008,

7

McElroy. Damien. "South Ossetian police tell Georgians to take a Russian passport, or leave their homes," UK Telegraph 31 Aug 2008. 30 May 2009. .

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over three months after the war ended, that there were still 20,000 ethnic Georgians who could not return to their homes in South Ossetia due to Russian or Ossetian gangs and soldiers continuing to operate in the region.8 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention likewise guarantees that persons “evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.” Clearly, this is not the case. In many cases, their children will be a displaced generation without a real homeland. They contribute to the growing number of refugees worldwide that continually drain international aid efforts and require constant attention to ensure that the situation doesn’t spiral further out of control and become even more serious. For those who stay and become Russian, there are further impacts as well. Article 22 of the UDHR guarantees each individual the “realization of…[the] social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” Rather than selfdetermination allowing these ethnic Georgians to maintain their heritage, they are forced into another society. Russia is creating a patchwork of forced residents that are coerced into allegiance to a nation that is not their own. One casualty of this process is the culture of those people who are press-ganged into a new national identity. They and their children have unwilling joined a society that is suddenly “Russian” rather than “Georgian.” The confluence of these citizenship-based violations represents a grave offence, as it equates to a denial of their recognition as members of a national community. When the Georgians are deprived of this basic humanizing right, they are instead viewed as objects that give the Russians legitimacy in their claims to Ossetia’s territory, or that should be forced from their lands as refugees. They become a strategic interest for a geopolitical move that many 8

"Georgia/Russia conflict: Counting the cost of war: Return, security and truth still a long way off." Press Releases. 18 Nov 2008. Amnesty International. 30 May 2009 .

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consider to be imperialist, as Russia and NATO compete to exert influence over contested Eastern European territories. Overall, it is clear that the Russian government and military was responsible for extensive breaches of human rights during the short conflict of August 2008. Of course, they were not the only responsible party—Georgia is likewise guilty of multiple violations. Unfortunately, almost a year after the war ended, there is little to no accountability on either side for actions taken during the war. The conflict still continues, as a Russian-backed parliament was elected in South Ossetia this week.9 Likely, this region will see more violence over the status of breakaway territories like South Ossetia, and human rights abuses against civilians and soldiers alike will continue. One can only hope that increased scrutiny from the international community in the wake of the last war will lessen the impacts of the next one.

9

Barry, Ellen. “South Ossetians Elect Parliament." New York Times 31 May 2009.

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Disk 2: Georgian Violations and Restriction of Nationality Alexander John Chandros Pugh

It’s easy to blame Russia; they’re the bad guys. This is how it was for the latter half of the 20th century and that’s how the beginning of the 21st seems to be going. At the very least, this Western perception of the once “evil empire” as the silent iron fist waiting to strike out and reassert the power politics of old still holds true if one were to watch any daily media concerning Russia. This was no more true than during the Georgia-Russia conflict in the summer of 2008, when Western media outlets were happy to jump on Russia as an aggressive, invading neighbor to Georgia’s pro-Western, innocent democracy. If one news source is to be believed, the conflict was “about Russia, resurgent and nationalistic, pushing its way back into the Caucasus and chasing others out, and reversing the losses Russia feels it has suffered since the end of the cold war.”10 To be sure, as Mr. Hilton so eloquently laid out, Russia has had and, during the 2008 conflict, did perpetrate human rights violations. But one must be careful not to get trapped into the politics of the situation, the lingering Cold War mentalities of Us v. Them, and dissect the conflict in South Ossetia through the clearest looking glass we can find: that of basic human rights. On August 7th, 2008, in the dying hours of the summer afternoon Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili declared an “immediate and total” ceasefire with Russian backed South Ossetian militias as well as with Russian itself. However by 11:00 P.M. that same evening Georgian artillery was observed as being fully engaged in bombardment of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, as well as the strategic heights around the city. The city was still inhabited 10

"Russia and Georgia: A Scripted War." The Economist 14 Aug 2008 Web.30 May 2009. .

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by thousands of civilians who were now caught in what can only be described as “indiscriminant shelling.”11 As Amnesty International noted in their report on the conflict, “much of the destruction in Tskhinvali was caused by GRADLAR MLRS (GRAD) launched rockets, which are known to be difficult to direct with any great precision.”12 Based on eyewitness reports, the nature of the munitions used and the evidence of scattered destruction in densely populated civilian areas strongly suggested that Georgian forces committed indiscriminate attacks in its assault on Tskhinvali on the night of 7 August, causing deaths and injuries among South Ossetian civilians and considerable damage to civilian objects. In later stages of the conflict it was widely reported that Georgian shelling included “cluster munitions” such that fragment into “smaller, exploding shrapnel bomblets” whose trajectory is guesswork at best.13 As pointed out by Mr. Hilton previous, such international legislation, and binding legislation at that, does indeed exist for there to be a concerted effort to curb this kind of wholesale and haphazard breach of human rights. Addressing what appears to be a joint effort by many in the international community to maintain a legalized status of such munitions, arms researcher and humanitarian Bonnie Docherty observes that, “a comprehensive prohibition is the only real solution. So-called responsible use of cluster munitions is a myth, and nations should resist efforts to weaken the ban.”14 Georgian use of cluster munitions falls in direct conflict on the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks in customary international law, as seen in Article 51 of Protocol I to the

11

Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. London: Amnesty International Publications, 2008. Pg 27. 12

Ibid. Pg 26.

13

Human Rights Watch. A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008. New York: Human Rights Watch Publications, 2009. Pg. 12 14

"Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty Approved." BBC News 28 May 2008 Web.1 Jun 2009. .

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Geneva Conventions.15 According to the group Handicap International, 98 percent of clusterbomb victims are civilians, and 27 percent are children.16 Georgian military action in the 2008 conflict, especially the initial instigation of hostilities followed by haphazard disregard for the protection of noncombatant life shows a disturbing lack of adherence to basic international humanitarian law. In its January report of the conflict the New York-city based Human Rights Watch put it in far more simple terms, noting that Georgian forces used "indiscriminate and disproportionate…force during their August 2008 war that violated international humanitarian law.”17 There have been conflicting reports on Georgian ground forces’ treatment of ethnic Ossetians during the build up to and execution of hostilities. Amnesty interviews maintain that Georgian forces were professional and respectful of the rights of those noncombatants in the conflict zone, both in regards to detainment and personal property rights.18 Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, paints a different picture of Georgian troops in South Ossetia, stating that, “in some villages, the Georgian offensive seemed to have been carried out with little regard to the safety of civilians,” going on to note that, “Human Rights Watch researchers learned that as the Georgian infantry entered the village they were spraying the gates and fences of homes with bullets, demanding that the militias surrender. Hundreds of bullet holes were clearly visible on

15

Article 51 of the GC bans attacks which are “ of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction” as well as “…may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 16 "Times Topics: Cluster Munitions." The New York Times 03 Jun 2009 Web.3 Jun 2009. . 17

Human Rights Watch. Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over South Ossetia. New York: Human Rights Watch Publications, 2009. Pg 41. 18

Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. Pg 25.

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fences and gates.”19 Unfortunately, with two conflicting reports by two reputable sources, it becomes increasingly hard to draw a clear picture of the conflict as it unfolded in this sense. However, of those reports authenticated it does not seem that civilian endangerment was an institutionalized tactic of the Georgian ground forces, occurring rather as isolated incidents. While looking at the nature of the hostilities as they played out in the summer of 2008 is indeed necessary for there to be transparency and accountability, a look at the issues at the root of the conflict is just as essential when dissecting human rights. The mountainous region of South Ossetia split off from Georgian government control in the 1991-1992 war that killed more than 1,000 people, displaced tens of thousands and resulted in the region's de facto independence. South Ossetian leaders are seeking eventually to join with their brethren across the border in the Russian republic of North Ossetia, while at the same time Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated that he “is determined to peacefully reassert the country's sovereignty and reintegrate the two separatist areas.”20 Various reports, mostly from South Ossetian sources, place support for Ossetian independence at about 90% of the population.21 Certainly, these issues bring up a myriad of questions, not the least of which can be addressed in the context of human rights, especially with regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UNHR says, in nothing short of clear and measured language, that, “everyone has the right to a nationality”22 as well as “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his

19

Human Rights Watch. Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over South Ossetia. Pg. 59-60 20

Ruff, Abdul. "Abkhazia and South Ossetia Independence: Russia-Georgia Tensions." Global Politician 14 May 2008 Web.30 May 2009. . 21

Ibid.

22

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 15.1

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nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”23 But how and in what context has Georgia perpetrated such violations based on these inalienable rights? The question is as ambiguous in its implications as it is in its asking. While the document guarantees the right to a nationality, it addresses neither the circumstances of nationality nor the implications of changing the nationality. Yes, Georgia does extend the right of nationality as Georgian citizens to the people of South Ossetia, but given the fact that these people are neither ethnically or culturally Georgian24 it should be noted that they do not want to be citizens of Georgia. The UDHR does provide for the change of nationality, as highlighted above, and indeed, as the BBC reports, “to Georgia's deep annoyance, most South Ossetians have Russian passports and the Russian rouble [sic] is commonly used in trade,”25 but this does not bring the true issue to bear: selfdetermination as a people. The declaration goes on to state that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality,”26 however, by being denied the recognition by Georgia as South Ossetians in national and cultural terms the government in Tbilisi is in violation of these rights. To be clear, this is not a case of a non-native ethnic minority group with a separatist agenda seeking regional autonomy, but rather a native, ethnically homogenous nation asserting its right to national

23

Ibid. Article 15.2

24

United States. CIA. The World Factbook - Georgia. CIA, 2009. Web. . 25

"Regions and Territories: South Ossetia." BBC News 13 May 2009 Web.25 May 2009. . 26

UDHR. Article 22.

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recognition and determination,27 a right protect by Article 22 of the UDHR. Georgian actions, such as those displayed during the 2008 August war suggest a violation of the UDHR and basic human rights not only in the letter but also in the spirit of the document. This is not an isolated issue, as cases of “grey-nationality” can be found from Chechnya in Russia to Kurdistan in Turkey and Iraq. It is, however, an issue that needs to be addressed, and doing so within the framework of human rights and the Universal Declaration can work to bring about a better understanding of the matter, and hopefully can be used to avoid future conflicts like the one seen in South Ossetia in the summer of 2008.

27

"Regions and Territories: South Ossetia." BBC News 13 May 2009.

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Conclusions

Examining evidence against both sides shows remarkably similar conduct throughout the course of the conflict. Both Russia and Georgia can and should be held responsible for using indiscriminate weapons systems over urban areas that needlessly threatened and took civilian lives, in addition to causing widespread damage to civilian infrastructure. Both sides are confirmed to have used cluster munitions that are widely regarded as violating international statutes on humanitarian uses of weapons. On the whole, both Russian and Georgian troops acted in accordance with laws regarding just conduct in war, especially regarding civilian populations. Isolated incidents did occur, especially at the hands of disorganized South Ossetian militias, but there is no evidence of institutional directives to do so, and no reason to believe that this was an intentional tactic on the part of their Russian supporters. Rights regarding national selfdetermination were violated by both sides, though evidence points to a more widespread and pervasive violation at the hands of the government in Tbilisi. Finally, evidence points to initial Georgian aggression, though conflicting reports exist pointing to the contrary. With these violations in mind, the authors reaffirm their support of all international humanitarian laws regarding the use of indiscriminate weapons, warfare in urban and heavilypopulated areas, and greater international discourse on what are perceived as “sub-national” groups that may see themselves as independent people. More cooperation is needed by the international community to create binding legislation and agreements that prevent such abuses from happening in the future. Finally, all nations should reaffirm the supremacy and legitimacy of the Geneva Conventions and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and be held accountable for their violations of those and other international statutes. 16