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Emporium Current Essays 413 With the November 2 passage of the Brown Amendment the Washington Administration has begun to practically undo the vital highway robbery it has committed against the Pakistan. After five I years Washington has finally agreed to account for the 1.3 billion I dollars Washington received from Pakistan for military equipment. I After passing this point of undoing this "historic wrong" where are I Pakistan-US relations headed? Going by statements of Pakistan and • US officials towards much greener pastures. Perhaps what the • visiting US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphei said at the • November 3 Press conference in Islamabad captures the prevailing • euphoria. In her opening comments Raphei had said. "I think the • Brown Amendment will give us the opportunity to start a new page Bin what has already been a long and fruitful relationship over the• years..." I The Brown Amendment, which enjoyed the backing the •Washington establishment, seems to have borne off a successful trip Hmade by the US Defence Secretary William Perry's in January this •tear. Essentially Perry's January trip in which he met with the •President, the Prime Minister, the COAS and senior defence Mofficialvmarked the turning point in Pak-US relations. H The outcome of the trip was best described by a senior Mfakistani official who had participated in the Perry meetings. He Hns upbeat claiming that, "the Americans are a relatively sorbed Hint.They are a few notches down from the post-cold war 'high'? You ^•jiim Perry was almost sentimental about Pakistan's role in the ^Bulf. In the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia they can't station American ^•orccs who will they turn to when the need arises - of course the ^•akisftmis, Similarly when in Central Asia when things get out of ^Hand they'll turn to us," he explained reassuringly. He was also ^Honvinced of Washington's choice of Pakistan as the "model Muslim ^Blatc" adding that "in times of turmoil who will the people in West ^Hbia turn to-Iraq or to Iran? Of course Washington

would ever ^Rrads Pakistan." In the words of an American diplomat "We want ^Bikistan to be what the Quaid had wanted it to be - a liberal ^HpjJiTn Muslim country. Nothing more nothing less." 414 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays 415 Clearly Islamabad has scored well in its relations with the United States. It stood its ground on the nuclear and the Kashmir issue. For now however, there prevails a deadlock over the two issues. Washington's calculation is that within growing Pak-US collaboration over the coming years in four specific fields Washington will gain leverage over Islamabad to influence its position on the nuclear and the Kashmir issue. For now in the postBrown Amendment phase some enhanced activity, although along existing lines, in peace-keeping, antiterrorism, countering drug trafficking and OPIC-covered private investment. In the UN (read US) peace-keeping operations since early nineties Pakistani troops have consistently been participating ... in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia. During a seminar at the GHQ the Chief of Army Staff proudly recorded Pakistan's role in UN Peacekeeping. "Under the United Nations flag we have our blood wherever humanity has clamoured for help. This has strengthened the cause of peace and promoted universally acclaimed right of man." This enthusiastic engagement is, of course, is sharp contest to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat AH Khan's refusal to oblige the American President when he requested for troop contribution towards the UN Peace Keeping Force in Korea. As quid pro quo he wanted Washington on underwriter its security vis-a-vis India. Today Pakistan's participation in peace-keeping has earned it Washington's appreciation. Recently a senior American diplomat acknowledge Pakistan's good behaviour' maintained that "Pakistan is a good citizen of the international community and are major members in the UN peace-keeping force." On anti-terrorism and drug trafficking Washington plans to support Pakistan "in a big way" especially after Islamabad readily extradited many including the suspect Ramzi Yusuf and drug dealer Iqbal Baig. To work out a joint strategy Washington's point-man for terrorism Ambassador Phil Wilcox was in Pakistan in end October. In its deep commitment to clean-up Carcass politics of the government certified MQM "terrorists" Islamabad has made common cause with Washington over cleaning up terrorists. Officials hop to receive financial, technical and equipment support for it anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist squads. With the passage of the Brown Amendment private American investment will get statesponsored insurance cover. Given the unpredictable political environment and a deteriorating security environment especially in Carcass, the private American

(investor may see Pakistan as a relatively less risky area once his investment get insurance cover. Under the Brown Amendment in the defence arena receiving military equipment paid for by Washington, it out. It still possible to have commercial (military) sales. In addition under the International Military Education Training (IMET) programme joint Pak-US military exercises and training programmes would increase. In fact as the American Assistant Secretary of State pointed "there is a regular menu of military cooperation now." In fact, there is already high gear collaboration between the Pakistan armed forces and the Pentagon. Over the last year about half a dozen visits by CENTCOM commanders have been made into Pakistan. The latest was the Commander US Army Central Command, Lt. -General Steven L. Arnold to boost "joint training as well as the joint military exercises between the armed forces of the two countries." Defence co-operation has involved joint army and air force exercises and may lead to docking facilities, Pakistan providing logistical support to CENTCOM forces, etc. This enhanced military co-operation becomes significant against the backdrop of Washington's force-driven aspect of foreign policy. Despite all it talk of disarmament and denuclearisation Washington views the role <*t overwhelming force as a central factor in promoting its economics and defence interests in the region. Washington is deeply involved in the defence set-up of the Gulf. American military strategists firmly believe that the "key" to its 'successful' policy against Iraq was its "ability to put armoured troops and combat aircraft quickly into the Gulf Region." Addressing a seminar organised by the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council Secretary Perry declared that the US was "poised to place more than 150,000 military personnel into the region" Washington has already carved out for itself, with support of the Gulf regimes, a major role in the security structure of the Gulf region. Fundamentally Washington's main constituency in Pakistan remains the Pakistan armed forces. Ever since the structural links Established in the fifties onwards through training, equipment support and joint operations, this has remained a central feature of all the high-points in Pakistan. Half a century into its birth it is Pakistan's armed forced - the highly trained and disciplined martial force-that Washington finds to be an appealing partner both within Pakistan and outside Pakistan. Within j^ikistan Washington ^f"~rcco^t'iscs the authority and control the armed'forces enjoy in a highly turbulent political environment. An authority which is known416 Emporium Current Essays to call to order chaotic politicians. For the region Washington perceives the Pakistani Army as a relatively reliable ally. Yet like the past Islamabad's and Washington's defence establishments are locked into different threat perceptions. For Pakistan it is the Indian threat while for Washington it is some undefined unstructured nebulous "Islamic fundamentalists" threat.

Against this American perception of the region Islamabad has some tough thinking to do. Deepening security relations must be accompanied by if not a common approach, at least by some shared perceptions on critical issues including the Middle East, South and Central Asia. These issues basically determine the motivating factors behind peacekeeping operations, anti-terrorism, etc. Islamabad must decide whether Islamabad can go along with Washington, reaping some military benefits but without undermining greater security interests vis-a-vis important regional neighbours like Iran and China and also without undermining its position on the nuclear issue and the Kashmir issue. Today merely playing a cog in a Washington-built wheel of 'stability' in exchange for some military equipment and military training will prove counter-productive, a very short term approach. H'