58-th Army

58th Army (III Formation) (1995-present)

• Active 1941 - current Country Soviet Union, Russia Branch Red Army, Russian Ground Forces • Type Field army • Size several corps or divisions Part of North Caucasus Military District • Garrison/HQ Vladikavkaz • Engagements 1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency, Second Chechen War, South Ossetian Crisis Commanders Notable commanders General-Colonel Anatoliy Nogovitsin

58th Army • The 58th Army is a field army; first of the Soviet Union's Red Army and subsequently (since 1995) of the Russian Ground Forces. • It was first formed in the Siberian Military District in November 1941, including the 362nd, 364th, 368th, 370th, 380th, and 384th Rifle Divisions and the 77th Cavalry Division and moved to the Archangelsk Military District, but then the Army was redesignated the 3rd Tank Army in May 1942. It was reestablished within the Kalinin Front in June 1942, and in July included the 16th and 27th Guards Rifle Divisions, the 215th

World War II • It was reformed in the Transcaucasian Front from the 24th Army on August 28 1942, under General Khomenko of the NKVD. Much of its senior cadre also came from the NKVD, and among its missions was to keep order in the Caucasus, particularly in the Groznyi and Makhachkala regions.[2] This was because of a Chechen rising that had gone on since 1941 (see 1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency). 58th Army later joined the North Caucasus Front. On 1 November 1942 it consisted of the 271st and 416th Rifle Divisions, and the Makhachkala Division of the NKVD.[3] Prior to the North Caucasus Front putting its main effort into the Kerch-Eltigen Operation (November 1943) the

Second Chechen War • The headquarters was reformed in 1995 in the North Caucasus Military District from the 42nd Army Corps at Vladikavkaz. During the Second Chechen War, the Army was commanded by General Vladimir Shamanov

2008 Ossetia War • On 4 August 2008, five battalions of the Russian 58th Army commanded by General-Colonel Anatoliy Nogovitsin were moved to the vicinity of Roki Tunnel that links South Ossetia with North Ossetia[6]. On 8 August 2008 [7][8] [9] the Army moved to South Ossetia and engaged in combat with Georgian forces in defense of the South Ossetian region,

Order of Battle, 2003 • The Army operates in a close coordination with the 4th Air Force and Air Defence Army of the district, and includes: • 19th Motor Rifle Division - Vladikavkaz • 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Budenovsk • 136th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Buynaksk, Dagestan • 135th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment- Prochladny, Kabardino-Balkaria • 291st Separate Artillery Brigade- Maikop- (equipped with 2A65) • 943rd Multiple Rocket Launcher Regiment – Krasnooktabrsky (Uragan 220mm MRL) • 1128th Anti-Tank Regiment- Maikop • 67th Separate Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade (SAM)- Volgograd area (SA-11 'Buk' SAM) • 487th Separate Helicopter Regiment (Mi-8/Mi-24)- Budenovsk • 11th Separate Engineer Regiment- Kavkazskay • 234th Separate Signals Regiment – Vladikavkaz

Structure 58th Army

Москва (ракетный крейсер) black sea naval

• Предназначен для нанесения ударов по крупным надводным кораблям противника, обеспечивает боевую устойчивость корабельных противолодочных групп. Противовоздушная оборона удаленных соединений, огневая поддержка десанта. • Вооружение Артиллерия 1x2 130-мм артустановка AK-130, 6 6-ствольных 30-мм артустановок АК-630 Ракетное вооружение 16 пусковых установок противокорабельных ракет (16 ПКР П-1000 Вулкан) Зенитное вооружение 8x8 пусковых установок Б-204 зенитно-ракетного комплекса

• Главный ракетный комплекс "Базальт"-16 крылатых ракет П500, дальность стрельбы 500 км, зенитно-ракетный комплекс "Форт" (68 ракет), артустановка АК-130 -дальность стрельбы 25 км, ракетно - зенитный комплекс "ОсаМ" (2 шт) дальность 10-15 км по воздушным целям, 2 пятитрубных торпедных аппарата по надводным кораблям, 6 установок АК-630, калибр 30 мм, дальность 5 км, против авиации и судов противника, скорострельность 1

gemebi -сторожевого корабля «Сметливый». -десантных корабля "Цезарь Куников" и "Саратов“ -Ямал

TU-22 Blinder

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General characteristics Bomber: Crew: three - pilot, navigator, weapons officer Length: 41.60 m (136 ft 5 in) Wingspan: 23.17 m (76 ft 0 in) Height: 10.13 m (33 ft 3 in) Wing area: 162 m² (1,742 ft²) Empty weight: kg (lb) Loaded weight: 85,000 kg (187,390 lb) Max takeoff weight: 92,000 kg (202,400 lb) Powerplant: 2× Dobrynin RD-7M-2 turbojets – Dry thrust: rated 107.9 kN (24,250 lbf) each – Thrust with afterburner: 161.9 kN (36,376 lbf) each

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Performance Maximum speed: 1,510 km/h (938 mph, Mach 1.42) Range: 4,900 km (3,045 mi) Service ceiling: 13,300 m (40,540 ft) Rate of climb: m/s (ft/min) Wing loading: 525 kg/m² (107 lb/ft²) Thrust/weight: 0.38 Armament Guns: 1 × AM-23 23 mm cannon in tail turret

76th Airborne Division (Russia)

• Active September 1, 1939 present Country Soviet Union Russia Branch Airborne Troops Type Paratroopers Role Parachute Infantry Size 6-8,000 Garrison/HQ Pskov Engagements World War II Soviet-Afghan War First Chechen War Second Chechen War 2008 South Ossetia war

• The 76th Guards Airborne Division (76-я гвардейская десантно-штурмовая Черниговская Краснознаменная дивизия) is an airborne division of the Russian Airborne Troops based in Pskov. It originally formed as the 157th Rifle Division in 1939. On 1 Mar 1943 it became the 76th Guards Rifle Division. It fought at Chernigov, Odessa, Brest, and Danzig. With 70th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front May 1945. Soon after the war it became an airborne division, by 1946 as part of the 15th Airborne Corps. • The 76th Division originally had three regiments, the 104th, 234th, and 237th, with the 237th Guards Airborne Regiment disbanded circa 2002. • After an experimental period, the 104th Parachute Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division became the first Russian ground forces regiment that was fully composed of professional soldiers (and not of "srochniki" - the conscripted soldiers aged eighteen). • Elements of the 104th Regiment were ambushed in Chechneya in March 2000. • In 2008 the 76th Airborne Division was involved in

• Units 2009 • 76th Guards Airborne Division in Pskov – 23rd Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov (newly raised regiment) – 104th Guards Airborne Regiment in Cherekha – 234th Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov – 1140th Guards Artillery Regiment in Pskov – 4th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov • 107th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov • 165th Air Defence Battalion in Donskoy (from disbanded 106th Guards Airborne Division)

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656th Engineer Battalion in Pskov 728th Signal Battalion in Pskov 7th Maintenance Battalion in Pskov 242nd Military Transport Aviation Squadron in Pskov

98th Airborne Division

• Active December 1943 present Country Soviet Union/ Russian Federation Branch Soviet, later Russian Airborne Troops Type Division Role Airborne force Part of Russian Airborne Troops Garrison/HQ Ivanovo Engagements World War II 2008 South Ossetia war

• The 98th Guards Airborne Division (98-я гвардейская воздушно-десантная Свирская Краснознаменная ордена Кутузова дивизия) is an airborne division of the Russian Airborne Troops, stationed in Ivanovo. It took part in the 2008 war against Georgia. • During the Second World War, the formation began its existence as the 98th Guards Rifle Division. It incorporated 296th Guards Rifle Regiment (formerly the 18th Independent Guards Airborne Brigade), 299th GRR (fmr 19 IGAB), 302nd GRR (fmr 20 IGAB). Formed in December 1943-January 1944 at Demitrov in the Moscow Military District.[1] It was part of the 37th Guards Airborne Corps, 9th Guards Army on the Karelian front (May 1944), on the Svir river (June 1944) and near Budapest in February 1945. The division ended the war near Prague. • Today, its two regiments, the 217th and 299th, are stationed near the Ivanovo Severny military[2]

Units 2009 • 98th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo – 137th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ryazan (from disbanded 106th Guards Airborne Division) – 217th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ivanovo – 331st Guards Airborne Regiment in Kostroma – 1065th Guards Artillery Regiment in Kostroma – 318th Air Defence Battalion in Ivanovo – 661st Engineer Battalion in Ivanovo – 674th Signal Battalion in Ivanovo – 15th Maintenance Battalion in Ivanovo – 243rd Military Transport Aviation Squadron in Ivanovo

45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment

• Active 1994 present Country Russia Branch Airborne Troops (direct subordination) GRU (operational subordination) Type Paratroopers Role Special operations and reconnaissance Garrison/HQ Kubinka, Moscow Oblast Engagements Second Chechen War War in South Ossetia

45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV (Russian: 45-й гвардейский отдельный разведывательный ордена Александра Невского полк ВДВ or 45-й полк специального назначения ВДВ) is an airborne regiment of the Russian Airborne Troops based in Moscow. • It was raised in 1994 on the base of 901st Detached Landing Assault Battalion (Raised in 1979) and 218th Detached Battalion for Special Operations of VDV, raised in 1992. Warfare.ru attributes to it 690 personnel with 15 BTR-80, and 1 BTR-D; the 218th Battalion is homebased in Sokolniki. • The unit is part of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV) and directly subordinated to VDV Headquarters. However it is also operationally subordinate to the GRU. • The Regiment fought in the First and Second Chechen Wars, and in 1994 it fought for Dolinsky, Argun, and Groznyy, sending 400 personnel, of which losses were 43 personnel, including 15

Critical Assessment of Russian Military Campaign By Igor Dzhadan, Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostey 14/8/08 Aug 18, 2008 - 4:09:21 PM

We admit that we vacillated, is it worthwhile to initiate a conversation about the problems, when the bodies of the deceased soldiers and victims of the Georgian aggression have not yet been interred. But we still decided not to put it off and to raise a number of serious questions already now. It doesn't make sense to delay the "post-flight analysis" precisely because the obvious success of the military operation is present. The findings can be interesting to all people, who are interested in Russia's victory in the information

level of equipment of the Russian soldiers and the enemy. Beginning with the uniforms: Russian soldiers do not have a standard uniform and are frequently dressed in whatever is available. But then again, the matter concerns not only the soldiers of the line units but also the elite - Spetsnaz (special forces), who are dressed in uniforms of various generations, from Soviet to the newest, which began to enter the troops just last year. If you compare the current situation with the diverse nature of Russian soldiers' clothing of the times of the first and second Chechen campaigns, no progress whatsoever has been noted in this regard, except that the "imitation-leather boots" have finally ceased to exist. And really the military uniform -

The servicemen often appear to be unconvincing due to their old washed-out uniforms. Some of the photographs make no less than a dispiriting impression, which does not at all promote the confirmation of the hypothesis about the Russian victory in the eyes of the unsuspecting observer. The variety of ammunition also attests to the inadequate level of discipline in the troops. Things have reached the point that certain soldiers have American helmets perched on their heads, which they took away from Georgian soldiers, which categorically contradicts the regulations. There are also photographs of this "playing to the gallery". Incidentally, the use of elements of enemy uniforms and helmets also contradicts the international rules of the conduct of war. The question arises: how did it come about that the practically constantly fighting 58 th Army has ended up without a normal uniform? Why, after the two Chechen wars, has the situation not moved off of dead center in this regard? And if this is so difficult, why has the Georgian Army managed to resolve the issue about the transition to a new uniform for the entire army in literally three years? The uniform issue - is not yet that important. Later - more. The situation with individual protective gear from bullets and

We all know that they are in the TOE in all 58 th Army units; however the commanders do not require their subordinates to wear helmets or body armor. The Army spetsnaz - is another matter, helmets are inconvenient in a number of cases there, which impede hearing in operations in the forest, and do little to help from the bullet of a sniper weapon. However, there are quite a few photographs, which prove that in a number of cases 58 th Army soldiers and line motorized rifle subunits in a combat situation, not to mention a march in columns, are in general not wearing protective gear. With the fact that according to the statistics, a helmet and body armor permit a manifold reduction of irretrievable losses from the shrapnel of mortar rounds and projectiles. According to the official statements, these losses totaled 74 men with 19 missing in action, without taking the wounded into account. What then can you call that situation if not official crimes by commanders, who are not

For example, why was the 58 th Army commander himself driving through the combat operations area in an ordinary army motor vehicle and not in an armored transport vehicle, as that is appropriate according to the TOE? As a result of the Georgian commandos' attack, he himself was wounded and his chauffer was killed. It is impossible to call this anything other than the criminal negligence of the commander himself. The commanders of that level must be painstakingly concerned both about the safety of their subordinates and also about their own safety, and not give the example of boyish bravado. We can imagine what the enemy side's propaganda success would have been if the Georgian saboteurs had managed to shoot the very operation commander at that time! Let's Shift To Small Arms. In this case, both sides turned out to be armed with approximately identical types of automatic weapons. In the majority of cases - these are various modifications of the Kalashnikov system of assault rifles and machineguns. In the context of the comparison of goals and capabilities, in our opinion, this also speaks not in Russia's favor. Russia has a number of more advanced developments which are already undergoing testing in the units and that have already been officially accepted into the inventory, but they also did not

• For Russia with its leading positions in the small arms development sphere, the Kalashnikov assault rifle - is not an entirely adequate response to contemporary needs. Georgia is another matter: Saakashvili quite recently announced the total rearming of his army from Kalashnikov assault rifles to American M4 carbines, "the best in the world", as they were told. However, now we have ascertained that the American carbines have turned out to be not that good. First of all, they are inadequately reliable and we have the opportunity to observe that even Saakashvili's bodyguards are armed with those same Kalashnikov assault rifles together with European small arms. The Georgian Army, including the elite units, are armed with those same AK-74M assault rifles, which were copied by Bulgaria and illegally sold to Tbilisi. It is also unfavorable for Russia that the Georgian Army has overtaken the Russians based upon the level of saturation with sniper rifles of the leading designs and night employment sights. Based upon their level of training, Georgian snipers also turned out to be head and shoulders above.

• But then again, it is difficult to provide a precise comparative assessment in this context: a number of Russian spetsnaz subunits have a very, very strong sniper staff, about which the Russians' regular victories at European army sniper competitions at least attest. However, according to our information, state-of-theart facilities for sniper training are still absent in a number of cases. In any case, that concerns certain spetsnaz subunits. The soldiers of one such subunit even appealed to the RF president with an open letter on this score approximately a year ago. And that situation is especially sad. It turns out that the generals haven't learned anything since the two Chechen wars... Right now, as we all know, the situation with the development and production of advanced sniper weapon systems in Russia is far from splendid. There are a total of a few firms, which are involved with

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These rifles are being produced in inadequate quantities and a monopoly situation permits a few manufacturers to exorbitantly raise prices. Along a number of positions, it is cheaper for the Ministry of Defense and the militarized departments to purchase sniper rifles abroad, which they are doing, however, in a clearly inadequate amount. So, it isn't surprising that in a number of photographs, which are being disseminated on the Internet, users can note British-made sniper rifles in the hands of Russian spetsnaz personnel. The situation is very "interesting" in the sphere of night sights for sniper weapons. Russia is among the countries, which manufacture the most state-of-theart optical night vision sights for small arms. A large portion of this production is being exported. Three firms throughout the world make third-generation electro-optical matrices for them; two of them are located in the United States and one - in Russia. Nevertheless, for some strange reason it has turned out that it is precisely the Georgian spetsnaz that had a predominant number of these devices, which permitted the Georgians to shoot up the roads during the course of the three days of engagements and to effectively maintain a humanitarian blockade of Tskhinvali. The question arises: at that time, where were the widely advertised Russian automated systems for sniper detection and blinding their optics

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However, the reason for that ratio - is tactical errors. One could say that the Georgians repeated all of the Russian Army's errors, which were made during the storming of Groznyy in the First Chechen Campaign. The tanks were cut off from the infantry and destroyed by RPG attacks from the side and rear axes. There was no coordination of the operations between the tank crews of the Georgian tanks and the infantry subunits. In contrast to the Georgians, the 58 th Army tank grouping operated correctly in a tactical context and took into account the experience of the two Chechen campaigns, so there were insignificant armored vehicle losses. But it is too early to be happy: if we compare the technical level of the tanks, which were employed in the operation with the Georgian tanks, we see that the Georgian tanks either correspond or substantially surpass the Russian tanks based upon their technical level. At a time when obsolete T72B and T-62 tanks constitute the primary portion of the 58 th Army's tank fleet, the modernization of the T-72 SIM1, which was supplied to Georgia by Ukraine, is substantially more "advanced". These tanks have state-ofthe-art thermal imaging sights, in all likelihood with the use of the French second-generation camera, which permits the gunner to identify targets, both during the day and at night, but then again, behind a smoke screen. What is even more unpleasant is that the Georgian T-72 SIM1 tanks possess a gun stabilizing system, that is, they can fire on the move. The Ukrainian specialists have adapted their Kombat guided weapon systemantitank missiles to these tanks, which are launched directly from the tank gun's tube. That system is newer than the similar Svir System of the 58 th Army's T-72B tanks. At the same time, we must point out the fact that the Georgian tank's level of armor protection does not surpass the armor of the Russian tanks

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We must point out that as before the 58 th Army's armored vehicles are primarily for the conduct of a counterterrorist war. Although tandem antitank grenades and missiles are now being actively employed even in that war, against which the old tanks are absolutely defenseless from any axis of attack. No one has attempted to improve that situation even in light of the unconcealed Georgian military preparations of recent years. Despite a significant increase of qualitatively new threats, as before we present the upgrade of the Russian 58 th Army with "modernized" 40-yearold T-62 tanks, with anti-shaped charge screens along the sides, as a gigantic "leap forward". Now we were able to behold all of these "tin cans" in South Ossetia. This is the kind of junk that the Russian military budget is being spent on now! It remains only to guess why the latest generation Russian tanks, which are being manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, are not coming to the constantly fighting North Caucasus Military District, but only to the "ceremonial" Moscow divisions. The same thing concerns light armored vehicles : All of the Russian armored infantry and airborne assault vehicles that were noted in South Ossetia completely turned out to be old Soviet-generation vehicles with updated service lives. Where are the BMP-3s? Where are the BMD-4s? They all remained at their permanent deployment locations. The generals' depraved psychology is present here: we will save the latest weapons for a parade and for now the Army is fighting with old equipment. We still need to decommission

• Ground Troops artillery has always been the Russian Army's strong suit. Here contemporary Russian arms makers have preserved the developments, of which as before our Western competitors are incapable. However, the enemy is not dozing: the foreign advisors managed to teach the Georgians the contemporary tactics of artillery employment. After an artillery raid, the Georgian artillery batteries rapidly left their location and changed position. It turned out to be an extraordinarily complex matter to combat this tactic. Georgian self-propelled artillery consists of dozens of multiple rocket launcher systems and self-propelled guns on a wheeled chassis that were purchased in the NATO countries. After five days of engagements, it remained undestroyed, having ceased its operations against Tskhinvali only after Saakashvili's panicked order about a general retreat was received. The Russian Army will have to master this lesson, having saturated ground troops' units with unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery fire localization and detection radars and other operational target designation systems for its own artillery and aircraft. Otherwise, counterbattery combat is one more headache for our military personnel in the next conflict. But then again, that urgently needs to be done, having taken as an example of efficiency - the rearming program of that same

• The active employment of unmanned aerial vehicles - is one more "anticipated surprise", to which the Russian Army also failed to react for some reason, although the degree of predictability of this type of threat was approximately the same in this case as the degree of predictability of the arrival of Tuesday after Monday. In general, we don't understand what the generals are thinking about on this score! It is impossible to explain the delay with the introduction of unmanned aerial systems in the troops either by the expense (they are an order of magnitude cheaper than manned aircraft) or by a technological lag (there are adequately many firms in Russia, which offer their product at the highest level). It remains to deduce that only tunnel vision and shortsightedness is impeding the introduction of these extremely effective and economical reconnaissance and strike systems in the troops. The operation's aviation component turned out to be significant. The famous Grach - Su-25 armored ground attack aircraft, which distinguished themselves already in the first and second Chechen wars, bore the primary load. It is precisely they that conducted precision strikes against the reconnoitered positions of the Georgian infantry and artillery. In Georgia, they also conducted "free hunt" against enemy troop columns, while sowing panic among the Georgian soldiers. This class of aircraft is ideal for operations under mountain conditions: the Su-25's speed is higher

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On the other hand - the speed of this aircraft is not too high, and it is capable of actively maneuvering between the mountain peaks, while inflicting precision strikes with a diving trajectory. But then again, we don't understand what is arriving to replace this aircraft. New aircraft are already not being manufactured in Russia and right now the question has been raised about in general not eliminating the mothballed Su-25 production capacity. The Georgian side also employed these aircraft, which were allegedly modernized with Israel's participation. It turns out that Russia did not possess technical supremacy in this class of weapons during the course of the conflict. Judging by everything, Tu-22M3 high-altitude, supersonic, Long Range Aviation bombers were also employed, however the nature of the operations with their participation has not been explained. We can assume that the mission to suppress the Georgian air defense system and aircraft was assigned to this class of aircraft. The air force handled this mission with a 3+. Why Russian aircraft and tactical missiles did not tear apart all of the Georgian takeoff and landing strips in the very first days of the conflict remains incomprehensible. One of the Tu-22M3 aircraft, which was involved with reconnaissance based upon the Russian military leaders' assertion, was even shot down. We must acknowledge the total level of losses - four aircraft - to be satisfactory for this type and scale of operations, and also while taking into account the powerful air defense, which was developed based upon the Soviet medium-range Buk and long-range S-200 systems, which were supplied by Ukraine.

• The truth is that we expected the more active employment of helicopters by the Russian peacekeepers. Exclusively Georgian Mi-24s, which flattened the Ossetian positions and the peacekeepers' positions, were visible over the battlefield in the first two days, at least if you believe the footage that was taken and the numerous eyewitnesses. At that time, where were the modernized Russian Mi-24s, and the Ka-50 and Mi-28N helicopters that have been extensively advertised and have already entered the inventory in small quantities? It is incomprehensible... It seems that there weren't even attempts to employ attack helicopters, to which the zero or close to zero loss level attests. It is possible that this turned out to be the best decision, while taking into account the presence on the Georgian side of portable air defense missiles and small caliber artillery. However, the question remains: what are the generals planning to do in the future? A program to supply hundreds of the latest helicopters to the Russian Army inventory was quite recently made public. If now we have ascertained that the helicopters for these operations are inadequately armored, isn't it better to resume the construction of modernized Su-25 ground attack aircraft in their place? Otherwise, it turns out to be something absurd: the production of the latest models is being increased, but when it comes down to it,

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On the other hand, it would be even more ridiculous in the 21 st century to continue to fight using Soviet models, without attempting to completely renew the arsenal. In general, we must adhere to the golden rule: THE ARMY OF THE VICTORIOUS COUNTRY ALSO MUST LOOK LIKE A VICTOR. Otherwise, the deterrence factor is subjected to erosion. The enemy once again can erroneously think that Russia is weak. And really it has already occurred: in 1812, 1941, and now with Georgia... However, we are not learning: our soldiers frequently seem to be grounddown "weaklings", although they move mountains on the battlefield, and the tanks and aircraft look like a heap of rusty iron, which has been lightly covered with peeling paint. "Obsolete weapons" can be adequately effective if you judge from the purely utilitarian point of view. However, in the process, its external appearance and age do not at all promote the formation of the deterrence factor. And really, as it was pointed out long ago: the ideal weapon - that is the weapon, which will do it in such a way that you will not have to employ it. The latest events have shown that Russia's deterrence factor has experienced significant corrosion in the last two decades and its needs "urgent resuscitation". If such a country as Georgia dared to attack the Russian Armed Forces and Russian citizens, the situation, as they say, "has reached the breaking point". Some sort of Latvia, while fulfilling the American pre-election order and relying on NATO's protection, will begin a military operation at some time for the "return" of Pytalovkskiy Rayon,

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The Russian leadership must seriously think about how it can restore the deterrence factor. Having never been used even once, Russian nuclear weapons are devaluing their deterrence potential with time and are becoming an ineffective investment of resources. The Georgian swagger is one of the examples, which confirms that assertion. And here it is impossible to get by with words or with military maneuvers. Russia will have to unambiguously demonstrate in deeds at some point that its leadership is adequately strong in order to employ all of the weapons that it has in its arsenal, also not excluding nuclear weapons. What's the sense of possessing these destructive weapons, if the readiness to employ them has not been demonstrated in 60 years?! If Russia's leadership is actually concerned about a fundamental increase of the return from its growing military expenditures in the context of the effective deterrence of aggression and ensuring a stable peace, it must find the capability to demonstrate its resolve through the employment of nuclear weapons. We will consider this task to be the next "test" for the new president. Otherwise, stronger states than Georgia will attempt to repeat aggression against Russia sooner or later, while relying on their more state-of-the-art and more numerous conventional armed forces. Source:Ocnus.net 2008