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NEW PANGASINAN REVIEW INC. v. NLRC [196 SCRA 55 G.R. No. 85939 April 19, 1991] MEDIALDEA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner New Pangasinan Review Inc. (NPRI) seeks to annul the proceedings in NLRC Case entitled "Constancia Adajar, et al. v. Pangasinan Review, Inc., dated May 30, 1988 which affirmed the decision dated June 10, 1987 of Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando, which disposed as follows: in the light of the foregoing observations, it appearing that the respondent ceased its operations by virtue of the expiration of its corporate charter, and the closure is not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the complainants are therefore entitled to a separation pay, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 283 of the Labor Code. The corporation through the Board of Liquidators are directed to pay the separation pay of the employees. NPRI filed a third party claim on the levied/garnished properties. Thus, the grant order was not satisfied despite the release orders due to the third-party claim. On November 14, 1988, respondent Labor Arbiter issued a Resolution denying the third party claim and directing the Sheriff to enforce the writ of execution already issued. November 14, 1988, shortly before the third-party claim was denied by petitioner Olairez, NPRI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 at Dagupan City, a complaint against the labor arbiter and the private respondents for injunction and damages with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction questioning execution of the decision in NLRC Case.

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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner guilty of forum shopping HELD: Yes. We declare petitioner guilty of forum shopping when it filed, despite the pendency of G.R. 85939, Civil Case D9187 before the Regional Trial Court Dagupan City. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition (G.R. 85939) and the action before the Regional Trial Court involve "the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances": In the action before the Regional Trial Court, as in the action before this Honorable Court, the validity and legality of the proceedings in NLRC Case and the propriety of implementing the decision therein against the petitioner were the basic issues. So, too, the relief was basically the same: the prevention of such implementation or execution. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in

which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. ACHACOSO v. CA [51 SCRA 424] TEEHANKEE, J.: FACTS: Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at bar for review of the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing petitioner's petition for mandamus filed with said court to compel the Manila court of first instance to allow petitioner's proposed appeal from its adverse judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the Court per its resolution of December 22, 1972 required respondents to comment thereon. Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive eighteen-page comment and petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12, 1973 a motion for leave to file reply within 15 days from notice alleging that there was need for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court may be fully and completely informed of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the instant petition." The Court granted such leave per its resolution of February 23, 1973 and notice of such leave was served on counsel on February 27, 1973. On the last day for filing of the reply, viz, March 14, 1973 counsel asked for an additional 15 days averring that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel during the original period granted, March 29, 1973 counsel again asked for still another 15day extension stating that "due to the pressure

of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the preparation of petitioners reply. The counsel explained to the Court that the reason for the extensions was because of finances. ISSUE: Whether or not counsel violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes. the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera. Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a financial position to advance the necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition of the case after the filing by respondents on February 8, 1973 of their comments on the petition showing its lack of merit. Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient in this instance. ROXAS v. CA [156 SCRA 253] ROMERO, J.: FACTS:

Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land. The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. The Land Registration Authority reported that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon. Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Petition for review before the Regional Trial Court to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun

Corporation committed actual fraud. The court ruled in negative. Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. HELD: Yes. The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-ininterest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration.

Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x". While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

AUSTRIA v. MASAQUEL [20 SCRA 1247] ZALDIVAR, J.: FACTS: Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in a Civil Case against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land. Respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land. Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. The defendant, through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, and respondent Judge granted the stay of execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore the possession of the 2 lands to the defendant. The petitioner likewise had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the 1 parcel of land, which prayer was granted, but upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the nonappointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion. Before the trial, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his coplaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground

that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, Domingo V. Austria guilty of contempt of court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, or had committed an act of disrespect toward the court or judge. HELD: No. We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the circumstances that led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of petitioner to disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for anyone to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party litigant desires or

suggests the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is understood, without saying it in so many words, that said litigant — having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or counsel — feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his former connection and he may unwittingly render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while it may be conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or counsel there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request cannot constitute contempt of court if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request to respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber. GALLO V CORDERO [245 SCRA 219] MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Respondent issued a subpoena to complainant requiring him to appear and to testify regarding his affidavit and to bring with him documents attesting to his ownership of the land. Complainant appeared as directed on August 30, 1994 in respondent's office. The following day, according to complainant, his son Roger Gallo went to respondent's office to deliver his letter in which he inquired from the judge whether he had already issued a warrant of arrest against the accused; that upon

entering the office, Roger saw respondent conversing with the accused in the criminal case; that an aide of respondent received the letter and opened it; that respondent did not however say anything nor reply to complainant's letter. Complainant charges the respondent judge with the following: (a) in violation of art. 207 (malicious delay in the administration of justice) and art. 208 (negligence and tolerance in the prosecution of crimes) of the Revised Penal Code respondent judge refused to order the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2194 entitled "People v. Cristuto Barreta, Alberto Macabata, Danilo Morillo, and Rodolfo Villanueva," which complainant filed in respondent judge's court on August 23, 1994 for violation of P.D.No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law.; (b) that respondent privately conferred with the accused in his office on August 31, 1994 which "logically and naturally arouses suspicion of graft and rank favoritism;" and (c) that he acted with bias and ignorance of the law in telling complainant, "You cannot eject tenants now under the law," and that even if the accused were not tenants, "nobody can eject them." Complainant Gallo prays that (1) respondent be preventively suspended or ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the case and that another judge be assigned to handle the case and (2) after due hearing, respondent be dismissed from the service. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is administratively liable

HELD: Yes. Respondent judge opened himself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting privately with the four accused. He says that he merely wanted to apprise them of their constitutional right. Whatever his purpose was, it was improper for respondent judge to meet them without the presence of complainant. Respondent judge not only has shown gross ignorance of law and procedure but has also failed to live up to the norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." He thus violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." In the words of Rule 2.01 of that Canon, "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. NESTLE PHILS. ,INC v SANCHEZ [154 SCRA 542] Teehankee, C.J. FACTS: The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987 outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Since June 17, 1981 On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the

Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively dealt with. HELD: No. Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. “It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and

that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.” (In re Stolen). The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the citizenry at large to have their causes tried fairly. The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being nonlawyers, the duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice. MARTILINO V ALEJANDRO [32 SCRA 106] CASTRO, J.: FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino of the AFP, and the officers and men under him, was charge with violation of the Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. At the hearing, petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission

that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident which had come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre". The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports. In addition, the petitioners cite a Manila Times editorial which states that "The Jabidah issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The petitioners argue that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election as to imperil his right to a fair trial. The petitioners further allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media unduly influence the members of the court-martial. In their answer, the respondents as members of the general court-martial assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. HELD: No. The spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners. Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to

arouse public opinion for or against a party. An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In the case at bar, the spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the courtmartial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed, the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, the Court thinks that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that the court believes that the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

CRUZ v. SALVA [105 Phil 1151] MONTEMAYOR, J.: FACTS: Manuel Monroy was killed in 1953 and a number of persons were accused of such killing. These persons were found guilty sentenced to the penalty of death. They all appealed. Pending the appeal, President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case which was conducted by the intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacanang. The result of the reinvestigation also points to the convicted persons as the real killers of Monroy. The counsel of the defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by the investigator of Malacanang which was made available to him. Salva formed a committee composed of himself as the chairman and two assistant city attorneys. Salva subpoenaed Cruz to appear at his office for the investigation. Atty. Baizas, counsel of Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to conduct the investigation considering that the case was pending appeal in SC. Salva contended that he subpoenaed Cruz et al because of their request to do so and that were it not for his request, he would not conduct the investigation. Although Cruz denied having made such request, the SC believed that he indeed made a request of

reinvestigation. However, the Supreme Court was interested in the manner to which the investigation headed by Salva was conducted. The investigation was made not in Salva‘s office but in the session hall of the Municipal Trial Court to accommodate a big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. Microphones were installed. There were reporters everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. ISSUE: Whether or not Salva violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes. The way Salva conducted the investigation is reprehensible. He publicized and sensationalized the case. He committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment. His actuations went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion, and good taste. Salva was publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation which is considered and found to be contempt of court.

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., INC. v. NLRC [252 SCRA 202] REGALADO, J.: FACTS:

On June 6, 1991, Virgilio Malinao, Rosemilo Gacusan and Dominador Loriaga filed a Complaint for regularization, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay and night shift differential pay against petitioners American Home Assurance Company and/or Leslie Mouat before the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss insofar as private respondents Malinao and Gacusan by reason of settlement in a compromise agreement. Private respondents Malinao and Gacusan filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. They averred that petitioners, using undue influence and trickery considering their educational backgrounds, deluded them into signing the compromise agreement. Labor Arbiter Caday denied motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondents Malinao and Gacusan failed to comply with Labor Arbiter Cadays directive to return the money they received by virtue of the compromise agreement. On April 24, 1992, private respondents by themselves, having been neglected by their counsel on record filed an Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dismiss. On April 30, 1992, Labor Arbiter Caday issued an Order dismissing the case. Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement and Revision of Title of the Case. Atty. Albert G. Fanoga served notice with Labor Arbiter Caday that he was withdrawing as counsel of record for private respondents. Atty. Cornelio G. Montesclaros, new counsel of record for private respondents, was furnished with a copy of the Order. Private respondent Loriaga

moved that the case be dismissed as against him without prejudice. The motion was granted by Labor Arbiter Caday. Private respondent Malinao filed a Motion to Admit the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion to Deny Due Course to Complainant Malinaos Motion to Admit due to the filing out of date. The motion to admit to motion for reconsideration was considered an appeal and eventually was elevated to public respondent NLRC for adjudication. Labor Arbiter is hereby directed to hear, with notice, complainants monetary claims on their merits including those claims of complainant Dominador Loriaga as after all, the dismissal of his case was without prejudice. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in giving due course to the Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration which was already filed out of time HELD: Yes. it is not disputed that the counsel for respondent Malinao received a copy of the Order. Evidently, the supposed extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable excuse for the failure of his counsel to file the motion for reconsideration on time under the circumstances. Instead, there was gross negligence on the part of Atty. Montesclaros in the discharge of his duty and this cannot be

countenanced if we are to have an orderly administration of justice. It has always been the judicial policy and an accepted rule that the client shall be bound by the acts of his lawyer, and no compelling reason exists in this case to sanction a deviation therefrom. We are not inclined to accept the justification advanced by respondent NLRC in applying an exception to the basic rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. While it may be true that an employee will not always be estopped from pursuing his action for illegal dismissal although he has executed a quitclaim in favor of his employer, the circumstances in this case constrain us to hold that an application of such rule will unfairly work to the prejudice of and cause injustice to herein petitioners.

MEJIA v. REYES [4 SCRA 648] PADILLA, J.: FACTS: Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank, while still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the defunct

Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City. The Court rendered judgment declaring valid the payment in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 on but crediting only the sum of P67.34. The Reyes and Cabato law firm filed a motion for reconsideration and the Philippine National Bank , to which the former filed a written objection. The Court denied both motion for reconsideration. No appeal was taken by either party. In this administrative proceeding, the complainants allege that they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the respondent's advice; that thereafter for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco S. Reyes is guilty of malpractice. HELD: Yes. City Attorney of Baguio, rendered a report finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending reprimand. Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case. The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the

Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. The Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that in the civil case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by Attorneys Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan in order that the interests thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286; and that the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just admonished and warned not to repeat it.